JUDGMENT : 1. Rule returnable forthwith. Learned advocate Mr. Rituraj M. Meena waives service of notice of Rule for the respondent No.1. Though served, none appeared for respondents No.2.1 to 2.3 and 3. 2. With the consent of the learned advocates for the respective parties, this matter was taken up for final hearing. 3. Heard learned advocate Mr. Anand B. Gogia for the petitioners and learned advocate Mr. Rituraj Meena for respondent No.1. Perused the record. 4. By way of this petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner has challenged the order dated 02.08.2021 passed by the learned City Civil Court, Ahmedabad in Civil Application No.4585 of 1991 below Exhibit 83 and 84. The petitioners before this Court are the heirs of the plaintiff No.1. Learned advocate for the petitioners submitted that parties to the suit i.e. plaintiffs and defendant No.2 are relatives inter se. 4.1 Learned advocate for the petitioners submitted that the petitioners are the heirs of original plaintiff No.1, and petitioners filed an application under Order 1 Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure to implead them in the suit. The original suit No.4585 of 1991 came to be dismissed for default by the learned Trial Court on 26.02.2003, thereafter the suit came to be restored on 31.08.2019. The heirs of the deceased plaintiff No.1 moved an application Exhibit 83 on 15.02.2020. Vide Exhibit 84, an application under Order 22 Rule 3 came to be preferred by the present petitioners. By common order below Exhibit 83 and 84, the learned Trial Court dismissed the applications on 02.08.2021. Learned advocate for the petitioners has placed reliance on the decision of Patel Ramjibhai Bhagvanbhai Khusalbhai Vs. Jethabhai Joitaram Patel deceased Throlegal Heirs; 2016(0) AIJEL-HC 240634. Learned advocate for the petitioners has submitted that petitioners are necessary and proper party in the suit. It is further submitted that the proposed heirs were not aware about the proceedings pending before the Court. 5. The learned Trial Court has observed in the order impugned that the suit against the defendant No.2 came to be abated on 13.02.2003. It is worthwhile to note here that plaintiff No.2 also preferred application to bring the heirs of the plaintiff No.1 and the defendant No.2 in the said suit. 5. The learned Trial Court has observed in the order impugned that the suit against the defendant No.2 came to be abated on 13.02.2003. It is worthwhile to note here that plaintiff No.2 also preferred application to bring the heirs of the plaintiff No.1 and the defendant No.2 in the said suit. However, the applications came to be dismissed by the learned Trial Court and the order is challenged in Special Civil Application No.7978 of 2022. 6. The learned Trial Court has rightly observed that the present petitioners claimed to be the heirs of Kalavati Chandiram Bajaj. But neither death certificate is produced nor date of death is mentioned in the application. Upon the notice issued by learned Trial Court Exhibit 72, it has come on record of learned Trial Court that plaintiff has expired before 10 years. As the plaintiffs and the defendant No.2 were relatives, it is therefore, not believable that the petitioners were not aware about the pending proceedings and no knowledge of death of defendant No.2 on 27.12.2001. 7. The decision of Patel Ramjibhai Bhagvanbhai Khusalbhai (supra) has been placed reliance by the learned advocate for the petitioners. In the said decision, the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court has observed that what is to be considered is the justification given for condonation of delay is to be considered and not a length of delay. In the present case on hand, for a moment, if the length of delay is not taken into account then the justification which are canvassed by the petitioners creates doubt for; (i) The parties are relatives, hence it leaves no room for the petitioners to plead ignorance of the date of death. (ii) The suit against the defendant No.2 came to be abated way back on 13.02.2003 and thereafter, the suit was dismissed for default and ultimately, the suit came to be restored on 31.08.2019 (iii) There is no reference about the date of death of plaintiff No.1 in the application. Thus, the application being very vague and seems to be an afterthought because the power of attorney of the plaintiff No.2 also moved an application below Exhibit 74 which was came to be dismissed. (iv) A review application under Order 47 Rule 1 which was filed by the heirs of plaintiff No.1 which was came to be dismissed on 16.12.2021. Thus, the application being very vague and seems to be an afterthought because the power of attorney of the plaintiff No.2 also moved an application below Exhibit 74 which was came to be dismissed. (iv) A review application under Order 47 Rule 1 which was filed by the heirs of plaintiff No.1 which was came to be dismissed on 16.12.2021. Thus, the facts in the case of Patel Ramjibhai Bhagvanbhai Khusalbhai (supra) and the facts involved in the present case on hand are totally different. Hence, the decision of Patel Ramjibhai Bhagvanbhai Khusalbhai (supra) has been placed reliance by the petitioners is not helpful to the petitioners. 8. It is also to be noted here that the petitioners have preferred two application under two different provisions i.e. one under Order 1 Rule 10 and the second one under Order 22 Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure. There is no explanation forthcoming from the side of the petitioners as to for what purpose, two application under two different provisions came to be preferred but this Court has taken the conduct of the petitioners very seriously. It seems that the intention of the heirs of the plaintiff No.1 was nothing but to misguide the learned Trial Court and also by taking the learned Trial Court in a different direction with a view to get a favourable order. This conduct also debars the petitioners for any relief in this petition. 9. So far as the scope of entertaining the present petition, it is pertinent to refer the decision dated 4.7.2018 of Division Bench of this Court rendered in Special Civil Application No.9010 of 2018 in the case of Diyorabhanderi Corporation V. Sarine Technologies Limited, wherein, the reference of the decision rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Shalini Shyam Shetty v. Rajendra Shankar Patil is made. Relevant paragraph No.9 of the decision dated 4.7.2018 of Special Civil Application No.9010 of 2018 is reproduced hereunder for the sake of convenience. “9. At this stage, we would like to refer the decision rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Shalini Shyam Shetty and Anr. Vs. Rajendra Shankar Patil (supra), upon which the reliance is placed by the learned Senior Advocate for respondent No.1 – plaintiff. “9. At this stage, we would like to refer the decision rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Shalini Shyam Shetty and Anr. Vs. Rajendra Shankar Patil (supra), upon which the reliance is placed by the learned Senior Advocate for respondent No.1 – plaintiff. In the said decision, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has laid down the principles for exercise of powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India by the High Court in Paragraph-62 as under: “62. On an analysis of the aforesaid decisions of this Court, the following principles on the exercise of High Court's jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution may be formulated: (a) A petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is different from a petition under Article 227. The mode of exercise of power by High Court under these two Articles is also different. (b) In any event, a petition under Article 227 cannot be called a writ petition. The history of the conferment of writ jurisdiction on High Courts is substantially different from the history of conferment of the power of Superintendence on the High Courts under Article 227 and have been discussed above. (c) High Courts cannot, on the drop of a hat, in exercise of its power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution, interfere with the orders of tribunals or Courts inferior to it. Nor can it, in exercise of this power, act as a Court of appeal over the orders of Court or tribunal subordinate to it. In cases where an alternative statutory mode of redressal has been provided, that would also operate as a restrain on the exercise of this power by the High Court. (d) The parameters of interference by High Courts in exercise of its power of superintendence have been repeatedly laid down by this Court. In this regard the High Court must be guided by the principles laid down by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Waryam Singh (supra) and the principles in Waryam Singh (supra) have been repeatedly followed by subsequent Constitution Benches and various other decisions of this Court. (e) According to the ratio in Waryam Singh (supra), followed in subsequent cases, the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction of superintendence can interfere in order only to keep the tribunals and Courts subordinate to it, `within the bounds of their authority'. (e) According to the ratio in Waryam Singh (supra), followed in subsequent cases, the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction of superintendence can interfere in order only to keep the tribunals and Courts subordinate to it, `within the bounds of their authority'. (f) In order to ensure that law is followed by such tribunals and Courts by exercising jurisdiction which is vested in them and by not declining to exercise the jurisdiction which is vested in them. (g) Apart from the situations pointed in (e) and (f), High Court can interfere in exercise of its power of superintendence when there has been a patent perversity in the orders of tribunals and Courts subordinate to it or where there has been a gross and manifest failure of justice or the basic principles of natural justice have been flouted. (h) In exercise of its power of superintendence High Court cannot interfere to correct mere errors of law or fact or just because another view than the one taken by the tribunals or Courts subordinate to it, is a possible view. In other words the jurisdiction has to be very sparingly exercised. (i) High Court's power of superintendence under Article 227 cannot be curtailed by any statute. It has been declared a part of the basic structure of the Constitution by the Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of L. Chandra Kumar vs. Union of India & others, reported in (1997) 3 SCC 261 and therefore abridgment by a Constitutional amendment is also very doubtful. (j) It may be true that a statutory amendment of a rather cognate provision, like Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code by the Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1999 does not and cannot cut down the ambit of High Court's power under Article 227. At the same time, it must be remembered that such statutory amendment does not correspondingly expand the High Court's jurisdiction of superintendence under Article 227. (k) The power is discretionary and has to be exercised on equitable principle. In an appropriate case, the power can be exercised suo motu. (l) On a proper appreciation of the wide and unfettered power of the High Court under Article 227, it transpires that the main object of this Article is to keep strict administrative and judicial control by the High Court on the administration of justice within its territory. In an appropriate case, the power can be exercised suo motu. (l) On a proper appreciation of the wide and unfettered power of the High Court under Article 227, it transpires that the main object of this Article is to keep strict administrative and judicial control by the High Court on the administration of justice within its territory. (m) The object of superintendence, both administrative and judicial, is to maintain efficiency, smooth and orderly functioning of the entire machinery of justice in such a way as it does not bring it into any disrepute. The power of interference under this Article is to be kept to the minimum to ensure that the wheel of justice does not come to a halt and the fountain of justice remains pure and unpolluted in order to maintain public confidence in the functioning of the tribunals and Courts subordinate to High Court. (n) This reserve and exceptional power of judicial intervention is not to be exercised just for grant of relief in individual cases but should be directed for promotion of public confidence in the administration of justice in the larger public interest whereas Article 226 is meant for protection of individual grievance. Therefore, the power under Article 227 may be unfettered but its exercise is subject to high degree of judicial discipline pointed out above. (o) An improper and a frequent exercise of this power will be counter-productive and will divest this extraordinary power of its strength and vitality.” 10. Thus, in totality of the facts and in view of the above decisions of this Court and Hon’ble Apex Court, I am of the considered view that the order dated 16.12.2021 passed below Exhs.97 and 99 by the learned trial Court is absolutely in consonance with law and there is no infirmity or illegality committed by the learned trial Court. 11. In this view of the matter, I do not find any reason to interfere in the findings recorded by the learned trial Court and, therefore, the petition is merit-less and deserves to be dismissed and accordingly it is dismissed with no order as to costs. Rule is discharged.