JUDGMENT Saurabh Lavania, J. Heard learned Counsel for the petitioner, Dr. Krishna Singh, learned State Counsel and Sri Anil Kumar Mishra, learned Counsel for opposite party no.4. 2. The present petition has been filed for the following main relief:- "(I) Issue a writ, order or direction in certiorari quashing the impugned order dated 24.03.2023 passed by the opposite party No. 1 contained as Annexure No. P-l to the writ petition. (II) Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of Mandamus commanding the respondents to maintain the status-quo." 3. By means of the present petition, the petitioner has assailed the order dated 24.03.2023 passed by opposite party no.1-Deputy Director of Consolidation, Sultanpur, in Revision No. 1495 (Amar Bahadur and Others v. Ram Samhar and Others), preferred under Section 48 of U.P. Consolation and Holdings Act, 1953 (in short "Act of 1953"). 4. It would be apt to point here that four revisions namely Revision No. 1485 (Asha Ram and Others v. Malti Singh and Others, Revision No. 1495 (Amar Bahadur and Others v. Ram Samhar and Others, Revision No. 1631 (Bankey Bhihari and Others v. Ram Milan and Others and Revision No. 1604 (Balai and Others v. Bankey Bihari, were decided by opposite party no. 1-Deputy Director of Consolidation, Sultanpur, by common order dated 28.11.2002. 5. The petitioner and three others namely Smt. Kiran Singh, Smt. Malti Singh and Smt. Heerawati Singh, filed an application seeking recall of order dated 28.11.2002 alongwith an application seeking interim protection. This application was filed on 02.12.2022 and on the same day i.e. 02.12.2022, the opposite party no. 1, passed the interim order. Thereafter, on coming to know about the pendency of application seeking for recall of order dated 28.11.2002, and interim order dated 02.12.2022, an application dated 17.03.2023 seeking recall of order dated 02.12.2022 was preferred by one Asha Ram son of Ram Bahal (opposite party no. 10) before the Deputy Director of Consolidation, Sultnapur. On the application dated 17.03.2023 filed by opposite party no. 10 for recalling the order dated 02.12.2022, the matter was fixed for 20.03.2023, though as per the order-sheet drawn, on 06.03.2023 matter was fixed for 19.04.2023. 6. On 20.03.2023, the learned Counsel for the parties were heard and thereafter the opposite party no. 1 recalled the order providing interim protection to the petitioner and three others vide order dated 02.12.2022. 10 for recalling the order dated 02.12.2022, the matter was fixed for 20.03.2023, though as per the order-sheet drawn, on 06.03.2023 matter was fixed for 19.04.2023. 6. On 20.03.2023, the learned Counsel for the parties were heard and thereafter the opposite party no. 1 recalled the order providing interim protection to the petitioner and three others vide order dated 02.12.2022. In other words, the order dated 02.12.2022, so far as it relates to interim protection was recalled by the impugned order dated 24.03.2023. 7. It reflects from the impugned order that parties would heard on 05.04.2023 on the application of restoration as also on the application seeking interim protection. Reason for recalling the order dated 02.12.2022, as per impugned order is to the effect that application for recall order dated 28.11.2002 was preferred after about 20 years as such without hearing the parties to the litigation, providing interim protection was not proper. The relevant portion of the order dated 24.03.2023, on reproduction reads as under:- ^^fnukad 27-03-2023 ds izkFkZuki= ij fnukad 20-03-2023 dh frfFk fu;r dj i{kdkjku~ dks lquk x;kA vk'kkjke iq= jkecgy dk dFku gS fd LFkxr vkns'k fujLr dj cktnk;j izkFkZuk i= dj lquokbZ dk volj nsus ds i'pkr gh vkns'k ikfjr fd;k tk;sA cktnk;jdrkZx.k ds fo}ku vf/koDrk us rdZ j[kk fd fuxjkuh U;k;ky; ds iz'uxr vkns'k fnukad 28-11-2002 dh mUgs dksbZ tkudkjh ugh jgh gSA xzke esa lgk;d pdcUnh vf/kdkjh Lrj ls cuk;s x;s pdks ds vuqlkj gh xzke esa dCtk ifjorZu djk;k x;k FkkA ekSds ij fookn gksus ds dkj.k iwokZf/kdkjh }kjk fnukad 02-12-2022 dks LFkxr vkns'k ikfjr fd;k x;k FkkA esjh jk; esa ewy fuxjkuh esa ikfjr vkns'k ds fo:) 20 o"kZ dky ckf/kr izLrqr cktnk;j izkFkZuk i= ij LFkxu vkns'k fn;k tkuk o iwoZ vkns'k dk izHkko LFkfxr fd;k tkuk mfpr ugh gSA ;g Hkh mYys[kuh; gS fd iz'uxr vkns'k mRrjoknh dks fcuk lqus ikfjr fd;k x;k gSA ,slh fLFkfr esa LFkxu vkns'k fnukad 02-12-2022 fujLr fd;k tkuk mfpr gSA vkns'k mijksDr foospuk ds vk/kkj ij iwoZ ikfjr LFkxu vkns'k fnukad 02-12-2022 fujLr fd;k tkrk gSA iwoZ ikfjr vkns'k fnukad 28-11-2002 dh okn i=koyh ryc gksA cktnk;j izkFkZuk i= ,oa mDr ds lkFk izLrqr LFkxu izkFkZuk i= ij fnukad 05-04-2023 dks cgl dh tk;sA i=koyh fnukad 05-04-2023 dks is'k gksA** 8. Assailing the order dated 24.03.2023, learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that no wrong was committed by opposite party no. Assailing the order dated 24.03.2023, learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that no wrong was committed by opposite party no. 1 in providing interim protection, as per which the parties were directed to maintain status-quo, as the dispute in issue particularly relates to the road between two villages. It is further stated that on account of altercation between the parties, two FIR(s) were also lodged. As such the indulgence of this Court is required. 9. On query being put, learned Counsel for the petitioner fairly stated that parties were heard on 20.03.2023. 10. On the other hand, Dr. Krishna Singh, learned Counsel for the State as also learned Counsel for the private respondent-Sri Anil Kumar Mishra, stated that application for recall was filed after about 20 years with the prayer for considering the application within time. 11. Also stated that as per settled principle of law, the issue of delay has to be considered first and thereafter the court can pass any order on the application seeking interim relief or on merits of case In other words, the issue of condonation of delay is liable to be decided first before entering into the merits of the case. Elaborating the same, it has also been stated that as per the settled preposition of law, the delay has to be condoned first and only then the Court concerned can pass an order on the application for stay or on the merits of the case. In this regard, reliance has been placed on a Division Bench judgment of this Court passed in the case of Ram Prakash v. Deputy Director of Consolidation and Others reported in 2022 SCC Online AH 107, relevant portion of which on reproduction reads as under:- "19. We are not going into the issue as to whether an order passed by appellate authority on an application seeking condonation of delay is an interim order or final as the same has not been referred for consideration by the Division Bench. Different situations may arise in an appeal filed along with application seeking condonation of delay. Firstly, the application for seeking condonation of delay may be dismissed. As a consequence thereof, the appeal will also fail. Another situation may be that application seeking condonation of delay is allowed and thereafter the appeal may either be accepted or rejected. 20. Different situations may arise in an appeal filed along with application seeking condonation of delay. Firstly, the application for seeking condonation of delay may be dismissed. As a consequence thereof, the appeal will also fail. Another situation may be that application seeking condonation of delay is allowed and thereafter the appeal may either be accepted or rejected. 20. If any statute provides certain period for filing of appeal, an appeal filed beyond the time limit will certainly be not entertained. If the provisions of 1963 Act are applicable and party is entitled to seek condonation of delay in filing appeal, an application has to be filed specifying the grounds on which delay in filing the appeal is sought to be condoned. It is only after that the application is allowed, the appeal can be entertained and heard on merits. Before that the appeal cannot be taken up and considered on merits. 21. As far as the issue regarding hearing of the application seeking condonation of delay and the appeal simultaneously is concerned, in our view, firstly the application has to be considered. Only thereafter, the appeal can be considered on merits but there is nothing in law which requires hearing of appeal on merits to be postponed mandatorily after acceptance of the application seeking condonation of delay. Both can be taken up on the same day. However, the appeal has to be heard on merits only after the application seeking condonation of delay has been accepted. 22. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we answer the question referred to the Division Bench that an application seeking condonation of delay has to be decided first before the appeal is taken up for hearing on merits. However, it can be on the same day and there is no requirement of adjourning the hearing of appeal on merits after acceptance of the application seeking condonation of delay." 12. Further, reliance has been placed on paragraph 32 of the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Noharlal Verma v. Distt. Coop. Central Bank Ltd. reported in (2008) 14 SCC 445 , which on reproduction reads as under:- "32. Now, limitation goes to the root of the matter. Further, reliance has been placed on paragraph 32 of the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Noharlal Verma v. Distt. Coop. Central Bank Ltd. reported in (2008) 14 SCC 445 , which on reproduction reads as under:- "32. Now, limitation goes to the root of the matter. If a suit, appeal or application is barred by limitation,a court or an adjudicating authority has no jurisdiction, power or authority to entertain such suit, appeal or application and to decide it on merits." 13. In continuation, it is stated that in this case without dealing with the issue of condonation of delay and without providing proper opportunity of hearing to the side opposite, the interim protection vide order dated 02.12.2022, was provided by opposite party no. 1, which has been recalled vide order dated 24.03.2023, which is just and valid in view of settled principles of law. As such no indulgence is required. The next date fixed in the case is 18.05.2023. 14. It is also stated that present petition without impleading necessary parties namely Smt. Kiran Singh, Smt. Malti Singh and Smt. Heerawati Singh, is not maintainable. 15. Considering the entire facts of the case indicated above particularly that without dealing with the issues of delay in filing the application for recall of order dated 28.11.2002 the interim protection was granted vide order dated 02.12.2022 as also the law on the issue, the Court is not inclined to entertain the present petition challenging the order dated 24.03.2023. 16. At this stage, learned Counsel for the petitioner stated that justice would suffice if a direction is issued to dispose of the matter expeditiously. 17. Considering the aforesaid, without interfering in impugned order, the present petition is disposed of with direction to opposite party no.1 to consider and decide the matter pending before him, in view of law laid down by the Division Bench as also the Hon'ble Apex Court, referred hereinabove, within a period of six months, after providing proper opportunity of hearing to the parties to the litigation, if there is no other legal impediment, from the date of production of certified copy of this order. 18. It is also expected from the authority-opposite party no. 1 to decide the pending issue related to delay condonation as also the application for interim protection, within a period of two months. 19. 18. It is also expected from the authority-opposite party no. 1 to decide the pending issue related to delay condonation as also the application for interim protection, within a period of two months. 19. The petitioner would also file an undertaking before the authority concerned, indicating therein that he would not take any adjournment and he will appear on each dates. 20. It is made clear that the Court has not examined the case of either of the parties on merits and the authority concerned shall be free to decide the matter strictly in accordance with law.