JUDGMENT : 1. Rule returnable forthwith. Learned advocate Mr.Rituraj M. Meena waives service of notice of rule for the respondent No.1. Though served, none appeared for and on behalf of respondent Nos.2.1 to 2.3 and 3.1 to 3.3. 2. With the consent of the learned advocates for the respective parties, this matter was taken up for final hearing. 3. Heard learned advocate Mr. Anand B. Gogia for the petitioner and learned advocate Mr. Rituraj Meena for respondent No.1. Perused the record. 4. By way of this petition, under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner has challenged the order dated 3.2.2020 passed below Exh.74 and another order dated 16.12.2021 passed below Exhs.97 and 99 by the learned City Civil Court, Ahmedabad in Civil Suit No.4585 of 1991. The heirs of deceased plaintiff No.1 has filed Special Civil Application No.7840 of 2022 challenging the order dated 2.8.2021 passed below Exhs.83 and 84 by the learned City Civil Court in Civil Suit No.4585 of 1991. 5. Learned advocate for the petitioner has submitted that the plaintiff is the present petitioner alongwith one Kalavati Chandiram Bajaj filed a suit against defendant i.e. Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation and Ramchandra Sinhamal Maherchandani for the reliefs claimed in the suit. As per the submissions of learned advocate for the petitioner, plaintiffs and defendant No.2 are relatives of each other. The said civil suit came to be dismissed for default on 26.2.2003. Thereafter, an application for restoration was filed. The said application came to be allowed by the learned trial Court vide order dated 31.8.2019. After that, an application under Order-1 Rule-10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 was preferred by the Power of Attorney Holder (for short, hereinafter referred to as `the POA) of plaintiff No.2 on 19.12.2019. The said application Exh.74 came to be dismissed by the learned trial Court on 3.2.2020 for want of the date of death and even for want of death certificate of plaintiff No.1. It is further submitted by learned advocate for the petitioner that due to mistake of the advocate, those details were not averred in the application. In light of those facts, the application Exh.74 came to be dismissed. 6. Thereafter, the POA of plaintiff No.2 filed application Exhs.97 and 99 for condonation of delay and bringing heirs of the deceased defendant No.2 on record respectively on 1.11.2021. In light of those facts, the application Exh.74 came to be dismissed. 6. Thereafter, the POA of plaintiff No.2 filed application Exhs.97 and 99 for condonation of delay and bringing heirs of the deceased defendant No.2 on record respectively on 1.11.2021. The said applications vide common order dated 16.12.2021 came to be dismissed by the learned trial Court. Against these orders, the petitioner has preferred this petition before this Court. 7. Learned advocate Mr. Rituraj Meena states that the Corporation is a formal party in the present proceedings and hence no submissions are made on behalf of respondent No.1. 8. Learned advocate for the petitioner has submitted that since the suit was dismissed for default on 26.2.2003 and the said suit came to be restored on 31.8.2019. Immediately thereafter, Exh.74 application was filed on 19.12.2019. In the said application due to mistake of the concerned advocate, the important details that is the date of death was not mentioned and death certificate was not produced resultantly, application came to be dismissed on 3.2.2020. It is further submitted that on 1.11.2021, again application Exh.97 for condonation of delay and application under Order 22, Rule 4 of the CPC below Exh.99 came to be filed. It is submitted by the learned advocate for the petitioner that the impugned order is not as per the provisions of law, inasmuch as, the delay period has wrongly been calculated and it is wrongly observed that there is a delay of 18 years in preferring the application. 9. It is also vehemently submitted by the learned advocate for the petitioner that the suit came to be restored on 31.8.2019 and the application for bringing the heirs with condonation of delay was preferred second time on 1.11.2021. So there is no delay of 18 years as observed by the learned trial Court. 10. At this juncture, provisions of Order 22, Rule 10A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 would be necessary which reads as under: “22(10A). Duty of pleader to communicate to Court death of a party. — Wherever a pleader appearing for a party to the suit comes to know of the death of that party, he shall inform the Court about it, and the Court shall thereupon give notice of such death to the other party, and, for this purpose, the contract between the pleader and the deceased party shall be deemed to subsist.” 11. — Wherever a pleader appearing for a party to the suit comes to know of the death of that party, he shall inform the Court about it, and the Court shall thereupon give notice of such death to the other party, and, for this purpose, the contract between the pleader and the deceased party shall be deemed to subsist.” 11. On perusal of application Exh.99, the plaintiff has averred that advocate of defendant No.2 by way of Purshis Exh.71 on 22.7.2002 has declared the fact of death. 12. Thus, the knowledge of death of defendant No.2 can be attributed to the plaintiff on 22.7.2002. The sole contention that the defendant did not inform the surviving plaintiff about the date of death of defendant No.2 has no force. So taking into consideration these factual aspects, it cannot be said that the surviving plaintiff had no knowledge about the death of defendant No.2. 13. Coming back to the observations made by the learned trial Court, the learned trial Court has taken into consideration all the available submissions of the petitioner. It is also an important aspect that even the surviving plaintiff has not taken care to bring the heirs of deceased plaintiff No.1 on record though defendant No.2 was the relative. Plaintiff No.1 was passed away on 28.5.2006. The learned trial Court has rightly observed that there is delay of 19 years, 10 months and 5 days in making an application for condonation of delay and an application for bringing legal heirs of deceased defendant No.2 on record. Even in the application for condonation of delay, petitioner has sought to condone delay of 19 years, 10 months and 5 days in filing the application. Thus, the submission of learned advocate for the petitioner that learned trial Court has erred in calculating delay period of 18 years in bringing the legal heirs of deceased defendant No.2 false flat. 14. During the course of hearing of Special Civil Application No.7840 of 2022, the learned advocate for the petitioner took this Court through the order impugned dated 2.8.2021 wherein the learned trial Court has observed that Civil Suit No.4585 of 1991 came to be abated against defendant No.2 on 13.2.2003. In backdrop of this factual matrix, if the suit is already abated on 13.3.2003 against defendant No.2 there is a gross delay in bringing the heirs of deceased defendant on record. In backdrop of this factual matrix, if the suit is already abated on 13.3.2003 against defendant No.2 there is a gross delay in bringing the heirs of deceased defendant on record. Moreover, there are no valid and legal reason for condoning delay. The petitioner has tried to play smart by throwing the burden on advocate of plaintiff in making mistake in drafting Exh.74 but plaintiff being the relative of defendant No.2 but plaintiff being the relative of defendant No.2 was supposed to have knowledge about the death of defendant No.2. Thus, in view of the conduct of plaintiff, this Court is not inclined to entertain this petition. 15. So far as the scope of entertaining the present petition, it is pertinent to refer the decision dated 4.7.2018 of Division Bench of this Court rendered in Special Civil Application No.9010 of 2018 in the case of Diyorabhanderi Corporation V. Sarine Technologies Limited, wherein, the reference of the decision rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Shalini Shyam Shetty v. Rajendra Shankar Patil is made. Relevant paragraph No.9 of the decision dated 4.7.2018 of Special Civil Application No.9010 of 2018 is reproduced hereunder for the sake of convenience. “9. At this stage, we would like to refer the decision rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Shalini Shyam Shetty and Anr. Vs. Rajendra Shankar Patil (supra), upon which the reliance is placed by the learned Senior Advocate for respondent No.1 – plaintiff. In the said decision, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has laid down the principles for exercise of powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India by the High Court in Paragraph62 as under: “62. On an analysis of the aforesaid decisions of this Court, the following principles on the exercise of High Court's jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution may be formulated: (a) A petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is different from a petition under Article 227. The mode of exercise of power by High Court under these two Articles is also different. (b) In any event, a petition under Article 227 cannot be called a writ petition. The history of the conferment of writ jurisdiction on High Courts is substantially different from the history of conferment of the power of Superintendence on the High Courts under Article 227 and have been discussed above. (b) In any event, a petition under Article 227 cannot be called a writ petition. The history of the conferment of writ jurisdiction on High Courts is substantially different from the history of conferment of the power of Superintendence on the High Courts under Article 227 and have been discussed above. (c) High Courts cannot, on the drop of a hat, in exercise of its power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution, interfere with the orders of tribunals or Courts inferior to it. Nor can it, in exercise of this power, act as a Court of appeal over the orders of Court or tribunal subordinate to it. In cases where an alternative statutory mode of redressal has been provided, that would also operate as a restrain on the exercise of this power by the High Court. (d) The parameters of interference by High Courts in exercise of its power of superintendence have been repeatedly laid down by this Court. In this regard the High Court must be guided by the principles laid down by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Waryam Singh (supra) and the principles in Waryam Singh (supra) have been repeatedly followed by subsequent Constitution Benches and various other decisions of this Court. (e) According to the ratio in Waryam Singh (supra), followed in subsequent cases, the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction of superintendence can interfere in order only to keep the tribunals and Courts subordinate to it, `within the bounds of their authority'. (f) In order to ensure that law is followed by such tribunals and Courts by exercising jurisdiction which is vested in them and by not declining to exercise the jurisdiction which is vested in them. (g) Apart from the situations pointed in (e) and (f), High Court can interfere in exercise of its power of superintendence when there has been a patent perversity in the orders of tribunals and Courts subordinate to it or where there has been a gross and manifest failure of justice or the basic principles of natural justice have been flouted. (h) In exercise of its power of superintendence High Court cannot interfere to correct mere errors of law or fact or just because another view than the one taken by the tribunals or Courts subordinate to it, is a possible view. In other words the jurisdiction has to be very sparingly exercised. (h) In exercise of its power of superintendence High Court cannot interfere to correct mere errors of law or fact or just because another view than the one taken by the tribunals or Courts subordinate to it, is a possible view. In other words the jurisdiction has to be very sparingly exercised. (i) High Court's power of superintendence under Article 227 cannot be curtailed by any statute. It has been declared a part of the basic structure of the Constitution by the Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of L. Chandra Kumar vs. Union of India & others, reported in (1997) 3 SCC 261 and therefore abridgment by a Constitutional amendment is also very doubtful. (j) It may be true that a statutory amendment of a rather cognate provision, like Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code by the Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1999 does not and cannot cut down the ambit of High Court's power under Article 227. At the same time, it must be remembered that such statutory amendment does not correspondingly expand the High Court's jurisdiction of superintendence under Article 227. (k) The power is discretionary and has to be exercised on equitable principle. In an appropriate case, the power can be exercised suo motu. (l) On a proper appreciation of the wide and unfettered power of the High Court under Article 227, it transpires that the main object of this Article is to keep strict administrative and judicial control by the High Court on the administration of justice within its territory. (m) The object of superintendence, both administrative and judicial, is to maintain efficiency, smooth and orderly functioning of the entire machinery of justice in such a way as it does not bring it into any disrepute. The power of interference under this Article is to be kept to the minimum to ensure that the wheel of justice does not come to a halt and the fountain of justice remains pure and unpolluted in order to maintain public confidence in the functioning of the tribunals and Courts subordinate to High Court. (n) This reserve and exceptional power of judicial intervention is not to be exercised just for grant of relief in individual cases but should be directed for promotion of public confidence in the administration of justice in the larger public interest whereas Article 226 is meant for protection of individual grievance. (n) This reserve and exceptional power of judicial intervention is not to be exercised just for grant of relief in individual cases but should be directed for promotion of public confidence in the administration of justice in the larger public interest whereas Article 226 is meant for protection of individual grievance. Therefore, the power under Article 227 may be unfettered but its exercise is subject to high degree of judicial discipline pointed out above. (o) An improper and a frequent exercise of this power will be counterproductive and will divest this extraordinary power of its strength and vitality.” 16. Thus, in totality of the facts and in view of the above decisions of this Court and Hon’ble Apex Court, I am of the considered view that the order dated 16.12.2021 passed below Exhs.97 and 99 by the learned trial Court is absolutely in consonance with law and there is no infirmity or illegality committed by the learned trial Court. 17. In this view of the matter, I do not find any reason to interfere in the findings recorded by the learned trial Court and, therefore, the petition is merit-less and deserves to be dismissed and accordingly it is dismissed with no order as to costs. Rule is discharged.