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2023 DIGILAW 112 (JHR)

A. Ramji Yadav v. State of Jharkhand

2023-02-02

SUBHASH CHAND, SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD

body2023
ORDER : 1. The instant intra-court appeal, under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent, is directed against the order/judgment dated 10.11.2009 passed in W.P. (C) No. 234 of 2003 whereby and whereunder the learned Single Judge while dismissing the writ petition has refused to interfere with order dated 28.04.2001 passed by Special Officer, Scheduled Area Regulation (SAR), Ranchi in SAR Case No. 139/1998-99, appended as Annexure 4 to the writ petition; order dated 03.06.2002 passed by appellate authority in SAR Appeal No. 27R/01-02, appended as Annexure 5 to the writ petition; and order dated 01.10.2002 passed by revisional authority in SAR No. 102/2002-2003, appended as Annexure 6 to the writ petition; by which the application filed by respondent no. 5 before original authority for restoration of land under Section 71A of the Chotanagpur Tenancy Act, 1908 (hereinafter referred as to as ‘Act, 1908’) has been allowed with a direction to restore the land forthwith in favour of respondent no. 5. 2. The brief facts of the case, as per pleadings made in the writ petition, read as hereunder: 3. The appellants-writ petitioners are alleged to be the heirs and successors of their late elder brother-Ram Sati Yadav @ Ram Sati Gwala, who acquired lands in the year 1945 comprising an area of 91 decimals and 24 decimals appertaining to Plot No. 1492 and 1495 under Khata No. 46 in village Hinoo (total area 1.15 acres) and since acquisition Ram Sati Yadav continued to remain in possession of the property and thereafter his legal heirs and successors i.e., the present appellants-writ petitioners. 4. Subsequently, a dispute was raised between the original raiyat and said Ram Sati Yadav, as a result thereof, said Ram Sati Yadav filed a suit being Title Suit No. 26 of 1960 for declaration of right, title and interest over the land in question. The said suit ended in a compromise and thereby a compromise decree dated 29.02.1960 was passed wherein the defendant, the original raiyat, admitted the possession of the plaintiff over the suit land. 5. It is the case of the writ petitioners that after the aforesaid compromise decree passed in the said Title Suit No. 26 of 1960, said Ram Sati Yadav @ Ram Sati Gwala got his name mutated and regularly paid the rent with respect to said land and even constructed a pucca house and other structures thereupon. 6. 5. It is the case of the writ petitioners that after the aforesaid compromise decree passed in the said Title Suit No. 26 of 1960, said Ram Sati Yadav @ Ram Sati Gwala got his name mutated and regularly paid the rent with respect to said land and even constructed a pucca house and other structures thereupon. 6. It is further case of the writ petitioners-appellants that respondent no. 5-Sunil Oraon, claiming himself to be the legal heir and successor of khatiyani raiyat, filed an application before the Special Officer being SAR Case No. 139/1998-99 under Section 71A of the Act, 1908 for restoration of land of total area of 8 decimals of land, falling under his share, mainly on the ground that the land in question has been obtained by the Opposite Parties (writ petitioners-appellants) by means of fraud alleged to have taken place seven years ago from the date of filing of this application. The writ petitioners-appellants appeared before Special Officer and filed show cause. The Special Officer finally passed an order on 28.04.2001 whereby the possession of the petitioners over the land in question was held to be illegal and direction was passed for restoration of entire piece of land comprising an area of 1.15 acres. 7. Being aggrieved thereof, the writ petitioners-appellants preferred appeal before the appellate authority being SAR Appeal No. 27R/01-02, which was dismissed vide order dated 03.06.2002, against which, revision petition being SAR No. 102/2002-2003 was filed, which was also dismissed vide order dated 01.10.2002. 8. Being aggrieved with the order passed by the original authority, appellant authority and the revisional authority, the petitioners-appellants approached this Court by filing writ petition being W.P. (C) No. 234 of 2003, which was dismissed vide order dated 10.11.2009, refusing to interfere with the concurrent finding recorded by revenue authorities, which is the subject matter of instant intra-court appeal. 9. It is evident from the fact, as pleaded on behalf of parties, that an application was filed under Section 71A of the Act, 1908 for restoration of land by respondent no. 5 on the ground that the appellants came in possession of the land without seeking any permission from Deputy Commissioner, as required under the provisions of Section 46 of the Act, 1908. 5 on the ground that the appellants came in possession of the land without seeking any permission from Deputy Commissioner, as required under the provisions of Section 46 of the Act, 1908. The Special Officer, SAR, Ranchi initiated a proceeding being SAR Case No. 139/1998-99 under Section 71A of the Act, 1908 wherein the Opposite Parties (writ petitioners-appellants herein) were called upon to participate in the proceeding. In pursuance thereto, the writ petitioners-appellants appeared before Special Officer and filed their show cause stating that they are in possession over the land in question since 1945 and further a suit being Title Suit No. 26 of 1960 seeking declaration of right, title and interest over the land in question was filed by the writ petitioner, which was ended in a compromise and thereby a compromise decree dated 29.02.1960 was passed wherein the defendant had admitted the possession of the plaintiff over the suit land and since then they (writ petitioners) are in peaceful possession over the land in question. 10. While on the other hand, it is the case of respondent no. 5, who had filed application for restoration of land, that the possession as has been shown by writ petitioners-appellants over the land in question is in complete violation of the provision of Section 46 of the Act, 1908 since the writ petitioners-appellants has come to the possession over the land in question without seeking permission from the Deputy Commissioner, as required under Section 46 of the Act, 1908. 11. The Special Officer, while dealing with the issue, has passed an order by coming to the conclusion that there is violation of provision as contained under Section 46 of the Act, 1908. Such finding has been recorded on the basis of consideration of the fact that a compromise decree passed in Title Suit No. 26 of 1960 has been considered to be obtained by means of fraud upon the Statute and the Court. The writ petitioner being aggrieved with such finding preferred appeal, but the appellate authority refused to interfere with the order passed by the original authority, as such the petitioner preferred revision, which was also dismissed. 12. The writ petitioner being aggrieved with such finding preferred appeal, but the appellate authority refused to interfere with the order passed by the original authority, as such the petitioner preferred revision, which was also dismissed. 12. The appellants-writ petitioners being aggrieved with the order passed by the authorities approached this Court by filing writ petition being W.P. (C) No. 234 of 2003 but the learned Single Judge has also dismissed the writ petition by refusing to interfere with the orders passed by the authorities concerned and uphold the finding recorded by original authority with respect to restoration of land in favour of respondent no. 5, the said order is under question before this intra-court appeal. 13. Mr. J.P. Jha, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants-writ petitioners has raised the question that the issue of limitation having been raised before the authority concerned on the basis of fact that the writ petitioners-appellants are in possession over the land in question since 1945 and the application under Section 71A of the Act, 1908 for restoration of the said land has been filed in the 1998-1999 and therefore, the said application having been filed after lapse of period of more than 30 years and as such the said application is hopelessly barred by limitation. 14. Reliance in this regard has been placed upon the judgment rendered by Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Situ Sahu v. State of Jharkhand, (2004) 8 SCC 340 : 2004 (4) JCR SC 211 wherein while interpreting the provision of Section 71A of the Act, 1908 more particularly while interpretation the phrase ‘at any time’, as has been referred under Section 71-A of the Act, 1908, it has been held that ‘at any time’ does not mean that application for restoration of land can be filed after delay of reasonable period. 15. Therefore, argument has been advanced that since 1945 the petitioners are in the possession of the land and application for restoration of the land in question has been filed in the year 1998-1999, which admittedly is beyond the period of 30 years and as such the order of restoration as has been passed by the revenue authorities as also the order passed by the writ Court refusing to interfere with the order passed by the revenue authorities cannot be said to be proper. 16. On the other hand, Mr. 16. On the other hand, Mr. P.P.N. Roy, learned senior counsel being assisted by Mr. Pragati Prasad, learned counsel appearing for respondent no. 5, referring to the order passed by the original authority has submitted that there is no infirmity in the order passed by the revenue authorities since the fact in entirety has been considered to the effect that possession as has been claimed by the writ petitioner-appellant since 1945 has been discarded as no document in support thereof has been filed before the authority concerned substantiating the plea of having possession over the land in question since 1945. 17. Further even accepting the contention of the appellants that title suit was filed in the year 1960 [Title Suit No. 26 of 1960] but the same has been ended in terms of compromise, vide compromise decree dated 29.02.1960, which cannot be said to be conclusive proof of dispossession, which is required to be ascertained in order to assess the period of limitation for entertaining the application filed under Section 71A of the Act, 1908, and as such the contention which has been raised that the period of 30 years to be counted either from 1945 or from the year 1960, when the said title suit was filed, the same cannot be said to be proper since the limitation was required to be counted from the date of dispossession. 18. This Court has heard learned senior counsel appearing for the parties, perused the documents available on record and the finding recorded by the revenue authorities as also the learned Single Judge in the impugned order. 19. This Court, before scrutinizing the legality and propriety of the impugned orders, deems it fit and proper to refer certain statutory provision as provided under the Act, 1908. 20. For ready reference, relevant provisions as under Sections 46 and 71A are re-produced hereunder as: 46. Restrictions on transfer of their right by Raiyat: (1) No transfer by a Raiyat of his right in his holding or any portion thereof: (a) by mortgagte or lease for any period expressed or implied which exceeds or might in any possible event exceed five years. Restrictions on transfer of their right by Raiyat: (1) No transfer by a Raiyat of his right in his holding or any portion thereof: (a) by mortgagte or lease for any period expressed or implied which exceeds or might in any possible event exceed five years. (b) by sale, gift or any other contract or agreement, shall be valid to any extent: Provided that a Raiyat may enter into a ‘bhugut bundha’ mortgage of his holding or any portion thereof for any period not exceeding seven years or if the mortgagee be a society registered or deemed to be registered under the ‘Bihar and Orissa Cooperative Societies Act, 1935 (B&O Act VI of 1935) for any period not exceeding fifteen years: Provided further that: (a) an occupancy-Raiyat, who is [a member of the Scheduled Tribes] may transfer with the previous sanction of the Deputy Commissioner his right in his holding or a portion of his holding by sale, exchange, gift or will to [another person, who is a member of the Scheduled Tribes and], who is a resident within the local limits of the area of the police station within which the holding is situate. (b) an occupancy-Raiyat, who is a member of the [Scheduled Castes or Backward Classes] may transfer with the previous sanction of the Deputy Commissioner his right in his holding or a portion of his holding by sale, exchange, gift, will or lease to another person, who is a member of the [Scheduled Castes or, as the case may be, Backward Classes] and who is a resident within the local limits of the district within which the holding is situate [***]. (c) any occupancy-Raiyat may, transfer his right in his holding or any portion thereof to a society or bank registered or deemed to be registered under the ‘Bihar and Orissa Cooperative Societies Act, 1935 (Bihar and Orissa Act VI of 1935), or to the State Bank of India or a bank specified in column 2 of the First Schedule to the Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Act, 1970 (5 of 1970) or to a company or a corporation owned by, or in which less than fifty-one per cent of the share capital is held by the State Government or the Central Government or partly by the State Government, and partly by the Central Government, and which has been set up with a view to provide agricultural credit to cultivators. (d) any occupancy-Raiyat, who is not a member of the Scheduled Tribes, Scheduled Castes or Backward classes, may, transfer his right in his holding or any portion thereof by sale, exchange, gift, will, mortgage or otherwise to any other person. (2) A transfer by a Raiyat of his right in his holding or any portion thereof under subsection (1) shall be binding on the landlords. (3) No transfer of contravention of sub-section (1), shall be registered or shall be in any way recognised as valid by any Court, whatever in exercise, of civil, criminal or revenue jurisdiction. (3-A) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, the Deputy Commissioner shall be a necessary party in all suits of a civil nature relating to any holding or portion thereof in which one of the parties to the suits is a member of the Scheduled Tribes and the other party is not a member of the Scheduled Tribes. (4) At any time within three years after the expiration of the period or which a Raiyat has under clause (a) of sub-section (1) transferred his right in his holding or any portion thereof, the Deputy Commissioner shall on the application of the Raiyat put the Raiyat into possession of such holding or portion in the prescribed manner. (4) At any time within three years after the expiration of the period or which a Raiyat has under clause (a) of sub-section (1) transferred his right in his holding or any portion thereof, the Deputy Commissioner shall on the application of the Raiyat put the Raiyat into possession of such holding or portion in the prescribed manner. (4-A) (a) The Deputy Commissioner may, of his own motion or on an application filed before him by an occupancy-Raiyat, who is a member of the Scheduled Tribes, for annulling the transfer on the ground that the transfer was made in contravention of clause (a) of the second proviso to sub-section (1), hold an inquiry in the prescribed manner to determine if the transfer has been made in contravention of clause (a) of the second proviso to sub-section (1): Provided that no such application be entertained by the Deputy Commissioner unless it is filed by the occupancy-tenant within a period of twelve years from the date of transfer of his holding or any portion thereof: Provided further that before passing any order under clause (b) or clause (c) of this subsection, the Deputy Commissioner shall give the parties concerned a reasonable opportunity to be heard in the matter. (b) If after holding the inquiry referred to in clause (a) of this subsection, the Deputy Commissioner finds that there was no contravention of clause (a) of the second proviso to sub-section (1) in making such transfer, he shall reject the application and may award such costs to the transferee to be paid by the transferor as he may, in the circumstances of the case, deem fit. (c) If after holding the inquiry referred to in clause (a) of this subsection, the Deputy Commissioner finds that such transfer was made in contravention of clause (a) of the second proviso to subsection (1), he shall annul the transfer and eject the transferee from such holding or portion thereof, as the case may be and put the transferor in possession thereof: Provided that if the transferee has constructed any building or structure, such holding or portion thereof, the Deputy Commissioner shall, if the transferor is not willing to pay the value of the same, order the transferee to remove the same within a period of six months from the date of the order, or within such extended time not exceeding two years from the date of the order as the Deputy Commissioner may allow failing which the Deputy Commissioner may get such building or structure removed: Provided further that where the Deputy Commissioner is satisfied that the transferee has constructed a substantial structure or building on such holding or portion thereof before the commencement of the Chota Nagpur Tenancy (Amendment) Act, 1969 (President's Act 4 of 1969) he may, notwithstanding any other provisions of this Act, validate such a transfer made in contravention of clause (a) of the second proviso to sub-section (1), if the transferee either makes available to the transferor an alternative holding or portion of a holding, as the case may be, of the equivalent value, in the vicinity or pays adequate compensation to be determined by the Deputy Commissioner for rehabilitation of the transferor. Explanation - In this Section “substantial structure or building” means the structure or building of the value exceeding five thousand rupees on the date of holding inquiry, but it does not include such structure or building of any value the materials of which cannot be removed without incurring substantial depreciation in its value. (5) Nothing in this Section shall affect the validity of any transfer (of otherwise invalid) of a Raiyats right in his holding or any portion thereof made bona fide before the first day of January 1908 in the Chota Nagpur Division except the district of ‘Manbhum’ or before the first day of January 1909, in the district of ‘Manbhum’. (5) Nothing in this Section shall affect the validity of any transfer (of otherwise invalid) of a Raiyats right in his holding or any portion thereof made bona fide before the first day of January 1908 in the Chota Nagpur Division except the district of ‘Manbhum’ or before the first day of January 1909, in the district of ‘Manbhum’. (6) In this Section [and in Section 47]: (a) “Scheduled Casted” means such castes, races or tribes as are specified in Part II of the Scheduled to the Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950; (b) “Scheduled Tribes” means such tribes or tribal communities or parts of or groups within such tribes or tribal communities as are specified in Part II of the Scheduled to the Constitution (Scheduled Tribes) Order, 1950; and (c) “Backward classed” means such classes of citizens as may be declared by the State Government, by notification in the Official Gazette, to be socially and educationally backward. “71A. “71A. Power to restore possession to member of the Scheduled Tribes over land unlawfully transferred: If at any time, it comes to the notice of the Deputy Commissioner that transfer of land belonging to a raiyat [or a Mundari Khunt Kattidar or a Bhuinhari] who is a member of the Scheduled Tribes has taken place in contravention of section 46 [or section 48 or Section 240] or any other provision of this Act or by any fraudulent method, [including decrees obtained in suit by fraud and collusion] he may, after giving reasonable opportunity to the transferee, who is proposed to be evicted, to show cause and after making necessary enquiry in the matter, evict the transferee from such land without payment of compensation and restore it to the transferor or his heir, or in case the transferor or his heir is not available or is not willing to agree to such restoration, re-settle it with another raiyat belonging to the Scheduled Tribes according to the village custom for the disposal of an abandoned holding: Provided that if the transferee has, within 30 years from the date of transfer, constructed any building or structure on such holding or portion thereof, the Deputy Commissioner shall, if the transferor is not willing to pay the value of the same, order the transferee to remove the same within a period of six months from the date of the order, or within such extended time not exceeding two years from the date of the order as the Deputy Commissioner may allow, failing which the Deputy Commissioner may get such building or structure removed: Provided further that where the Deputy Commissioner is satisfied that the transferee has constructed a substantial structure or building on such holding or portion thereof before coming into force of the Bihar Scheduled Areas Regulation, 1969, he may notwithstanding any other provisions of the Act, validate such transfer where the transferee either makes available to the transferor an alternative holding or portion thereof as the case may be, of the equivalent value of the vicinity or pays adequate compensation to be determined by the Deputy Commissioner for rehabilitation of the transferor: Provided also that if after an enquiry the Deputy Commissioner is satisfied that the transferee has acquired a title by adverse possession and that the transferred land should be restored or re-settled, he shall require the transferor or his heir or another raiyat, as the case may be, to deposit with the Deputy Commissioner such sum of the money as may be determined by the Deputy Commissioner having regard to the amount for which the land was transferred or the market value of the land, as the case may be, and the amount of any compensation for improvements effected to the land which the Deputy Commissioner may deem fair and equitable.” 21. It is evident from the provisions of Section 46 of the Act, 1908 that there is embargo in transfer of land, save and except, the permission granted by the Deputy Commissioner. 22. The Chotanagpur Tenancy Act since is a beneficial legislation enacted as a piece of beneficial legislation to protect the welfare of the tribal people living in the Chotanagpur region and as such the object and intent of the Act is to protect their interest and further several provisions have been inserted therein so that the land which belongs to the tribal people of the Chotanagpur region may not be transferred and may not go to possession of non-tribal people without following the provision as contained in the Act, 1908. 23. It further appears from the Act, 1908 that at the time when the Act was enacted there was no provision for restoration of land save and except the provision as contained under Section 46 [(4-A) (a) of the Act, 1908 which provides the period of limitation for 12 years so far as the land belongs to the non-scheduled area is concerned. 24. Therefore, the legislature has thought for insertion of a provision for making an application for restoration of land in case the land having been transferred without taking recourse of the provision as contained under the Act, 1908 and accordingly Section 71A of the Act, 1908 was inserted by way of amendment to be known as Schedule Area Regulation Act, 1969. 25. Section 71A of the Act, 1908 begins with the phrase ‘at any time’ and speaks that if it comes to the knowledge of the District Commissioner concerned that the land has been transferred without following the statutory provision, as contained under the Act, 1908, the Deputy Commissioner will have power to invalidate such transfer depending upon such exception(s) as carved out under Proviso to Section 71A of the Act, 1908. 26. By passage of time, an issue has crept up that what would be termed as ‘at any time’. The matter travelled to the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Situ Sahu (Supra) wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court has given its thoughtful consideration to the phrase ‘at any time’ and has held at paragraphs 10, 13 to 16, which reads as under: “10. The matter travelled to the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Situ Sahu (Supra) wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court has given its thoughtful consideration to the phrase ‘at any time’ and has held at paragraphs 10, 13 to 16, which reads as under: “10. Apart from the reasoning given by the High Court, it appears to us that the judgment of this Court in Ibrahimpatnam (2003) 7 SCC 667 is decisive on the contention of limitation urged before us. Under somewhat similar circumstances suo motu power was given to the Collector under Section 50-B(iv) of the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1950 to call for and examine the record relating to any certificate issued or proceedings taken by the Tahsildar under this section for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the legality or propriety of such certificate or as to the regularity of such proceedings and pass such order in relation thereto as he may think fit. In this judgment, to which one of us (Shivaraj V. Patil, J.) was a party, the Court observed (SCC pp. 676-677, Para 9): “9. Even before the Division Bench of the High Court in the writ appeals, the appellants did not contend that the suo motu power could be exercised even after a long delay of 13-15 years because of the fraudulent acts of the non-official respondents. The focus of attention before the Division Bench was only on the language of sub-section (4) of Section 50-B of the Act as to whether the suo motu power could be exercised at any time strictly sticking to the language of that sub-section or it could be exercised within reasonable time. In the absence of necessary and sufficient particulars pleaded as regards fraud and the date or period of discovery of fraud and more so when the contention that the suo motu power could be exercised within a reasonable period from the date of discovery of fraud was not urged, the learned Single Judge as well as the Division Bench of the High Court were right in not examining the question of fraud alleged to have been committed by the non-official respondents. Use of the words ‘at any time’ in sub-section (4) of Section 50-B of the Act only indicates that no specific period of limitation is prescribed within which the suo motu power could be exercised reckoning or starting from a particular date advisedly and contextually. Exercise of suo motu power depended on facts and circumstances of each case. In cases of fraud, this power could be exercised within a reasonable time from the date of detection or discovery of fraud. While exercising such power, several factors need to be kept in mind such as effect on the rights of the third parties over the immovable property due to passage of considerable time, change of hands by subsequent bona fide transfers, the orders attaining finality under the provisions of other Acts (such as the Land Ceiling Act). Hence, it appears that without stating from what date the period of limitation starts and within what period the suo motu power is to be exercised, in sub-section (4) of Section 50-B of the Act, the words ‘at any time’ are used so that the suo motu power could be exercised within reasonable period from the date of discovery of fraud depending on facts and circumstances of each case in the context of the statute and nature of rights of the parties. Use of the words ‘at any time’ in sub-section (4) of Section 50-B of the Act cannot be rigidly read letter by letter. It must be read and construed contextually and reasonably. If one has to simply proceed on the basis of the dictionary meaning of the words ‘at any time’, the suo motu power under sub-section (4) of Section 50-B of the Act could be exercised even after decades and then it would lead to anomalous position leading to uncertainty and complications seriously affecting the rights of the parties, that too, over immovable properties. Orders attaining finality and certainty of the rights of the parties accrued in the light of the orders passed must have sanctity. Exercise of suo motu power ‘at any time’ only means that no specific period such as days, months or years are not (sic) prescribed reckoning from a particular date. But that does not mean that ‘at any time’ should be unguided and arbitrary. Exercise of suo motu power ‘at any time’ only means that no specific period such as days, months or years are not (sic) prescribed reckoning from a particular date. But that does not mean that ‘at any time’ should be unguided and arbitrary. In this view, ‘at any time’ must be understood as within a reasonable time depending on the facts and circumstances of each case in the absence of prescribed period of limitation.” “13. We will assume that the surrender of tenancy on 7.2.1938 and the settlement of the lands on the present appellant on 25.2.1938 were in quick succession and could be viewed as parts of the same transaction within the meaning of the term ‘transfer’ as contemplated by the Act. Nonetheless, it has not been established before us that the transfer was contrary to any other provisions of the Act. 14. We shall now examine the last argument of Shri Narasimha that the transfer was fraudulent. Even on this, we are afraid that the appellants are entitled to succeed. We need not go into the details of the transaction for we may even assume that the transfer was fraudulent. Even then, as held in Ibrahimpatnam (supra), the power under Section 71A could have been exercised only within a reasonable time. Looking to the facts and circumstances of the present appeal, we are not satisfied that the Special officer exercised his powers under Section 71A within a reasonable period of time. The lapse of 40 years is certainly not a reasonable time for exercise of power, even if it is not hedged in by a period of limitation. We derive support to our view from the observations made by this Court in Jai Mangal Oraon case (supra) which was also a case which arose under the very same provision of law. There this Court took the view that Section 46(4)(a), which envisaged a prior sanction of the Deputy Commissioner before effecting the transfer in any of the modes stated therein, was introduced only in the year 1947 (with effect from 5.1.1948) and no such provision existed during the relevant point of time when the surrender was made in that case (15.1.1942). Obviously, therefore, no such provision existed in 1938, and the same reasoning applies. 15. Obviously, therefore, no such provision existed in 1938, and the same reasoning applies. 15. In the result, therefore, we are of the view that the Special Officer ought not to have exercised his powers under Section 71A of the Act after such an unreasonable long period of time, in the facts and circumstances of the case brought to light. 16. The appellants succeed. The impugned judgment of the High Court and the impugned judgments of the authorities below are all set aside and the application for restoration made by the fifth respondent being SAR 415/77-78 is dismissed. (Emphasis supplied) 27. At any time does not mean that such application can be filed even beyond the reasonable period. 28. The main argument advanced by learned senior counsel for the writ petitioners-appellants by referring to the impugned order passed by learned Single Judge that however, the learned Single Judge has taken into consideration the judgment passed by Hon'ble Apex Court in the Funchand Munda v. State of Bihar, (2008) 14 SCC 774 : 2008 (2) JCR (SC) wherein the issue of limitation was the subject matter, in which, it has been held that although there is no period of limitation prescribed for exercising the power under Section 71A by the Deputy Commissioner, the party affected is called upon to approach the appropriate authority or the power has to be exercised by the Deputy Commissioner within a reasonable period of time but did not give any specific finding to that effect, as such the impugned judgment passed by learned Single Judge cannot be said to be proper and justified because in absence of any determination of period of limitation i.e., as to whether it is filed within reasonable time or beyond reasonable time. 29. We are in agreement with the submission advanced by learned counsel for the appellants in this regard since when the law has been settled by Hon'ble Apex Court by making interpretation of provision of Section 71A of the Act, 1908 clarifying the meaning of phrase ‘at any time’ as has been given in Section 71A of the Act, 1908 then it is the bounden duty of the authorities as also the learned Single Judge to give a conclusive finding in that regard. 30. 30. The provision of Section 71A of the Act, 1908 speaks that the application may be filed ‘at any time’ and if it comes to the notice of the Deputy Commissioner that the transfer of land belonging to raiyat has taken place in contravention of section 46 or any other provision of this Act or by any fraudulent method, including decrees obtained in suit by fraud and collusion, he may, after giving reasonable opportunity to the transferee, who is proposed to be evicted, to show cause and after making necessary enquiry in the matter, evict the transferee from such land without payment of compensation and restore it to the transferor or his heir, or in case the transferor or his heir is not available or is not willing to agree to such restoration, re-settle it with another raiyat belonging to the Scheduled Tribes, subject to exceptions as carved out under proviso to Section 71A of the Act. 31. The issue of limitation since is the core issue for consideration before this Court and as such, we are of the view that there must be conclusive finding to that effect in view of law as has been laid down by Hon'ble Apex Court in the judgment rendered in Situ Sahu (supra). 32. It appears from the order passed by the revenue authorities that a conclusion has been arrived at by giving direction for restoration of land on the ground of violation of provision of Section 46 of the Act, 1908. But the revenue authorities have failed to consider the issue of limitation since there is no finding to that effect so also by the learned Single Judge. 33. But the revenue authorities have failed to consider the issue of limitation since there is no finding to that effect so also by the learned Single Judge. 33. The contention has been raised on behalf of appellant that even counting the period of limitation from the year 1960, the day when the compromise decree has been passed then also the application so filed under Section 71A of the Act, 1908 is beyond the period of 30 years since the Original Application being SAR Case No. 139/1998-999 has been filed sometimes in the year 1998-1999 but aforesaid contention according to our considered view and as the law settled in this regard to the effect that the title shown to have in favour of non-tribal on the basis of a collusive decree cannot be said to be valid proof of transfer of the land as has been held by this Court in the case of Bhuwang Oroan v. State of Jharkhand, 2009 (1) JCR 299 (Jhr). 34. For ready reference, the relevant paragraph 5 of the judgment quoted hereunder as: “5. Part C of the Vth Schedule of the Constitution of India confers power upon the President of India to declare any area to be scheduled area. Article 244 read with Vth Schedule of the Constitution of India makes it clear that the main object of the framer of the Constitution and the framer of the Regulation is to protect the interest of the members of the Scheduled Tribes who were being exploited at the hands of the others. With the aforesaid object, Section 71-A conferred power upon the Deputy Commissioner to take action in accordance with the provisions of the Regulation. The Deputy Commissioner has been empowered to restore possession of the land belonging to members of Scheduled Tribes who have been dispossessed from their lands illegally and fraudulently or in contravention of the provisions of the Act. It has been well settled now that the Deputy Commissioner in exercise of power under Section 71-A can restore the land even in cases where he is satisfied that a collusive decree was obtained in respect of the land against the tribal by practising fraud, undue influence or by collusive methods.” (Emphasis supplied) 35. It has been well settled now that the Deputy Commissioner in exercise of power under Section 71-A can restore the land even in cases where he is satisfied that a collusive decree was obtained in respect of the land against the tribal by practising fraud, undue influence or by collusive methods.” (Emphasis supplied) 35. Further this Court in the case of Etwa Oraon v. Karo Oraon, 2004 SCC Online Jhar 990 : (2004) 2 JLJR 169 (Jhr) the Hon'ble Court has been pleased to hold that by virtue of Section 71A of the Act, the Deputy Commissioner has the power to evict the transferee from the land if the transfer has taken place in contravention of Section 46 or any other provision of the Act or by any fraudulent method which includes fraud or collusion that power can be exercised by him at any time. 36. For ready reference, the relevant paragraph 10 of the judgment is quoted hereunder as: 10. It is, therefore, clear that by virtue of Section 71A of the said Act the Deputy Commissioner has the power to evict the transferee from the land if the transfer has taken place in contravention of Section 46 or any other provisions of the Act or by any fraudulent method in suits by fraud or collusion and that the power can be exercised by him at any time. To hold that power of the Deputy Commissioner is limited to setting aside or ignoring only transfers of lands which have taken place after the coming into force of Section 71A of the Act would involve reading limitations into the exercise of the power which are not there in the Act and there would be no warrant for reading the limitation that the impugned transfer of the land must have taken place prior to coming into force of the section. The provisions which, I have quoted above makes it crystal clear that the power extends direct restoration of land transfers of which were made prior to the coming into force of the Regulation by which Section 71A was introduced in the Act. The provisions which, I have quoted above makes it crystal clear that the power extends direct restoration of land transfers of which were made prior to the coming into force of the Regulation by which Section 71A was introduced in the Act. Furthermore, the period of limitation is 30 years within which an application shall lie before the Deputy Commissioner under Section 71A for restoration of possession, in case, the transfer has been taken place in contravention of Section 46 or any other provisions of the said Act or by any fraudulent method. Here in this case, the auction sale took place on 24.8.1942 in Execution Case No. 82 (R)-9 of 1942-43 and sale was confirmed on 25.11.1942 and sale certificate was issued to the auction purchaser Gajadhar Ram Pandey on 19.6.1943 and decree was effected in his favour on 10.9.1943. The plaintiff-appellant filed an application under Section 71A of the said Act before the Deputy Commissioner in the year 1977-1978 which gave rise to S.R. Case No. 57 of 1977-78 i.e. after the expiry of the statutory period of 30 years and the Deputy Commissioner vide order dated 9.2.1998 dismissed the application of the plaintiff-appellant finding the auction sale not at all in contravention of any provision of the Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act much less Section 46 of the said Act. The contention of the plaintiff-appellant that the said application was filed under mistake has no relevancy in this case and in this view of the matter there is no question of declaring the order of the Deputy Commissioner passed under Section 71A of the said Act as void and illegal. However, both the courts below have found the suit filed by the plaintiff-appellant not maintainable on the ground that in view of the order under Section 71A of the said Act, Civil Court has no jurisdiction. Both the courts below have erred in coming to the finding to that effect. It is pertinent to mention here that in the case of Luthra Uraon v. Samua Uraon, AIR 1948 Pat. Both the courts below have erred in coming to the finding to that effect. It is pertinent to mention here that in the case of Luthra Uraon v. Samua Uraon, AIR 1948 Pat. 49 it has been observed that the first part of Section 258 of the Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act did not operate to bar the suit, inasmuch as the substance and scope of the decision of the Deputy Commissioner being quite different from the substance and scope demanded from the civil court and the decision of the civil court will not, therefore, vary, modify or set aside the decisions of the Deputy Commissioner. It has further been observed which runs thus:— “Where a suit for declaration of a raiyat's title and ejectment of the transferee is filed in a civil Court after the period of three years mentioned in the old Section 46(4) has elapsed and therefore, the Deputy Commissioner can no longer entertain any application thereunder, the Deputy Commissioner cannot be said to be competent to try the suit within the meaning of Section 11, Civil P.C. inasmuch as the opening words of Section 46(4), “At any time………portion thereof” can properly be understood as affecting the jurisdiction of the Deputy Commissioner to hear the application therein authorised and not as merely imposing a limit of time and, therefore, the suit is not barred either by Section 258 or by Sections 139 and 139A.” (Emphasis supplied) 37. But hereafter the law having been settled by Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Situ Sahu (supra), the question of consideration of filing application under Section 71A of the Act, 1908 to be made within a reasonable time is the issue to be decided but the same has not been decided. 38. The contention of the appellant that the cut-off date if is not to be taken from the year 1945 then it will be 1960, the date when title suit was filed, as such the application filed under Section 71A of the Act, 1908 is beyond the reasonable period of 30 years, as has been held in the case of Situ Sahu (supra). 39. 39. But the question would be that merely by filing a title suit, which resulted into compromise decree can it be said to be date to be actual dispossession counting the period of limitation of filing application under Section 71 A of the Act as per the judgment rendered in the case of Situ Sahu (supra). 40. This Court, after having scrutinized the order passed by the revenue authorities as also the order passed by learned Single Judge, has found that no conclusion having been arrived at regarding the date of dispossession from which the reasonable period is to be counted maintaining an application for restoration of the land in question. 41. A question may arise that why the order has been passed by way of decree of compromise be not considered to be a valid document. The position of law is well settled that the compromise decree since has been said to be fraud upon the Statute and the Court and once it has been held to be fraud upon the Statute and the Court and as such the aforesaid document cannot be said to be conclusive proof to establish the possession over the land in question. 42. This Court after having discussed the aforesaid facts, as above and taking into consideration the fact that the maintainability of the application filed under Section 71A of the Act, 1908 said to be beyond the period of 30 years since has not been considered on the basis of delivery of possession said to be made in favour of the appellant by respondent no. 5 and hence the order passed by the revenue authorities, according to our considered view, require interference due to non-consideration of the vital issue of limitation. 43. Furthermore, the learned single Judge has also failed to consider the aforesaid aspect of the matter, however, reference of a judgment has been made but there is no finding to that effect. 44. There is no dispute that if any issue is being raised before any quasi judicial authority or Court of law, it is the bounden duty of such authority or the Court of law to consider. Consideration means active consideration of mind, as has been held by Hon'ble Apex Court in Chairman, Life Insurance Corporation of India v. A. Masilamani, (2013) 6 SCC 530 , in particular paragraph 19, which reads hereunder as:— “19. Consideration means active consideration of mind, as has been held by Hon'ble Apex Court in Chairman, Life Insurance Corporation of India v. A. Masilamani, (2013) 6 SCC 530 , in particular paragraph 19, which reads hereunder as:— “19. The word “consider” is of great significance. The dictionary meaning of the same is, “to think over”, “to regard as”, or “deem to be”. Hence, there is a clear connotation to the effect that there must be active application of mind. In other words, the term “consider” postulates consideration of all relevant aspects of a matter. Thus, formation of opinion by the statutory authority should reflect intense application of mind with reference to the material available on record. The order of the authority itself should reveal such application of mind. The appellate authority cannot simply adopt the language employed by the disciplinary authority and proceed to affirm its order.” 45. Therefore, as per the interpretation of the word ‘consideration’ as has been done by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Chairman, Life Insurance Corporation of India v. A. Masilamani (supra) the consideration means active consideration of mind and as such on the issue which has been raised since there is no consideration of the period of limitation, this Court is of the view that there is no consideration on the point of limitation. 46. Therefore, this Court is of the view that non-consideration of the vital issue i.e., the issue of limitation which is mixed question of fact and law ought to have been considered by the quasi judicial authority as also by the learned Single Judge. 47. The matter could have been remanded to the learned Single Judge had there been consideration by the quasi judicial authorities with respect to the period of limitation but we, after going through the order passed by the quasi judicial authorities, have found that there is non-consideration of this issue by the quasi judicial authority too. 48. 47. The matter could have been remanded to the learned Single Judge had there been consideration by the quasi judicial authorities with respect to the period of limitation but we, after going through the order passed by the quasi judicial authorities, have found that there is non-consideration of this issue by the quasi judicial authority too. 48. Therefore, this Court is of the view that the orders passed by the quasi judicial authorities as also the order passed by learned Single Judge requires interference by this Court for fresh consideration on the issue of ascertaining the period of limitation on the basis of factual aspect as to what would be the date of dispossession treating the same to be cut off date for counting the period of limitation maintaining an application filed under the provisions of Section 71A of the Act, 1908. 49. Learned Single Judge however has opined while dismissing the writ petition that taking into consideration the concurrent finding as has been arrived at by the quasi judicial authorities, no interference is required. But the issue is well settled that the concurrent finding recorded by the authorities cannot be said to be sufficient ground to uphold any decision rather the learned Single Judge ought to have taken into consideration the vital aspect of the matter of the issue of limitation which has not been considered by the authorities. Therefore, we are of the considered view that the order passed by the learned Single Judge requires interference. 50. Accordingly, order/judgment dated 10.11.2000 passed in W.P. (C) No. 234 of 2003 by the learned Single Judge as also order dated 28.04.2001 passed by Special Officer, Scheduled Area Regulation, Ranchi in SAR Case No. 139/1998-99; order dated 03.06.2002 passed by appellate authority in SAR Appeal No. 27R/01-02 and order dated 01.10.2002 passed by revisional authority in SAR No. 102/2002-2003 are hereby quashed and set aside. 51. In consequence thereof, the matter is remitted before the Special Officer, SAR for passing appropriate order, after giving specific finding with respect to limitation by coming to the conclusion with respect to the date of dispossession, within a period of four months from the date of receipt/production of copy of this order. 52. 51. In consequence thereof, the matter is remitted before the Special Officer, SAR for passing appropriate order, after giving specific finding with respect to limitation by coming to the conclusion with respect to the date of dispossession, within a period of four months from the date of receipt/production of copy of this order. 52. Needless to say that while giving such finding the Special Officer will secure the appearance of the parties and shall provide ample opportunity to the party concerned, if required to adduce evidence, and shall come to the conclusion after taking into consideration the evidence so adduced and material available before it. 53. The instant intra-court appeal stands allowed, as indicated herein above with the aforesaid observations and directions. 54. Consequent upon disposal of the instant intra-court appeal, the Interlocutory Application, if any, stands disposed of.