JUDGMENT : 1. This appeal is filed under Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 challenging the judgment and order of acquittal dated 06.06.2023 passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Babara, District Amreli in Criminal Case No.252 of 2020 acquitting the respondent-No.2 under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (‘the N.I.Act’ hereinafter). 2. The facts of the complaint is as under: 2.1. The complainant had filed the aforesaid case before the concerned Court and contended that the complainant is the resident of village Vinchiya, Taluka Gadhada, District Amreli and respondent No.2-original accused is also resident of the same village and they were having the relations through one of the nearest relative. As the respondent No.2-accused, was in a financial needs, had borrowed Rs.25 Lakh before six months before the date of issuance of the notice. At the time of borrowing the money, the respondent No.2-original accused has assured that within a period of two months, the amount would be repaid. After two months, the demand was raised, time and again, but the respondent No.2 remained fails in repaying however, the cheque of Rs.25 Lakh being No.011460 of Central Bank of India, Babara Branch was issued on 21.08.2020 in favour of the appellant-original complainant with assurance that on depositing the cheque with the Bank, the same would be honored. On the same day, the cheque was deposited in the Central Bank of India, Babara Branch in the account of the complainant, which was dishonored with the endorsement of “Insufficient Fund”, therefore, legal notice came to be issued through an advocate by the complainant on 21.08.2020. Within a prescribed period, the respondent No.2 remained fails in making the payment, therefore, the complaint came to be filed under Section 138 of the N.I.Act read with Section 142 of the N.I.Act before the Competent Court on 28.09.2020. 2.2. After recording the verification on 17.03.2021, the criminal case came to be registered and process was issued under Section 204 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 against the respondent No.2-original accused. The respondent No.2 appeared through an advocate therefore, plea was recorded below Exhibit 16 under Section 251 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the accused had pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. The respondent No.2 appeared through an advocate therefore, plea was recorded below Exhibit 16 under Section 251 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the accused had pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. To prove the case the learned advocate for the complainant had examined two witnesses, namely, Kathadbhai Lakshmanbhai Sorathiya-complainant below Exhibit 13 and PW-2 Prabhakar Ashokram Nikumbe below Exhibit 27. The learned advocate had also produced nine documentary evidences including the cheque, notice, etc. After filing the closing pursis, further statement under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 was recorded and all the incriminating material was put before the respondent No.2 wherein he had pleaded false prosecution and produced evidence below Exhibit-21, which is refusal envelope of the notice, issued by the original accused to the complainant. After considering the evidence and arguments raised by the respective parties, learned trial Court had passed the judgment and order of acquittal, which is impugned before this Court. 3. Heard the learned advocate Mr.Samir Afzal Khan for the appellant and learned APP, Ms.Divyangna Jhala for the respondent-State. 4. Learned advocate Mr.Samir Afzal Khan for the appellant submits that the reasonings given by the learned trial Court is against the settled principle of law as the presumption which is in favour of the complainant under Sections 118 and 139 of the N.I.Act was not rebutted by the respondent No.2 by leading the evidence and proving the defence, then also learned trial Court had acquitted the respondent No.2-original accused. Learned advocate Mr.Khan further submits that though all the procedures prescribed under the N.I.Act were followed and though issuance of the cheque and the signatures were not disputed by the respondent No.2-original accused, the judgment and order of the acquittal was passed by the learned trial Court. 4.1. Learned advocate Mr.Khan further submits that the learned trial Court had erred in giving much weightage to the cross examination of the complainant and accepting the defence of the respondent No.2 that the cheque was misused and though accused had repaid the hand loan, which was given by the complainant, the false case is filed against the respondent No.2. Learned advocate Mr.Khan further submits that the learned trial Court had committed a grave error in shifting a burden on the appellant-original complainant to prove the financial capacity. Learned advocate Mr.Khan further submits that the learned trial Court had committed a grave error in shifting a burden on the appellant-original complainant to prove the financial capacity. As per the provisions of the N.I.Act, the burden is not on the shoulder of the complainant to prove the case, but it is on the respondent no.2 original accused to prove the innocent. Learned advocate Mr.Khan further submits that the learned trial Court had accepted the bare version of the respondent No.2-original accused that the cheque, which was given of prior transaction toward the security, was misused by the present appellant. Therefore, also the learned advocate Mr.Khan prays to quash the judgment and order of the acquittal and to allow this appeal and also prays to convict the respondent No.2-original accused and to pass an order to undergo the sentence accordingly. As this Court deems it fit to decide the appeal at admission stage, no notice was issued to respondent No.2-original accused. 5. Considering the submissions advanced by the learned advocate Mr.Samir Khan for the appellant, before going into the merits of the case, this Court deems it fit to consider relevant provisions of Sections 118, 138, 139 and 142 of the N.I.Act and Sections 2, 3 and 4 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, which are reproduced respectively as under: “Section 118 of the N.I.Act: Presumptions as to negotiable instruments. —Until the contrary is proved, the following presumptions shall be made:— (a) of consideration —that every negotiable instrument was made or drawn for consideration, and that every such instrument, when it has been accepted, indorsed, negotiated or transferred, was accepted, indorsed, negotiated or transferred for consideration; (b) as to date —that every negotiable instrument bearing a date was made or drawn on such date; (c) as to time of acceptance —that every accepted bill of exchange was accepted within a reasonable time after its date and before its maturity; (d) as to time of transfer —that every transfer of a negotiable instrument was made before its maturity; (e) as to order of indorsements —that the indorsements appearing upon a negotiable instrument were made in the order in which they appear thereon; (f) as to stamps —that a lost promissory note, bill of exchange or cheque was duly stamped; (g) that holder is a holder in due course —that the holder of a negotiable instrument is a holder in due course: Provided that, where the instrument has been obtained from its lawful owner, or from any person in lawful custody thereof, by means of an offence or fraud, or has been obtained from the maker or accept or thereof by means of an offence or fraud, or for unlawful consideration, the burden of proving that the holder is a holder in due course lies upon him.” Section 138 of the N.I.Act: Dishonour of cheque for insufficiency, etc., of funds in the account. — Where any cheque drawn by a person on an account maintained by him with a banker for payment of any amount of money to another person from out of that account for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability, is returned by the bank unpaid, either because of the amount of money standing to the credit of that account is insufficient to honour the cheque or that it exceeds the amount arranged to be paid from that account by an agreement made with that bank, such person shall be deemed to have committed an offence and shall, without prejudice to any other provisions of this Act, be punished with imprisonment for a term which may be extended to two years, or with fine which may extend to twice the amount of the cheque, or with both: Provided that nothing contained in this section shall apply unless— (a) the cheque has been presented to the bank within a period of six months from the date on which it is drawn or within the period of its validity, whichever is earlier; (b) the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque, as the case may be, makes a demand for the payment of the said amount of money by giving a notice in writing, to the drawer of the cheque, within thirty days of the receipt of information by him from the bank regarding the return of the cheque as unpaid; and (c) the drawer of such cheque fails to make the payment of the said amount of money to the payee or, as the case may be, to the holder in due course of the cheque, within fifteen days of the receipt of the said notice. Section 139 of the N.I.Act: Presumption in favour of holder.—It shall be presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that the holder of a cheque received the cheque of the nature referred to in section 138 for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability. Section 139 of the N.I.Act: Presumption in favour of holder.—It shall be presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that the holder of a cheque received the cheque of the nature referred to in section 138 for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability. Section 2 of the Indian Evidence Act: An admission may be proved by or on behalf of the person making it, when it consists of a statement of the existence of any state of mind or body, relevant or in issue, made at or about the time when such state of mind or body existed, and is accompanied by conduct rendering its falsehood improbable. Section 3 of the Indian Evidence Act. Interpretation clause.- In this Act the following words and expressions are used in the following senses, unless a contrary intention appears from the context:- “Court.”-”Court” includes all Judges and Magistrate, and all persons, except arbitartors, legally authorized to take evidence. “Fact”.-”Fact” means and includes- (1) thing, state of things, or relation of things, capable of being perceived by the senses; (2) any mental condition of which any person is conscious. Section 4 of the Indian Evidence Act. “May presume”.—Whenever it is provided by this Act that the Court may presume a fact, it may either regard such fact as proved, unless and until it is disproved, or may call for proof of it. “Shall presume”.—Whenever it is directed by this Act that the Court shall presume a fact, it shall regard such fact as proved, unless and until it is disproved. “Conclusive proof”.—When one fact is declared by this Act to be conclusive proof of another, the Court shall, on proof of the one fact, regard the other as proved, and shall not allow evidence to be given for the purpose of disproving it.” 6. In order to determine the question whether the offence punishable under Section 138 of the N.I.Act is made out against the appellant, it will be necessary to examine this Court and ambit of the presumption to be raised as envisaged by the provision of Sections 118 and 139 of the N.I.Act. In a suit to enforce the simple contract the plaintiff has to aver in his pleading that it was made for good consideration and must substantiate by it by evidence, but to these Rules Negotiable Instruments are a exception. 7. In a suit to enforce the simple contract the plaintiff has to aver in his pleading that it was made for good consideration and must substantiate by it by evidence, but to these Rules Negotiable Instruments are a exception. 7. In a significant departure from the general rules applicable to the contracts, Section 118 of the N.I.Act provides certain presumptions to be raised. This section laid down for some special rule of evidence relating to the presumption. The reason for presumption is that, Negotiable Instrument passes from hands to hand on endorsement and it would make trading very difficult and negotiability of the instrument impossible, unless certain presumptions are made. The presumption, therefore, is a matter of principle to facilitate the negotiability as well as trade. Section 118 of the N.I.Act provides presumptions to be raised until contrary is proved (i) as to consideration, (ii) as to the date of instrument (iii) as to time of acceptance, (iv) as to time of transfer, (v) as to order of indorsement, (vi) as to appropriate stamp and (vii) as to holder is a holder in due course. 8. Section 139 of the N.I.Act provides that, it shall be presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that the holder of a cheque received the cheque of the nature referred to in section 138 for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability. 9. Presumptions are devices by use of which the Courts are enable and entitled to pronounce on an issue not with standing that there is no evidence or insufficient evidence. Under the Evidence Act, all presumptions must come under one or other class of three classes mentioned in the Act, namely, may presume (rebuttable), shall presume (rebuttable), conclusive presumption (irrebuttable). The term Presumption is used to designate and inference, affirmative or dis-affirmative of existence of fact, conveniently called the presumed facts drawn by a judicial Court, by a process of probable reasoning for some matter of fact, either judicially noticed or admitted or established by legal evidence to the satisfaction of the Court. Presumption literally means (taking a true without examining or prove). Presumption literally means (taking a true without examining or prove). Applying the defence of the word ‘prove’ in Section 3 of the Evidence Act to the provision of Sections 118 and 139 of the N.I.Act, it becomes evident that trial under Section 138 of the N.I.Act a presumption will have to be made that every Negotiable Instrument was made or drawn for consideration and that it was executed for discharge of debt or liability once the execution of Negotiable Instrument is either proved or admitted. As soon as the complainant discharged the burden to prove that the instrument, was executed by the accused, the rule of presumption under Sections 118 and 139 of the N.I.Act help him to shift the burden on the accused, the presumption will live, exist and survive and only when the contrary is proved by the accused i.e. the cheque was not issued for the consideration and in discharge of any debt or liability. The presumption is not itself evidence, but only makes a prima facie case for a party, whose benefit it exists. 10. Now keeping in mind the aforesaid provisions, examining the present case, it transpires that it was the case of the complainant that cheque was issued towards the discharge of the legally enforceable debt, which was dishonored. To prove the case, the complainant himself was examined below Exhibit-13 and also examined one witness below Exhibit-27. After proving the issuance of the cheque and the signature of the respondent No.2, the burden was shifted on the accused to disprove the case of the complainant by pleading the probable defence. In his defence, respondent No.2 had cross examined the complainant wherein the following material aspects came on the record: (a) The Complainant admits that he was having the diamond factory in partnership, but he is not filing the income tax return with regard to the same and that said diamond factory was closed from 2014 onwards; (b) He also admits that he is having the agricultural land of 25 vigha at Monpur village and 35 vigha at Gadhada village; (c) He admits that earlier 2 to 5 times he lent money to the respondent No.2, the amount he does not remember and earlier when the amount was lent, no any cheque was given by the respondent No.2. (d) He further admits that the amount of Rs.25 Lakh which was advanced with the respondent No.2 by the complainant was given in cash, the date is not remembered to the complainant. (e) He admits that he is having the four Bank account 1st in Saurashtra Khetiwadi Bank at Ambardi vilalge, 2nd in Khetiwadi Bank at Chital village, 3rd in Bank of India Babara village and 4th in Dena Bank, Surat. (f) He admits that except these, no other Bank accounts he is operating. Thereafter, he admits that one more account in Central Bank of India, Babara Branch he is having. (g) He also admits that the respondent No.2 had filed a complaint in the year 2018 at Varacha Police Station, Surat and he was called by the Police Officer, namely, Rajendrabhai at Varacha Police Station. (i) He denied to the fact that on 22.03.2018 the accused had given the application against the present complainant and other persons. He denied to the fact that in the said complaint, the accused had stated to have repaid Rs.4 Lakh in two equal installments to the present appellant. The said application was exhibited and marked ‘A’ was given. (j) He accepting that he is not aware that accused is doing which business and he had never asked to the accused. He also admits that the facts with regard to the business were never asked from the date of lending money to the accused. (k) He admits that notice below Exhibit-9 was replied by the respondent No.2 and he admits that Exhibit-12, which was replied-cum-notice was not received by the present appellant-original complainant. He admits that he is staying at Gadhada village from 01.09.2020 to 20.09.2020 with his wife. He also admits that the postman came with the R.P.A.D. cover, but at that point of time he was not at his house. (l) He admits that the cover was refused as he had not accepted. The aforesaid cover was exhibited at Exhibited 21. (m) He pleaded ignorance to the aspect that wife of the accused, namely, Vaishaliben Sorathiya had given a complaint at Kamrej Police Station, Surat on 10.05.2018. (n) He also denied to the knowledge that in the said complaint, fact regarding borrowing the money was mentioned. (o) He admits that the fact regarding the returning of the cheque he was orally informed by the Central Bank of India, Babara Branch. (n) He also denied to the knowledge that in the said complaint, fact regarding borrowing the money was mentioned. (o) He admits that the fact regarding the returning of the cheque he was orally informed by the Central Bank of India, Babara Branch. (p) He did not remember that at the time of depositing the cheque whether the counter slip was received or not. (q) He admits that he had not produced any document to show that he is having 60 vigha of agricultural land. (r) He admits that the notice which was issued by the accused was read by him. He admits that in the said notice, it was mentioned that Rs.4 Lakh was repaid by the accused and the cheque was misplaced. (s) He admits that the accused is land broker and also doing the business of LIC. 11. To further rebut the case, the accused had produced the reply to the notice as well as the notice below Exhibit 21 wherein it is mentioned by the accused that the accused had never borrowed Rs.25 Lakh, but only Rs.4 Lakh was borrowed by him at that time the cheque bearing No.011460 (impugned herein) was taken by the present appellant towards the security. It is mentioned in the reply-cum-notice that though Rs.4 Lakh returned and on demanding the security cheque, the complainant had stated that the cheque was misplaced by him and on raising various demands of the cheque, it was conveyed that cheque is misplaced and that you have paid the amount therefore, you did not have to worry. It is conveyed by the present respondent to the complainant that though he had repaid the amount, the cheque which was given towards the security was misused by him by filling the amount of Rs.25 Lakh and depositing the same for clearing and therefore, the complainant had committed the offence of breach of trust and cheating. 12. On pleading the probable defence as per the law again the burden is shifted on the complainant to prove the debt, which is legally enforceable and accused is liable to repay the same. Thereafter, it is for the complainant to prove his financial capacity by leading the evidence as the financial capacity was challenged during the cross examination by the present respondent No.2. Thereafter, it is for the complainant to prove his financial capacity by leading the evidence as the financial capacity was challenged during the cross examination by the present respondent No.2. It is admitted in the cross examination that he is having the income of Rs.15 Lakh, but he is not having any contemporaneous document to support the same. Neither any revenue record was produced to show that he is having 60 vighas of land nor any income tax return was produced to show that he is financially capable to lend Rs.25 Lakh in cash to the complainant. The Bank statement of Central Bank of India, which is produced by the complainant during 2020 to 2022 which shows Bank balance of Central Bank of India Rs.1079/-. It is also suffice to show that the complainant was not having the capacity to lend the cash amount of Rs.25 Lakh to the respondent No.2. Though the complainant had admitted in his cross examination that he is having six Bank accounts, but he did not produce any passbook or documentary evidence to prove that he was having such a huge balance in any of the accounts. Therefore, learned trial Court had rightly accepted the probable defence which was raised by the respondent No.2 and passed judgment and order of acquittal. 13. The Apex Court in case of M.S.NARAYANA MENON ALIAS MANI VS. STATE OF KERALA AND ANOTHER, reported in (2006) 6 SCC 39 has observed as under: “ *** 41. In Hiten P. Dalal v. Bratindranath Banerjee [ (2001) 6 SCC 16 ], a 3- Judge Bench of this Court held that although by reason of Sections 138 and 139 of the Act, the presumption of law as distinguished from presumption of fact is drawn, the court has no other option but to draw the same in every case where the factual basis of raising the presumption is established. Pal, J. speaking for a three-Judge Bench, however, opined: “22. … "Presumptions are rules of evidence and do not conflict with the presumption of innocence, because by the latter, all that is meant is that the prosecution is obliged to prove the case against the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The obligation on the prosecution may be discharged with the help of presumptions of law or fact unless the accused adduces evidence showing the reasonable possibility of the non-existence of the presumed fact. 23. The obligation on the prosecution may be discharged with the help of presumptions of law or fact unless the accused adduces evidence showing the reasonable possibility of the non-existence of the presumed fact. 23. In other words, provided the facts required to form the basis of a presumption of law exist, no discretion is left with the court but to draw the statutory conclusion, but this does not preclude the person against whom the presumption is drawn from rebutting it and proving the contrary. A fact is said to be proved when, "after considering the matters before it, the court either believes it to exist, or considers its existence so probable that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of the particular case, to act upon the supposition that it exists". Therefore, the rebuttal does not have to be conclusively established but such evidence must be adduced before the court in support of the defence that the court must either believe the defence to exist or consider its existence to be reasonably probable, the standard of reasonability being that of the "prudent man"." 42. The court, however, in the fact situation obtaining therein, was not required to go into the question as to whether an accused can discharge the onus placed on him even from the materials brought on records by the complainant himself. Evidently in law he is entitled to do so. 43. In Goaplast (P) Ltd. v. Chico Ursula D'Souza and Another [ (2003) 3 SCC 232 ], upon which reliance was placed by the learned counsel, this Court held that the presumption arising under Section 139 of the Act can be rebutted by adducing evidence and the burden of proof is on the person who want to rebut the presumption. The question which arose for consideration therein was as to whether closure of accounts or stoppage of payment is sufficient defence to escape from the penal liability under Section 138 of the Act. The answer to the question was rendered in the negative. Such a question does not arise in the instant case. 44. The question which arose for consideration therein was as to whether closure of accounts or stoppage of payment is sufficient defence to escape from the penal liability under Section 138 of the Act. The answer to the question was rendered in the negative. Such a question does not arise in the instant case. 44. In Kundan Lal Rallaram v. Custodian, Evacuee Property, Bombay [ AIR 1961 SC 1316 ], Subba Rao, J., as the learned Chief Justice then was, held that while considering the question as to whether burden of proof in terms of Section 118 had been discharged or not, relevant evidence cannot be permitted to be withheld. If a relevant evidence is withheld, the court may draw a presumption to the effect that if the same was produced might have gone unfavourable to the plaintiff. Such a presumption was itself held to be sufficient to rebut the presumption arising under Section 118 of the Act stating: "Briefly stated, the burden of proof may be shifted by presumptions of law or fact, and presumptions of law or presumptions of fact may be rebutted not only by direct or circumstantial evidence but also by presumptions of law or fact. We are not concerned here with irrebuttable presumptions of law." 45. Two adverse inferences in the instant case are liable to be drawn against the Second Respondent: (i) He deliberately has not produced his books of accounts. (ii) He had not been maintaining the statutory books of accounts and other registers in terms of the bye-laws of Cochin Stock Exchange. Moreover, the onus on an accused is not as heavy as that of the prosecution. It may be compared with a defendant in a civil proceeding. 46. (ii) He had not been maintaining the statutory books of accounts and other registers in terms of the bye-laws of Cochin Stock Exchange. Moreover, the onus on an accused is not as heavy as that of the prosecution. It may be compared with a defendant in a civil proceeding. 46. In Harbhajan Singh v. State of Punjab and another [ AIR 1966 SC 97 ], this Court while considering the nature and scope of onus of proof which the accused was required to discharge in seeking the protection of exception 9 to Section 499 of the Indian Penal Code stated the law as under: "In other words, the onus on an accused person may well be compared to the onus on a party in civil proceedings, and just as in civil proceedings the court trying an issue makes its decision by adopting the test of probabilities, so must a Criminal Court hold that the plea made by the accused is proved if a preponderance of probability is established by the evidence led by him…" 47. In V.D. Jhingan v. State of Uttar Pradesh, [ AIR 1966 SC 1762 ], it was stated: “It is well-established that where the burden of an issue lies upon the accused, he is not required to discharge that burden by leading evidence to prove his case beyond a reasonable doubt.” 48. In Kali Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh [ (1973) 2 SCC 808 ], Khanna, J., speaking for the 3-Judge Bench, held: "One of the cardinal principles which has always to be kept in view in our system of administration of justice for criminal cases is that a person arraigned as an accused is presumed to be innocent unless that presumption is rebutted by the prosecution by production of evidence as may show him to be guilty of the offence with which he is charged. The burden of proving the guilt of the accused is upon the prosecution and unless it relieves itself of that burden, the courts cannot record a finding of the guilt of the accused. There are certain cases in which statutory presumptions arise regarding the guilt of the accused, but the burden even in those cases is upon the prosecution to prove the existence of facts which have to be present before the presumption can be drawn. There are certain cases in which statutory presumptions arise regarding the guilt of the accused, but the burden even in those cases is upon the prosecution to prove the existence of facts which have to be present before the presumption can be drawn. Once those facts are shown by the prosecution to exist, the Court can raise the statutory presumption and it would, in such an event, be for the accused to rebut the presumption. The onus even in such cases upon the accused is not as heavy as is normally upon the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused. If some material is brought on the record consistent with the innocence of the accused which may reasonably be true, even though it is not positively proved to be true, the accused would be entitled to acquittal." 49. In The State (Delhi Admn) v. Sanjay Gandhi, it was stated: "Indeed, proof of facts by preponderance of probabilities as in a civil case is not foreign to criminal jurisprudence because, in cases where the statute raises a presumption of guilt as, for example, the Prevention of Corruption Act, the accused is entitled to rebut that presumption by proving his defence by a balance of probabilities. He does not have to establish his case beyond a reasonable doubt. The same standard of proof as in a civil case applies to proof of incidental issues involved in a criminal trial like the cancellation of bail of an accused" 14. This Court has noticed through the cross examination conducted by the respondent-accused of the complainant that before lending the money in cash of Rs.25 Lakh, it is impossible for the person that he would not inquire with regard to the business and need of the accused. Any prudent man before lending the money would at least inquire regarding the source of repayment of the money. Financial capacity was challenged by the accused in the cross examination and on perusing the statements of the account, where the last balance is find of Rs.1079/-. It would be difficult to believe the case of the complainant that he was having Rs.25 Lakh cash on his hand and that has been lent to the accused. Financial capacity was challenged by the accused in the cross examination and on perusing the statements of the account, where the last balance is find of Rs.1079/-. It would be difficult to believe the case of the complainant that he was having Rs.25 Lakh cash on his hand and that has been lent to the accused. When the accused had successfully rebutted the presumption by cross examining the complainant as well as by producing the reply-cum-notice below Exhibit 21 wherein the specific contention regarding repayment of Rs.4 Lakh, which was borrowed by the accused and regarding demand of the security cheque, which was lying with the complainant. 15. In fact, it is the duty of the complainant to produce the reply when he is producing the notice, however, he did not accept the cover, which was containing the reply, but in the cross examination, he admits that he had read the reply-cum-notice, which was of Exhibit 21. This conduct shows that complainant had put the different story before the Court of Law and therefore, the learned trial Court had rightly acquitted the respondent-accused from the charges. 16. For the foregoing reasons, this appeal is dismissed. Judgment and order of acquittal dated 06.06.2023 passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Babara, District Amreli in Criminal Case No.252 of 2020 acquitting the respondent-No.2 under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 is confirmed. Record and Proceedings be sent back to the trial Court, forthwith.