JUDGMENT : 1. Heard Sri Nitin Agrawal along with Ms. Priya Dimri, learned counsel for the plaintiff-petitioner and Sri Ashish Kumar Singh, learned counsel for the contesting respondent Nos.1 & 2. 2. The petitioner has preferred the present petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India with the prayer to annul Judgments and orders dated 06.03.2010 passed by Additional Civil Judge (Senior Division) Court No. 6 Allahabad as well as the order dated 30.11.2015 passed by Additional District Judge, Court No. 10 Allahabad insofar as it relates with the prayer no. (a) of the proposed amendment sought which has been rejected by the trial court and affirmed by the revisional court by means of the impugned orders and substitute the same by its own judgment allowing the amendment application in toto or direct the trial court to decide the amendment application afresh in the light of observation/ direction of this Court. 3. Facts in brief as contained in the petition are that the property bearing house no. 129/Al situated at Darbhanga Colony, District – Allahabad of which the petitioner is sole owner and is in possession. The house no. 129 had been constructed over plot no. 33 Darbhanga Castle compound District Allahabad of which one Chowdhary Labh Singh was the recorded owner. Labh Singh through his will deed dated 29.02.1966 divided the said house in two equal portions bequeathing the same in favour of his two sons through will deed. Northern 1/2 portion of said house was allocated in favour of Shri Surendra Jeet Singh Rekhi/ defendant respondent no. 3 and the southern 1/2 portion was allocated to Shri Nirmal Jeet Singh his other son. 4. After the death of Chowdhary Labh Singh the defendant/respondent No.3 became the sole and absolute owner in possession over the northern half portion of House No.129 Darbhanga Castle Colony Allahabad total area 600 Sq. Yards (501.60 Square meters) out of which covered area was 302 Square Yards (252.47 Square Meters) and rest of area 298 Square Yards (249.13 Square Meter) was an open area. The Nagar Nigam allotted House No. 129/1A to the said house in the name of respondent no. 3. The respondent no.3 became absolute recorded owner of the house in question. The respondent no. The Nagar Nigam allotted House No. 129/1A to the said house in the name of respondent no. 3. The respondent no.3 became absolute recorded owner of the house in question. The respondent no. 3 executed sale deed of the house in question in respect of the area 430 Square Meters (514.39 Sq.) through registered sale deed dated 19.02.1994 in favour of the Plaintiff/petitioner. 5. After execution of sale deed the respondent No.3 remained owner of remaining area 85.61 Sq. Yards (600 -514.39)=85.61. Thereafter the respondent No.3 executed a sale deed dated 26.10.1994 in favour of Smt. Indira Mishra for area 85.16 Sq. Yards = 72 Sq. Yards of the Darbhanga Colony in respect of House No.129/1. Thus, the respondent no.3 sold the entire area of house no. 129/1 Darbhanga Colony Allahabad by means of two sale deeds. Therefore, after execution of the aforesaid two sale deeds, though no area remained with the respondent No.3 even then he executed another sale deed of excess area 80 Sq. Yards of House No. 129/1 Darbhanga Colony Allahabad in favour of defendant/respondent no. 1 through sale deed dated 19.07.1997. 6. It is argued that the aforesaid sale deed could not be executed by the respondent No.3 in favour of the respondent No.1 as the respondent No.1 was never in physical possession over any part of the house in question. It is argued that due to mistake in the sale deed dated 19.02.1994 executed in favour of petitioner, the eastern boundary was wrongly shown to be part of house no. 129/1 Darbhanga Colony Allahabad after the execution of second sale deed dated 26.10.1994 and no area of house in question remained balance. It is argued that on 26.08.2000 and the defendants/respondent no. 1 and 2 tried to interfere in peaceful possession of the Plaintiff/ petitioner and Plaintiff/ petitioner filed Civil Suit being Original.Suit. No. 432 of 2000 (Smt. Neeta Agrawal Vs. Smt. Shanti Rani Agrwal and two others). 7. In the aforesaid suit, the defendants/respondent no. 1 and 2 filed their joint written statement along with counter claim on 22.11.2000. The respondent no. 3 also filed his separate written statement taking different stand but failed to justify the area alleged to be sold in favour of respondent no. 1. It is argued that the petitioner filed replication to the aforesaid written statements filed by the respondents denying the contents of the aforesaid written statement. 8. The respondent no. 3 also filed his separate written statement taking different stand but failed to justify the area alleged to be sold in favour of respondent no. 1. It is argued that the petitioner filed replication to the aforesaid written statements filed by the respondents denying the contents of the aforesaid written statement. 8. In the meanwhile, an amendment application was filed by the Plaintiff/ petitioner on 01.10.2009 which was marked as Paper no. 103-A seeking certain amendments in the plaint as per provisions contained under Order 6 Rule 17 of the C.P.C The aforesaid amendment was opposed by the respondent nos. 1 and 2 only and they filed their objection on 05.10.2009. The trial court vide its order dated 06.03.2010 partly allowed the amendment application and rejected the prayer seeking amendment in Eastern boundary of the disputed house. 9. Aggrieved by the aforesaid order, the petitioner preferred Civil Revision No. 91 of 2010 in the Court of District Judge under section 115 C.P.C. on 26.03.2010. The Revisional Court rejected the same vide its order dated 30.11.2015. Hence the present petition. 10. A counter affidavit has been filed by Sri Ashish Kumar Singh, learned counsel for respondent Nos.1 & 2. It is argued that the total area of house was 600 sq. yards mentioned in the sale deed map and eastern open area was not mentioned in the sale deed map and in the sale deed map, it is specifically stated that open area of which respondent No.3 was owner is in the eastern side. It is further stated in the counter affidavit that the respondent No.3 having more area in the eastern side and the same was sold by him to the respondent No.1. It is further argued that the land in dispute was purchased by the respondent No.1 and the amendment application was illegally filed by the petitioner after the expiry of nine years of the filing of the suit. By moving the aforesaid amendment application, the petitioner is trying to linger on the proceedings. It is further argued that absolutely a frivolous case has been carved out by the plaintiff-petitioner by moving amendment application. Hence, the amendment application by which an amendment is sought in the prayer of the suit was rightly rejected by the Courts below. 11. By moving the aforesaid amendment application, the petitioner is trying to linger on the proceedings. It is further argued that absolutely a frivolous case has been carved out by the plaintiff-petitioner by moving amendment application. Hence, the amendment application by which an amendment is sought in the prayer of the suit was rightly rejected by the Courts below. 11. A rejoinder affidavit has also been filed by counsel for the petitioner reiterated the same facts as narrated in the petition. 12. Heard learned counsel for the parties and with the consent of learned counsel for the parties, the present petition is finally decided. 13. From perusal of the facts narrated in the petition, it is clear that Original Suit No.432 of 2000 was filed by the plaintiff-petitioner in the Civil Court of Allahabad with the following reliefs:- “(a) That the defendants, their agents, servants, representatives and all persons claiming through them be restrained by means of permanent injunction from disturbing the possession of the plaintiff in Premises No. 129/1 A, Darbhanga Castle, Allahabad or to demolish any portion of the boundary walls or the gate fixed therein or raise any constructions on the East of the plaintiff ’s house. (b) That, if defendant no. 1 and 2 produce and rely upon any sale deed executed by defendant no. 3 in respect of any portion of premises No. 129/1 A, Darbhanga Castle, Allahabad city, the same may be declared null and void and non est. against the interest of the plaintiff. (c) That the cost of the suit be awarded in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendants. (d) That any other and further relief be granted in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendants which the court may deems fit in the interest of justice. Description of the Premises in Suit. 514.39 sq yards ( equal to 430.03 sq. mts.) of the construction area and the land appurtenant thereto shown bounded by Red Lines in the plan appended to the sale deed of the house no. 129/1 A, Darbhanga Colony, Allahabad city, boundaries whereof are as follows : - North Sarak South House of Sri Sanjay Agrawal with common boundary wall. East Open Land of defendant no. 3 West Open Land.” 14. Paragraph 7 of the plaint reads as follows:- “7. 129/1 A, Darbhanga Colony, Allahabad city, boundaries whereof are as follows : - North Sarak South House of Sri Sanjay Agrawal with common boundary wall. East Open Land of defendant no. 3 West Open Land.” 14. Paragraph 7 of the plaint reads as follows:- “7. That, the area sold, as stated above, is 430.03 sq mts.(equal to 514.39 sq yards) shown bounded by RED LINES In the site plan appended to the sale deed with the following boundries: North Sarak South house of Sri Sanjay Agrawal with common boundary wall. East open Land of defendant no. 3 West open Land.” 15. Now by way of amendment, the petitioner wanted that in place of the words “open land of defendant no.3 described against east side of the boundaries, as contained in paragraph-7 of the plaint, the word corner of the house should be inserted. 16. From perusal of the description of the premises in suit, it is clear that in the sale deed which according to the petitioner was executed in his favour, under the heading description of the premises in suit against the word East it is mentioned as “open land of defendant no.3”. The same description has been given by the petitioner in paragraph-7 of the plaint as quoted above. Now the petitioner wants by way of amendment application that against the boundaries of the property as mentioned against the word East “in place of open land of defendant no.3” it should be mentioned as corner of the house. 17. While rejecting the amendment application, it was recorded that since no application was filed at any point of time by plaintiff-petitioner to make correction in the sale deed, the permission to amend the plaint cannot be granted. Findings were also recorded that in case the amendment is allowed, it will change the nature of the plaint. 17. While rejecting the amendment application, it was recorded that since no application was filed at any point of time by plaintiff-petitioner to make correction in the sale deed, the permission to amend the plaint cannot be granted. Findings were also recorded that in case the amendment is allowed, it will change the nature of the plaint. The operative portion of the order passed by the Trial Court is reproduced below:- ijUrq ÁkFkZuk&i= , dk iSjk , ftlds tfj;s oknh&i= esa ;g vafdr djkuk pkgrk gS fd iwoZ lkbM esa ckm.M+h fod;&i= o okn&i= esa xyr vafdr gks x;s gS bl txg edku dk dksuk gS fy[kus dh vuqefr nh tk; lgh Árhr ugha gksrk gS D;ksafd ;g rF; iwoZ ls gh oknh ds laKku esa gS rFkk oknh }kjk fod;&i= esa Hkh dksbZ nq#Lrhdj.k ugha djk;k x;k gS rFkk ;fn oknh dk okn&i= esa vafdr rF;ksa dks fy[kus dh vuqefr Ánku dh tkrh gS rks fookfnr lEifr dks Ád~fr cny tk;sxhA 18. Similar findings were also recorded by the Revisional Court while rejecting the Revision. Similar findings were also recorded by the Revisional Court while rejecting the Revision. The relevant portion of the order reads as follows:- vr% Li"V gS fd la'kks/ku çkFkZuki= 103, ds iSjk&^^,Þ esa of.kZr rF; ß vksisu yS.M vkQ fMQs.Ms.V ua03^^ ds LFkku ij ÞdkuZj vkQ gkmlÞ fy[ks tkus dh fLFkfr esa okn dh ç—fr esa ifjorZu gksrk gSA ;g Li"V gS fd v/khuLFk U;k;ky; }kjk vius vkns'k esa Hkh bl rF; dks Li"V:i ls vafdr fd;k gS fd ßla'kks/ku dsoy iwjc lkbM dks cnyus ds fy;s çkFkZuki= [kkfjt fd;s tkus ;ksX; gS D;ksafd ;g rF; fod; foys[k esa gh [kqyk LFkku çfroknh laå3 fy[kk gqvk gSA ;g la'kks/ku dsoy nsjh dh otg ls Lohdkj ugha fd;k tk jgk gS cfYd fod; i= Hkh ;g ckm.Mªh iwjc lkbM esa [kqyk LFkku çfroknh l0 3 vafdr gS tks okni= esa Hkh vafdr gSA blfy;s okni= es la'kks/ku dh vuqefr ugha fn;k tkrk gS D;ksfd mä la'kks/ku ls oknxzLr lEifÙk dh ç—fr cny tk;sxhAÞ voj U;k;ky; }kjk çkFkZuk i= 103, ds çLrkfor çLrj ch o lh esa çLrkfor la'kks/ku dks Lohdkj dj fy;k x;k FkkA Li"Vr%% çkFkZuki= 103, ds iSjk , dks Lohdkj fd;s tkus dh fLFkfr esa okn dh ç—fr esa ifjorZu gksrk gS D;ksafd oknh vksisu yS.M vkQ çfroknh l0 3 ds LFkku ij dkuZj vkQj gkml fy[kuk pkgrk gS tks fd fod; foys[k esa okn ugha gS oknh dks oknxzLr lEifÙk ds lEcU/k esa tks vf/kdkj mn~Hkwr gS] og fod; foys[k ds i'pkr gh gS vkSj mls lHkh rF; iwoZ ls gh ekywe Fks mls bl pkSgnnh dk Hkh lE;d Kku jgk gS vr% çLrkfor la'kks/ku tks oknxzLr lEifÙk ds iwjc vafdr fd;s tkus dks ysdj gS] mls okni= esa vafdr fd;s tkus dh vuqefr ugha nh tk ldrhA vr% voj U;k;k=; }kjk ikfjr vkns'k fnukafdr 06-03-10 esa dksbZ voS/kkfudrk vFkok rkfRod vfu;ferrk ugha dh x;h gSA 19. In the present petition the orders passed by both the courts below rejecting the amendment applications are under challenge. Only ground taken in the present petition to challenge the aforesaid order contained in paragraph-23 & 24 of the petition reads as follows:- “23. That in case during the pendency of the present writ petition this Hon’ble Court is not graciously be pleased to stay the further proceedings of the O.S. No. 432 of 2000 Smt. Neeta Agrawal Vs. Smt. Shanti Rani Agrawal pending before the respondent no. That in case during the pendency of the present writ petition this Hon’ble Court is not graciously be pleased to stay the further proceedings of the O.S. No. 432 of 2000 Smt. Neeta Agrawal Vs. Smt. Shanti Rani Agrawal pending before the respondent no. 5, then the petitioner shall sufer irreparable loss and the suit may be defeated. 24. That the balance of convenience lies in suitable interim order being passed to protect the interest of the petitioner during pendency of the writ petition before this Hon'ble Court.” 20. From perusal of the aforesaid, the Court is of the opinion that no proper pleadings whatsoever has been taken by the petitioner while challenging the aforesaid order. 21. In order to consider whether the plaintiff-petitioner has made out a case for amendment of his plaint, it is useful to refer Order VI Rule 17 CPC which reads as under: 17. Amendment of pleadings.-The Court may at any stage of the proceedings allow either party to alter or amend his pleadings in such manner and on such terms as may be just, and all such amendments shall be made as may be necessary for the purpose of determining the real questions in controversy between the parties: Provided that no application for amendment shall be allowed after the trial has commenced, unless the Court comes to the conclusion that in spite of due diligence, the party could not have raised the matter before the commencement of trial. 22. The first part of the rule makes it abundantly clear that at any stage of the proceedings, parties are free to alter or amend their pleadings as may be necessary for the purpose of determining the real questions in controversy. However, this rule is subject to proviso appended therein. The said rule with proviso again substituted by Act 22 of 2002 with effect from 01.07.2002 makes it clear that after the commencement of the trial, no application for amendment shall be allowed. However, if the parties to the proceedings are able to satisfy the court that in spite of due diligence they could not have raise the issue before the commencement of trial and the court is satisfied with their explanation, amendment can be allowed even after commencement of the trial. 23. However, if the parties to the proceedings are able to satisfy the court that in spite of due diligence they could not have raise the issue before the commencement of trial and the court is satisfied with their explanation, amendment can be allowed even after commencement of the trial. 23. To make it clear, Order VI Rule 17 C.P.C. confers jurisdiction on the Court to allow either party to alter or amend his pleadings at any stage of the proceedings on such terms as may be just. 24. The courts have very wide discretion in the matter of amendment of pleadings but court’s powers must be exercised judiciously and with great care. While deciding applications for amendments the courts must not refuse bona fide, legitimate, honest and necessary amendments and should never permit mala fide, worthless and/or dishonest amendments. The first condition which must be satisfied before the amendment can be allowed by the court is whether such amendment is necessary for the determination of the real question in controversy. If that condition is not satisfied, the amendment cannot be allowed. This is the basic test which should govern the courts’ discretion in grant or refusal of the amendment. The other important condition which should govern the discretion of the court is the potentiality of prejudice or injustice which is likely to be caused to the other side. Ordinarily, if the other side is compensated by costs, then there is no injustice but in practice hardly any court grants actual costs to the opposite side. 25. Some basic principles which ought to be taken into consideration while allowing or rejecting the application for amendment are: (i) whether the amendment sought is imperative for proper and effective adjudication of the case; (ii) whether the application for amendment is bona fide or mala fide, (iii) the amendment should not cause such prejudice to the other side which cannot be compensated adequately in terms of money; (iv) refusing amendment would in fact lead to injustice or lead to multiple litigation; (v) whether the proposed amendment constitutionally or fundamentally changes the nature and character of the case; and (vi) as a general rule, the court should decline amendments if a fresh suit on the amended claims would be barred by limitation on the date of application. The fact that the claim is barred by the law of limitation is but one of the factors to be taken into account by the court in exercising the discretion as to whether the amendment should be allowed or refused, but it does not affect the power of the court if the amendment is required in the interests of justice. 26. When I apply the principle laid down by the above judgments, the conclusion becomes irresistible that the view taken by the courts below in the impugned orders cannot be said to be unjustified. 27. I am tracing the legislative history, objects and reasons for incorporating Order 6 Rule 17 not because it is necessary to dispose of this case, but a large number of applications under Order 6 Rule 17 are filed and our courts are flooded with such cases. Indiscriminate filing of applications of amendments is one of the main causes of delay in disposal of civil cases. 28. I deem it appropriate to give the historical background of Rule 17 of Order 6 which corresponds to Section 53 of the old Code of 1882. It is similar to Order 21 Rule 8 of the English Law. Order 6 Rule 17 CPC is already quoted above. 29. In my considered view, Order 6 Rule 17 is one of the important provisions of CPC, but I have no hesitation in also observing that this is one of the most misused provision of the Code for dragging the proceedings indefinitely, particularly in the Indian courts which are otherwise heavily overburdened with the pending cases. All civil courts ordinarily have a long list of cases, therefore, the courts are compelled to grant long dates which causes delay in disposal of the cases. The applications for amendment lead to further delay in disposal of the cases. 30. In a recently published unique, unusual and extremely informative book Justice, Courts and Delays, the author Mr. Arun Mohan, a Senior Advocate of the High Court of Delhi and the Hon’ble Supreme Court, from his vast experience as a civil lawyer observed that 80% applications under Rule 17 of Order 6 are filed with the sole objective of delaying the proceedings, whereas 15% applications are filed because of lackadaisical approach in the first instance, and 5% applications are those where there is actual need of amendment. His experience further revealed that out of these 100 applications, 95 applications are allowed and only 5 (may be even less) are rejected. According to him, a need for amendment of pleading should arise in a few cases, and if proper rules with regard to pleadings are put into place, it would be only in rare cases. Therefore, for allowing amendment, it is not just costs, but the delays caused thereby, benefit of such delays and the additional costs which had to be incurred by the victim of the amendment. The court must scientifically evaluate the reasons, purpose and effect of the amendment and all these factors must be taken into consideration while awarding the costs. 31. To curtail delay in disposal of cases, in 1999 the legislation altogether deleted Rule 17 which meant that amendment of the pleadings would no longer have been permissible. But immediately after the deletion there was widespread uproar and in 2002 Rule 17 was restored, but added a proviso. That proviso applies only after the trial has commenced. Prior to that stage, the situation remains as it was. According to the view of the learned author Mr. Arun Mohan as observed in his book, although the proviso has improved the position, the fact remains that amendments should be permissible, but only if a sufficient ground therefor is made out, and further, only on stringent terms. To that end, the rule needs to be further tightened. 32. The general principle is that courts at any stage of the proceedings may allow either party to alter or amend the pleadings in such manner and on such terms as may be just and all those amendments must be allowed which are imperative for determining the real question in controversy between the parties. 33. In Tildesley v. Harper (1878) 10 Ch D 393 which was decided by the English court even earlier than Cropper case (supra), in an action against a lessee for setting aside a lease, in the statement of claim it was alleged that the power of attorney of the donee had received a specified sum as a bribe. In the statement of defence, each circumstance was denied but there was no general denial of a bribe having been given. A prayer for amendment of the defence statement was refused. The Court of Appeal held that the amendment ought to have been allowed. In the statement of defence, each circumstance was denied but there was no general denial of a bribe having been given. A prayer for amendment of the defence statement was refused. The Court of Appeal held that the amendment ought to have been allowed. Bramwell, L.J. made the following pertinent observations: “... I have had much to do in Chambers with applications for leave to amend, and | may perhaps be allowed to say that this humble branch of learning is very familiar to me. My practice has always been to give leave to amend unless I have been satisfied that the party applying was acting mala fide, or that, by his blunder, he had done some injury to his opponent which could not be compensated for by costs or otherwise.” (emphasis added) 34. In the leading English case of Cropper v. Smith (1884) 26 Ch D 700 (CA), the object underlying amendment of pleadings has been laid down by Browen, L.J. in the following words: “... it is a well-established principle that the object of courts is to decide the rights of the parties, and not to punish them for mistakes they make in the conduct of their cases by deciding otherwise than in accordance with their rights. ... I know of no kind of error or mistake which, if not fraudulent or intended to overreach, the court ought not to correct, if it can be done without injustice to the other party. Courts do not exist for the sake of discipline, but for the sake of deciding matters in controversy, and I do not regard such amendment as a matter of favour or of grace. ... It seems to me that as soon as it appears that the way in which a party has framed his case will not lead to a decision of the real matter in controversy, it is as much a matter of right on his part to have it corrected, if it can be done without injustice, as anything else in the case is a matter of right,” (emphasis supplied) 35. In Steward v. North Metropolitan Tramways Co. reported in (1886) 16 QBD 556, the plaintiff filed a suit for damages against the tramways company for negligence of the company in allowing the tramways to be in a defective condition. The company denied the allegation of negligence. In Steward v. North Metropolitan Tramways Co. reported in (1886) 16 QBD 556, the plaintiff filed a suit for damages against the tramways company for negligence of the company in allowing the tramways to be in a defective condition. The company denied the allegation of negligence. It was not even contended that the company was not the proper party to be sued. More than six months after the written statement was filed, the company applied for leave to amend the defence by adding the plea that under the contract entered into between the company and the local authority the liability to maintain tramways in proper condition was of the latter and therefore, the company was not liable. On the date of the amendment application, the plaintiff’s remedy against the local authority was time-barred. Had the agreement been pleaded earlier, the plaintiff could have filed a suit even against the local authority. Under the circumstances, the amendment was refused. 36. The rule, however, is not a universal one and under certain circumstances, such an amendment may be allowed by the court notwithstanding the law of limitation. The fact that the claim is barred by the law of limitation is but one of the factors to be taken into account by the court in exercising the discretion as to whether the amendment should be allowed or refused, but it does not affect the power of the court if the amendment is required in the interests of justice (see Ganga Bai v. Vijay Kumar and Arundhati Mishra v. Ram Charitra Pandey reported in (1994) 2 SCC 29 ). 37. In another leading English case Weldon v. Neal (1887) 19 QBD 394, A filed a suit against B for damages for slander. A thereafter applied for leave to amend the plaint by adding fresh claims in respect of assault and false imprisonment. On the date of the application, those claims were barred by limitation though they were within the period of limitation on the date of filing the suit. The amendment was refused since the effect of granting it would be to take away from B the legal right (the defence under the law of limitation) and thus would cause prejudice to him. 38. In the said case, Pollock, J. quoting with approval the observation of Bremwell, L.J. rightly observed in the case of Steward case (supra):- “... The amendment was refused since the effect of granting it would be to take away from B the legal right (the defence under the law of limitation) and thus would cause prejudice to him. 38. In the said case, Pollock, J. quoting with approval the observation of Bremwell, L.J. rightly observed in the case of Steward case (supra):- “... The test as to whether the amendment should be allowed, is whether or not the defendants can amend without placing the plaintiff in such a position that he cannot be recouped, as it were, by any allowance of costs, or otherwise.” According to him such an amendment ought not be allowed. 39. Kisandas Rupchand v. Rachappa Vithoba Shilwant reported in ILR (1909) 33 Bom 644 is probably the first leading case decided by the High Court of Bombay under the present Code of 1908. There A, the plaintiff, averred that in pursuance of a partnership agreement, he delivered Rs 4001 worth of cloth to B, the defendant, and sued for dissolution of partnership and accounts. The trial court found that A delivered the cloth worth Rs 4001 but held that there was no partnership and the suit was not maintainable. In appeal, A sought amendment of the pleadings by adding a prayer for the recovery of Rs 4001. On that day, claim for recovery of money was barred by limitation. The amendment was allowed by the appellate court and the suit was decreed. B challenged the decree. The High Court upheld the order and dismissed the appeal. 40. Referring to leading English decisions on the point, Batchelor, J. stated: (Kisandas case (supra)) “... From the imperative character of the last sentence of the rule it seems to me clear that, at any stage of the proceedings, all amendments ought to be allowed which satisfy the two conditions (a) of not working injustice to the other side, and (b) of being necessary for the purpose of determining the real questions in controversy between the parties.” 41. In a concurring judgment, Beaman, J. observed that: “.. the practice is to allow all amendments, whether introducing fresh claims or not, so long as they do not put the other party at a disadvantage for which he cannot be compensated by costs.” 42. In a concurring judgment, Beaman, J. observed that: “.. the practice is to allow all amendments, whether introducing fresh claims or not, so long as they do not put the other party at a disadvantage for which he cannot be compensated by costs.” 42. His Lordship proceeded to state : (Kisandas case supra)) “In my opinion two simple tests, and two only, need to be applied, in order to ascertain whether a given case is within the principle. First, could the party asking to amend obtain the same quantity of relief without the amendment? If not, then it follows necessarily that the proposed amendment places the other party at a disadvantage, it allows a his opponent to obtain more from him than he would have been able to obtain but for the amendment. Second, in those circumstances, can the party thus placed at a disadvantage be compensated for it by costs? If not, then the amendment ought not, unless the case is so peculiar as to be taken out of the scope of the rule, to be allowed.” 43. The basic principles of grant or refusal of amendment articulated almost 125 years ago are still considered to be correct statement of law and our courts have been following the basic principles laid down in those cases. If I carefully examine all the cases, the statement of law declared by the Privy Council in Ma Shwe Mya v. Maung Mo Hnaung reported in AIR 1922 PC 249 has been consistently accepted by the courts till date as correct statement of law. The Privy Council observed : (IA pp. 216-17):- “... All rules of court are nothing but provisions intended to secure the proper administration of justice, and it is therefore essential that they should be made to serve and be subordinate to that purpose, so that full powers of amendment must be enjoyed and should always be liberally exercised, but nonetheless no power has yet been given to enable one distinct cause of action to be substituted for another, nor to change, by a means of amendment, the subject-matter of the suit.” 44. In Amulakchand Mewaram vy. Babulal Kanalal Taliwala (1933) 35 Bom LR 569 the Bombay High Court again had an occasion to decide a case under Order 6 Rule 17. In that case, the Court approved the following observations of Beaumont, C.J. and observed: (Bom LR p. 571) “... In Amulakchand Mewaram vy. Babulal Kanalal Taliwala (1933) 35 Bom LR 569 the Bombay High Court again had an occasion to decide a case under Order 6 Rule 17. In that case, the Court approved the following observations of Beaumont, C.J. and observed: (Bom LR p. 571) “... the question whether there should be an amendment or not really turns upon whether the name in which the suit is brought is the name of a non-existent person, or whether it is merely a mis-description of existing c persons. If the former is the case, the suit is a nullity and no amendment can cure it. If the latter is the case, prima facie there ought to be an amendment because the general rule, subject no doubt to certain exceptions, is that the Court should always allow an amendment where any loss to the opposing party can be compensated for by costs.” 45. In L.J. Leach & Co. Ltd. v. Jardine Skinner & Co.' reported in AIR 1957 SC 357 , a suit for damages for “conversion of goods” filed by the plaintiff was decreed by the trial court but the decree was set aside by the High Court. In an appeal before this Court, the plaintiff applied for amendment of the plaint by raising an alternative claim for damages for breach of contract for “non-delivery of goods’’, The amendment was resisted by the defendant contending that it sought to introduce a new cause of action which was barred by limitation on e the day the amendment was sought and hence, it would seriously prejudice the defendant. Though the Court noticed “considerable force” in the objection, keeping in view the prayer in the amendment which was not “foreign to the scope of the suit” and all necessary facts were on record, it allowed the amendment. 46. In Pirgonda Hongonda Patil v. Kalgonda Shidgonda Patil AIR 1957 SC 363 , A obtained a decree for possession against B. He was, however, obstructed in obtaining possession by C in execution. A then filed a substantive suit against B and C. In the plaint, except saying that he had obtained a decree against B, nothing more was stated by A. Hence, he filed an application for amendment which was rejected by the trial court but allowed by the High Court. C approached this Court. A then filed a substantive suit against B and C. In the plaint, except saying that he had obtained a decree against B, nothing more was stated by A. Hence, he filed an application for amendment which was rejected by the trial court but allowed by the High Court. C approached this Court. Dismissing the appeal and confirming the order of the High Court, this Court observed that the discretionary power of amendment was not exercised by the High Court on wrong principles. There was merely a defect in the pleading which was removed by the amendment. The quality and quantity of the reliefs sought remained the same. Since the amendment did not introduce a new case, the defendant was not taken by surprise. 47. In Purushottam Umedbhai & Co. v. Manilal & Sons reported in AIR 1961 SC 325 a suit was instituted in the name of the firm by the partners doing business outside India. It was held that there was only mis-description of the plaintiff. The plaint in the name of the firm was not a nullity and could be amended by substituting the names of partners. In similar circumstances, in a subsequent case Ganesh Trading Co. v. Moji Ram (1978) 2 SCC 91 , this Court reiterated the law laid down in Purushottam Umedbhai & Co. (supra) The Court observed: “5. It is true that, if a plaintiff seeks to alter the cause of action itself and to introduce indirectly, through an amendment of his pleadings, an entirely new or inconsistent cause of action, amounting virtually to the substitution of a new plaint or a new cause of action in place of what was originally there, the Court will refuse to permit it if it amounts to depriving the party against which a suit is pending of any right which may have accrued in its favour due to lapse of time. But, mere failure to set out even an essential fact does not, by itself, constitute a new cause of action. A cause of action is constituted by the whole bundle of essential facts which the plaintiff must prove before he can succeed in his suit. It must be antecedent to the institution of the suit. If any essential fact is lacking from averments in the plaint the cause of action will be defective. A cause of action is constituted by the whole bundle of essential facts which the plaintiff must prove before he can succeed in his suit. It must be antecedent to the institution of the suit. If any essential fact is lacking from averments in the plaint the cause of action will be defective. In that case, an attempt to supply the omission has been and could sometimes be viewed as equivalent to an introduction of a new cause of action which, cured of its shortcomings, has really become a good cause of action. This, however, is not the only possible interpretation to be put on every defective state of pleadings. Defective pleadings are generally curable if the cause of action sought to be brought out was not ab initio completely absent. Even very defective pleadings may be permitted to be cured, so as to constitute a cause of action where there was none, provided necessary conditions such as payment of either any additional court fees, which may be payable, or, of costs of the other side are complied with. It is only if lapse of time has barred the remedy on a newly constituted cause of action that the courts should, ordinarily, refuse prayers for amendment of pleadings.” 48. In Laxmidas Dayabhai Kabrawala vy. Nanabhai Chunilal Kabrawala AIR 1964 SC 11 , the defendant’s prayer for amendment by treating a counterclaim as cross-suit was objected to by the plaintiff inter alia on the ground of limitation. The amendment, however, was allowed. When the matter reached this Court, while affirming the order of the High Court, the majority stated: “14, ... It is, no doubt, true that, save in exceptional cases, leave to amend under Order 6 Rule 17 of the Code will ordinarily be refused when the effect of the amendment would be to take away from a party a legal right which had accrued to him by lapse of time. But this rule can apply only when either fresh allegations are added or fresh reliefs are sought by way of amendment. Where for instance, an amendment is sought which merely clarifies an existing pleading and does not in substance add to or alter it, it has never been held that the question of a bar of limitation is one of the questions to be considered in allowing such clarification of a matter already contained in the original pleading.” 49. Where for instance, an amendment is sought which merely clarifies an existing pleading and does not in substance add to or alter it, it has never been held that the question of a bar of limitation is one of the questions to be considered in allowing such clarification of a matter already contained in the original pleading.” 49. The Court in Laxmidas case (supra) further observed that since there was no addition to the averments or relief, it was not possible to uphold the contention of the plaintiff that by conversion of written statement into a plaint in a cross-suit, a fresh claim was made or a new relief was sought. ‘To the facts of the present case, therefore, the decisions holding that amendments could not ordinarily be allowed beyond the period of limitation and the limited exceptions to that rule have no application. 50. In Jai Jai Ram Manohar Lal v. National Building Material Supply reported in (1969) 1 SCC 869 , A sued B in his individual name but afterwards sought leave to amend the plaint to sue as the proprietor of a Hindu joint family business. The amendment was granted and the suit was decreed. The High Court, however, reversed the decree observing that the action was brought by a “non-existing person’’, Reversing the order of the High Court, this Court (per Shah, J., as he then was) made the following oft-quoted observations: (SCC p. 871, para 5) “5. ... Rules of procedure are intended to be a handmaid to the administration of justice. A party cannot be refused just relief merely because of some mistake, negligence, inadvertence or even infraction of e the rules of procedure. The Court always gives leave to amend the pleading of a party, unless it is satisfied that the party applying was acting mala fide, or that by his blunder, he had caused injury to his opponent which may not be compensated for by an order of costs. However negligent or careless may have been the first omission, and, however late the proposed amendment, the amendment may be allowed if it can be made without injustice to the other side.” (emphasis added) 51. In Ganga Bai v. Vijay Kumar (1974) 2 SCC 393 , an appeal was filed against a mere finding recorded by the trial court. However negligent or careless may have been the first omission, and, however late the proposed amendment, the amendment may be allowed if it can be made without injustice to the other side.” (emphasis added) 51. In Ganga Bai v. Vijay Kumar (1974) 2 SCC 393 , an appeal was filed against a mere finding recorded by the trial court. After a lapse of more than seven years, amendment was sought by which a preliminary decree was challenged which was granted by the High Court by a laconic order. Setting aside the order of the High Court, this Court stated: “22. The preliminary decree had remained unchallenged since September 1958 and by lapse of time a valuable right had accrued in favour of the decree-holder. The power to allow an amendment is undoubtedly wide and may at any stage be appropriately exercised in the interest of justice, the law of limitation notwithstanding. But the exercise of such far-reaching discretionary powers is governed by judicial considerations and wider the discretion, greater ought to be the care and circumspection on the part of the court.” 52. In Modi Spg. & Wvg. Mills Co. Ltd. v. Ladha Ram & Co. reported in (1976) 4 SCC 320 , the trial court while rejecting an application under Order 6 Rule 17 said that the repudiation of clear admission is motivated to deprive the plaintiff of the valuable right accrued to him and it is against law. The High Court in revision affirmed the judgment of the trial court and held that by means of amendment the defendant wanted to introduce an entirely different case and if such amendments were permitted it would prejudice the other side. Paragraph 10 of the aforesaid judgement is reproduced herein below:- “10. It is true that inconsistent pleas can be made in pleadings but the effect of substitution of paras 25 and 26 is not making inconsistent and alternative pleadings but it is seeking to displace the plaintiff completely from the admissions made by the defendants in the written statement. If such amendments are allowed the plaintiff will be irretrievably prejudiced by being denied the opportunity of extracting the admission from the defendants. The High Court rightly rejected the application for amendment and agreed with the trial court.” 53. In Haridas Aildas Thadani v. Godrej Rustom Kermani reported in (1984) 1 SCC 668 this Court said that: “1. ... If such amendments are allowed the plaintiff will be irretrievably prejudiced by being denied the opportunity of extracting the admission from the defendants. The High Court rightly rejected the application for amendment and agreed with the trial court.” 53. In Haridas Aildas Thadani v. Godrej Rustom Kermani reported in (1984) 1 SCC 668 this Court said that: “1. ... It is well settled that the Court should be extremely liberal in granting prayer of amendment of pleading unless serious injustice or irreparable loss is caused to the other side. It is also clear that a Revisional Court ought not to lightly interfere with a discretion exercised in allowing amendment in absence of cogent reasons or compelling circumstances.” 54. In Suraj Prakash Bhasin v. Raj Rani Bhas (1981) 3 SCC 652 the Hon’ble Apex Court held that: “... liberal principles which guide the exercise of discretion in allowing amendment are that multiplicity of proceedings should be avoided, that amendments which do not totally alter the character of an action should be readily granted while care should be taken to see that injustice and prejudice of an irremediable character are not inflicted on the opposite party under pretence of amendment, that one distinct cause of action should not be substituted for another and that the subject-matter of the suit should not be changed by amendment.” 55. In B.K. Narayana Pillai v. Parameswaran Pillai (2000) 1 SCC 712 , a suit was filed by A for recovery of possession from B alleging that B was a licensee. In the written statement B contended that he was a lessee. After the trial began, he applied for amendment of the written statement by adding an alternative plea that in case B is held to be a licensee, the licence was irrevocable. The amendment was refused. Setting aside the orders refusing amendment, the Hon’ble Apex Court stated: “3. The purpose and object of Order 6 Rule 17 CPC is to allow either party to alter or amend his pleadings in such manner and on such terms as may be just. The power to allow the amendment is wide and can be exercised at any stage of the proceedings in the interests of justice on the basis of guidelines laid down by various High Courts and [the Supreme Court]. The power to allow the amendment is wide and can be exercised at any stage of the proceedings in the interests of justice on the basis of guidelines laid down by various High Courts and [the Supreme Court]. It is true that the amendment cannot be claimed as a matter of right and under all circumstances, But it is equally true that the courts while deciding such prayers should not adopt a hypertechnical approach. Liberal approach should be the general rule particularly in cases where the other side can be compensated with the costs. Technicalities of law should not be permitted to hamper the courts in the administration of justice between the parties. Amendments are allowed in the pleadings to avoid uncalled for multiplicity of litigation.” 56. This judgment has been referred in Usha Balashaheb Swami Vs. Kiran Appaso Swami (2007) 5 SCC 602 and the Court observed that Modi Spe. Case (supra) was a clear authority for the proposition that once a written statement contained an admission in favour of the plaintiff, by amendment such an admission of the defendant cannot be withdrawn and if allowed, it would amount to totally displacing the case of the plaintiff. 57. In the same judgment of Usha Balashaheb Swami (supra), the Court dealt with a number of judgments of Hon’ble Apex Court and laid down that the prayer for amendment of the plaint and a prayer for amendment of the written statement stand on different footings. The general principle that amendment of pleadings cannot be allowed so as to alter materially or substitute the cause of action or the nature of claim applies to amendments to the plaint. It has no counterpart in the principles relating to amendment of the written statement. Therefore, addition of a new ground of defence or substituting or altering a defence or taking inconsistent pleas in the written statement would not be objectionable while adding, altering or substituting a new cause of action in the plaint may be objectionable. 58. Insofar as the pleadings in the petition are concerned, law in this connection is well settled as has been held by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Bachhaj Nahar vs. Nilima Mandal reported in (2008) 17 SCC 49 that no relief could be granted as claim for under the petition in case the same does not flow from the facts as contained in the petition. It was further held in the aforesaid case that no amount of evidence can be looked into, upon a plea which was never put forward in the pleadings. Relevant paragraph namely paragraph nos.10 & 12 reproduced below:- “10. The High Court, in this case, in its obvious zeal to cut delay and hardship that may ensue by relegating the plaintiffs to one more round of litigation, has rendered a judgment which violates several fundamental rules of civil procedure. The rules breached are : (i) No amount of evidence can be looked into, upon a plea which was never put forward in the pleadings. A question which did arise from the pleadings and which was not the subject matter of an issue, cannot be decided by the court. (ii) A Court cannot make out a case not pleaded. The court should confine its decision to the question raised in pleadings. Nor can it grant a relief which is not claimed and which does not flow from the facts and the cause of action alleged in the plaint. (iii) A factual issue cannot be raised or considered for the first time in a second appeal. 12. The object and purpose of pleadings and issues is to ensure that the litigants come to trial with all issues clearly defined and to prevent cases being expanded or grounds being shifted during trial. Its object is also to ensure that each side is fully alive to the questions that are likely to be raised or considered so that they may have an opportunity of placing the relevant evidence appropriate to the issues before the court for its consideration. This Court has repeatedly held that the pleadings are meant to give to each side intimation of the case of the other so that it may be met, to enable courts to determine what is really at issue between the parties, and to prevent any deviation from the course which litigation on particular causes must take.” 59. Taking into consideration of the aforesaid decision in Bachhaj Nahar (Supra), another judgment was delivered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of V.Prabhakara vs. Basavaraj K. (Dead) By Legal Representatives and Another reported in 2022 (1) SCC Page 115, the relevant paragraph namely paragraph-21 of the aforesaid judgment reads as follows:- “21. A relief can only be on the basis of the pleadings alone. A relief can only be on the basis of the pleadings alone. Evidence is also to be based on such pleadings. The only exception would be when the parties know each other’s case very well and such a pleadings implicit in an issue. Additionally, a court can take judicial note of a fact when it is so apparent on the face of the record.” 60. In this view of the matter, I am of the opinion that in case there is no proper pleading to support the relief as claimed in the petition, then the respondent has no opportunity to resist or oppose such relief, and if the court considers and grant such relief, it will lead to miscarriage of justice. 61. In view of the aforesaid, the Court is of the opinion that the present petition is liable to be dismissed on both the grounds namely the amendment filed by the petitioner will change the nature of the case and secondly there is no pleadings whatsoever made by the petitioner in the entire petition while challenging the aforesaid orders. Further nothing has been stated in the amendment application nor in the present petition regarding the latches in filing the amendment application since the suit was filed in this case in the year, 2000 and amendment was sought by him in the year 2009. 62. In this view of the matter, the Court is of the opinion that petition is without any merit, the same is liable to be dismissed and the same is hereby dismissed. 63. It further reveals from perusal of the record that the Civil Suit which was filed by the plaintiff-petitioner is pending consideration before the Trial Court since last 23 years. Written statements have already been filed by the parties. 64. In this view of the matter, Court is of the opinion that the Trial Court be directed to decide the aforesaid suit most expeditiously and positively within a period of six months from today strictly in accordance with law and without bring influenced with any observations made by this Court in this judgement. 65. The Registrar (Compliance) is directed to communicate a copy of this order to the Additional Civil Judge (Senior Division) Allahabad through District Judge Allahabad within three days. 66. Action taken report be filed by the Court below in this Court on or before 01.12.2023. 67. 65. The Registrar (Compliance) is directed to communicate a copy of this order to the Additional Civil Judge (Senior Division) Allahabad through District Judge Allahabad within three days. 66. Action taken report be filed by the Court below in this Court on or before 01.12.2023. 67. The petition stands disposed of in above terms, save and except for reporting compliance on 01.12.2023.