ORDER : I.A. No. 6953 of 2021 1. This interlocutory application has been preferred under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condoning the delay of 07 days in preferring this Letters Patent Appeal. 2. Heard learned counsel for the appellant. 3. Having regard to the averments made in the application and submissions made on behalf of the appellant, we are of the view that the State appellant was prevented from sufficient cause in filing the appeal within the period of limitation. As such, the delay of 07 days in preferring the appeal is hereby condoned. 4. I.A. No. 6953 of 2021 stands allowed. L.P.A. No. 169 of 2021 5. The instant intra-court appeal, preferred under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent, is directed against the order/judgment dated 06.02.2020 passed by learned Single Judge of this Court in W.P. (S) No. 4326 of 2015 whereby and whereunder the impugned order of punishment dated 08.08.2011 passed by the disciplinary authority as well as order dated 23.07.2013 passed by the appellate authority have been quashed and set aside and the writ petition has been allowed with all consequential benefits. 6. Brief facts of the case as per the pleadings made in the writ proceeding, which are required to be enumerated herein, read as under: The writ petitioner while working as Warden in District Jail, Chaibasa, one prisoner, namely, Moti Shandilya attempted to commit 02.09.2009 by iron angle who was admitted in Sadar Hospital and after treatment for 22 days, he died after returning to Jail. 7. Thereafter, the petitioner was served with charge-sheet on 16.07.2011 and was asked to submit his explanation. The petitioner submitted his show cause reply on 03.08.2011. But, the authority concerned, without considering the show cause, in a mechanical manner, passed the order of punishment vide order 08.08.2011 imposing the punishment of stoppage of three increments with cumulative effect as well as deprivation of promotion for further three years. 8. Against the aforesaid order, the writ petitioner filed writ petition being W.P. (S) No. 6975 of 2011 before this Court for quashing the order of punishment. The said writ petition was dismissed as not pressed vide order dated 08.02.2012 giving liberty to the petitioner to avail the remedy of departmental appeal. 9. The petitioner, thereafter, filed appeal before the appellate authority who has dismissed the appeal on 23.07.2013 confirming the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority. 10. The said writ petition was dismissed as not pressed vide order dated 08.02.2012 giving liberty to the petitioner to avail the remedy of departmental appeal. 9. The petitioner, thereafter, filed appeal before the appellate authority who has dismissed the appeal on 23.07.2013 confirming the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority. 10. Being aggrieved with the order passed by the disciplinary authority as well as appellate authority, the petitioner filed writ petition being W.P. (S) No. 4326 of 2015. The learned Single Judge, after hearing the parties, has allowed the writ petition vide order dated 06.02.2020 by quashing and setting aside the order passed by the disciplinary authority as well as appellate authority and ordered for all consequential benefits. Against the aforesaid order, the present Letters Patent Appeal has been preferred. 11. It appears from the factual aspect that while the writ petitioner was posted as Warden in the District Jail, Chaibasa, he was departmentally proceeded by attributing the accountability due to death of one prisoner, namely, Moti Sandilya who had committed suicide on 02.09.2009 by iron angle. 12. The following charges have been leveled against the writ petitioner, for ready reference the charge-sheet is being quoted and referred hereunder as: 13. The writ petitioner had participated in the regular enquiry and defended his case by showing his innocence. But the Enquiry Officer has come to conclusion by proving the charge. The Disciplinary Authority, while accepting the finding recorded by the Enquiry Officer, has passed the order of punishment on 08.08.2011 whereby and whereunder two punishments have been inflicted: (i) Withholding of three annual increments with cumulative effect. (ii) Debarring the writ petitioner from promotion for three years. 14. The order dated 08.08.2011 was carried to the appellate authority but the appellate authority has refused to interfere with the order passed by the original authority by passing the order on 23.07.2013. 15. The writ petitioner, being aggrieved, had preferred writ petition being W.P. (S) No. 4326 of 2015 by taking the ground that proper consideration of the defence has not been given by the Enquiry Officer. Further, ground has been taken that neither the enquiry report nor the second show cause notice was issued and hence, serious prejudice was caused to the writ petitioner. 16. Further, ground has been taken that neither the enquiry report nor the second show cause notice was issued and hence, serious prejudice was caused to the writ petitioner. 16. The learned Single Judge, on consideration of the legal position, as laid down by Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad and Others vs. B. Karunakar and Others, (1993) 4 SCC 727 , has quashed the impugned order of punishment against which the present appeal. 17. Mr. Anshuman Kumar, learned counsel appearing for the State appellants has submitted that admittedly the enquiry report or second show cause notice was not issued but even accepting that the said error is there which learned Single Judge has taken into consideration but taking into consideration the nature of allegation, the learned Single Judge ought to have remitted the matter before the Disciplinary Authority for de novo proceeding, but, having not done so, the instant appeal. 18. We have heard learned counsel for the State appellant, perused the documents available on record as also the finding recorded by the learned Single Judge in the impugned order. 19. The admitted fact herein is that the enquiry was initiated against the writ petitioner for commission of irregularity in course of discharging his duty while he was posted as Warden in the District Jail at Chaibasa on account of the fact that one prisoner had committed suicide on 02.09.2009. 20. The writ petitioner has taken his defence by showing his innocence. However, the Enquiry Officer has not accepted the plea of defence and has proved the charge. The Enquiry Officer has forwarded the said report to the Disciplinary Authority, who on its acceptance, has inflicted the punishment which is major in nature, i.e. withholding of three annual increments with cumulative effect and debarring the writ petitioner from promotion for three years. The order of punishment was challenged by approaching this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India being W.P. (S) No. 4326 of 2015. 21. The learned Single Judge, on consideration of the failure on the part of the Disciplinary Authority in not supplying a copy of the enquiry report as also the second show cause notice and considering it to have cause serious prejudice to the writ petitioner, has quashed the order of punishment against which the present appeal. 22. 21. The learned Single Judge, on consideration of the failure on the part of the Disciplinary Authority in not supplying a copy of the enquiry report as also the second show cause notice and considering it to have cause serious prejudice to the writ petitioner, has quashed the order of punishment against which the present appeal. 22. This Court, on consideration of the argument and the finding recorded by the learned Single Judge in the impugned order, is required to consider: (i) Whether non-supply of the enquiry report and the second show cause notice said to have caused prejudice to the writ petitioner? (ii) The punishment of debarring the writ petitioner from promotion for three years can be said to be within the jurisdiction of the Disciplinary Authority? 23. It needs to refer herein that the learned Single Judge, however, has not taken into consideration the fact regarding the jurisdiction in imposing the punishment of debarring the writ petitioner from promotion for three years, but, this Court, being furtherance of the writ proceeding, is of the view that the same is also required to be considered and, therefore, the issue for the said purpose has been formulated hereinabove. 24. So far as the issue of non-supply of the enquiry report and second show cause notice is concerned, the reference needs to be made of the judgment rendered by Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Union of India and Others vs. Mohd. Ramzan Khan, (1991) 1 SCC 588 wherein the three Judges Bench of the Hon'ble Apex Court has laid down the law that due to non-supply of the enquiry report and the second show cause notice, the departmental proceeding is to be vitiated. But, subsequent to the said judgment, the matter again fell for consideration before the Constitution Bench in the case of Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad and Others vs. B. Karunakar and Others (Supra) wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court, as under paragraph 28, 29, 30(v), 31, and 34, has laid down that before coming to the conclusion about initiation of departmental proceeding, due to non-supply of enquiry report and the second show cause notice, the issue of prejudice is to be judged, for ready reference the relevant paragraphs of the aforesaid judgment are being referred and quoted hereunder as: “28. The position in law can also be looked at from a slightly different angle. The position in law can also be looked at from a slightly different angle. Article 311(2) says that the employee shall be given a “reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of the charges against him.” The findings on the charges given by a third person like the enquiry officer, particularly when they are not borne out by the evidence or are arrived at by overlooking the evidence or misconstruing it, could themselves constitute new unwarranted imputations. What is further, when the proviso to the said Article states that “where it is proposed after such inquiry, to impose upon him any such penalty, such penalty may be imposed on the basis of the evidence adduced during such inquiry and it shall not be necessary to give such person any opportunity of making representation on the penalty proposed”, it in effect accepts two successive stages of differing scope. Since the penalty is to be proposed after the inquiry, which inquiry in effect is to be carried out by the disciplinary authority (the enquiry officer being only his delegate appointed to hold the inquiry and to assist him), the employee's reply to the enquiry officer's report and consideration of such reply by the disciplinary authority also constitute an integral part of such inquiry. The second stage follows the inquiry so carried out and it consists of the issuance of the notice to show cause against the proposed penalty and of considering the reply to the notice and deciding upon the penalty. What is dispensed with is the opportunity of making representation on the penalty proposed and not of opportunity of making representation on the report of the enquiry officer. The latter right was always there. But before the Forty-second Amendment of the Constitution, the point of time at which it was to be exercised had stood deferred till the second stage viz., the stage of considering the penalty. Till that time, the conclusions that the disciplinary authority might have arrived at both with regard to the guilt of the employee and the penalty to be imposed were only tentative. All that has happened after the Forty-second Amendment of the Constitution is to advance the point of time at which the representation of the employee against the enquiry officer's report would be considered. All that has happened after the Forty-second Amendment of the Constitution is to advance the point of time at which the representation of the employee against the enquiry officer's report would be considered. Now, the disciplinary authority has to consider the representation of the employee against the report before it arrives at its conclusion with regard to his guilt or innocence of the charges. 29. Hence it has to be held that when the enquiry officer is not the disciplinary authority, the delinquent employee has a right to receive a copy of the enquiry officer's report before the disciplinary authority arrives at its conclusions with regard to the guilt or innocence of the employee with regard to the charges levelled against him. That right is a part of the employee's right to defend himself against the charges levelled against him. A denial of the enquiry officer's report before the disciplinary authority takes its decision on the charges, is a denial of reasonable opportunity to the employee to prove his innocence and is a breach of the principles of natural justice. 30. [v] The next question to be answered is what is the effect on the order of punishment when the report of the enquiry officer is not furnished to the employee and what relief should be granted to him in such cases. The answer to this question has to be relative to the punishment awarded. When the employee is dismissed or removed from service and the inquiry is set aside because the report is not furnished to him, in some cases the non-furnishing of the report may have prejudiced him gravely while in other cases it may have made no difference to the ultimate punishment awarded to him. Hence to direct reinstatement of the employee with back-wages in all cases is to reduce the rules of justice to a mechanical ritual. The theory of reasonable opportunity and the principles of natural justice have been evolved to uphold the rule of law and to assist the individual to vindicate his just rights. They are not incantations to be invoked nor rites to be performed on all and sundry occasions. Whether in fact, prejudice has been caused to the employee or not on account of the denial to him of the report, has to be considered on the facts and circumstances of each case. They are not incantations to be invoked nor rites to be performed on all and sundry occasions. Whether in fact, prejudice has been caused to the employee or not on account of the denial to him of the report, has to be considered on the facts and circumstances of each case. Where, therefore, even after the furnishing of the report, no different consequence would have followed, it would be a perversion of justice to permit the employee to resume duty and to get all the consequential benefits. It amounts to rewarding the dishonest and the guilty and thus to stretching the concept of justice to illogical and exasperating limits. It amounts to an “unnatural expansion of natural justice” which in itself is antithetical to justice. 31. Hence, in all cases where the enquiry officer's report is not furnished to the delinquent employee in the disciplinary proceedings, the Courts and Tribunals should cause the copy of the report to be furnished to the aggrieved employee if he has not already secured it before coming to the Court/Tribunal and give the employee an opportunity to show how his or her case was prejudiced because of the non-supply of the report. If after hearing the parties, the Court/Tribunal comes to the conclusion that the non-supply of the report would have made no difference to the ultimate findings and the punishment given, the Court/Tribunal should not interfere with the order of punishment. The Court/Tribunal should not mechanically set aside the order of punishment on the ground that the report was not furnished as is regrettably being done at present. The courts should avoid resorting to short cuts. Since it is the Courts/Tribunals which will apply their judicial mind to the question and give their reasons for setting aside or not setting aside the order of punishment, (and not any internal appellate or revisional authority), there would be neither a breach of the principles of natural justice nor a denial of the reasonable opportunity. It is only if the Court/Tribunal finds that the furnishing of the report would have made a difference to the result in the case that it should set aside the order of punishment. It is only if the Court/Tribunal finds that the furnishing of the report would have made a difference to the result in the case that it should set aside the order of punishment. Where after following the above procedure, the Court/Tribunal sets aside the order of punishment, the proper relief that should be granted is to direct reinstatement of the employee with liberty to the authority/management to proceed with the inquiry, by placing the employee under suspension and continuing the inquiry from the stage of furnishing him with the report. The question whether the employee would be entitled to the back-wages and other benefits from the date of his dismissal to the date of his reinstatement if ultimately ordered, should invariably be left to be decided by the authority concerned according to law, after the culmination of the proceedings and depending on the final outcome. If the employee succeeds in the fresh inquiry and is directed to be reinstated, the authority should be at liberty to decide according to law how it will treat the period from the date of dismissal till the reinstatement and to what benefits, if any and the extent of the benefits, he will be entitled. The reinstatement made as a result of the setting aside of the inquiry for failure to furnish the report, should be treated as a reinstatement for the purpose of holding the fresh inquiry from the stage of furnishing the report and no more, where such fresh inquiry is held. That will also be the correct position in law. 34. However, it cannot be gainsaid that while Mohd. Ramzan Khan Case (1991) 1 SCC 588 made the law laid down there prospective in operation, while disposing of the cases which were before the Court, the Court through inadvertence gave relief to the employees concerned in those cases by allowing their appeals and setting aside the disciplinary proceedings. The relief granted was obviously per incuriam. The said relief has, therefore, to be confined only to the employees concerned in those appeals. The law which is expressly made prospective in operation there, cannot be applied retrospectively on account of the said error. It is now well settled that the courts can make the law laid down by them prospective in operation to prevent unsettlement of the settled positions, to prevent administrative chaos and to meet the ends of justice. The law which is expressly made prospective in operation there, cannot be applied retrospectively on account of the said error. It is now well settled that the courts can make the law laid down by them prospective in operation to prevent unsettlement of the settled positions, to prevent administrative chaos and to meet the ends of justice. In this connection, we may refer to some well-known decisions on the point.” 25. The question of prejudice has been dealt with in the said judgment. There is no dispute that prejudice is required to be raised by the delinquent employee. Herein, the purpose of supply of enquiry report along with the show cause notice is to provide an opportunity as to what has come by way of finding by the Enquiry Officer and when the proposed punishment has been decided by the Disciplinary Authority to be imposed based upon the finding recorded by the Enquiry Officer then the requirement of providing such opportunity has been made mandatory so as not to cause any prejudice to the delinquent employee. 26. Herein, in the given facts of the case, the copy of the enquiry report has not been supplied, however, the plea was taken of no accountability of the delinquent employee, the writ petitioner, in causing suicide of one of the prisoner. 27. This Court, therefore, is of the view that in the aforesaid context it was the bounden duty of the Disciplinary Authority to supply copy of the enquiry report so as to put forth his defence against the punishment which was to be proposed and to be apprised to the delinquent employee before imposing the punishment that too the punishment major in nature. 28. It is further evident as has been admitted by learned State counsel that second show cause notice has also not been given and straightway the order of major punishment has been passed. 29. This Court, in view of the aforesaid admitted fact, is of the view that before inflicting the punishment which is major in nature, the requirement of law is to provide copy of the enquiry report and second show cause notice so as to provide an opportunity to the delinquent employee to put forth his defence. 30. 29. This Court, in view of the aforesaid admitted fact, is of the view that before inflicting the punishment which is major in nature, the requirement of law is to provide copy of the enquiry report and second show cause notice so as to provide an opportunity to the delinquent employee to put forth his defence. 30. After having discussed the legal position vis-à-vis the fact of the given case and coming back to the order passed by the learned Single Judge, it is evident that the learned Single Judge before coming to the conclusion regarding the propriety of the said punishment, has taken into consideration the judgment rendered by Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad and Others vs. B. Karunakar and Others (Supra), therefore, this Court is of the view that the order passed by the learned Single Judge so far as it relates to order inflicting punishment is concerned, the same cannot be said to suffer from an error. 31. The ground taken by the learned Single Judge with respect to second punishment, i.e. debarring the writ petitioner from promotion for three years, we have examined the list of punishment as provided under Rule 49 of the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1930 where there is no punishment to the effect that a punishment can be inflicted debarring from promotion for any particular year, for ready reference, the list of punishment enshrined under Rule 49 is being referred hereunder as: “49. The following penalties may, for good and sufficient reason and as hereinafter provided, be imposed upon members of the services comprised in any of the classes (1) to (5) specified in rule 14, namely: (i) Censure. (ii) Withholding of increments or promotion including stoppage at an efficiency bar. (iii) Reduction to a lower post or time-scale, or to a lower stage in a time-scale. (iv) Recovery from pay of the e whole or part of any pecuniary loss caused to Government by negligence or breach of orders. (iv-a) Compulsory retirement. (v) Suspension. (vi) Removal from the civil service of the Crown, which does not disqualify from future employment. (vii) Dismissal from the civil service of the Crown, which ordinarily disqualifies from future employment.” 32. (iv) Recovery from pay of the e whole or part of any pecuniary loss caused to Government by negligence or breach of orders. (iv-a) Compulsory retirement. (v) Suspension. (vi) Removal from the civil service of the Crown, which does not disqualify from future employment. (vii) Dismissal from the civil service of the Crown, which ordinarily disqualifies from future employment.” 32. The law is well settled that the Disciplinary Authority is only empowered to impose punishment if provided in the list of punishment, reference in this regard be made to the judgment rendered by Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Vijay Singh vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others, (2012) 5 SCC 242 wherein in a case leading to imposing punishment was not found to be under the statutory rules so prescribed and as such held to be without jurisdiction, as would appear from paragraph 11 to 15 and 23, which reads hereunder as: “11. Admittedly, the punishment imposed upon the appellant is not provided for under Rule 4 of Rules 1991. Integrity of a person can be withheld for sufficient reasons at the time of filling up the Annual Confidential Report. However, if the statutory rules so prescribe it can also be withheld as a punishment. The order passed by the Disciplinary Authority withholding the integrity certificate as a punishment for delinquency is without jurisdiction, not being provided under the Rules 1991, since the same could not be termed as punishment under the Rules. The Rules do not empower the Disciplinary Authority to impose “any other” major or minor punishment. It is a settled proposition of law that punishment not prescribed under the rules, as a result of disciplinary proceedings cannot be awarded. 12. This Court in State of U.P. and Others vs. Madhav Prasad Sharma, (2011) 2 SCC 212 , dealt with the aforesaid 1991 Rules and after quoting Rule 4 thereof held as under: “16. We are not concerned about other rule. The perusal of major and minor penalties prescribed in the above Rule makes it clear that sanctioning leave without pay is not one of the punishments prescribed, though, and under what circumstances leave has been sanctioned without pay is a different aspect with which we are not concerned for the present. However, Rule 4 makes it clear that sanction of leave without pay is not one of the punishments prescribed. However, Rule 4 makes it clear that sanction of leave without pay is not one of the punishments prescribed. Disciplinary authority is competent to impose appropriate penalty from those provided in Rule 4 of the Rules which deals with the major penalties and minor penalties. Denial of salary on the ground of “no work no pay” cannot be treated as a penalty in view of statutory provisions contained in Rule 4 defining the penalties in clear terms.” (Emphasis added) 13. The Authority has to act or purport to act in pursuance or execution or intended execution of the Statute or Statutory Rules. 14. The issue involved herein is required to be examined from another angle also. Holding departmental proceedings and recording a finding of guilt against any delinquent and imposing the punishment for the same is a quasi-judicial function and not administrative one. 15. Imposing the punishment for a proved delinquency is regulated and controlled by the statutory rules. Therefore, while performing the quasi-judicial functions, the authority is not permitted to ignore the statutory rules under which punishment is to be imposed. The disciplinary authority is bound to give strict adherence to the said rules. Thus, the order of punishment being outside the purview of the statutory rules is a nullity and cannot be enforced against the appellant. 23. Thus, in view of the above, the punishment order is not maintainable in the eyes of law. In the result, appeal succeeds and is allowed. The impugned order dated 8.7.2010 withholding integrity certificate for the year 2010 and all subsequent orders in this regard are quashed. Respondents are directed to consider the case of the appellant for all consequential benefits including promotion etc., if any, afresh taking into consideration the service record of the appellant in accordance with law.” 33. In the aforesaid judgment, the Hon'ble Apex Court has laid down parameter by restricting the jurisdiction of Disciplinary Authority not to inflict punishment if not enshrined in the list of punishment. 34. The purpose is if the imposed punishment is contrary to the punishment prescribed in the list of punishment, then it will be said to be without jurisdiction. 35. In the aforesaid judgment, the Hon'ble Apex Court has laid down parameter by restricting the jurisdiction of Disciplinary Authority not to inflict punishment if not enshrined in the list of punishment. 34. The purpose is if the imposed punishment is contrary to the punishment prescribed in the list of punishment, then it will be said to be without jurisdiction. 35. Herein also, the punishment of debarring a person from promotion for three years is not available in the list of punishment, hence, the order of punishment to the effect debarring the writ petitioner from promotion for three years cannot be said to be within the authority of law. 36. This Court, after having discussed the factual aspect with the legal position and coming back to the order passed by the learned Single Judge, is of the view that the learned Single Judge has taken into consideration the legal position and, as such, the order impugned needs no interference. 37. In the result, the instant appeal fails and is dismissed. 38. Interlocutory application for stay (I.A. No. 6954 of 2021) also stands dismissed.