JUDGMENT : 1. This appeal under Section 39 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1940 (in short “the Act of 1940”) has been filed for setting aside the order and decree dated 2.3.2019 and 10.5.2019 respectively passed by District Judge, Rajnandgaon (CG) in MJC (Civil) No.137/2018 (Annexure A/1) to the extent of denial of pendente lite interest @ 18% p.a. from 1.9.1991 to 20.8.1997 and 18% p.a. interest for the post award period till the actual payment and for direction to the District Judge to pass a decree in accordance with the award. 2. Briefly stated, case of the appellant is that the appellant, a partnership firm registered under the Partnership Act, is engaged in contract works of all types and nature with the government or semi government departments, public sector undertakings or private companies etc. The appellant firm was awarded the contract for “construction of traction sub-station building with approach road at Rajnandgaon” for a total contract value of Rs.5.6 lacs and the parties entered into a contract on 10.3.1989, according to which the work was to be completed within six months from the date of award. However, due to major delays on the part of the respondent railways in providing the availability of work front and construction materials and also requesting the petitioner to undertake the additional work of laying pipes in control office, which did not form part of the initial contract, the work was delayed beyond the initial six months and the respondent railways arbitrarily terminated the contract on 7.9.1991 at the verge of completion of the work. 3. Aggrieved by such termination, the appellant made a request for appointment of arbitrator vide letter dated 23.9.1991 which was rejected by the respondent railways and thereafter, on application being filed by the appellant under Section 20 of the Act of 1940, in compliance of the order dated 25.1.2019 passed by the District Judge, Rajnandgaon, Shri B. Pandey was appointed as the sole arbitrator. 4. The learned Arbitrator passed an award on 31.7.2000 allowing the claim of the appellant and directed the respondent to pay a total sum of Rs.7,86,791/- inclusive of interest @ 18% p.a. pendente lite. 4. The learned Arbitrator passed an award on 31.7.2000 allowing the claim of the appellant and directed the respondent to pay a total sum of Rs.7,86,791/- inclusive of interest @ 18% p.a. pendente lite. It was further directed that the awarded sum shall be payable to the appellant by 31st August, 2000 or else interest @ 18% p.a. will be paid for the whole period from the date of cause i.e. 1.9.1991 till the date of payment. However, by mistake the appellant filed an application under Section 36 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (in short “the Act of 1996”) for execution of award before the District Judge, Rajnandgaon as the Act of 1996 was in force at that time, which was rejected vide order dated 23.4.2003 on the ground that the award was passed under the Act of 1940, so execution application under the Act of 1996 would not be maintainable. Thereafter, the appellant filed an application under Section 17 read with Section 14 of the Act of 1940 with an application under Section 14 read with Section 5 of the Limitation Act which was registered as MJC No.06/2010. Learned District Judge condoned the delay and directed the respondent to file the award but the respondent expressed their inability to file the award on the ground of non-availability of the same in their office and therefore, the appellant filed certified copy of the award with an application on 18.3.2016. 5. The respondent railways in its reply to the application of the appellant raised objection that since the award was passed after the new Act of 1996 came into force, therefore, it shall be treated as an award passed under the Act of 1996 and as such, there would be no need for filing certified copy of the award before the District Judge. Thereafter, the learned District Judge passed an order on 9.3.2017 rejecting the application of the appellant holding that the application under Section 17 r/w section 14 for pronouncing the judgment in terms of award would not be maintainable as the award was passed after coming into force of the Act of 1996. 6. Thereafter, the learned District Judge passed an order on 9.3.2017 rejecting the application of the appellant holding that the application under Section 17 r/w section 14 for pronouncing the judgment in terms of award would not be maintainable as the award was passed after coming into force of the Act of 1996. 6. Aggrieved by the above order, the appellant filed a civil revision bearing No.134/2017 before this Court which was allowed vide order dated 30.10.2018 holding that the award dated 30.7.2000 was passed under the Act of 1940 and not the Act of 1996 and therefore, the application of the appellant was maintainable. Accordingly, this Court remitted the matter to the District Judge, Rajnandgaon for consideration afresh. Thereafter, the learned District Judge partly allowing the application of the appellant pronounced an order and a decree in contravention of the award by reducing the interest from 18% p.a. as awarded by the Arbitrator to 6% p.a. for the period from 1.9.1991 to 20.8.1997 and further, no post award interest has been granted to the appellant, which was earlier granted @ 18% p.a. by the Arbitrator. Hence this appeal. 7. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the impugned order and decree passed by the learned District Judge are illegal, arbitrary to the extent it denies the pendente lite and post award interest @ 18% pa on the awarded amount as was awarded by the Arbitrator. Learned District Judge has committed a grave illegality in pronouncing the decree contrary to the terms of the award which is impermissible as per Section 17 of the Act of 1940. Without there being an application or prayer for modification of the award or any objection raised by the respondent railways regarding the rate of interest awarded by the Arbitrator, the learned District Judge committed a grave illegality in passing the impugned order and decree to the extent of reducing the interest from 18% to 6% pa and denying the post award interest @ 18% pa. It is a settled principle of law that the District Judge while exercising power under Section 17 would not be sitting in appeal over the award passed by the Arbitrator but the power is restricted to passing a decree in terms of the award unless the award suffers from blatant error of law or is perverse or unjust. It is a settled principle of law that the District Judge while exercising power under Section 17 would not be sitting in appeal over the award passed by the Arbitrator but the power is restricted to passing a decree in terms of the award unless the award suffers from blatant error of law or is perverse or unjust. In the present case, the award suffered from no illegality or perversity and therefore, the order of the District Judge interfering with the award is unjust and improper. In absence of any objection by the respondent, suo motu reduction of interest amount has resulted in grave illegality. The power of the District Judge in an application under Section 17 r/w Section 14 are wide enough to consider the objections raised by the respondent to the award. However, in the present case, the sole objection raised by the respondent railways was regarding applicability of the Act of 1940 which was already determined by the order of this Court in the civil revision. Therefore, the impugned order suffers from material illegality and deserves to be set aside to that extent. Reliance has been placed on the decisions in the matters of Union of India and others Vs. M/s Jamshedpur Engineering & Machines Manufacturing, 1994 Suppl (1) SCC 510 and Manalal Prabhudayal Vs. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd, (2009) 17 SCC 296 . 8. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent has supported the impugned order and the decree. 9. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record. 10. Sections 14 and 17 of the Act of 1940 read as under: “14. Award to be signed and filed.- (1) When the arbitrators or umpire have made their award, they shall sign it and shall give notice in writing to the parties of the making and signing thereof and of the amount of fees and charges payable in respect of the arbitration and award. Award to be signed and filed.- (1) When the arbitrators or umpire have made their award, they shall sign it and shall give notice in writing to the parties of the making and signing thereof and of the amount of fees and charges payable in respect of the arbitration and award. (2) The arbitrators or umpire shall, at the request of any party to the arbitration agreement or any person claiming under such party or if so directed by the Court and upon payment of the fees and charges due in respect of the arbitration and award and of the costs and charges of filing the award, cause the award or a signed copy of it, together with any depositions and documents which may have been taken and proved before them, to be filed in Court, and the Court shall thereupon give notice to the parties of the filing of the award. (3) Where the arbitrators or umpire state a special case under clause (b) of section 13, the Court, after giving notice to the parties and hearing them, shall pronounce its opinion thereon and such opinion shall be added to, and shall form part of, the award. 17. Judgment in terms of award.- Where the Court sees no cause to remit the award or any of the matters referred to arbitration for reconsideration or to set aside the award, the Court shall, after the time for making an application to set aside the award has expired, or such application having been made, after refusing it, proceed to pronounce judgment according to the award, and upon the judgment so pronounced a decree shall follow and no appeal shall lie from such decree except on the ground that it is in excess of, or not otherwise in accordance with, the award.” 11. Learned District Judge held in paras 25 & 28 of the impugned order as under: ^^25-bl U;k;ky; }kjk C;kt ds laca/k esa ,okMZ jkf'k ij 6 izfr’kr dh x.kuk fd;k tk jgk gS] D;ksafd ,dy iapkV }kjk ikfjr ,okMZ fnukad 31-07-2000 dks U;k;ky; dk fu;e ¼:Yl vkQ nh dksVZ½ ds rgr fMdzh ikfjr fd;k tkuk gSA blfy, ,dy iapkV }kjk vkosnd ds i{k esa fnukad 01-09- 1991 ls 20 -08-1997 rd ,okMZ jkf'k ij ikfjr C;kt jkf'k dks 18 izfr'kr ds LFkku ij 6 izfr'kr fu/kkZfjr fd;k tk jgk gSA 28- vkosnd ds i{k esa ,dy iapkV }kjk ikfjr ,okMZ fnukad 31-07-2000 dks U;k;ky; dk fu;e ¼:Yl vkQ nh dksVZ½ ekuk tkdj fuEukuqlkj vkKfIr ikfjr dh tkrh gSA ¼1½ vkosnd ,dy iapkV }kjk ikfjr ,okMZ fnukad 31-07-2000 ds eqrkfcd ,okMZ jkf'k 3]79]254@:i;s vuksond ls nks ekg ds Hkhrj izkIr djus dk vf/kdkjh gSA ¼2½ vkosnd] mDr ikfjr ,okMZ jkf'k ij fnukad 01-09- 1991 ls 20 -08-1997 rd 6 izfr'kr dh nj ls C;kt jkf'k izkIr djus dk vf/kdkjh gSA ¼3½ mHk; i{kdkj viuk viuk okn O;; ogu djsaxsA^^ rnkuqlkj vkKfIr rS;kj dh tkosA 12. In the matter of Gautam Constructions and Fisheries Ltd. Vs. National Bank for Agriculture & Rural Development and another, (2000) 6 SCC 519 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held in para 5 as under: “5. So far as the interest is concerned, no exception could be taken to the award at the rate of 12% p.a. The grant of interest at 18% p.a. is directly opposed to the specific terms in the contract and it is not permissible for the Arbitrator or the Court dealing with the validity of the award to award a higher rate than the mutually agreed rate, which is binding on parties. The challenge to the judgment of the Division Bench in this connection fails and shall stand rejected.” 13. The Division Bench of this Court in the matter of Union of India Vs. MP Goyal and sons, ARBA No.78 of 2017 held in paras 15, 16 & 17 of the judgment dated 5.3.2018 as under: “15. Mr. Abhishek Sinha and Ms. Harshita, counsel for the appellant placed reliance on the decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Union of India -v- Ambica Construction [ AIR 2016 SC 1441 ] wherein it is held in para 24 that :- “24. Mr. Abhishek Sinha and Ms. Harshita, counsel for the appellant placed reliance on the decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Union of India -v- Ambica Construction [ AIR 2016 SC 1441 ] wherein it is held in para 24 that :- “24. Thus, our answer to the reference is that if the contract expressly bars the award of interest pendente lite, the same cannot be awarded by the arbitrator. We also make it clear that the bar to award interest on delayed payment by itself will not be readily inferred as express bar to award interest pendente lite by the Arbitral Tribunal, as ouster of power of the arbitrator has to be considered on various relevant aspects referred to in the decisions of this Court, it would be for the Division Bench to consider the case on merits.” 16. The appellant failed to prove that there was the term in aforesaid agreements that arbitrator will have no authority to award the interest for the pre-reference period, pedente lite, post-award period. 17. Looking to the above mentioned facts, judicial precedents laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court this Court finds that, the Arbitrators had legal authority to award the pre-reference period interest, pedente lite period interest, post-award period interest on the amounts which have been awarded in different heads of the aforesaid agreements. Thus this Court disallows the argument of the counsel for the appellant, regarding this matter.” 14. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, keeping in view the aforesaid principles of law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the impugned order and decree passed by the District Judge deserve to be modified to the extent that the appellant is entitled to get pendente lite interest on the awarded sum @ 18% p.a. for a period from 1.9.1991 to 20.8.1997 and further entitled to get interest @ 18% p.a. for the post award period till the actual payment, as awarded by the Arbitrator vide award dated 31.7.2000 (Annexure A/2). Ordered accordingly. Thus, the appeal stands allowed.