JUDGMENT : 1. By way of this Civil Application under Article 226(3) of the Constitution of India, the applicant herein – original respondent No.14 has prayed for vacation of ad-interim relief granted on 3rd August 2023 in R/Special Civil Application No.13302 of 2023. By way of an ex parte ad-interim relief, the Coordinate Bench of this Court has stayed the impugned order dated 6th May 2023 as well as stayed the further proceedings of RTS Case No.381 of 2022 pending before the Collector, Surat. 2. So as to decide the present Civil Application, basic controversy of the petition deserves to be understood as under: 2.1. The subject matter of the main proceeding is with regard to mutation of entry No.1845 pursuant to the registered sale deed dated 31st July 2008 executed by Farukbhai Valibhai Poonawala in favour of the husband of the applicant namely Parshottam Laxman Vaghani. The aforesaid sale deed was executed in favour of the husband of the present applicant for the land admeasuring 14,220 sq. mtrs. out of total 1 Lakh sq. yard. 2.2. Upon mutation of entry No.1845, the original petitioners and others have raised an objection, and thereby, RTS/Dispute Case No.133 of 2012 was registered. The learned Mamlatdar, City Taluka, Surat, however, after having considered the objection, vide its order dated 28th April 2012, cancelled the entry No.1845. 2.3. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid, the husband of the present applicant has filed RTS/Appeal No.153 of 2013 before the Deputy Collector, City Prant, Surat, on 20th June 2013. Unfortunately, thereafter, the husband of the present applicant expired on 21st August 2013. Thereafter, the present applicant was joined as heir and legal representative of deceased Parshottambhai Laxmanbhai Vaghani. The Deputy Collector, City Prant, Surat, thereafter, vide its order dated 28th April 2016, rejected the appeal. 2.4. It is the case of the present applicant that, she being an illiterate widow of Parshottambhai Vaghani, was not aware with the proceedings before the revenue authorities and as such, the order of the Deputy Collector was also not served upon her and because of her family responsibilities and the other complications of his husband’s unnatural death i.e. by way of suicide, the present applicant could not prefer an appeal within the stipulated time against the order of the Deputy Collector, City Prant, Surat. It is further the case of the present applicant that meanwhile, there was a CORONA pandemic for almost two years. However, after obtaining certified copy and taking necessary advice, the present applicant could file an appeal before the District Collector, Surat with an application for condonation of delay. The delay was approximately for 6 years. 2.5. The District Collector, Surat, after having verified and examined the record, vide its order dated 6th May 2023, was pleased to condone the delay in preferring the revision application. 2.6. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied by the aforesaid, the original petitioners approached the learned Special Secretary, Revenue Department (Appeals) by way of Revision Application No.73 of 2023. The said revision application was ordered to be removed from the register vide order dated 13th July 2023 on the ground that the impugned order was not appealable under Section 206 of the Land Revenue Code. 2.7. Thus, the original petitioners have approached this Court by way of R/Special Civil Application No.13302 of 2023 challenging the order dated 6th May 2023 passed by the Collector, Surat in RTS/Revision/Application No.381 of 2022, whereby the delay of approximately 6 years was condoned. 2.8. The Coordinate Bench of this Court, on 3rd August 2023, while issuing Notice making it returnable on 11th September 2023, granted an ex parte ad-interim relief. The relevant extract of the order dated 3rd August 2023 is reproduced as under: “Issue Notice returnable on 11.9.2023. In the meantime, there shall be stay of the impugned order dated 6.5.2023 as well as the further proceedings in RTS Revision Application Case No.381 of 2022 pending before the Collector, Surat, till the next date of hearing. Direct Service is permitted.” 2.9. As it appears, no sooner the service of Notice along with an ex parte ad-interim relief was effected on the present applicant, the present applicant has presented this Civil Application under Article 226(3) of the Constitution of India on 2nd September 2023 after serving the advance copy of the same on the learned counsel for the original petitioners. 2.10. It further appears that the main petition being R/Special Civil Application No.13302 of 2023 was listed before this Court on its returnable date i.e. on 11th September 2023. The said petition was listed in the cause list at Serial No.243. 2.10. It further appears that the main petition being R/Special Civil Application No.13302 of 2023 was listed before this Court on its returnable date i.e. on 11th September 2023. The said petition was listed in the cause list at Serial No.243. Pertinently, on the said date, though the Civil Application for vacating interim relief was filed on 2nd September 2023, the same was not listed along with the main petition being R/Special Civil Application No.13302 of 2023. As the main petition was listed at Serial No.243 in the cause list, due to paucity of time, the said petition was not heard. On that date, incidentally, learned advocate Mr. Mehul Sharad Shah for the applicant had filed a leave note. As transpired from the record, learned advocate Mr. Aadit Sanjanwala for the original petitioners had mentioned at the last minutes of the Court proceedings for extension of interim relief as the same was limited in nature. Accordingly, vide order dated 11th September 2023, this Court adjourned the matter on 11th December 2023 by extending the ex parte ad-interim relief granted on 3rd August 2023. 2.11. The present Civil Application was listed before this Court for the first time on 12th October 2023. Thereafter, for one or the other reason, the present Civil Application was adjourned time to time and listed for hearing on 2nd November 2023. 3. I have heard learned advocate Mr. Mehul Sharad Shah for the applicant – original respondent No.14 and learned Senior Advocate Mr. Rashesh S. Sanjanwala assisted by learned advocate Mr. Aadit Sanjanwala for the respondents Nos.1 to 4 – original petitioners. 4. Learned advocate Mr. Mehul Sharad Shah for the applicant has fervently, relying upon the provisions of Article 226(3) of the Constitution of India, submitted that since the mandatory period of two weeks from the date of filing the application and/or furnishing such application on the learned counsel for the petitioners is over, the ex parte ad-interim relief granted is automatically vacated by operation of law and thereby, this Court may not decide the application on merits, but may pass formal declaration of vacating ex parte ad-interim relief. 5. Learned advocate Mr. 5. Learned advocate Mr. Shah for the applicant, while placing heavy reliance on the judgement rendered by the Full Bench of this Court in the matter between District Development Officer vs. Maniben Virabhai reported in 2000(2) G.L.H. 204 , submitted that the moment the Civil Application is filed on 2nd September 2023 in the Registry, after serving copy on the learned counsel for the original petitioners, the period of limitation of two weeks would commence from the very date itself. Learned advocate Mr. Shah submitted that as per the law laid down by the Full Bench of this Court, once the aggrieved party of ex parte ad-interim relief completes all the formalities of making an application to the High Court and furnishing copy to the party in whose favour the ex parte ad-interim relief was made, action or inaction on the part of the parties or the Registry shall have no consequence. Learned advocate Mr. Shah, thus, submitted that once the mandatory period of limitation of two weeks is over and the application is not decided within such mandatory time limit, the provisions of law would come into operation by automatic vacating the ex parte ad-interim relief. 6. To substantiate the aforesaid submissions, learned advocate Mr. Shah for the applicant pointed out that the original petitioners, though served with the copy of application on 2nd September 2023, the original petitioners had shown utter casual approach. Learned advocate Mr. Shah submitted that although, as per practice, the advance cause list of the matters are generated, and thereby, though the original petitioners were aware that on the returnable date i.e. 11th September 2023, along with the main petition, Civil Application filed by the present applicant was not listed, no endevaour whatsoever was made by the original petitioners. According to learned advocate Mr. Shah, at least, the original petitioners could have, by way of advance mentioning, listed the present Civil Application along with the main petition, which was listed on 11th September 2023. Learned advocate Mr. Shah further pointed out that on 11th September 2023, the main petition was listed at Serial No.243 and because of some personal difficulty, he had filed a leave note. Learned advocate Mr. Shah further pointed out that on 11th September 2023, the main petition was listed at Serial No.243 and because of some personal difficulty, he had filed a leave note. However, due to paucity of time, the main petition was not taken up, and thereby, the learned counsel for the petitioner, at the last minutes of the Court proceedings, mentioned the matter very casually and requested for extension of ex parte ad-interim relief granted vide order dated 3rd August 2023. According to learned advocate Mr. Shah, even at that stage also, learned advocate for the original petitioners could have requested for early date in the proceedings as the mandate of two weeks was to be over on 17th September 2023. However, according to learned advocate Mr. Shah, the original petitioners had shown a very casual approach towards the application under Article 226(3) of the Constitution of India and only shown interest to get the extension of interim relief. Thus, learned advocate Mr. Shah, with all vehement, submitted that because of casual approach on the part of the original petitioners, the operation of law has come into play and resultantly, ex parte ad-interim relief stands vacated. Learned advocate Mr. Shah, therefore, requested this Court to pass formal order to that effect. 7. By making above submissions, learned advocate Mr. Shah for the applicant has prayed this Court for passing formal declaration of automatic vacation of interim relief. 8. Per contra, learned Senior Advocate Mr. Rashesh S. Sanjanwala assisted by learned advocate Mr. Aadit Sanjanwala for the respondents Nos.1 to 4 – original petitioners has mainly made the following submissions: 8.1. Learned Senior Advocate Mr. Sanjanwala for the original petitioners, at the outset, submitted that since the main petition being R/Special Civil Application No.13302 of 2023 is listed for hearing on 11th December 2023, the same can be decided finally instead of passing formal declaration of automatic vacation of ex parte ad-interim relief. 8.2. Learned Senior Advocate Mr. Sanjanwala submitted that the challenge in the main petition is to the order of the learned Collector, Surat, whereby, delay of 6 years was condoned. Learned Senior Advocate Mr. Sanjanwala submitted that if the original petitioners succeed in the main petition, the entire proceedings pending before the learned Collector, Surat shall come to an end. 8.2. Learned Senior Advocate Mr. Sanjanwala submitted that the challenge in the main petition is to the order of the learned Collector, Surat, whereby, delay of 6 years was condoned. Learned Senior Advocate Mr. Sanjanwala submitted that if the original petitioners succeed in the main petition, the entire proceedings pending before the learned Collector, Surat shall come to an end. Thus, if the declaration of automatic vacation of ad-interim relief is granted, in that event, the proceedings before the learned Collector, Surat would commence and might also be concluded before the petition is finally heard, and thereby, the entire petition of the original petitioners would become infructuous. Under the circumstances, learned Senior Advocate Mr. Sanjanwala submitted that instead of passing formal declaration of automatic vacation of ex parte ad-interim relief, present Civil Application may be considered on its own merits alternatively. 8.3. Learned Senior Advocate Mr. Sanjanwala further submitted that during the mandatory period of two weeks, the main petition was listed for hearing and the same could not have been heard due to paucity of time, and thereby, upon request being made by the original petitioners for extension of interim relief, against which, as there was no opposition raised, then the provisions of Article 226(3) of the Constitution of India, would not come into play. Learned Senior Advocate Mr. Sanjanwala submitted that once, in the main petition, extension was granted by the Court, without there being any opposition by the other side, the said extension cannot be said to be an ex parte ad-interim relief, and thereby, the provisions of Article 226(3) of the Constitution of India would not be applicable, and resultantly, there cannot be any automatic vacation of ad-interim relief. 8.4. Learned Senior Advocate Mr. Sanjanwala would, therefore, submit that the present Civil Application deserves to be decided on merits rather declaring automatic vacation of ad-interim relief by operation of law. To substantiate his contentions, learned Senior Advocate Mr. Sanjanwala has placed reliance on the decision of this Court in the case of Sunni Muslim Samaj vs. Pandya Manishanker Dhanjibhai and others reported in (2004) 1 GLR 540 and also placed reliance on the decision of this Court in the case of Vinayakrao S. Desai vs. Interlink Petroleum Ltd and others reported in (2001) 3 GLR 2649 . 9. By making above submissions, learned Senior Advocate Mr. 9. By making above submissions, learned Senior Advocate Mr. Sanjanwala for the original petitioners has prayed this Court not to pass formal declaration with regard to automatic vacation of ex parte ad-interim relief and further requested this Court to either decide the present Civil Application on merits having not falling within the category under Article 226(3) of the Constitution of India or to decide the main petition finally, which is scheduled for hearing on 11th December 2023. 10. I have heard learned advocates appearing for the respective parties and have gone through the relevant record and material pertaining to the present case. No other and further submissions have been canvassed by the learned advocates appearing for the respective parties except what are stated hereinabove. 11. Having considered the submissions of the learned advocates appearing for the parties, a short question that falls for consideration of this Court is whether when a mandatory period of two weeks is over, without any fault on the part of the applicant, a Court can still adjudicate merits/demerits of the case qua vacation /continuation of interim relief and/or shall pass formal order for declaration of vacation of ex parte ad-interim relief? 12. So as to decide the aforesaid question, in my considered opinion, the decision rendered by the Full Bench of this Court, in the case of District Development Officer (supra), requires to be considered. Thus, to profit, I deem fit to extract the relevant observations of the said decision as under: “10. In our considered opinion, where the language of constitutional provision is plain and unambiguous, the provision cannot be read down on consideration that if plain meaning is assigned the consequences would be inconvenient or unjust to a party. On the plain language of Clause (3), we do not find that the provision stating that the ex parte order of stay or injunction would stand vacated after a specified period of fulfilment of specified formalities by the party aggrieved, has any unjust result against the party who had obtained the ex parte order. The object and intention of the Parliament behind the constitutional amendment has to be kept good in view in construing the provision. The object and intention of the Parliament behind the constitutional amendment has to be kept good in view in construing the provision. The Parliament has noticed large number of cases where ex parte orders of stay or injunction are obtained by parties without furnishing copies of the petition and stay applications thus denying grant of opportunity to the opposite parties of hearing and such ex parte orders continue to remain in operation to the prejudice of the aggrieved parry for an indefinite period of time as the stay matters do not receive consideration by the High Court within a reasonable period of time. To protect the Interest of such aggrieved parties suffering under ex parte orders of stay or injunction, Article 226 in the Constitution is amended to incorporate Clause (3) providing for automatic vacation of ex parte order or stay, if the aggrieved party is not heard against the ex parte order within a specific period after it had approached the Court for the purpose in accordance with the laid down procedure. 11. In our opinion, the expressions employed in Clause (3) "makes an application" and "when it is received" are clearly intended to convey the meaning of filing of an application in accordance with the practice of the High Court. The said expressions on their plain language cannot be read to mean placing of an application before the concerned Judge to whom the case, in which the ex parte order is passed, has been assigned. All the High Courts in India have framed their own High Court Rules regulating their procedure. In Gujarat High Court Rules, 1993, the procedure for making applications under Article 226 is contained in Chapter XVII. Rule 188 of the Rules states that subject to Rules in Chapter XVII, the Rules in other Chapter shall apply mutaitis mutandis to petitions and applications under Chapter XVII laying down procedure for filing applications and writ petitions under Articles 226, 227 and 228. By virtue of Rule 188 in Chapter XVII, Rule 30 in Chapter IV which lays down the normal procedure of presentation of any application is applicable to application made under Article 226. By virtue of Rule 188 in Chapter XVII, Rule 30 in Chapter IV which lays down the normal procedure of presentation of any application is applicable to application made under Article 226. Rule 30 of Chapter IV lays down a procedure stating that "all matters which are to be instituted in the High Court shall be presented in the office of the Registry to such person as the Registry by special or general authorities, ordinarily between 10.30 a.m. to 4.30 p.m." 12. The expression "making of an application" and "receiving of such application" cannot on their plain language be construed to mean cognizance of the application by the Judge to whom the case is assigned as per the roster prepared by the Chief Justice. Such an interpretation, as has been placed by Hon'ble H. L. Gokhale, J. is one sided and favours the party which has obtained the ex parte order. It defeats the purpose for which Clause (3) has been inserted in the Constitution to protect the aggrieved party from the ill effects of continuance of ex parte order obtained against it for an indefinite point of time. 13. In our considered opinion from Clause (3) the intention of Parliament is very clear that an ex parte order of stay or injunction obtained in proceedings under Article 226 will have a maximum life of two weeks from the date the application is made by the opposite party and is received by the High Court or to the party obtaining such order. The specified period would not commence from the date it is actually placed before the Judge to whom the case is assigned on the judicial side. The specified period would not commence from the date it is actually placed before the Judge to whom the case is assigned on the judicial side. Maxwell in a book on "The Interpretation of Statutes" (12th Edition) has stated as under : "Enactments regulating the procedure in Courts are usually construed as imperative, even where the observance of the formalities in question is not a condition exacted from the party seeking the benefit of the statute, but a duty imposed on a Court or public officer when no general inconvenience or injustice seems to call for a different construction." Crales in "Statute Law" (7th Edition) contains the following statement of law on the canon of construction of an Act of Parliament : "Words may be modified or varied where their import is doubtful or obscure, but we assume the functions of legislators when we depart from the ordinary meaning of the precise words used. Merely because we see, or fancy we see, an absurdity or manifest injustice from an adherence to their literal meaning." 14. We find that by putting a plain meaning to the language employed in Clause (3), no unjust results or consequences flow which can be said as contrary to the intention contained in the Constitutional amendment.” “17. On the settled principles of interpretation of statutes and more so of the constitutional provision, we are, with utmost respect, of the considered opinion, that the learned single Judge H. L. Gokhale, J. as he then was, was not correct in reading something into Clause (3) which is not to be found in it. It is not possible to read that on the 'making of an application' by the aggrieved party for vacation of ex parte order or stay or injunction reckoning the prescribed period of two weeks would be from the date on which such application is placed before the Judge, to which the matter is assigned. In our considered opinion the views expressed by Calcutta and Rajasthan High Courts (supra) place such interpretation on Clause (3) which is in consonance with the settled canons of interpretation. We also do not find that Clause (3) of Article 226 lays down any time limit for making an application for vacating ex parte orders by the aggrieved party for statutory operation of automatic vacation of such ex parte order. 18. We also do not find that Clause (3) of Article 226 lays down any time limit for making an application for vacating ex parte orders by the aggrieved party for statutory operation of automatic vacation of such ex parte order. 18. On the discussion aforesaid, we have answered all the questions posed by the learned single Judge M. R. Calla, J. formulated in his order. Our conclusion therefore, is that that on plain language of Clause (3) in Article 226, an ex parte order of injunction or stay shall stand vacated automatically after two weeks, if the aggrieved party completes all the formalities of making an application to the High Court and furnishing copy of such application to the party in whose favour the order is made. The period of limitation of two weeks specified under Clause (3) shall commence on the plain language of that Article from the date the application is received by the Registry of the Court or is furnished to the party for whose benefit it is passed whichever is later in accordance with the Rules and practice of the Court. In our opinion, action or inaction on the part of the parties or Registry shall have no consequence of undoing what the Constitution law contemplates of automatic vacation of the order after expiry of two weeks on the completion of required formalities of procedure and occurrence of eventualities mentioned in Clause (3) of Article 226.” 13. Having considered the aforesaid proposition of law, the Full Bench of this Court has, in clear terms, observed and held that ex parte ad-interim order of injunction or stay shall stand vacated automatically after two weeks if the aggrieved party completes all the formalities of making an application to the High Court and furnishing copy of such application to the party in whose favour the order is made. It has been further held that action or inaction on the part of the party or the Registry shall have no consequence of undoing what the Constitution law contemplates of automatic vacation of the order after expiry of two weeks on the completion of required formalities of procedure. In my understanding, the Full Bench of this Court has, in no uncertain terms, given much weightage to the plain language employed of Clause (3) in Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In my understanding, the Full Bench of this Court has, in no uncertain terms, given much weightage to the plain language employed of Clause (3) in Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In my view, the Full Bench of this Court has, in terms, said that once an application under Article 226(3) of the Constitution of India is filed before the Registry of the High Court, after serving advance copy to the other side, the mandate of limitation shall commence from the said date, and if, within the said mandate, the application is not decided irrespective of action or inaction on the part of the parties or the Registry, by operation of law, the ex parte ad-interim relief shall stand vacated. In my considered opinion, in a way, the Full Bench has cast heavy onus and/or responsibility on the party who has obtained ex parte ad-interim relief. Therefore, in my view, it is the duty of the party in whose favour the ex parte ad-interim relief is in operation to act not only vigilantly, but to some extent proactively because the Full Bench of this Court has, in terms, said that once the formalities of filing an application and serving copy thereof to the other side is over, in that eventuality, the mandatory limitation would commence. Thus, in my view considered view, keeping in mind the proposition of law laid down by the Full Bench, the party, in whose favour the ex parte ad-interim order is in operation, has to make all positive efforts to get decided such application on merits within a period of two weeks, failing which, by way of operation of law, ex parte ad-interim relief shall stand vacated. 14. Keeping in mind the aforesaid proposition of law, the facts of the present case are considered as under: 14.1. The present Civil Application under Article 226(3) of the Constitution of India is filed on 2nd September 2023. The copy thereof was served to the counsel for the original petitioners on 2nd September 2023. 14.2. On 11th September 2023, the main petition was listed, however, the present Civil Application under Article 226(3) of the Constitution of India, anyhow, not listed. The present Civil Application under Article 226(3) of the Constitution of India is filed on 2nd September 2023. The copy thereof was served to the counsel for the original petitioners on 2nd September 2023. 14.2. On 11th September 2023, the main petition was listed, however, the present Civil Application under Article 226(3) of the Constitution of India, anyhow, not listed. It is pertinent to note, at this stage, that despite the original petitioners was served with a copy of application under Article 226(3) of the Constitution of India and despite having known that the mandatory period of limitation of two weeks commenced from 2nd September 2023, at the time of mentioning of the main petition, which was not taken up due to paucity of time, more particularly, at the last minutes of the Court proceedings, the original petitioners were only interested in mentioning for extension of ad-interim relief. The original petitioners, at that stage, should have requested the Court to keep the main petition before expiry of two weeks i.e. 17th September 2023 along with the Civil Application under Article 226(3) of the Constitution of India. However, the original petitioners have shown casual approach towards the present application under Article 226(3) of the Constitution of India. 14.3. The another glaring fact, which deserves to be noted, is that the present Civil Application listed for the first time before the Court on 16th October 2023. The said application neither circulated by the Registry for any reason nor any party, more particularly, the original petitioners made any attempt to get it circulated before expiry of mandatory period of limitation. As per the mandate of Article 226(3) of Constitution of India, after expiry of 14 days, by way of operation of law, automatic vacation of ad-interim relief is provided, and thereby, as stated hereinabove, the onus cast upon the original petitioners to ensure that there shall be no automatic vacation of ad-interim relief operating in his favour rather to have decided the application within the mandatory period of limitation. 15. Keeping in mind the proposition of law laid down by the Full Bench of this Court in the case of District Development Officer (supra) and the facts of the present case, as stated hereinabove, now, I may propose to deal with the contentions of learned Senior Advocate Mr. Sanjanwala for the original petitioners as under: 15.1. 15. Keeping in mind the proposition of law laid down by the Full Bench of this Court in the case of District Development Officer (supra) and the facts of the present case, as stated hereinabove, now, I may propose to deal with the contentions of learned Senior Advocate Mr. Sanjanwala for the original petitioners as under: 15.1. So far as the contention raised by learned Senior Advocate Mr. Sanjanwala with regard to deciding main petition which is listed for hearing on 11th December 2023 instead of deciding the present Civil Application being no more remained to be as an application under Article 226(3) of the Constitution of India, is concerned, in my view, the said contention cannot be accepted. I say so because the basis of the said contention that once, in the main petition, the ad-interim relief has been extended without any objection by the other side, the said extension, therefore, cannot be said to be an ad-interim. Thus, provisions of Article 226(3) of the Constitution of India cannot be applicable. The very said argument, in my view, is misconceived. The extension of interim relief was granted not after bi-parte hearing and/or not after hearing the petition. The extension was granted during the course of mentioning at the last minutes of the Court proceedings. Therefore, merely because the extension was granted, it does not become bi-parte order. Therefore, in my considered opinion, rigor of the provisions of Article 226(3) of the Constitution of India cannot be diluted. In view of the aforesaid, the contention of learned Senior Advocate Mr. Sanjanwala to decide the main petition cannot be accepted. 15.2. So far as the alternative submission of learned Senior Advocate Mr. Sanjanwala with regard to decide the present Civil Application on merits by not treating the application as styled under Article 226(3) of the Constitution of India, as in the main petition, the ad-interim relief was extended by the Court without any objection, is concerned, in my considered opinion, as stated hereinabove, the said extension of interim relief, vide order dated 11th September 2023, was not after any bi-parte hearing. In fact, the main petition could not be taken up due to paucity of time, and thereby, the learned counsel for the original petitioners, in the mentioning during the last minutes of the Court proceedings, requested this Court to extend the ad-interim relief and the same was thereby acceded to. In fact, the main petition could not be taken up due to paucity of time, and thereby, the learned counsel for the original petitioners, in the mentioning during the last minutes of the Court proceedings, requested this Court to extend the ad-interim relief and the same was thereby acceded to. Thus, in my view, the extension of the ad-interim relief, which was not bi-parte, cannot dilute the rigor of Article 226(3) of the Constitution of India, and thus, the application under Article 226(3) of the Constitution of India cannot be converted into simple application in vacating interim relief, which, in any case, has to be decided on merits. By virtue of the formal extension of interim relief, not after bi-parte hearing, would not convert the application under Article 226(3) of the Constitution of India into a general application for vacating interim relief. Thus, the original petitioners cannot claim any right of hearing the application on merits. Once, by operation of law, interim relief already stands vacated, in my considered opinion, this Court would not further decide the application on merits. If, by virtue of mandate of the Constitution of India, the interim relief is automatically vacated, this Court, in my view, cannot then decide the application on merits by ignoring the mandate of the Constitution of India. Under the circumstances, the contention raised by learned Senior Advocate Mr. Sanjanwala for the original petitioners deserves to be rejected. 15.3. So far as the second contention of learned Senior Advocate Mr. Sanjanwala is concerned merely because the main petition would become infructuous in the event of declaration of automatic vacation of ad-interim relief is granted, in my view, is of no consequence. I say so because, in the process of giving effect of constitutional mandate, the Court should not envisage any situation as to what would happen after the order is passed. The Court, while exercising its power, has to decide the proceedings in accordance with law. Thus, if, by operation of law, the ad-interim relief has already stood vacated, in that event, the Court cannot go further to envisage any situation, as sought to be projected by the original petitioners. The Court, while exercising its power, has to decide the proceedings in accordance with law. Thus, if, by operation of law, the ad-interim relief has already stood vacated, in that event, the Court cannot go further to envisage any situation, as sought to be projected by the original petitioners. In my view, once the mandatory period of limitation is over and the automatic vacation of interim relief comes into play, the Court is left with no option to act as per the mandate of the Constitution by passing the formal declaration. The Court cannot go step beyond and consider effect of automatic vacation of interim relief. 16. So far as the authorities relied upon by learned Senior Advocate Mr. Sanjanwala for the original petitioners in the case of Sunni Muslim Samaj (supra) is concerned, the Coordinate Bench of this Court, in the said decision, in para 10, has held as under: “10. In light of the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case, it is not possible to accept the submission on behalf of the applicant that the period of two weeks specified in Article 226(3) of the Constitution should be reckoned regardless of the conduct of the parties. Once, the applicant itself seeks time and does not proceed with the hearing of the application, it cannot be permitted to turn round and be heard to say that now as two weeks have expired only formal order has to be passed. If this interpretation put by the applicant on the Article is accepted, it would not be necessary to even hear the parties because all that a particular applicant would be required to do is to file an application, and thereafter, not to proceed with and have the same heard, despite the same being posted for hearing before the Court, and after a period of two weeks expires, turn round and state that the application requires to be allowed. This cannot be the legislative intention and cannot be countenanced.” 17. Having considered the aforesaid decision, more particularly, para 10, the Coordinate Bench of this Court has not accepted the submission that the period of two weeks specified under Article 226(3) of the Constitution of India should be reckoned regardless of the conduct of the parties, meaning thereby, the Coordinate Bench has given much importance to the conduct of the parties. Having considered the aforesaid decision, more particularly, para 10, the Coordinate Bench of this Court has not accepted the submission that the period of two weeks specified under Article 226(3) of the Constitution of India should be reckoned regardless of the conduct of the parties, meaning thereby, the Coordinate Bench has given much importance to the conduct of the parties. Now, in this context, if the facts of the present case are concerned, the original petitioners, who were served with the copy of application under Article 226(3) of the Constitution of India for vacating interim relief on 2nd September 2023, have never shown any vigilance and/or proactive conduct to get the application decided within a period of two weeks. More so, on 11th September 2023, the original petitioners were only concerned with extension of interim relief and not much concerned to request the Court to adjourn the matter on any date before 17th September 2023 along with Civil Application under Article 226(3) of the Constitution of India. Thus, keeping in mind the proposition of law laid down by the Full Bench and the conduct of the original petitioners, the judgement cited by the learned Senior Advocate for the original petitioners, in the case of Sunni Muslim Samaj (supra), is not applicable. 18. So far as reliance placed by learned Senior Advocate Mr. Sanjanwala for the original petitioners, in the case of Vinayakrao S. Desai (supra), is concerned, in my considered opinion, the facts of the decision so cited and the facts of the present case are materially different. In said case, on 16th December 1999, notice was issued returnable on 18th January 2000 and ad-interim relief was granted in terms of para 8(C) till 18th January 2000. The applicant therein received notice on 24th December 1999 and filed appearance on 27th December 1999. The applicant therein did not file any application under Article 226(3) of the Constitution of India till its returnable date i.e. 18th January 2000. But, on 18th January 2000, the learned advocate for the applicant therein remain absent. Thus, ad-interim relief was extended till 9th February 2000. On 9th February 2000, the learned advocate again remained absent and that he had not chosen to avail the opportunity of hearing or contest the interim relief granted on 16th December 1999. But, on 18th January 2000, the learned advocate for the applicant therein remain absent. Thus, ad-interim relief was extended till 9th February 2000. On 9th February 2000, the learned advocate again remained absent and that he had not chosen to avail the opportunity of hearing or contest the interim relief granted on 16th December 1999. The Court heard the learned counsel for the applicant on interim relief application for which notice was issued and passed an order in short as per practice prevalent in the Court, “S.O. to 23rd February 2000. Ad-interim relief as per para 8(C) to continue till further orders”. In the said proceeding, the Civil Application under Article 226(3) of the Constitution of India was filed on 12th June 2000 and under the context of the aforesaid facts, the Coordinate Bench of this Court has held that the ratio laid down by the Full Bench is not attracted. However, in the present case, if the facts are considered, the Coordinate Bench of this Court, on 3rd August 2023, issued Notice making it returnable on 11th September 2023 and granted ad-interim relief. Upon service of notice and granting ex parte ad-interim relief, the applicant herein has immediately approached this Court by way of filing the present Civil Application under Article 226(3) of the Constitution of India on 2nd September 2023 after serving copy of same on the counsel for the original petitioners. That, on 11th September 2023, the main petition was listed for hearing, but the same was not heard because of paucity of time and extension of interim relief was granted upon mentioning made by the learned advocate for the original petitioners at last minutes of the Court proceedings. Admittedly, while granting extension, the main petition was not heard. Thus, the said extension cannot be equated with extension of interim relief after bi-parte hearing. In addition to the aforesaid, the learned Senior Advocate for the original petitioners has only taken care to get the extension of interim relief by mentioning without taking any care to see that the main petition be adjourned within a period of mandatory limitation so as to see that the present Civil Application is decided on merits. In addition to the aforesaid, the learned Senior Advocate for the original petitioners has only taken care to get the extension of interim relief by mentioning without taking any care to see that the main petition be adjourned within a period of mandatory limitation so as to see that the present Civil Application is decided on merits. Thus, in my view, in the facts of the present case, the ratio laid down by the Full Bench of this Court in the case of District Development Officer (supra) is squarely applicable, and accordingly, the decision in the case of Vinayakrao S. Desai (supra) is of no help to the original petitioners. I answer the question accordingly. 19. For the foregoing discussion, this Court is of the firm opinion that in view of expiry of mandatory period of limitation, ex parte ad-interim relief, by operation of law, stands already vacated and accordingly, this Court has no hesitation to declare the same. 20. Resultantly, ex parte ad-interim relief granted, vide order dated 3rd August 2023, is hereby declared to have vacated automatically by operation of law. The present Civil Application is, accordingly, disposed of. 21. Needless to clarify that the original petitioners shall be at liberty to approach the Court by way of appropriate application for fixing early date of hearing of the main matter being R/Special Civil Application No.13302 of 2023, if so desired. FURTHER ORDER After pronouncement of this order, learned advocate Mr. Sanjanwala requested this Court to stay the order for some time. The said request cannot be accepted and the same is declined accordingly.