JUDGMENT 1. This revision is preferred by the defendants 2 and 3 challenging the order, dtd. 13/12/2021, passed in O.S.No.18 of 2013 on the file of the Court of VII Additional District Judge, Visakhapatnam. 2. Heard learned counsel for the revision petitioners and the respondents 1 & 2/plaintiffs. Respondent No.3 died and respondent No.4 is shown as not a necessary party to this revision as no relief is claimed against him. 3. The facts of the case are as follows: The schedule property which was originally purchased in the name of Muthuswamy, father of the 1st defendant, as well as, father-in-law of the 1st plaintiff, to an extent of 2000 square yards by virtue of partition in the year 1968, was divided allotting 1000 square yards to the husband of 1st plaintiff and 500 square yards each to 1st defendant and her sister, Adi Lakshmi Bhaskaran, who is the mother of the 2nd defendant. On mutual understanding, the husband of the 1st plaintiff constructed a duplex house in an extent of 400 square yards, but as he is living away from the schedule property by virtue of his job, he permitted his parents and his sister, i.e., defendant No.1 to be in possession of the property and that out of mutual understanding over 1000 square yards belonging to 1st defendant and Adilakshmi Bhaskaran clubbing 600 square yards, i.e., over 1600 square yards, a multi-storied building was constructed in which the husband of 1st plaintiff was allotted 3 flats. But it is the case of the defendants that out of 1000 square yards allotted to the husband of 1st plaintiff, a mutual understanding was arrived at between the parties to the effect that 400 square yards being the southern part of 1000 square yards was given to 1st defendant to enable her to build a house and in view of the same, the husband of the plaintiff was given 600 square yards with a building thereon at Chennai. Thus, 400 square yards was given to the 1st defendant and it is the 1st defendant who had submitted plan, obtained permission to construct a house over the schedule property and as such, she claims the property to be of her own. 4. While so, during trial when DW1 entered into witness box and intended to mark the referred deed of assignment, dtd. 4. While so, during trial when DW1 entered into witness box and intended to mark the referred deed of assignment, dtd. 1/10/1973, under which the 1st defendant claims to have been allotted 400 square yards over which she constructed a house and similarly to prove that 1st defendant has been in possession of the property in view of the mutual understanding, the defendant intended to mark the said lease deed as well. 5. Learned counsel for the plaintiffs raised objection regarding admissibility of the documents titled 'deed of assignment' and 'lease deed' when they were produced and sought to be marked through DW1 on the ground that both the documents are compulsorily registerable documents and cannot be received in evidence without registration. 6. After hearing both the parties, the trial Court permitted the document styled as 'lease deed' to be marked subject to objection raised by the plaintiff and the second document titled as 'deed of assignment' is rejected. 7. Hence, this revision is preferred by defendants 2 and 3. 8. Though necessary stamp duty has been collected on the deed of assignment, since the trial Court refused to mark it in evidence for want of registration, the revision petitioner vehemently contended that the trial Court erroneously did not follow the decision of the Supreme Court in Bipin Shantilal Panchal vs. State of Gujarat and Ors., AIR 2001 SC 1158 . In this regard, it is further contended that in view of the proviso to Sec. 49 of the Registration Act which permits receipt of a document in evidence for proof of collateral transaction which does not require registration, the trial Court ought to have marked the document subject to any objection that may be decided later on, instead of shutting the doors of the party by eliminating the evidence from consideration and not giving an opportunity to Court in trial to examine whether such document can be looked into or not for any collateral purpose. 9. It is relevant to extract the observations of the apex Court in the decision in Bipin Shantilal Panchal (1 supra) at paragraphs 13 to 15 which are as follows: "13. It is an archaic practice that during the evidence collecting stage, whenever any objection is raised regarding admissibility of any material in evidence the Court does not proceed further without passing order on such objection. It is an archaic practice that during the evidence collecting stage, whenever any objection is raised regarding admissibility of any material in evidence the Court does not proceed further without passing order on such objection. But the fall out of the above practice is this: Suppose the trial Court, in a case, upholds a particular objection and excludes the material from being admitted in evidence and then proceeds with the trial and disposes of the case finally. If the Appellate or Revisional Court, when the same question is recanvassed, could take a different view on the admissibility of that material in such cases the Appellate Court would be deprived of the benefit of that evidence, because that was not put on record by the trial Court. In such a situation the higher Court may have to send the case back to the trial Court for recording that evidence and then to dispose of the case afresh. Why should the trial prolong like that unnecessarily on account of practices created by ourselves? Such practices, when realised through the course of long period to be hindrances which impede steady and swift progress of trial proceedings, must be recast or remoulded to give way for better substitutes which would help acceleration of trial proceedings. 14. When so recast, the practice which can be a better substitute is this: Whenever an objection is raised during evidence taking stage regarding the admissibility of any material or item of oral evidence the trial Court can make a note of such objection and mark the objected document tentatively as an exhibit in the case (or record the objected part of the oral evidence) subject to such objections to be decided "at the last stage in the final judgment. If the Court finds at the final stage that the objection so raised is sustainable the Judge or Magistrate can keep such evidence excluded from consideration. In our view there is no illegality in adopting such a course. (However, we make it-clear that if the objection relates to deficiency of stamp duty of a document the Court has to decide the objection before proceeding further. For all other objections the procedure suggested above can be followed). 15. The above procedure, if followed, will have two advantages. In our view there is no illegality in adopting such a course. (However, we make it-clear that if the objection relates to deficiency of stamp duty of a document the Court has to decide the objection before proceeding further. For all other objections the procedure suggested above can be followed). 15. The above procedure, if followed, will have two advantages. First is that the time in the trial Court, during evidence taking stage, would not be wasted on account of raising such objections and the Court can continue to examine the witnesses. The witnesses need not wait for long hours, if not days. Second is that the superior Court, when the same objection is recanvassed an reconsidered in appeal or revision against the final judgment of the trial Court, can determine the correctness of the view taken by the trial Court regarding that objection, without bothering to remit the case to the trial Court again for fresh disposal. We may also point out that this measure would not cause any prejudice to the parties to the litigation and would not add to their misery of expenses." 10. Learned counsel for the revision petitioner further placed reliance on the decision of the High Court of Judicature at Hyderabad (For the State of Telangana and the state of Andhra Pradesh) in Annamadevulu Chandrarao and others v. M. Veera Raghvulu and others, 2015 (2) ALD 625 . wherein at paragraph Nos.10,11, and 12, it was held as follows: "10. A five Judges Bench of this Court in "Chinnappareddigari Pedda Muthylareddy v. Chinnappareddigari Venkatareddy [AIR 1969 AP 242]" held that though an unregistered partition deed cannot be looked into for terms of partition, it can be looked into for establishing severance in status. Thus, for establishing the collateral purpose of proving the factum of earlier partition and the consequential nature of possession of the parties to the document, an unregistered partition deed can be let in evidence. 11. What is a collateral purpose is not free from grave doubts. As was pointed out by the Supreme Court in K.B. Saha's case (referred supra) a collateral transaction is one which is independent of, or divisible from, the transaction to effect which the law requires registration. Hence, it must be a document which does not create any right, title or interest in immovable property of the value of one hundred rupees and upwards. Hence, it must be a document which does not create any right, title or interest in immovable property of the value of one hundred rupees and upwards. For establishing only an ancillary issue which is purely incidental to the direct and substantive issue, a document can otherwise be received in evidence, but however whenever a document is marked for any such collateral purpose, the Court must make an endorsement that the said document is received only as evidence for collateral purpose under the proviso to Sec. 49 of the Registration Act, 1908. Since the document in question is sought to be marked for purpose of establishing the possession of the defendant/petitioner altogether independent of an earlier partition, the document can be received in evidence and marked for establishing the collateral purpose relating to the possession of the petitioner herein. 12. Accordingly, the Court below is directed to receive the document dtd. 8/8/1962 in evidence marking an endorsement on the face of it that it is received for collateral purpose of possession of the defendant under the proviso to Sec. 49 of the Registration Act, 1908. The document, however, shall not be looked into for purpose of establishing the shares of the respective parties effected by an earlier partition." 11. Learned counsel further added that the deed of assignment can be used for the collateral transaction indicating the nature of the possession held by these defendants and it is time and again held that a document which requires registration but not registered can be received in evidence for the purpose of showing the nature of possession held by virtue of such document, and therefore, in the present case, the trial Court ought to have allowed the document to be marked in evidence may be, subject to objection. 12. Learned counsel for the respondents 1 and 2/plaintiffs contended that the trial Court has rightly dismissed the petition after exhaustive discussion on the contentions of both sides and examination of law on the subject. 13. Perused the record. 14. As rightly contended by the revision petitioners, in the light of the decision of the Supreme Court and also of the High Court referred to supra, the trial Court ought to have marked the document in evidence by recording that it is used for the purpose of collateral transaction, i.e., the nature of possession, instead of totally discarding the document from evidence. Whenever an objection on the admissibility of document is taken regarding curable defects, it is necessary to then and there decide so as to give an opportunity to the party to cure defect and whereas in case of an incurable defect pointed out in the document regarding admissibility to be taken in evidence, a Court is supposed to mark the document subject to the objection indicating that it shall be decided after the trial. 15. In this regard, it is also pertinent to refer the decision of the Supreme Court in R.V.E. Venkatachala Gounder vs. Arulmigu Viswesaraswami and V.P. Temple and Anr., AIR 2003 SC 4548 . wherein the Supreme Court having referred to an earlier decision cited held as follows: "The learned counsel for the defendant-respondent has relied on 'The Roman Catholic Mission v. The State of Madras and Another [ AIR 1966 SC 1457 ] in support of his submission that a document not admissible in evidence, though-brought on record, has to be excluded from consideration. We do not have any dispute with the proposition of law so laid down in the above said case. However, the present one is a case which calls for the correct position of law being made precise. Ordinarily an objection to the admissibility of evidence should be taken when it is tendered and not subsequently. The objections as to admissibility of documents in evidence may be classified into two classes:- (i) an objection that the document which is sought to be proved is itself inadmissible in evidence; and (ii) where the objection does not dispute the admissibility of the document in evidence but is directed towards the mode of proof alleging the same to be irregular or insufficient. In the first case, merely because a document has been marked as 'an exhibit', an objection as to its admissibility is not excluded and is available to be raised even at a later stage or even in appeal or revision. In the latter case, the objection should be taken before the evidence is tendered and once the document has been admitted in evidence and marked as an exhibit, the objection that it should not have been admitted in evidence or that the mode adopted for proving the document is irregular cannot be allowed to be raised at any stage subsequent to the marking of the document as an exhibit. The later proposition is a rule of fair play. The crucial test is whether an objection, if taken at the appropriate point of time, would have enabled the party tendering the evidence to cure the defect and resort to such mode of proof as would be regular. The omission to object becomes fatal because by his failure the party entitled to object allows the party tendering the evidence to act on an assumption that the opposite party is not serious about the mode of proof. On the other hand, a prompt objection does not prejudice the party tendering the evidence, for two reasons; firstly, it enables the Court to apply its mind and pronounce its decision on the question of admissibility then and there; and secondly, in the event of finding of the Court on the mode of proof sought to be adopted going against the party tendering the evidence, the opportunity of seeking indulgence of the Court for permitting a regular mode or method of proof and thereby removing the objection raised by the opposite party, is available to the party leading the evidence. Such practice and procedure is fair to both the parties. Out of the two types of objections, referred to hereinabove, in the later case, failure to raise a prompt and timely objection amounts to waiver of the necessity for insisting on formal proof of a document, the document itself which is sought to be proved being admissible in evidence. In the first case, acquiescence would be no bar to raising the objection in superior Court." 16. In view of the foregoing discussion, it is a matter fit to allow the revision petition. 17. Accordingly, the Civil Revision Petition is allowed, setting aside the order, dtd. 13/12/2021, passed in O.S.No.18 of 2013, to the extent of rejecting the deed of assignment and the trial Court is directed to mark the deed of assignment, dtd. 1/10/1973, in evidence indicating the collateral transaction of the nature of possession under the document. There shall be no order as to costs. Pending miscellaneous applications, if any, shall stand closed.