JUDGMENT : Heard Sri.N.D.Sathishchandra, learned counsel for the appellant, Sri.S.N.Prashant Chandra, learned counsel for respondent No.1 and Smt.M.V.Adithi, learned AGA for respondent No.2. 2. These four appeals are preferred against the common Judgment passed in O.S.No.2340/2004, O.S.No.2342/2004, O.S.No.2343/2004, O.S.No.2344/2004 and O.S.No.2345/2004 dated 27.02.2006, whereunder the learned Trial Judge entertained the applications filed by the first defendant under Order VII Rule 11 of CPC and allowed the same and rejected the plaint and directed the plaintiff to approach the relevant authority under Section 70 of the Karnataka Co-Operative Societies Act, 1959 (herein after referred to as 'Act' for short), for the redressal of the grievance. 3. Brief facts which are utmost necessary for disposal of these appeals are as under. 4. Plaintiff being a Co-Operative Society Ltd. registered under the provisions of Act, was functioning in the cause title address. On account of certain alleged miss deeds in the Society, the matter was referred to the Registrar and Joint Registrar of Co-Operative Societies (in short 'JRCS') by few of the members and the Registrar of Co-Operative Society by order dated 19.05.2003, appointed a Deputy Registrar of Co-Operative Societies (in short 'DRCS') Bangalore City-I, as the Special Officer to take the charge of the affairs of the Society in toto.A photo copy of the said order is produced before this Court today along with a memo by the appellant. 5. Appointment of the Special Officer to the plaintiff-Society was an appealable order as per Section 106(e-1) as the order of the appointment of Special Officer is Under Section 31 of the Act. 6. However, for the reasons best known to the plaintiff, order of the appointment of Special Officer was not challenged before the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal (Co-Operative) under Section 106(e-1) of the Act, but the plaintiff chose to approach the Government under Section 108 of the Act, by filling a Revision Petition in RP.No.CMW/39/CAP2003. 7. The then Hon'ble Minister acting under the powers of under Section 108 of the Act, stayed the appointment of Special Officer by order dated 11.06.2003 till next date of hearing. Next date was fixed as 30.07.2003. 8. It is contended by the plaintiff that on 30.07.2003 there was no sitting and the matter could not be taken up further. 7. The then Hon'ble Minister acting under the powers of under Section 108 of the Act, stayed the appointment of Special Officer by order dated 11.06.2003 till next date of hearing. Next date was fixed as 30.07.2003. 8. It is contended by the plaintiff that on 30.07.2003 there was no sitting and the matter could not be taken up further. In the interregnum, the Special Officer said to have executed registered sale/conveyance deed in favour of the first respondent in all these cases on 11.08.2003, whereby a flat in the occupation of first respondent in all these appeals. Said action of the Special Officer is called in question in all these suits. 9. After the suit summons were issued, the first respondent, who is the first defendant in the Court below, filed an application under Order VII Rule 11 of CPC inter alia contended that Civil Court has no jurisdiction in view of Section 70 of the Act 1959 and therefore, sought for rejection of the plaint. 10. Application filed by the first defendant was opposed by the plaintiff by filing the written objection. 11. Learned Trial Judge heard the parties in detail in respect of the application filed by the first defendant in all these suits under Order VII Rule 11 of CPC and by virtue of impugned common order allowed the applications filed by the first defendant in all these suits and rejected the plaint with liberty to approach the authorities under the provisions of the Act by raising necessary dispute and seek redressal of the grievance of the plaintiff. 12. The validity of said common order passed by the Learned Additional City Civil Judge (CCH-19) dated 27.02.2006 is the subject matter of these appeals. 13. Sri.N.D.Sathishchandra, learned counsel reiterating the grounds of the appeal memorandum vehemently contended that the rejection of the plaint by the Trial Court acting under the powers vested in the Order VII Rule 11 of CPC and directing the appellant to exhaust the remedy before the authorities under the provisions of the Act, has resulted in injustice to the plaintiff and sought for allowing the appeal. 14. In support of his arguments, he has relied on the following Judgment, where it is held under. i) AIR 1990 Kant 173: 7. 14. In support of his arguments, he has relied on the following Judgment, where it is held under. i) AIR 1990 Kant 173: 7. "The third relief prayed for by the petitioners relates to the quashing of the registration of the deeds of cancellation said to have been executed and registered by the 4th respondent. Specific provision is made under S.31 of the Specific Relief Act to seek cancellation of certain instruments which may be void or voidable by person or persons who is/are affected by such instruments. Art. 226 cannot be pressed into service by which instrument registered with the 5th respondent may be cancelled. Therefore, the petitioners are not entitled to that relief either." ii) AIR 1969 SC 78 : 54.1. "Where the statute gives a finality to the orders of the special tribunals the Civil Court's jurisdiction must be held to be excluded if there is adequate remedy to do what the Civil Courts would normally do in a suit. Such provision, however, does not exclude those cases where the provisions of the particular Act have not been complied with or the statutory tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure. 54.2. Where there is an express bar of the jurisdiction of the court, an examination of the scheme of the particular Act to find the adequacy or the sufficiency of the remedies provided may be relevant but is not decisive to sustain the jurisdiction of the civil court. Where there is no express exclusion the examination of the remedies and the scheme of the particular Act to find out the intendment becomes necessary and the result of the inquiry may be decisive. In the latter case it is necessary to see if the statute creates a special right or a liability and provides for the determination of the right or liability and further lays down that all questions about the said right and liability shall be determined by the tribunals so constituted, and whether remedies normally associated with actions in Civil Courts are prescribed by the said statue or not. 54.7. An exclusion of the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not readily to be inferred unless the conditions above set down apply". iii) AIR 1969 SC 1320 : 13. 54.7. An exclusion of the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not readily to be inferred unless the conditions above set down apply". iii) AIR 1969 SC 1320 : 13. "The principal questions which arise on the interpretation of Section 91 are two: (1) What is the meaning of the expression "touching the business of the society?" and (2) What is the meaning of the expression "a person claiming through a member", which occurs in Section 91(1)(b)? 14. The answer depends on the words used in the Act. Although a number of cases have been cited to us on similar expressions contained in various other Acts, both Indian and English, in the first instance, it is advisable to restrict the enquiry to the terms of the enactment itself, because the legislatures have been changing the words and expanding the scope of references to arbitrators or to the Registrars step by step. The sentence, namely, 'notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force" clearly ousts the jurisdiction of civil courts if the dispute falls squarely within the ambit of Section 91(1). Five kinds of disputes are mentioned in Sub-section (1); first, disputes touching the constitution of a society; secondly, disputes touching election of the office-bearers of a society; thirdly, disputes touching the conduct of general meetings of a society; fourthly, disputes touching the management of a society; and, fifthly, disputes touching the business of a society. It is clears that the word "business" in this context does not mean affairs of a society because election of office-bearers, conduct of general meetings and management of a society would be treated as affairs of a society. In this sub-section the word "business" has been used in a narrower sense and it means the actual trading or commercial or other similar business activity of the society which the society is authorised to enter into under the Act and the Rules and its bye-laws". iv) AIR 1972 SC 1893 : 11. With all respect to the High Court, it seems to us that there was fundamental error in the above approach. No doubt it was the business of the society to let out premises and a member had no unqualified right to let out his flat or tenement to another by virtue of the byelaws and a breach of the bye-laws could affect the defaulting member's right to membership. No doubt it was the business of the society to let out premises and a member had no unqualified right to let out his flat or tenement to another by virtue of the byelaws and a breach of the bye-laws could affect the defaulting member's right to membership. But we are not able to see how letting by a member to another member would touch the business of the society which included inter alia the trade of buying, selling, hiring and letting land in accordance with co-operative principles. The letting of flat by respondent No.1 was a transaction of the same nature as the society itself was empowered to enter into but such letting by itself did not concern the business of the society in the matter of its letting out flats. Nothing was Wrought to our notice to show that such a letting would affect the business of the society once it had sold the flat to the respondent nO.1. The position might have been different if the latter had himself been a tenant of the flat under the society. "To touch" means "to come in contact with" and it does not appear that there is a point of contact between a letting by the respondent No.1 and the business of the society when the society was not itself the landlord of the flat. 13. In the result we allow the appeal, set aside the judgment and order of the High Court and of the Bench of the Court of Small Causes. The matter is now to go back to the Court of Small Causes for disposal according to law. The appellants will have the costs incurred in this Court". v) AIR 1997 SC 2925 : 7. "The power of Administrator given under the statue to the Act, Rules and Bye-laws. The Division Bench has minutely and carefully gone into all the questions and agreed with the learned single Judge that the Administrator has no power to enroll new members; but he has the power to organise election process in accordance with the provisions of the Act, the rules and the bye-laws of the society. In that view of the matter, we think that the High Court has not committed any error of law warranting interference". vi) AIR 2004 SC 1801 : (1). In that view of the matter, we think that the High Court has not committed any error of law warranting interference". vi) AIR 2004 SC 1801 : (1). "Question of tenancy cannot be decided under section 50 of Bombay Public Trusts Act--Except relief regarding enquiry, other reliefs could be claimed before and can be adjudicated by civil courts--Bar of Sections 50 and 51 of said Act not attracted". 15. He also pointed out that even assuming that the appointment of Special Officer cannot be faulted with, according to the bye-laws of the Societies, the property could not have been sold by the Special Officer in favour of the first defendant by executing the sale/conveyance deed dated 11.08.2003. He further contended that bye-laws of the society would not permit the Society to sale the ownership of the flats to its members and sought for allowing the appeal. 16. Per contra, Sri.S.N.Prashantchandra, learned counsel appearing for the respondent No.1 and Smt.M.V.Adithi learned AGA for respondent No.2, supported the impugned Judgment. Sri.S.N.Prashantchandra, learned counsel contended that having regard to the language employed in Section 70 of the Act, the action that is contemplated or the relief that has been claimed by the plaintiff would squarely fall within the ambit and scope of Section 70 of the Act and therefore, in view of the clear bar in Section 70 of the Act, the suit before the Trial Court was not at all maintainable and therefore, the same has been rightly rejected by the Learned Trial Judge in the impugned judgment. 17. He further contended that the revision petition filed by the Society before the Government and order passed by the Hon'ble Minister by exercising powers under Section 108 of the Act in revision petition referred to supra is non est in asmuchas the order appointing the Special Officer under Section 31 by the JRCS was an appealable order before the Appellate Tribunal and Section 108 contemplates that if any appeal is provided against the order, revision would not be maintainable before the Government in respect of such orders. Therefore, the order of stay passed on 11.06.2003 was also non est and so also so the final order passed by the Hon'ble Minister by setting aside the appointment of the Special Officer. Therefore, the order of stay passed on 11.06.2003 was also non est and so also so the final order passed by the Hon'ble Minister by setting aside the appointment of the Special Officer. He further argued that the Interim Order was not extended on 30.07.2003 and therefore, the Special Officer had every right to execute the sale/conveyance deed in favour of the first defendant on 11.08.2003 and sought for dismissal of the appeal. 18. He further contended that whether at all the Special Officer had the power to execute the sale/conveyance deed in favour of the first defendant for and on behalf of the appellant-Society or not, cannot be gone into this by Court in this appeal as the scope of present appeal is restricted only with regard to the validity of the order passed by the learned Additional City Civil Judge (CCH-19) in rejecting the plaint and therefore, sought for dismissal of the appeal in toto. 19. Smt.M.V.Adithi, learned AGA for respondent No.2 while adopting the arguments put forth on behalf of the first respondent, further contended that in view of the specific provision made under Section 106(e-1), the revision before the Government was not at all maintainable in view of Section 108 of the Act 1959 and sought for passing the suitable orders. 20. In view of the rival contentions of the parties, this Court perused the material on record meticulously. On perusal of the material on record, the admitted facts that would emerge in the case are as under: Plaintiff-Society was registered under the provisions of the Karnataka Co-operative Society Act and governed by the said Statute. There were shortcomings/misdeeds brought to the notice of the Registrar by the Members of the Society resulting in passing an order by the JRCS on 19.05.2003, whereby DRCS, Bangalore City-I, being appointed as Special Officer of the plaintiff-Society with immediate effect from 19.05.2003 for a period of 3 months. Order of appointment of Special Officer was passed by excising the power vested in the Authorities under Section 31 of the Act. Said order of appointment of Special Officer dated 19.05.2003 was not appealed by the plaintiff-Society before the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal by exercising the power under Section 106(e-1) of the Act.. Order of appointment of Special Officer was passed by excising the power vested in the Authorities under Section 31 of the Act. Said order of appointment of Special Officer dated 19.05.2003 was not appealed by the plaintiff-Society before the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal by exercising the power under Section 106(e-1) of the Act.. A revision petition was filed before the Government in Revision Petition No.CMW/39/CAP2003, wherein an order of stay was granted on 11.06.2003 till the next date and the next of hearing was fixed as 30.07.2003. No hearing was conducted on 30.07.2003 and as such, stay was not extended and the revision petition came to be allowed subsiquently. 21. Following disputed facts are to be noted from the analysis of the factual aspects: Bye-laws of the Co-Operative Society did not enunciate the sale of the flats, which is in the occupation of first defendant in all these matters and other members. Special Officer did not possess power to alienate the property of the Co-Operative Society in favour of its members. Civil suit would be maintainable Under Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, seeking relief of annulling the conveyance deed/misdeeds committed by the Special Officer appointed by the JRCS. Jurisdiction of the Civil Court in entertaining the suit. 22. In view of the above admitted and disputed facts, the gamut of the present appeals is narrowed down to a considerable extent. What has to be looked into and adjudicated in the present appeals is: "Whether impugned order passed by the Civil Court in rejecting the plaint and directing the plaintiff to have redressal of its grievance before the appropriate Authority under the provisions of the Act is valid?" 23. In order to appreciate the rival contentions of the parties, it is just and necessary for this Court to cull out the following few provisions of law, which are necessary: (i) ORDER VII RULE 11 OF CPC: "11. Rejection of plaint. In order to appreciate the rival contentions of the parties, it is just and necessary for this Court to cull out the following few provisions of law, which are necessary: (i) ORDER VII RULE 11 OF CPC: "11. Rejection of plaint. The plaint shall be rejected in the following cases:- (a) where it does not disclose a cause of action; (b) where the relief claimed is undervalued, and the plaintiff, on being required by the Court to correct the valuation within a time to be fixed by the Court, fails to do so; (c) where the relief claimed is properly valued but the plaint is written upon paper insufficiently stamped, and the plaintiff, on being required by the Court to supply the requisite stamp-paper within a time to be fixed by the Court, fails to do so; (d) where the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred by any law; [(e) where it is not filed in duplicate;] [(f) Where the plaintiff fails to comply with the provisions of rule 9:] [Provided that the time fixed by the Court for the correction of the valuation or supplying of the requisite stamp-paper shall not be extended unless the Court, for reasons to be recorded, is satisfied that the plaintiff was prevented by any cause of an exceptional nature for correcting the valuation or supplying the requisite stamp-paper, as the case may be, within the time fixed by the Court and that refusal to extend such time would cause grave injustice to the plaintiff.]" (ii) SECTION 9 OF CPC: "9. Courts to try all civil suits unless barred.-The Courts shall (subject to the provisions herein contained) have jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature excepting suits of which their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred. [Explanation I]:-A suit in which the right to property or to an office is contested is a suit of a civil nature, notwithstanding that such right may depend entirely on the decision of questions as to religious rites or ceremonies. [Explanation II:-For the purposes of this section, it is immaterial whether or not any fees are attached to the office referred to in Explanation I or whether or not such office is attached to a particular place.]" (iii) SECTION 70 OF THE KARNATAKA STATE CO-OPERATIVE SOCIETIES ACT, 1959: "70. [Explanation II:-For the purposes of this section, it is immaterial whether or not any fees are attached to the office referred to in Explanation I or whether or not such office is attached to a particular place.]" (iii) SECTION 70 OF THE KARNATAKA STATE CO-OPERATIVE SOCIETIES ACT, 1959: "70. Disputes which may be referred to Registrar for decision.-(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force, if any dispute touching the constitution, management, or the business of a cooperative society [*****] arises,— (a) among members, past members and persons claiming through members, past members and deceased members, or (b) between a member, past member or person claiming through a member, past member or deceased member and the society, its [board] or any officer, agent or employee of the society, or (c) between the society or its [board] and any past [board], any officer, agent or employee, or any past officer, past agent or past employee or the nominee, heirs, or legal representatives of any deceased officer, deceased agent, or deceased employee of the society, or (d) between the society and any other co-operative society, [or a credit agency] such dispute shall be referred to the Registrar for decision and[no Civil or Labour or Revenue Court or Industrial Tribunal] shall have jurisdiction to entertain any suit or other proceeding in respect of such dispute. (2) For the purposes of sub-section (1), the following shall be deemed to be disputes touching the constitution, management or the business of a co-operative society, namely:— (a) a claim by the society for any debt or demand due to it from a member or the nominee, heirs or legal representatives of a deceased member, whether such debt or demand be admitted or not; (b) a claim by a surety against the principal debtor where the society has recovered from the surety any amount in respect of any debt or demand due to it from the principal debtor, as a result of the default of the principal debtor whether such debt or demand is admitted or not; [(c) any dispute arising in connection with the election of a President, Vice-President or any office-bearer or Member of board of the society:] [(d) any dispute between a co-operative society and its employees or past employees or heirs or legal representatives of a deceased employ , including a dispute regarding the terms of employment, working conditions and disciplinary action taken by a co-operative society [notwithstanding anything contrary contained in the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (Central Act 14 of 1947)]; (e) a claim by a co-operative society for any deficiency caused in the assets of the co-operative society by a member, past member, deceased member or deceased officer, past agent or deceased agent or by any servant, past servant or deceased servant or by its [board], past or present whether such loss be admitted or not.] 3) If any question arises whether a dispute referred to the Registrar under this section is a dispute touching the constitution, management or the business of a cooperative society, the decision thereon of the Registrar shall be final and shall not be called in question in any court." [(4) *****. (5) *****.] (iv) SECTION 106 OF THE KARNATAKA STATE CO-OPERATIVE SOCIETIES ACT, 1959: "106. Appeals to other authorities.-(1) [Subject to the provisions of section 108A, an appeal shall lie under this section] against,— Xxxxxxx Xxxxxxx Xxxxxxx [(e-1) an order of the Registrar [*****] under sub-section (1) of section 31;] Xxxxxxx Xxxxxxx Xxxxxxx Xxxxxx (2) XXXXX (v) SECTION 108 OF KARNATAKA COOPERATIVE SOCIETIES ACT 1959: "108. Appeals to other authorities.-(1) [Subject to the provisions of section 108A, an appeal shall lie under this section] against,— Xxxxxxx Xxxxxxx Xxxxxxx [(e-1) an order of the Registrar [*****] under sub-section (1) of section 31;] Xxxxxxx Xxxxxxx Xxxxxxx Xxxxxx (2) XXXXX (v) SECTION 108 OF KARNATAKA COOPERATIVE SOCIETIES ACT 1959: "108. Powers of revision of State Government.-[Subject to the provisions of Section 108-A, the State Government] suo motu at any time, and, on application of any person aggrieved, within a period of six months from the date of any order, may call for and examine the record of any case or proceedings of any officer subordinate to it except those subject to appeal or revision by the Tribunal or those in respect of which [[an appeal has been made to the State Government or other authorities under Section 106], and the State Government after such enquiry as it deems fit is satisfied that the order of the officer is contrary to law and has resulted in a miscarriage of justice, pass such orders thereon as the State Government deems just: Provided that no order shall be made to the prejudice of any person under this section unless he has been given a reasonable opportunity of being heard." 24. On careful consideration of language employed in the aforesaid statutory provisions, it is crystal clear that a Civil Suit would be maintainable in ordinary course of business if it is not expressly barred by any other law for the time being in force. 25. In the case on hand, the nature of the dispute as could be seen from the rival contentions of the parties and the material placed on record is that, whether the appointment of the Special Officer by the JRCS is justified and said Special Officer had power to alienate the property of the Co-Operative Societies in favour of its Members. 26. On careful perusal of Section 70 of the Act referred to supra, it is crystal clear that disputed issue would become a dispute within the ambit and scope of Section 70 of Act, inasmuch as, the power of Special Officer in alienating the property in favour of the Members and the original office bearers, who have been reinstated into the Society, being aggrieved by the action of the Special officer and seeking redressal of the dispute inter-se Members, office bearers of the Society and the Special Officer. 27. Further, the next limb of the argument that was sought to be canvassed before this Court by the appellant is that appointment of the Special officer was stayed from 11.06.2003 to 30.07.2003 in the Revision Petition No.CMW/39/CAP2003 by the Hon'ble Minister of the Co-Operative Societies. As such Special Officer was incompetent to alienate the flats. 28. In this regard, the counter argument putforth on behalf of the first respondent is that the very revision petition itself was not maintainable before the Government having regard to the specific provisions available under the Act namely, under Section 106 (e-1) to challenge the appointment of Special Officer. 29. As could be seen from the above provision coupled with language employed in Section 108 of the Act, if an appeal dismissed in provided to challenge an are contemplated against an order, a revision under Section 108 of the Act would not be maintainable before the Government. 30. In the case on hand, appointment of Special Officer by JRCS was passed by exercising the power under Section 31 of the Act. Said order was appealable before the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal as per Section 106(e-1) of the Act. Therefore, bypassing the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal and approaching the Government and Hon'ble Minister entertaining the revision petition and passing the order of stay on 11.06.2003 in the aforesaid revision petition, is thus to be termed as illegal having regard to the specific statutory requirement as contemplated under Section 108 of Act referred to supra. 31. It is settled principles of law and requires no emphasis that if an authority passes an order without the jurisdiction, the order would be non est. Therefore, the order passed by the Hon'ble Minister of Co-Operative Societies in the revision petition referred to supra, is to be termed as non est. Therefore, said order of stay did not enure to the benefit of the appellant to any extent. 32. It is also pertinent to note that on 30.07.2003 there was no sitting before the Government and stay order was not extended and the alienation has taken place on 11.08.2003. The Special Officer was appointed by the JRCS on 19.05.2003 for a period of 3 months. Therefore, action of the Special Officer in executing the sale/conveyance deed in favour of the first defendant in all these appeals on 11.08.2003 was well within the powers of the Special Officer. The Special Officer was appointed by the JRCS on 19.05.2003 for a period of 3 months. Therefore, action of the Special Officer in executing the sale/conveyance deed in favour of the first defendant in all these appeals on 11.08.2003 was well within the powers of the Special Officer. Whether he had power to alienate the property of the Society having regard to the bye-laws of the societies cannot be gone into by this Court in this appeal having regard to the scope of the appeal. 33. Therefore, it is always open for the Society to challenge the action of the Special Officer in alienating the property of the Co-Operative Society in favour of its members who is first defendant in all these appeals, before the appropriate authority under the provisions of the Act, by initiating the necessary proceedings. 34. In fact, in the impugned order the learned Trial Judge has reserved such liberty for the appellant. 35. Therefore, viewed from any angle, this Court does not find any legal infirmity whatsoever in rejecting the plaint by the Trial Court. 36. The legal principles enunciated in the decisions relied on by the learned counsel for the appellant as well as learned counsel for the contesting respondents are also taken note by this Court meticulously. 37. However, having regard to the factual aspects that are involved in the case on hand, as discussed supra, especially the appointment of Special Officer is not challenged in an appeal, detailed discussion as to the legal principles enunciated in the aforesaid decisions, in the considered opinion of this Court is unnecessary. 38. Further, all that learned Trial Judge in impugned order has held in same that the suit is not maintainable before this Civil Court, which is based on sound reasons, inasmuch as, if a dispute as it would fall under the scope and ambit of Section 70 of Act, having regard to the express bar provided under Section 70, Civil Suit would not be maintainable before this Civil Court. Accordingly, rejection of plaint under Order VII Rule 11 of CPC is perfectly justified in the facts and circumstances of the case. 39. Further, the scope and ambit of the present appeal is restricted only with regard to rejection of the plaint. Accordingly, rejection of plaint under Order VII Rule 11 of CPC is perfectly justified in the facts and circumstances of the case. 39. Further, the scope and ambit of the present appeal is restricted only with regard to rejection of the plaint. Expressing any opinion on the merits of the matter would definitely prejudice the rights of the parties in the intended proceedings to be initiated by the plaintiff against the defendant and the Special Officer, if so advised. It is made clear that this Court has not expressed any opinion on the merits of the matter in this judgment. 40. As such dismissal of the above appeals would not affect the rights of the appellant in the intended proceedings including the question of limitation which benefit could be obtained by the appellant in accordance with law having regard to Section 14 of the Limitation Act. 41. In view of the fore going discussions, the point is answered in affirmative and following order is passed: ORDER (i) Appeals are meritless and hereby dismissed. (ii) No order as to costs.