JUDGMENT : Sujit Narayan Prasad, J. 1. The instant intra-court appeal, preferred under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent, is directed against the order/judgment dated 06.03.2020 passed by learned Single Judge of this Court in W.P.(S) No.1664 of 2014 by which the order of punishment dated 06.09.2013 passed in Service Appeal No.38/2012 wherein the appeal filed by the petitioner against the order of punishment dated 12.10.2010 as contained in Memo No.3419 has been affirmed, has been refused to be interfered with. 2. Brief facts of the case as per the pleadings made in the writ proceeding, which are required to be enumerated herein, read as under :- 3. The petitioner was appointed in 1994 as an Assistant Teacher by the State Government as he qualified in a competitive examination held by Bihar Public Service Commission for appointment of Assistant Teacher. He was appointed as an Assistant Teacher in upgraded Middle School, Khudgadda in Bokaro District and subsequently he was given charge of Headmaster in the same school. 4. The writ petitioner was performing his duties honestly and diligently but some interested people of the Khudgadda village in coalition with some officers started harassing the petitioner and in the pressure of a local leader an inspection was made to the petitioner's school by the Block Development Officer, Gomiya. After inspection, the Block Development Officer, Gomiya wrote to the District Superintendent of Education, Bokaro wherein he has stated that an enquiry of the said school was made by him on 07.06.2010 and he found irregularity in building construction work. He also alleged that irregularities were being done by the petitioner in Mid-Day-Meal. The stock register was not up to date. The presence of the students was found 70 out of 145 on the day of inspection, whereas, cent per cent attendance was shown in the attendance register one day prior to the date of inspection. It was also alleged that the cereals of Mid-Day-Meal was kept in the house of the petitioner. Moreover, the equipment of sports and musical instruments were kept in the petitioner's house instead of providing them to the students. It was further alleged that the petitioner was working for 15 to 16 years at one place and the local villagers were annoyed because of his work style. This respondent No.5 recommended transfer of the petitioner immediately to other school. 5. It was further alleged that the petitioner was working for 15 to 16 years at one place and the local villagers were annoyed because of his work style. This respondent No.5 recommended transfer of the petitioner immediately to other school. 5. It is the case of the writ petitioner that in the garb of the letter of the BDO, Gomiya, the DSE, Bokaro, passed an order of suspension of the writ petitioner vide memo no. 2416 dated 22.06.2010 reiterating therein the allegations leveled against the petitioner by the BDO, Gomiya without making any enquiry or without giving opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. 6. After issuance of the suspension order, Form 'KA' was issued by the respondent against the petitioner for as many as 3 charges. All the charges were made on the basis of the letter written by the BDO, Gomiya to DSE, Bokaro. 7. The charge sheet was issued by the respondent DSE, Bokaro vide memo no. 2534 dated 01.07.2010. 8. The petitioner replied the charges leveled against him through letter dated 12.08. 2010 and he denied all of them stating therein categorically that they were false and fabricated. 9. An enquiry was conducted by the authorized enquiry officer and he submitted a three pages report to the DSE, Bokaro, dated 16.08.2010 wherein the charges leveled against the petitioner were not found to be true and recommendation for petitioner's transfer to another school was made by the enquiry officer as he had been in the same school for last 15 to 16 years. 10. It is the further case of the writ petitioner that though, the recommendation was made by the BDO, Gomiya, for transfer of the petitioner from the school but, the DSE, Bokaro arbitrarily suspended the petitioner and initiated departmental proceeding against him and passed an order of punishment against the petitioner vide Memo No. 3419 dated 12.10.2010. 11. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the order passed by DSE, Bokaro, vide memo no. 3419 dated 12.10.2010, the petitioner filed a service appeal no. 38/2012 before the Divisional Commissioner, North Chhotanagpur Division, Hazaribag but the same was dismissed by the Divisional Commissioner passing an order dated 6.09.2013 without considering the facts circumstances of the case. 12. 11. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the order passed by DSE, Bokaro, vide memo no. 3419 dated 12.10.2010, the petitioner filed a service appeal no. 38/2012 before the Divisional Commissioner, North Chhotanagpur Division, Hazaribag but the same was dismissed by the Divisional Commissioner passing an order dated 6.09.2013 without considering the facts circumstances of the case. 12. The writ petitioner, approached this Court by filing writ petition wherein he challenged the punishment order dated 12.10.2010 and the appellate order dated 06.09.2013 but the same was dismissed against which the present appeal has been filed. 13. It is evident from the pleading that the writ petitioner/appellant was working as Teacher and while he was given the charge of Headmaster in the Upgraded Middle School, Khudgadda in Bokaro, he was assigned the construction of a building in which certain irregularities have been found in course of its construction. The said irregularity was detected by conducting a fact finding enquiry. Based upon the said fact finding, altogether three charges have been framed. The charges are since in Hindi, therefore, the same are being reproduced herein in order to avoid any confusion regarding the imputation of charges :- (i) Irregularity in civil work, (ii) Irregularity in Mid-Day-Meal Scheme; and (iii) Non-providing of the equipments of sports and instruments of music for the students under 'Sarv Shiksha Abhiyan'. 14. The appellant, in pursuance to the decision of the authority for appearance before the Enquiry Officer to defend the imputations, as leveled against him in the memorandum of charge, had appeared and defended the charge by giving reply. The Enquiry Officer has found the charge proved vide enquiry report dated 16.08.2010. The said charges have been forwarded before the disciplinary authority, i.e., the District Superintendent of Education-cum-Sub-Divisional Education Officer, Bokaro. 15. The disciplinary authority has accepted the finding so recorded by the Enquiry Officer and has inflicted the following punishments :- (i) Deduction of two annual increments from cumulative effect. (ii) The difference of salary amount for the suspension period shall not be payable. (iii) The petitioner shall compensate the difference of amount in building construction and in Mid-Day-Meal Scheme at once and if the said amount is not deposited, a case shall be filed against him for defalcation of Government Fund. (iv) The appellant has been transferred on administrative ground to Upgraded Middle School, Sarhochiya (Closed School), Gomiya. 16. (iii) The petitioner shall compensate the difference of amount in building construction and in Mid-Day-Meal Scheme at once and if the said amount is not deposited, a case shall be filed against him for defalcation of Government Fund. (iv) The appellant has been transferred on administrative ground to Upgraded Middle School, Sarhochiya (Closed School), Gomiya. 16. The appellant, being aggrieved with the order of punishment dated 12.10.2010, has preferred statutory appeal before the Divisional Commissioner, North Chhotanagpur Division, Hazaribagh under whose jurisdiction the alleged work falls which was registered as Service Appeal No.38/2012. The said appeal was dismissed vide order dated 06.09.2013. 17. The appellant, being aggrieved with the order dated 06.09.2013 passed in Service Appeal No.38/2012, has filed writ petition being W.P.(S) No.1664 of 2014 but the learned Single Judge has also refused to interfere with the order imposing punishment and its affirmation by the appellate authority against which the present appeal. 18. Mr. Bhawesh Kumar, learned counsel appearing for the appellant, has taken the sole ground by referring to the enquiry report that the same is nothing but the reproduction of the view of the Enquiry Officer since no evidence has been dealt with reason being that no evidence was recorded by the Enquiry Officer. 19. It has been contended that the Enquiry Officer ought to have granted adequate and sufficient opportunity in order to follow the mandate of Rule 55 of Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1930 wherein specific process has been given for the purpose of providing adequate and sufficient opportunity. But, if the enquiry report will be considered, there is no reference of any evidence as recorded by the witnesses which itself suggests that the entire enquiry report is based upon the oral version of one or the other without recording their deposition. 20. It has been contended that since none of the witnesses have been brought by the Enquiry Officer for recorded their statements, hence, there is no question of any cross-examination by the appellant. 21. The further ground has been agitated by referring to the enquiry report that the Enquiry Officer has referred in the enquiry report that the sample was sent before the B.I.T. Sindri for testing of quality but without receiving the report, finding of proving of charge has been recorded. 22. 21. The further ground has been agitated by referring to the enquiry report that the Enquiry Officer has referred in the enquiry report that the sample was sent before the B.I.T. Sindri for testing of quality but without receiving the report, finding of proving of charge has been recorded. 22. Learned counsel for the appellant, on the basis of the aforesaid premise, has submitted that the aforesaid fact has not been considered by the learned Single Judge, rather, the learned Single Judge, without assigning any reason, has accepted the finding recorded by the Enquiry Officer which is the basis of imposing punishment. 23. Per contra, Mr. Mrinal Kanti Roy, learned G.A.-I appearing for the State respondent, has submitted by defending the impugned order by making submission that the learned Single Judge has not committed any error since, the power of judicial review is very least in a case of decision taken by the administrative disciplinary authority. 24. It has been contended by referring to the enquiry report that charges have been found to be proved by the Enquiry Officer which is the basis of imposing punishment. 25. The learned Single Judge by assigning the reason under paragraph 5, has declined to interfere with the decision taken by the disciplinary authority which cannot be said to suffer from an error. 26. We have heard learned counsel for the parties, perused the document available on record as also the finding recorded by the learned Single Judge in the impugned order. 27. This Court, on perusal of the admitted fact and after going through the memorandum of charge wherein altogether three charges have been framed, which have been quoted hereinabove. 28. The charges have been found to be proved. On its acceptance by the disciplinary authority, the order of punishment has been passed. The order of punishment has also been confirmed by the appellate authority. The learned Single Judge has also affirmed the decision of the disciplinary authority and also the order passed by the appellate authority. 29. The order passed by both the consecutive administrative authorities and the learned Single Judge have seriously been defended by the learned State counsel solely on the ground of limited scope of power of judicial review which is to be exercised by the High Court in exercise of power conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 30. 29. The order passed by both the consecutive administrative authorities and the learned Single Judge have seriously been defended by the learned State counsel solely on the ground of limited scope of power of judicial review which is to be exercised by the High Court in exercise of power conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 30. The aforesaid law, according to our considered view, is not in dispute as has been held by Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of in B.C. Chaturvedi vs. Union of India, reported in (1995) 6 SCC 749 held that the court in its power/judicial review does not act as an appellate authority and reappreciate the evidence and arrive at its own independent findings on the evidence. The relevant portion of this case at paragraphs-12 and 13 are quoted herein below :- “12. ….......... When an inquiry is conducted on charges of misconduct by a public servant, the Court/Tribunal is concerned to determine whether the inquiry was held by a competent officer or whether rules of natural justice are complied with. Whether the findings or conclusion are based on some evidence, the authority entrusted with the power to hold inquiry has jurisdiction, power and authority to reach a finding of fact or conclusion. But that finding must be based on some evidence. Neither the technical rules of Evidence Act nor of proof of fact or evidence as defined therein, apply to disciplinary proceeding. When the authority accepts that evidence and conclusion receives support therefrom, the disciplinary authority is entitled to hold that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge. The Court/Tribunal in its power of judicial review does not act as appellate authority to reappreciate the evidence and to arrive at its own independent findings on the evidence. 13. The disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts. Where appeal is presented, the appellate authority has coextensive power to reappreciate the evidence or the nature of punishment. In a disciplinary inquiry, the strict proof of legal evidence and findings on that evidence are not relevant.” 31. The same settled proposition of law has been reiterated by the Apex Court in Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. & Anr. vs. Ashok Kumar Arora, reported in (1997) 3 SCC 72 wherein at para-20 it has been held that :- “20. In a disciplinary inquiry, the strict proof of legal evidence and findings on that evidence are not relevant.” 31. The same settled proposition of law has been reiterated by the Apex Court in Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. & Anr. vs. Ashok Kumar Arora, reported in (1997) 3 SCC 72 wherein at para-20 it has been held that :- “20. At the outset, it needs to be mentioned that the High Court in such cases of departmental enquiries and the findings recorded therein does not exercise the powers of appellate court/authority.” 32. Further, in the case of State of U.P. & Ors. Vs. Raj Kishore Yadav and another reported in (2006) 5 SCC 673 at para 4 as follows:- “.................... It is a settled law that the High Court has limited scope of interference in the administrative action of the State in exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and, therefore, the findings recorded by the enquiry officer and the consequent order of punishment of dismissal from service should not be disturbed.” 33. But, the Hon'ble Apex Court has also laid down the guidelines and parameters for showing interference in the matter of decision taken by the administrative disciplinary authority as would appear from the judgment rendered by Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Union of India vs. P. Gunasekaran reported in AIR 2015 SC 545 wherein at paragraph 13 thereof, the following guidelines has been laid down for showing interference in the decision taken by the disciplinary authority and not to interfere with the decision which reads hereunder as:- “13. Despite the well-settled position, it is painfully disturbing to note that the High Court has acted as an appellate authority in the disciplinary proceedings, re-appreciating even the evidence before the enquiry officer. The finding on Charge No. 1 was accepted by the disciplinary authority and was also endorsed by the Central Administrative Tribunal. In disciplinary proceedings, the High Court is not and cannot act as a second court of first appeal. The High Court, in exercise of its powers under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, shall not venture into reappreciation of the evidence. In disciplinary proceedings, the High Court is not and cannot act as a second court of first appeal. The High Court, in exercise of its powers under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, shall not venture into reappreciation of the evidence. The High Court can only see whether: a. the enquiry is held by a competent authority; b. the enquiry is held according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf; c. there is violation of the principles of natural justice in conducting the proceedings; d. the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair conclusion by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case; e. the authorities have allowed themselves to be influenced by irrelevant or extraneous considerations; f. the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at such conclusion; g. the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed to admit the admissible and material evidence; h. the disciplinary authority had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which influenced the finding; i. the finding of fact is based on no evidence. Under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court shall not: (i). re-appreciate the evidence; (ii). interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in case the same has been conducted in accordance with law; (iii). go into the adequacy of the evidence; (iv). go into the reliability of the evidence; (v). interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings can be based. (vi). correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be; (vii). go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience.” 34. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Central Industrial Security Force and Ors. vs. Abrar Ali reported in AIR (2017) SC 200, wherein the following guidelines have been laid down, showing interference by the High Court in the matter of punishment imposed on conclusion of the departmental proceeding, the same extract of para 8 thereof, is referred hereinbelow : “8. Contrary to findings of the Disciplinary Authority, the High Court accepted the version of the Respondent that he fell ill and was being treated by a local doctor without assigning any reasons. It was held by the Disciplinary Authority that the Unit had better medical facilities which could have been availed by the Respondent if he was really suffering from illness. It was held by the Disciplinary Authority that the Unit had better medical facilities which could have been availed by the Respondent if he was really suffering from illness. It was further held that the delinquent did not produce any evidence of treatment by a local doctor. The High Court should not have entered into the arena of facts which tantamounts to re-appreciation of evidence. It is settled law that re-appreciation of evidence is not permissible in the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur v. Nemi Chand Nalwaiya, reported in (2011) 4 SCC 584 : ( AIR 2011 SC 1931 , Para 6), this Court held as follows: "7. It is now well settled that the courts will not act as an appellate court and reassess the evidence led in the domestic inquiry, nor interfere on the ground that another view is possible on the material on record. If the inquiry has been fairly and properly held and the findings are based on evidence, the question of adequacy of the evidence or the reliable nature of the evidence will not be grounds for interfering with the findings in departmental enquiries. Therefore, courts will not interfere with findings of fact recorded in departmental enquiries, except where such findings are based on no evidence or where they are clearly perverse. The test to find out perversity is to see whether a tribunal acting reasonably could have arrived at such conclusion or finding, on the material on record. The courts will however interfere with the findings in disciplinary matters, if principles of natural justice or statutory regulations have been violated or if the order is found to be arbitrary, capricious, mala fide or based on extraneous considerations” 35. It is, thus, evident that there is no absolute rule that the High Court in exercise of power conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has got no power to interfere with the order passed by the disciplinary authority, rather, the same is to be tested depending upon the facts and circumstances governing the case, as per the guidelines formulated in the judgment referred hereinabove, i.e. Union of India vs. P. Gunasekaran (Supra). 36. 36. The argument has been advanced on behalf of the appellant regarding the perversity in the enquiry report or no opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses was provided for the said purpose, the learned counsel for the appellant has carried this Court to the enquiry report which is available at Annexure-5 appended to the paper book. 37. We, in order to appreciate the aforesaid argument, have considered the enquiry report. It is evident that the enquiry report is in three columns. The first column is the details of the charges, the second column is explanation furnished by the appellant and third column is the consideration made by the enquiry officer. The Enquiry Officer has also given a conclusion therein. 38. We, on consideration of the enquiry report, have found that there is no reference of any witness said to have been examined in course of enquiry proceeding. Rather, the reference of oral version of one or the other has been recorded. 39. It further appears that the Enquiry Officer has taken note regarding the first charge which relates to the quality of the material used in the construction work, sample of the material used had been sent to B.I.T. Sindri for quality test report. But, there is no reference about the outcome of the said sample. It has also not been referred that the Enquiry Officer has ever seen the said sample said to have been sent. 40. This Court, in view thereof, is not hesitant in coming to the conclusion that the sample which was sent to the B.I.T. Sindri for quality test had never been before the Enquiry Officer. 41. It further appears that so far as the charge No.2 which pertains to the presence of the students in the school is concerned, a justification has been given as under column of explanation but there is no consideration, rather, the documentary evidences have been referred therein based upon which the charge No.2 has been found to be proved. 42. The question arises that when the proceeding has been initiated under Rule 55 of the applicable conduct rules which provides for affording adequate and sufficient opportunity, then what is the meaning of adequate and sufficient opportunity. 42. The question arises that when the proceeding has been initiated under Rule 55 of the applicable conduct rules which provides for affording adequate and sufficient opportunity, then what is the meaning of adequate and sufficient opportunity. The adequate and sufficient opportunity means that the delinquent employee is to be provided all opportunity by supplying the documents which are being tried to be made basis of coming to the conclusion of proving of charge. 43. The Enquiry Officer while coming to the conclusion of proving of charge No.2, however, has referred certain documents but it appear from the memorandum of charge that there is no reference of such documents which is the mandatory requirement as per the provision of Rule 55 of the Conduct Rules. 44. The adequate and sufficient opportunity cannot be said to be followed if the documentary evidence which is being tried to be made basis of proving the charge is not supplied to the delinquent employee. It is for the reason that if the documents will not be supplied then how the delinquent employee will have an opportunity to defend by making reply on perusal of the said documents. 45. The third charge is also based upon recording of no evidence. The Enquiry Officer has given conclusion that the villagers are not satisfied with the conduct of the appellant. The Court is very much surprised that when the enquiry has been decided to be conducted then is it the jurisdiction of the Enquiry Officer to gather evidence by contacting the villagers. 46. The same, according to our considered view, is not permissible for the reason that the Enquiry Officer when assigned with the duty to conduct an enquiry, has been assigned a quasi-judicial function. 47. The quasi-judicial function means the power of adjudication has been given to the Enquiry Officer who is to discharge his duty of coming to the conclusion without being influenced even by the disciplinary authority by whom he has been appointed. Otherwise, if the Enquiry Officer will be influenced by the disciplinary authority, then the entire proceeding will be vitiated in the eyes of law on the ground that the Enquiry Officer has become a man of the disciplinary authority and in that view of the matter, he cannot be said to have exercised the quasi-judicial function. 48. The Enquiry Officer has given a conclusion. 49. 48. The Enquiry Officer has given a conclusion. 49. We, on perusal of the said conclusion, have found that the Enquiry Officer has even visited the place of construction where he has recorded the statement of Block Education Extension Officer, Gomia, namely, Smt. Pushpa Kumari and Junior Engineer Shri Kaushal Kumar along with them the teachers, the guardians, the members of the Village Education Committee, the entire villagers as also the representative of the political leaders/parties. The Enquiry Officer, based upon such statements, has found the charge proved. 50. It is further evident that the Enquiry Officer has come to a conclusion that the statement so recorded by him appears also to be contradictory. 51. The said enquiry report is the basis of imposing punishment that too four in numbers. 52. The law is settled that if the enquiry report is improper and suffers from perversity then the punishment inflicted based upon the said enquiry report will have got no legal sanctity. 53. Perversity means that the material placed before the Enquiry Officer is required to be considered by assigning specific reason either way, i.e., by accepting or discarding, based upon the reason contained in the enquiry report. 54. The word “perversity” has been defined by Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Arulvelu and Another v. State represented by the Public Prosecutor and Another [ (2009) 10 SCC 206 ] at paragraph 27, which is quoted hereunder:- 27. The expression “perverse” has been defined by various dictionaries in the following manner: 1. Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary of Current English, 6th Edn. “Perverse.—Showing deliberate determination to behave in a way that most people think is wrong, unacceptable or unreasonable.” 2. Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English, International Edn. Perverse.—Deliberately departing from what is normal and reasonable. 3. The New Oxford Dictionary of English, 1998 Edn. Perverse.—Law (of a verdict) against the weight of evidence or the direction of the judge on a point of law. 4. The New Lexicon Webster's Dictionary of the English Language (Deluxe Encyclopedic Edn.) Perverse.—Purposely deviating from accepted or expected behavior or opinion; wicked or wayward; stubborn; cross or petulant. 5. Stroud's Judicial Dictionary of Words & Phrases, 4th Edn. “Perverse.—A perverse verdict may probably be defined as one that is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against the evidence.” 55. 5. Stroud's Judicial Dictionary of Words & Phrases, 4th Edn. “Perverse.—A perverse verdict may probably be defined as one that is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against the evidence.” 55. Further, the meaning of “perverse” has been examined in H.B. Gandhi, Excise and Taxation Officer-cum-Assessing Authority, Karnal and Others v. M/s Gopi Nath & Sons and Others [1992 Supp (2) SCC 312] wherein, at paragraph 7, the Hon'ble Apex Court has observed as under :- “7. In the present case, the stage at and the points on which the challenge to the assessment in judicial review was raised and entertained was not appropriate. In our opinion, the High Court was in error in constituting itself into a court of appeal against the assessment. While it was open to the respondent to have raised and for the High Court to have considered whether the denial of relief under the proviso to Section 39(5) was proper or not, it was not open to the High Court to reappreciate the primary or perceptive facts which were otherwise within the domain of the fact-finding authority under the statute. The question whether the transactions were or were not sales exigible to sales tax constituted an exercise in recording secondary or inferential facts based on primary facts found by the statutory authorities. But what was assailed in review was, in substance, the correctness—as distinguished from the legal permissibility—of the primary or perceptive facts themselves. It is, no doubt, true that if a finding of fact is arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant material or by taking into consideration irrelevant material or if the finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality incurring the blame of being perverse, then, the finding is rendered infirm in law.” 56. It further appears from the enquiry report that explanation has been furnished having been quoted in column no.2 but there is no consideration either accepting or discarding, as would appear from column no.3 of the enquiry report. 57. The question arises that when the enquiry has been decided to be conducted which is the sole purpose to provide adequate and sufficient opportunity. If the delinquent has furnished its reply in defence and the same if not considered then can it be said to be proper enquiry report? 58. Here, the perversity will play an important role. 57. The question arises that when the enquiry has been decided to be conducted which is the sole purpose to provide adequate and sufficient opportunity. If the delinquent has furnished its reply in defence and the same if not considered then can it be said to be proper enquiry report? 58. Here, the perversity will play an important role. The perversity since has been defined, as referred hereinabove, in the judgment rendered in the case of Arulvelu and Another v. State represented by the Public Prosecutor and Another (Supra), the defence having not been considered or the same has been considered erroneously. 59. Herein, the defence has not been at all considered as was brought to the notice of the Enquiry Officer by way of explanation furnished, charge wise. 60. The consideration always means active application of mind and that is to be reflected from the documents. Even by making reference of the word that the reply so furnished has not been found to be satisfactory, that cannot be said to be consideration in the eyes of law. 61. The word “consideration” has also been defined by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Chairman, Life Insurance Corporation of India and Others v. A. Masilamani reported in (2013) 6 SCC 530 wherein at paragraph 19 it has been observed which is being quoted hereunder as :- “19. The word “consider” is of great significance. The dictionary meaning of the same is, “to think over”, “to regard as”, or “deem to be”. Hence, there is a clear connotation to the effect that there must be active application of mind. In other words, the term “consider” postulates consideration of all relevant aspects of a matter. Thus, formation of opinion by the statutory authority should reflect intense application of mind with reference to the material available on record. The order of the authority itself should reveal such application of mind. The appellate authority cannot simply adopt the language employed by the disciplinary authority and proceed to affirm its order. (Vide Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd. v. Santosh Kumar [ (2006) 11 SCC 147 ] and Bhikhubhai Vithlabhai Patel v. State of Gujarat [ (2008) 4 SCC 144 ].) 62. The order of the authority itself should reveal such application of mind. The appellate authority cannot simply adopt the language employed by the disciplinary authority and proceed to affirm its order. (Vide Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd. v. Santosh Kumar [ (2006) 11 SCC 147 ] and Bhikhubhai Vithlabhai Patel v. State of Gujarat [ (2008) 4 SCC 144 ].) 62. The enquiry report, therefore, according to our considered view, based upon the aforesaid reason, is not only perverse but it is also without consideration of the defence and further, based upon no evidence as recorded in course of the enquiry proceeding. 63. The order of punishment since is based upon the said enquiry report, therefore, the order of punishment cannot be said to be sustainable in the eyes of law. 64. The aforesaid order of punishment is also not sustainable for the other reasons. However, the said reason appears not to be agitated before the learned writ court but if any patent illegality is appearing on the face of the order of punishment, then the intra-court appeal being the furtherance of the writ proceeding is duty bound to answer the same also. 65. This Court, therefore, is now proceeding to examine the propriety of the impugned order on different grounds, i.e., punishment No.2 which pertains to withholding the salary for the period of suspension by passing an order of punishment that the delinquent employee will not be entitled for anything save and except the subsistence allowance. 66. The learned State counsel has not disputed that withholding salary for the period of suspension is not under the list of punishment. 67. He is also fair enough to submit that any decision in this regard is to be taken under Rule 97 of the Jharkhand Service Code. 68. We have considered the provision of Rule 97(2) of the Jharkhand Service Code, wherein it has been provided, for ready reference the same is being referred hereunder as :- “97 (2) Where the authority mentioned in sub-rule (1), is of opinion that the Government servant has been fully exonerated, or in the case of suspension, that it was wholly unjustified, the Government servant shall be given full pay and allowance to which he would have been entitled has he not been dismissed, removed or suspended, as the case may be.” 69. The question of denial of salary for the suspension period cannot be by way of passing an order simplicitor, rather, an opportunity is to be provided to the delinquent employee that as to why salary for the period of suspension be not withheld, that is the requirement of Rule 97(2) of the Jharkhand Service Code as has been decided by the Patna High Court in the case of Shri Mahabir Prasad v. The State of Bihar & Others [ 1988 (0) PLJR 82 ], wherein it has been held that disentitling the delinquent employee from salary for the suspension period, save and except his subsistence allowance, can only be passed after issuance of show cause notice to the delinquent employee. For ready reference, paragraph 3 of the aforesaid judgment is reproduced hereunder:- “3. Mr. Tarkeshwar Dayal, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner did not challenge the validity of the order of censure. Learned counsel however, submitted that the order of the State Government that the period of suspension would be treated as on duty for the purposes of pension and gratuity but the petitioner would not get anything more than the subsistence allowance already received by him during the period of suspension is invalid, because the petitioner was not given an opportunity to be heard before the said order was passed. In support of this contention, learned counsel relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court in M. Gopalkdsana Naida v. The State of Madhya Pradesh ( AIR 1968 SC 240 ). There is substance in the contention of learned counsel. The facts of the Supreme Court case were, more or less, similar in the sense that the delinquent officer had been suspended pending the Departmental enquiry. The enquiring officer found the officer not guilty, but the Government disagreed with that finding and served a notice to show cause why he should not be dismissed. Subsequently, the Government held that the charges against the officer were not proved beyond reasonable doubt. It also held that the suspension and the Departmental enquiry “were not wholly unjustified”. The enquiring officer found the officer not guilty, but the Government disagreed with that finding and served a notice to show cause why he should not be dismissed. Subsequently, the Government held that the charges against the officer were not proved beyond reasonable doubt. It also held that the suspension and the Departmental enquiry “were not wholly unjustified”. The order further directed, inter alia, that the entire period of absence from duty should be treated as period spent on duty under Fundamental Rule 54 (5) for purposes of pension only, but that he should not be allowed any pay beyond what he had actually received or what was allowed to him by way of subsistence allowance during the period of his suspension. The Supreme Court held that Fundamental Rule 54 contemplates a duty to act in accordance with the basic concept of justice and fairplay. The authority has to afford a reasonable opportunity to the officer concerned to show cause why clauses (3) and (5) should not be applied. In that case the order was held to be invalid as no reasonable opportunity to the officer to show cause was given. Rule 97 of the Bihar Service Code, 1952, is in pari materia with rule 54 of the Fundamental Rules. The petitioner, therefore, ought to have been given an opportunity to show cause why clauses (3) and (5) of Rule 97 should not be applied in his case. As that had not been done, the application is allowed and the impugned portion of the order contained in Annexure 1 which reads “The period of suspension be treated as on duty for the purposes of pension and gratuity but he will not get anything more beyond the subsistence grant already received by him during the period of suspension” is struck down as invalid. It would be open to the competent authority to consider the question de novo, after giving the petitioner a reasonable opportunity to show cause against the action proposed against him. There will be no order as to costs.” 70. Subsequently, the Hon'ble Apex Court has also considered the same very issue in the case of State of Jharkhand and Anr. vs. Amresh Narayan Singh, (2020) 14 SCC 411 wherein at paragraph-7, it has been held which reads as under:- “7. There will be no order as to costs.” 70. Subsequently, the Hon'ble Apex Court has also considered the same very issue in the case of State of Jharkhand and Anr. vs. Amresh Narayan Singh, (2020) 14 SCC 411 wherein at paragraph-7, it has been held which reads as under:- “7. Sub-rule (1) of Rule 97 indicates that where a government servant is suspended, the authority competent to order the reinstatement has to consider and make a specific order regarding the pay and allowances for the period of absence from duty and on whether the period shall be treated as a period spent on duty. Sub-rule (2) indicates that where the authority concludes that the suspension was “wholly unjustified”, the government servant shall be given full pay and allowances as if the order of suspension had not been passed. The High Court misconstrued the provisions of Rule 97 in coming to the conclusion that full pay and allowances must necessarily follow as a consequence of the suspension being revoked. This construction is contrary to the plain terms of Rule 97 as extracted above. The disciplinary proceedings have been held in abeyance pending the conclusion of the criminal trial. It is only after the conclusion of the departmental inquiry that the competent authority will have to decide, in terms of Rule 97, how the period of suspension should be treated and whether it is liable to be treated as a period spent on duty. A decision will be taken on the pay and allowances which should be allowed. The directions which were issued by the High Court at this stage were hence contrary to Rule 97.” 71. The coordinate Division Bench of this Court has decided the said issue by following the judgment rendered by Patna High Court in the case of Shri Mahabir Prasad v. The State of Bihar & Others (Supra) and Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of State of Jharkhand and Anr. vs. Amresh Narayan Singh (Supra). 72. Herein also, there is no opportunity said to have been followed as provided under Rule 97(2) of the Jharkhand Service Code, therefore, according to our considered view, the punishment No. (ii) which is denial of the salary for the period of suspension also suffers from illegality. 73. vs. Amresh Narayan Singh (Supra). 72. Herein also, there is no opportunity said to have been followed as provided under Rule 97(2) of the Jharkhand Service Code, therefore, according to our considered view, the punishment No. (ii) which is denial of the salary for the period of suspension also suffers from illegality. 73. So far as punishment No.(i) is concerned, we are of the view that under the list of punishment as provided under Rule 49 of the Conduct Rule there is no such punishment. 74. The law is well settled that any punishment if not enlisted in the list of punishment, cannot be imposed against the delinquent employee. Otherwise, such punishment will be said to be without any authority of law and hence, not sustainable, reference in this regard may be made to the judgment rendered by Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Vijay Singh vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors., (2012) 5 SCC 242 . Relevant paragraph of the said judgment reads as under : “11. Admittedly, the punishment imposed upon the appellant is not provided for under Rule 4 of the 1991 Rules. Integrity of a person can be withheld for sufficient reasons at the time of filling up the annual confidential report. However, if the statutory rules so prescribe, it can also be withheld as a punishment. The order passed by the disciplinary authority withholding the integrity certificate as a punishment for delinquency is without jurisdiction, not being provided under the 1991 Rules, since the same could not be termed as punishment under the Rules. The Rules do not empower the disciplinary authority to impose “any other” major or minor punishment. It is a settled proposition of law that punishment not prescribed under the Rules as a result of disciplinary proceedings cannot be awarded. 12. This Court in State of U.P. v. Madhav Prasad Sharma [ (2011) 2 SCC 212 : (2011) 1 SCC (L&S) 300] dealt with the aforesaid 1991 Rules and after quoting Rule 4 thereof held as under : (SCC p. 216, para 16): “16. We are not concerned about other rule. 12. This Court in State of U.P. v. Madhav Prasad Sharma [ (2011) 2 SCC 212 : (2011) 1 SCC (L&S) 300] dealt with the aforesaid 1991 Rules and after quoting Rule 4 thereof held as under : (SCC p. 216, para 16): “16. We are not concerned about other rule. The perusal of major and minor penalties prescribed in the above Rule makes it clear that "sanctioning leave without pay" is not one of the punishments prescribed, though, and under what circumstances leave has been sanctioned without pay is a different aspect with which we are not concerned for the present. However, Rule 4 makes it clear that sanction of leave without pay is not one of the punishments prescribed. Disciplinary authority is competent to impose appropriate penalty from those provided in Rule 4 of the Rules which deals with the major penalties and minor penalties. Denial of salary on the ground of "no work no pay" cannot be treated as a penalty in view of statutory provisions contained in Rule 4 defining the penalties in clear terms.” (emphasis added) 75. This Court, having discussed the aforesaid factual and legal aspect, has considered the order passed by the appellate authority wherein there is no consideration of these facts. 76. Further, we have also considered the judgment passed by learned Single Judge wherein the learned Single Judge has dismissed the writ petition on the ground that the power of judicial review in the matter of decision taken by the disciplinary authority is very least to be exercised. 77. But, the learned Single Judge has not appreciated the legal position that there is no complete embargo in interfering with the decision taken by the administrative authority on conclusion of the departmental proceeding but the power is to be exercised depending upon the condition if available as per the judgment rendered by Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Union of India vs. P. Gunasekaran (Supra) and Central Industrial Security Force and Ors. vs. Abrar Ali (Supra). 78. Therefore, this Court has considered the propriety of the impugned order of punishment as per the discussion made hereinabove, hence, we are of the view that the learned Single Judge has committed error in passing the judgment. 79. Mr. vs. Abrar Ali (Supra). 78. Therefore, this Court has considered the propriety of the impugned order of punishment as per the discussion made hereinabove, hence, we are of the view that the learned Single Judge has committed error in passing the judgment. 79. Mr. Mrinal Kanti Roy, learned State counsel has submitted that if there is illegality in the enquiry report, then the matter may be remitted to the authority from the stage of enquiry proceeding. 80. But, we are not impressed with such argument for the following reasons :- (i) Once the State counsel has accepted the falsity of the enquiry report, since, the very procedure as stipulated under the statutory command as under the provision of Rule 55 of the Conduct Rules has not been followed by the Enquiry Officer then why to remand the matter again for the wrong committed by the Enquiry Officer. The law is well settled that a wrong doer cannot be allowed to take advantage of its own wrong. Herein, if the Enquiry Officer has committed wrong then the question will be that why the delinquent employee who has already put in rigour of departmental proceeding for 13 years will again be put the rigor of departmental proceeding when he has to retire within two years. (ii) The issue of remand also fell for consideration in such circumstances before the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Punjab National Bank and Others v. Kunj Behari Misra [ (1998) 7 SCC 84 ] wherein also the Hon'ble Apex Court, depending upon the facts of the case, has refused to remit the matter before the authority, for ready reference the paragraph 21 is being referred herein :- “21. Both the respondents superannuated on 31-12-1983. During the pendency of these appeals, Misra died on 6-1-1995 and his legal representatives were brought on record. More than 14 years have elapsed since the delinquent officers had superannuated. It will, therefore, not be in the interest of justice that at this stage the cases should be remanded to the disciplinary authority for the start of another innings. We, therefore, do not issue any such directions and while dismissing these appeals, we affirm the decisions of the High Court which had set aside the orders imposing penalty and had directed the appellants to release the retirement benefits to the respondents. There will, however, be no order as to costs.” 81. We, therefore, do not issue any such directions and while dismissing these appeals, we affirm the decisions of the High Court which had set aside the orders imposing penalty and had directed the appellants to release the retirement benefits to the respondents. There will, however, be no order as to costs.” 81. We, on the basis of the aforesaid proposition and applying the same in the facts and circumstances of the case wherein the departmental proceeding was initiated in the year 2010 and we are about the end of the year 2023. It has been informed that within two years the appellant is to superannuate. 82. Therefore, we are of the view that it will not be just and proper to remit the matter before the authority for the wrong committed by the disciplinary authority in conducting the enquiry. 83. Further, the disciplinary authority has imposed the punishments even though the disciplinary authority has got no jurisdiction to impose such punishments, i.e., (i) Deduction of two annual increments from cumulative effect, (ii) The difference of salary amount for the suspension period shall not be payable, (iii) The petitioner shall compensate the difference of amount in building construction and in Mid-Day-Meal Scheme at once and if the said amount is not deposited, a case shall be filed against him for defalcation of Government Fund and (iv) The appellant has been transferred on administrative ground to Upgraded Middle School, Sarhochiya (Closed School), Gomiya. 84. This Court, in view of the aforesaid reason, is of the view that the argument which has been advanced for remitting the matter for de novo enquiry is having no substance. 85. Accordingly, the instant appeal is allowed. 86. The writ petition also stands allowed. 87. In consequence thereof, order dated 06.03.2020 passed by learned Single Judge of this Court in W.P.(S) No.1664 of 2014, the order of punishment dated 12.10.2010 as contained in Memo No.3419 and the order dated 06.09.2013 passed in Service Appeal No.38/2012 are hereby quashed and set aside.