JUDGMENT : 1. Since all these special leave to applications filed under Section 378(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure raise common question of law in similar set of facts, the same were heard together and were reserved for orders and are disposed of by this common judgment and order. Criminal Miscellaneous Application No.4078 of 2020: 2. This application seeking special leave to appeal is filed under Section 378(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, whereby, the original complainant-present applicant seeks permission of this Court to prefer appeal against the impugned judgment and order dated 31.1.2020 passed by the learned 5th Additional Judicial Magistrate, Bhuj in Criminal Case No.54 of 2011. By the said judgment and order, the learned Magistrate has proceeded to record acquittal of the present respondent no.1-original accused for the offence alleged under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. Criminal Miscellaneous Application No.4710 of 2020: 2.1. This application seeking special leave to appeal is filed under Section 378(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, whereby, the original complainant-present applicant seeks permission of this Court to prefer appeal against the impugned judgment and order dated 31.1.2020 passed by the learned 5th Additional Judicial Magistrate, Bhuj in Criminal Case No.2189 of 2016. By the said judgment and order, the learned Magistrate has proceeded to record acquittal of the present respondent no.1-original accused for the offence alleged under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. Criminal Miscellaneous Application No.4716 of 2020: 2.2. This application seeking special leave to appeal is filed under Section 378(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, whereby, the original complainant-present applicant seeks permission of this Court to prefer appeal against the impugned judgment and order dated 31.1.2020 passed by the learned 5th Additional Judicial Magistrate, Bhuj in Criminal Case No.55 of 2011. By the said judgment and order, the learned Magistrate has proceeded to record acquittal of the present respondent no.1-original accused for the offence alleged under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. Criminal Miscellaneous Application No.4740 of 2020: 2.3. This application seeking special leave to appeal is filed under Section 378(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, whereby, the original complainant-present applicant seeks permission of this Court to prefer appeal against the impugned judgment and order dated 31.1.2020 passed by the learned 5th Additional Judicial Magistrate, Bhuj in Criminal Case No.56 of 2011.
This application seeking special leave to appeal is filed under Section 378(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, whereby, the original complainant-present applicant seeks permission of this Court to prefer appeal against the impugned judgment and order dated 31.1.2020 passed by the learned 5th Additional Judicial Magistrate, Bhuj in Criminal Case No.56 of 2011. By the said judgment and order, the learned Magistrate has proceeded to record acquittal of the present respondent no.1-original accused for the offence alleged under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. 3. The brief case as narrated in the original complaint of Criminal Case No.54 of 2011 is reproduced as under: 3.1. The complainant is engaged in the profession of law and is practicing lawyer. He came in contact of respondent no.1 as he was engaged by him to represent one of his case. It is the case of the complainant that since the said respondent was in need of financial assistance had prayed for friendly loan of an amount of Rs.1,50,000/-. Considering the brief relationship, the complainant had given hand loan of an amount of Rs.1,50,000/-which was assured by the respondent to be repaid in brief period. 3.2. The respondent had handed over four cheques bearing nos.366573, 366574, 366575 and 366572, dated 1st August 2010 drawn in favour of the complainant of the State Bank of Saurashtra, Anjar Branch. As per the instructions of the respondent said cheque was presented for realization of the aforesaid amount on 22.10.2010. However, the cheque No.366573 was dishonoured on 25.10.2010 as reported by the concerned Bank on the ground of “funds insufficient”. 3.3. Though, the complainant had informed the respondent about the same, the respondent had not made any attempt to repay the borrowed amount. In such circumstances, the complainant was constrained to issue legal notice dated 16.11.2010 upon the respondent, which was duly served on the known address of the respondent on 20.11.2010. It is submitted by the complainant that vague reply was given to the aforesaid notice. 3.4. Upon failure of the respondent to make good the payment within the stipulated period of 15 days, the complainant was constrained to approach the Court of learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Anjar by lodging the complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.
3.4. Upon failure of the respondent to make good the payment within the stipulated period of 15 days, the complainant was constrained to approach the Court of learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Anjar by lodging the complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. The said complaint was presented on 4.1.2011 before the Court of learned Additional Judicial Magistrate, Bhuj, which was registered as Criminal Case No.54 of 2011. 4. The learned Magistrate after recording of the verification of the original complainant on 12.1.2011 directed issuance of process under Section 204 of the Code of Criminal Procedure upon respondent accused. The said summons were duly served upon the respondent accused and the plea of the accused came to be recorded by the learned Magistrate which has come on record at Exh.14. Having noticed the denial of the guilt by the accused, the trial Court had proceeded with the summary triable case. 5. During the course of trial, the complainant has offered himself as witness and his evidence has come on record at Exh.23. Apart from his own evidence, the complainant has also examined two other witnesses viz. Soniya Sunil Bhagchandani at Exh.100 and Dijendra Chandrashekhar Vora at Exh.115. Apart from the aforesaid oral evidence, the complainant has also brought on record the following documentary evidence: Particulars Exh. No. Original disputed cheque 60 Bank Slip 61 Cheque return memo 62 Legal notice issued upon the accused 63 Acknowledgment slip 64 Registered AD Slip 65 Reply given by the respondent accused to the legal notice 66 & 67 Rejoinder given by the complainant to the aforesaid reply of the accused 68 Registered AD Slip 69 Acknowledgment Slip 70 Statement of account of accused 101 Cheque return register 102 Bank statement account of the complainant 116 5.1. After recording the evidence of the complainant, the trial Court had proceeded with the evidence of the accused. The accused seems to have chosen not to examine or lead any evidence on record. However, the defence in the form of statement recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure has come on record. The learned Magistrate upon appreciation of the evidence brought on record by the respective parties, having noticed the absence of any challenge to the signature on the disputed cheque, had drawn statutory presumption in favour of the complainant. Analysis of evidence by learned Magistrate: 6.0.
The learned Magistrate upon appreciation of the evidence brought on record by the respective parties, having noticed the absence of any challenge to the signature on the disputed cheque, had drawn statutory presumption in favour of the complainant. Analysis of evidence by learned Magistrate: 6.0. The learned Magistrate thereafter has proceeded to analyze the evidence brought on record by the original complainant so as to examine as to whether the accused had raised probable defence to rebut the aforesaid presumption. 6.1. On close examination of the cross examination of the complainant, the learned Magistrate noticed that the complainant has admitted that in his profession, the account about the transaction with the client are required to be maintained. The complainant has further admitted that he had not inquired as to for what purpose the amount was borrowed by the accused. He also admitted his ignorance about the time, date and place at which the complainant had given amount to the respondent accused. 6.2. The learned Magistrate noticed that no such specific particulars have been disclosed by the complainant in his complaint, demand notice or even in his examination in chief. At one stage, he has in fact admitted that amount towards the legal fees related to the case, in which, he was engaged, has been realized. 6.3. Apart from the aforesaid particulars, the respondent accused has also led question related to the source of funds and the financial capacity of the original complainant. Responding to such question, complainant had admitted that he has not filed income tax return for FY 2009-10 and 2010-11 neither any entry has been reflected with regard to such borrowed amount in any of the account. He had also admitted that no details with regard to the bank statement has been disclosed and has admitted that in all four complaints have been filed against the respondent – accused. He has also admitted in his cross examination that no evidence has been place on record to suggest the income earned for the year 2009-10 and 2010-11. At the same time, he also admitted that last income tax return was filed for FY 2006-07 and thereafter no return has been filed, neither there is any reference of borrowed amount in the returned filed by the complainant. 7.0.
At the same time, he also admitted that last income tax return was filed for FY 2006-07 and thereafter no return has been filed, neither there is any reference of borrowed amount in the returned filed by the complainant. 7.0. Having noticed the aforesaid infirmity in the evidence of the complainant, the learned Magistrate has further proceeded to evaluate the evidence of Bank Officer –Soniya Sunil Bhagchandani whose evidence has been brought on record vide Exh.100. The evidence in the nature of Bank Statement of the respondent accused has been proved through her evidence. In her cross examination, she has fairly admitted that merely on the basis of the disputed cheque, she cannot confirm as to in which year the cheque book was issued. The factum of the dishonoured of cheque has been proved by the complainant by bringing on record the cheque return register through the aforesaid witness vide Exh.102. The fact which has come on record is that during the period 01.03.2010 to 30.04.2011, the balance as indicated from the statement of account of the respondent-accused, was for palpable amount of Rs.1456.75 which goes to indicate that no sufficient balance was available as on the date of issuance of cheque on 25.10.2010. 7.1. The learned Magistrate has thereafter appreciated the evidence of the witness viz. Dijendra Chandrashekhar Vora, who is the Information Officer attached with the Bank of Baroda whose evidence has been brought on record vide Exh.115. In his evidence, he has stated that the complainant and his wife Nalini Vrajlal Mahicha are holding joint account with their bank and the cheque bearing no.36575 dated 01.08.2010 signed by the respondent accused was deposited in their bank. In his evidence, he has submitted that the disputed cheque Exh.60 does not bear endorsement of “account payee”. While referring to the document i.e. statement of bank account of the complainant (Exh.116) goes to indicate three credit entries of an amount of Rs.1,50,000/-being entered on 25.10.2010, which has been debited later on. 7.2. Apart from the aforesaid oral evidence, the learned Magistrate has further appreciated the documentary evidence brought on record by the original complainant. The aforesaid documentary evidence has been appreciated in light of the further statement of the accused recorded under Section 313 of the Code. The learned Magistrate has taken note of the fact that the accused has not disputed his signature and the contents of the cheque.
The aforesaid documentary evidence has been appreciated in light of the further statement of the accused recorded under Section 313 of the Code. The learned Magistrate has taken note of the fact that the accused has not disputed his signature and the contents of the cheque. At the same time, the complainant has denied the fact that blank cheques were issued by the accused which were taken away by the complainant under the pretext of payment of fees in revenue record. 7.3. The learned Magistrate after appreciating the aforesaid evidence has proceeded to dismiss the complaint mainly on the ground that complainant has failed to lead any evidence about existence of the legal debt against the respondent accused and issuance of disputed cheques towards realization of the legally enforcement debt. Submission on behalf of Appellant-original complainant: 8. Mr. Jitendra Malkan, learned advocate has appeared with Mr. Vatsal Parikh, learned advocate for the applicant – original complainant. The notice issue issued by this Court was duly served upon the respondent –accused and Mr. Jayesh Dave, learned advocate has appeared on behalf of respondent – accused. Learned advocates have jointly prayed for final adjudication of the said leave to appeal along with appeal at the admission stage. Hence, with the consent of the learned advocates for the respective parties, the matter is taken up for final adjudication at the admission stage. 9. Learned advocate for the applicant, at the outset, has invited attention of this Court to the reasons assigned by the learned Magistrate while recording the acquittal of the respondent – accused. Learned advocate has paused question that whether the averments made by the accused that the cheques in question were drawn for payment of the government money with regard to his loan matter and not for redemption of any loan, can be taken as a probable defence. Learned advocate has submitted that no probable defence has emerged on record to rebut the presumption, which was already drawn by the learned Magistrate in favour of the complainant and in absence of such rebuttal of presumption, the learned Magistrate committed serious error in recording order of acquittal. 9.1. In support his aforesaid submission, he contended that the accused has chosen not to enter into the witness box to give his evidence.
9.1. In support his aforesaid submission, he contended that the accused has chosen not to enter into the witness box to give his evidence. Even close examination of his statement recorded under Section 313 of the Code, no whisper has been made by the accused of the fact that cheques were drawn towards the payment of the government money with regard to his land matter. As against that, the admission of the complainant in the cross examination were merely based on suggestion which cannot take form of substantive evidence. The theory of blank cheque has not been established by the original complainant. Thus, the only evidence in the form of denial has come on record which merely creates doubt and does not rebut the presumption drawn in favour of the complainant. 9.2. According to learned advocate the theory of the cheque being issued towards payment of government money with regard to land matter is highly improbable, concocted and false. The reference was made to Section 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act which also deals with the presumption as to the fact the instrument i.e. cheque was drawn on the date appearing on the cheque. As against that, learned advocate submitted that no case was established on record by the accused that he had engaged complainant as his lawyer in the year 2010 with regard to alleged land matter, nor it is the case of the accused that he had handed over undated cheque. He, therefore, submitted that the entire story is highly improbable, concocted and false and did not rebut the presumption. 9.3. In support of his aforesaid submission, learned advocate has placed reliance upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Rohit Jivanlal Patel vs. State of Gujarat and Another reported in (2019) 8 SCC 106 for the proposition of law that mere denial of the creation of doubt may not rebut the presumption as envisage by Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. Submissions of Respondent- Original Accused: 10. Mr. Jayesh Dave, learned advocate for the respondent – accused has also referred to the reasons assigned by the learned Magistrate and has submitted that having appreciated the evidence which has come on record, the learned Magistrate was convinced that the original complainant has failed to show the existence of legal debt against the respondent accused.
Mr. Jayesh Dave, learned advocate for the respondent – accused has also referred to the reasons assigned by the learned Magistrate and has submitted that having appreciated the evidence which has come on record, the learned Magistrate was convinced that the original complainant has failed to show the existence of legal debt against the respondent accused. At the same time, learned Magistrate was convinced that the complainant has failed to prove the fact that the disputed cheques were given towards discharge of any legally enforceable debt against the respondent accused. By referring to the various decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, learned advocate made much emphasis on the scheme of the Negotiable Instruments Act. By applying the proposition of law as noted in the aforesaid decisions, learned advocate submitted that it is open for the accused to even refer to and rely upon the evidence led by him as well as by the complainant in order to raise probable defence. He, therefore, submitted that the statute does not mandate the evidence to be brought on record by the accused. What is necessary is the probable defence which can be culled out even from the cross examination of the complainant. He relied upon the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of APS Forex Services Private Limited vs. Shakti International Fashion Linkers and Ors reported in AIR 2020 SC 945 . By referring to para 6.4, learned advocate submitted that even in case where the accused had denied the debt liability and at the same time has questioned the financial capacity of the complainant, noticing the failure on the part of the complainant to prove and establish his financial capacity, despite presumption under Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act being raised the Court had treated failure to prove financial capacity as rebutting of presumption and onus being shifted upon the complainant. He, therefore submitted that it was for the complainant to lead the evidence to prove his financial capacity with regard to giving of loan by cash. 10.1. Learned advocate has also relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Rajaram S/o Shriramulu Naidu (Since Deceased) Through Lrs vs. Maruthachalam (Since Deceased) Through Lrs reported in 2023(2) Scale 100.
10.1. Learned advocate has also relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Rajaram S/o Shriramulu Naidu (Since Deceased) Through Lrs vs. Maruthachalam (Since Deceased) Through Lrs reported in 2023(2) Scale 100. By referring to the aforesaid judgment, learned advocate submitted that the standard of proof in proceedings under the Negotiable Instruments Act for rebutting the presumption is that of preponderance of probabilities and inference of preponderance of probabilities can be drawn not only from the material brought on record by the parties but also by reference to the circumstances upon which they rely. He submitted that no fault can be found with the approach of the learned Magistrate in absence of any cogent material being brought on record by the complainant to establish his financial capacity to lend such amount as alleged in the complaint. He, therefore, urge this Court to not to entertain the present appeal by refusing the leave to appeal. Rejoinder on behalf of Appellant: 11. Learned advocate has further tried to distinguish the case relied upon by the learned advocate for the respondent to meet with the issue of financial capacity, learned advocate for the applicant submitted that the complainant is a practicing lawyer and in fact she holds joint accounts with her father. No question was led in the cross examination with regard to the non taxable income. In such circumstances, her financial capacity could not be questioned, more particularly, in absence of any rebuttal of presumption by the respondent accused. 11.1. While summarizing the principles laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Basalingappa vs. Mudibasappa reported in AIR 2019 SC 1983 , learned advocate submitted that it was the case where the complainant in his cross examination had admitted that he had retired in the year 1997 and had received monetary benefits of Rs.8 lakhs but later on he had entered into agreement to sell of immovable property whereby he was paid an amount of Rs.4,50,000/-. Noticing the aforesaid facts, the accused was successful in questioning the financial capacity of the complainant. By referring to the aforesaid fact, learned advocate submitted that Hon’ble Supreme Court in light of the aforesaid facts has laid down the principle. 11.2.
Noticing the aforesaid facts, the accused was successful in questioning the financial capacity of the complainant. By referring to the aforesaid fact, learned advocate submitted that Hon’ble Supreme Court in light of the aforesaid facts has laid down the principle. 11.2. Dealing with the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of APS Forex Services Private Limited (supra), learned advocate submitted that the Hon’ble Supreme Court noticing the facts of issuance of cheque for the second time after earlier cheque being dishonoured, in absence of any evidence being led by the accused to rebut the presumption, proceeded to discard the plea taken by the accused that cheque was given by way of security and same has been misused by the complainant as not tenable. It is submitted by learned advocate that it was in light of the peculiar facts such approach of the Hon’ble Supreme Court cannot be ruled out and has no relevance to the facts of the present case. 11.3. Dealing with the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Rajaram S/o Shriramulu Naidu (Since Deceased) Through Lrs(supra) is concerned, learned advocate submitted that it is entirely based on different set of the facts and in past several litigations were filed between the parties and on facts, the Hon’ble Supreme Court found that there was no probable defence. 11.4. By referring to the aforesaid distinguishing facts, learned advocate reiterated that in absence of any evidence being led by the respondent accused, no probable defence has emerged on record rebutting the presumption drawn in favour of the original complainant. He, therefore, urge this Court to grant special leave to appeal against the order impugned. Findings/ Reasons: 12. Having heard the learned advocates for the respective parties and having perused the record as well as relevant papers forming part of the original record, the question which falls for consideration of this Court whether the learned Magistrate in the facts and circumstances of the case and in light of the evidence which has emerged on record committed error in shifting burden upon the original complainant to prove his case beyond the reasonable doubt. 12.1. On perusing the order of the trial Court, it is noticed that the trial Court proceeded to pass order of acquittal by shifting the burden upon the original complainant, to prove his case as contended in the complaint.
12.1. On perusing the order of the trial Court, it is noticed that the trial Court proceeded to pass order of acquittal by shifting the burden upon the original complainant, to prove his case as contended in the complaint. The learned Magistrate has upon appreciation of evidence, more particularly, the evidence of two witnesses examined by the complainant and the documentary evidence has initially drawn the presumption available under Section 118 and Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. By noticing the existence of basic ingredients being satisfied the learned trial Court has noticed that the accused – respondent herein has not denied his signature on the disputed cheques and the facts that cheques were drawn in favour of the complainant on a bank account maintained by the accused for total sum of Rs.1,50,000/-each. The said cheques were presented to the bank concerned within the validity period, which were returned unpaid for the reasons of insufficient balance in the account. Thus, all the basic ingredients of Section 138 as also Section 118 and Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act have apparently been noticed on the face of the record. The trial Court being conscious of the aforesaid fact has rightly drawn requisite presumption in favour of the original complainant. 12.2. Having noticed so, in light of the statutory provisions, it is required to be presumed that the cheques in question were drawn for consideration and the holder of the cheque i.e. present complainant had received the same in discharge of an “existing debt”. However, this was merely in the form of presumption which at the initial stage shifts burden upon the respondent – original accused to establish a probable defence so as to rebut such presumption. 12.3. At this stage, it would be appropriate to refer to the guiding principle laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court as regards the approach of the Court on the aspect relating to the preponderance of probabilities. Generally, based on the facts and circumstances of the case as well as material led on record by the parties, the Courts are guided to conclude as to whether the consideration did not exist or that its non-existence was so probable that a prudent man would, under the circumstances of the case, act upon the plea that the consideration did not exist. 12.4.
12.4. The judgment relied upon by the applicant in the case of Bharat Barrel and Drum vs. Amin Chand Payrelal reported in (1999) 3 SCC 35 , wherein, in para 12 Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed as under: “12. Upon consideration of various judgments as noted hereinabove, the position of law which emerges is that once execution of the promissory note is admitted, the presumption under Section 118(a) would arise that it is supported by a consideration. Such a presumption is rebuttable. The defendant can prove the non-existence of a consideration by raising a probable defence. If the defendant is proved to have discharged the initial onus of proof showing that the existence of consideration was improbable or doubtful or the same was illegal, the onus would shift to the plaintiff who will be obliged to prove it as a matter of fact and upon its failure to prove would disentitle him to the grant of relief on the basis of the negotiable instrument. The burden upon the defendant of proving the non-existence of the consideration can be either direct or by bringing on record the preponderance of probabilities by reference to the circumstances upon which he relies. In such an event, the plaintiff is entitled under law to rely upon all the evidence led in the case including that of the plaintiff as well. In case, where the defendant fails to discharge the initial onus of proof by showing the nonexistence of the consideration, the plaintiff would invariably be held entitled to the benefit of presumption arising under Section 118(a) in his favour. The court may not insist upon the defendant to disprove the existence of consideration by leading direct evidence as the existence of negative evidence is neither possible nor contemplated and even if led, is to be seen with a doubt. The bare denial of the passing of the consideration apparently does not appear to be any defence. Something which is probable has to be brought on record for getting the benefit of shifting the onus of proving to the plaintiff.
The bare denial of the passing of the consideration apparently does not appear to be any defence. Something which is probable has to be brought on record for getting the benefit of shifting the onus of proving to the plaintiff. To disprove the presumption, the defendant has to bring on record such facts and circumstances upon consideration of which the court may either believe that the consideration did not exist or its non- existence was so probable that a prudent man would, under the circumstances of the case, shall act upon the plea that it did not exist.” 12.5. In light of the aforesaid principle laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court once the presumption under Section 118(a) arises in support of consideration, the burden is upon the defendant to prove non existence of consideration by raising a probable defence. In such process, the burden of proving the non existence of consideration can be either by direct or by bringing on record preponderance of probabilities even by referring to the circumstances, upon which, he relies. But bare denial of absence of consideration does not take form of any defence. Thus, for getting benefit of shifting onus something probable has to be brought on record by the accused. 12.6. In light of the aforesaid principle, in the facts of the present case, the learned Magistrate has taken notice of the admission of the complainant in his cross examination with regard to his failure to clarify the date, place and purpose for which the amount of Rs.1,50,000/-was handed over in cash to the respondent accused. Such failure on the part of the complainant has gained significance on further failure of the complainant to meet with his financial capacity and the source of funds. On overall appreciation of the circumstances being brought on record, the learned trial Court has arrived at a conclusion that the respondent accused has brought on record the circumstances probable to challenge the very existence of the transaction as alleged by the complainant. In the opinion of this Court, no fault can be found with the approach of the learned Magistrate in shifting the burden upon the complainant to prove his case beyond reasonable doubt. Non explanation on the part of the complainant gain significance to believe that the consideration did not exist. 13.
In the opinion of this Court, no fault can be found with the approach of the learned Magistrate in shifting the burden upon the complainant to prove his case beyond reasonable doubt. Non explanation on the part of the complainant gain significance to believe that the consideration did not exist. 13. For the foregoing reasons, the conclusion drawn by the learned Magistrate of failure of establishing financial capacity as regards existence of alleged transaction, cannot be termed as perverse as the same has been arrived by the trial Court upon appreciation of the evidence which has come on record. Even otherwise the scope of interference of the High Court in an appeal arising out of an order of acquittal is limited unless upon appreciation and re-appreciation of the evidence, the finding arrived at by the trial Court it appears to be perverse. In my opinion, no arguable case is made out which calls for interference in appeal under Section 378(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Hence, applications seeking special leave to appeal are hereby dismissed. Consequently, Criminal Appeals, stand dismissed.