ORDER : Heard Sri Ghantasala Udaya Bhaskar, learned counsel for the revision-petitioner. No representation for the respondent. 2. This revision-petition is directed against the Order, dated 03.07.2015 passed in I.A.No.53 of 2014 in O.P.No.236 of 2012 on the file of Judge, Family Court-cum-IV Additional District and Sessions Judge, Vijayawada, filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (for brevity “the Act”) by the revision-petitioner to condone the delay of 125 days in filing the application under Order IX Rule 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for brevity “CPC”) to set-aside the ex parte decree, dated 03.07.2015. 3. Learned counsel for the revision-petitioner would submit that delay was occurred as the revision-petitioner was suffering from ill-health during the above said period, but the Trial Court erroneously “Dismissed” the application. 4. In the light of the above context of the revision petitioner/appellant, the point that arises for consideration is: - “Whether the Trial Court committed any material irregularity in the impugned Order, dated 03.07.2015 passed in I.A.No.53 of 2014 in O.P.No.236 of 2012 on the file of Judge, Family Court-cum-IV Additional District and Sessions Judge, Vijayawada?” 5. POINT: - The impugned Order of the Trial Court would show that the respondent filed an Order copy in Maintenance Case No.17 of 2012 on the file of Judicial First Class Magistrate Court, Kaikaluru, whereunder, it was established that the revision-petitioner was appearing before the learned Magistrate Court regularly during the period from 01.07.2013 to 25.07.2013 and received maintenance. Therefore, the learned Trial Court considering the said circumstances, found that the plea raised by the revision-petitioner that she was suffering from ill-health at the relevant point in time is false and dismissed the application. 6. In this context, it is imperative to refer the proposition of law laid down by the Hon”ble Apex Court in Maniben Devraj Shah vs. Municipal Corporation of Brihan Mumbai, (2012) 5 Supreme Court Cases 157, wherein their Lordships at para-Nos.23 and 24 held as under: “23. 6. In this context, it is imperative to refer the proposition of law laid down by the Hon”ble Apex Court in Maniben Devraj Shah vs. Municipal Corporation of Brihan Mumbai, (2012) 5 Supreme Court Cases 157, wherein their Lordships at para-Nos.23 and 24 held as under: “23. What needs to be emphasised is that even though a liberal and justice oriented approach is required to be adopted in the exercise of power under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and other similar statutes, the Courts can neither become oblivious of the fact that the successful litigant has acquired certain rights on the basis of the judgment under challenge and a lot of time is consumed at various stages of litigation apart from the cost. 24. What colour the expression “sufficient cause” would get in the factual matrix of a given case would largely depend on bona fide nature of the explanation. If the Court finds that there has been no negligence on the part of the applicant and the cause shown for the delay does not lack bona fides, then it may condone the delay. If, on the other hand, the explanation given by the applicant is found to be concocted or he is thoroughly negligent in prosecuting his cause, then it would be a legitimate exercise of discretion not to condone the delay.” 7. Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sugandhi (Died) by LRs and others vs. P.Rajkumar, (2020) 10 Supreme Court Cases 706. and Basawaraj and another vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer, 2013 (6) ALT (SC) 43 (D.B.). held that sufficient cause is distinct from good cause and sufficient cause be given liberal interpretation if negligence, inaction, or lack of bonafides cannot be imputed to the applicant. 8. It is also an established principle of law that if negligence, inaction, or lack of bonafides are made out and the cause pleaded by the petitioner is not established, the Court has no power to extend the limitation on equitable grounds. 9. The Order of the Trial Court would show that notice sent in O.P.No.236 of 2012 to the revision-petitioner, through Registered post, was “Returned” with postal endorsement that “revision-petitioner was informed about the registered post, but she did not claim it”. In the said circumstances, the learned Trial Judge found that there is no sufficient reason to condone the delay. 10. The Order of the Trial Court would show that notice sent in O.P.No.236 of 2012 to the revision-petitioner, through Registered post, was “Returned” with postal endorsement that “revision-petitioner was informed about the registered post, but she did not claim it”. In the said circumstances, the learned Trial Judge found that there is no sufficient reason to condone the delay. 10. When the opposite party disputed the truth and veracity of the cause pleaded by the petitioner, onus is on the petitioner to prove the cause. Then the question whether it is a sufficient cause would arise. 11. In the light of clear findings of the Trial Court on facts that the revision-petitioner was appearing before the learned Magistrate Court at the relevant point in time for receiving maintenance, her plea that she was suffering from ill-health and could not attend before the Trial Court in O.P.No.236 of 2012 on the file of Judge, Family Court-cum-IV Additional District and Sessions Judge, Vijayawada, is not true and correct. In that point of view, this Court is of the considered opinion that there are no grounds to interfere with the impugned Order and no material illegality committed by the learned Trial Court and the revision petition is deserved to be dismissed. 12. Accordingly, Civil Revision Petition is ‘Dismissed’. There shall be no order as to costs. 13. As a sequel, miscellaneous applications pending, if any, shall stand closed.