JUDGMENT : 1. The appellants, through the medium of present appeal, seek setting aside of the order dated 17.02.2016, hereinafter for short as impugned order, passed by the learned Principal District Judge, Pulwama, for short trial court, in a civil suit titled Farooq Ahmad Shah v. Feroz Ahmad Shah & Ors., on the grounds taken in the memo of appeal. BRIEF FACTS 2. The case of the appellant, precisely, is that he had filed a suit for declaration, specific performance of contract and permanent injunction before the trial court accompanied with an application for grant of ad-interim relief. The appellant had pleaded that 5 marlas of land under survey No. 1294/Min situated at Rajpora Ullar were purchased by him from the respondent no. 1 against a consideration amount of Rs. 50,000/- which he paid to respondent no. 3 on the directions of respondent no. 1. An advance payment of Rs. 10,000/- was paid to the respondent no. 1 and the remaining amount was to be paid at the time of registration of sale deed. Pursuant to such purchase the appellant is stated to have dumped some construction material on the spot to start construction of a mosque. The said construction was opposed by the respondent no. 2 for having purchased the said piece of land from respondent no. 1 against a consideration amount of Rs. 70,000/- out of which Rs. 60,000/-has already been paid to the respondent no. 1 and a sale deed dated 13.09.2013 stands registered in this behalf. 3. The appellant had raised a plea before the trial court that the sale deed executed by respondent no. 1 with respondent no. 2 in respect of the land in question is inoperative insofar as the appellant is concerned. 4. The respondents in their written statement had denied the claim of the appellant. xxxx 6. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material made available. 7. Admittedly, the appellant projects himself as a prospective owner of the land in question on the basis of a verbal promise allegedly having been extended to him by the respondent no. 1, the owner of the land, while as the respondent no. 2 claims to be the owner having purchased the land in question pursuant to a sale deed executed by the respondent no. 1 with respondent no. 2 on 13.09.2013 registered by the competent authority. 1, the owner of the land, while as the respondent no. 2 claims to be the owner having purchased the land in question pursuant to a sale deed executed by the respondent no. 1 with respondent no. 2 on 13.09.2013 registered by the competent authority. The learned counsel for the appellant submits that the appellant has been prejudiced by the impugned order as the trial court failed to appreciate the fact that he is in possession of the land in question and has paid the advance amount of the sale consideration. The learned counsel further submits that the Full Bench of this Court in case titled Gh. Qadir & Anr. v. Gh. Hussain reported as 2010 (8) JKJ 136 [HC] & Julien Education Trust v. Sourendra Kumar Roy (2010) 1 SCC 379 . It would be profitable to reproduce paragraph no. 10 and 11 of the Full Bench judgment of this court herein, thus:- "10. We find ourselves in complete agreement with the observations made by their Lordships in the aforesaid case. It is manifestly clear that where the plaintiff voluntarily executes a contract of sale puts the proposed vendee in possession of the property and receives the entire consideration money, there is no special equity in his favour to allow him to turn around and claim the property after a long time merely because the price of the property has increased. He cannot be allowed to repudiate the judiciary obligation arising out of the contract nor can the Court aid him to commit fraud by dispossessing a prospective vendee who has done all that was required of him to do for purchasing the property. 11. For these reasons we find that even though the possession of the defendant may be permissive, since the plaintiff has received the entire consideration money and allowed the position to be changed to the prejudice of the defendant, he will be estopped from repudiating the sale transaction and recovering possession from the defendant. On ground alone, in our opinion, the defendant is entitled to succeed." (Emphasis supplied) 8. On the other hand the learned counsel for the respondents' submission was the order impugned is, besides being an interlocutory order, a discretionary one and the appellate court cannot substitute its own discretion in an appeal preferred against such discretionary order. On ground alone, in our opinion, the defendant is entitled to succeed." (Emphasis supplied) 8. On the other hand the learned counsel for the respondents' submission was the order impugned is, besides being an interlocutory order, a discretionary one and the appellate court cannot substitute its own discretion in an appeal preferred against such discretionary order. In support of his submissions, the learned counsel referred to and relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court delivered in case titled Wander Ltd. & Anr. v. Antox India P. Ltd, reported as 1990 (Supp) SCC 727. It would be profitable to take note of the paragraphs 9, 10, 11, 13 & 14 herein:- "9. Usually, the prayer for grant of an interlocutory injunction is at a stage when the existence of the legal right asserted by the plaintiff and its alleged violation are both contested and uncertain and remain uncertain till they are established at the trial on evidence. The court, at this stage, acts on certain well settled principles of administration of this form of interlocutory remedy which is both temporary and discretionary. The object of the interlocutory injucntion, it is stated is to protect the plaintiff against injury by violation of his rights for which he could not adequately be compensated in damages recoverable in the action if the uncertainty were resolved in his favour at the trial. The need for such protection must be weighed against the corresponding need of the defendant to be protected against injury resulting from his having been prevented from exercising his own legal rights for which he could not be adequately compensated. The court must weigh one need against another and determine where the "balance of convenience lies". The interlocutory remedy is intended to preserve in status quo, the rights of parties which may appear on a prima facie. The court also, in restraining a defendant from exercising what he considers his legal right but what the plaintiff would like to be prevented, puts into the scales, as a relevant consideration whether the defendant has yet to commence his enterprise or whether he has already been doing so in which latter case considerations somewhat different from those that apply to a case where the defendant is yet to commence his enterprise, are attracted. 10. 10. In the present case, the learned single Judge held that, at all events as between Antox and Wander Ltd. even to the extent considerations relevant for a passing-off action go, the latter was undisputably the earlier user of the Trade-Mark in that Wander Ltd. was manufacturing and marketing the Calcium Glouconate Vitamin Tablets under the Trade-Mark Cal-De-Ce at its own factory in Bombay from August 1983 upto June 1986. If this is correct, Antox's user cannot be held to be prior user. It is pertinent to note, and perhaps emphasise, that the appellate bench did not disturb this finding at all. Learned Single Judge was persuaded to the view that, in any event so far as the prima facie position as to the test of earlier user is concerned Antox could not be held entitled to interlocutory order in its favour on the basis of the earlier user claimed by it. The interlocutory relief was accordingly refused against both Wander and Alfered Berg. 11. Aggrieved by this order of the Trial Judge declining the interlocutory injunction Antox preferred O.S.A. Nos. 111-112 of 1989 before the Division Bench. The Division Bench, however, re-assessed the material considered by the single Judge and came to a different conclusion. The Division Bench held: "...The plaintiffs had licenses to manufacture for sale with the trade names and had indeed sold the manufactured stock in bulk to the defendants Its user of the trade marks pursuant to the licence obtained, was nut the user of the registered user under Sections 48 and 49 of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, not was its manufacture carried out in pursuance of any loan licence taken out by the defendant under rule 69-A of the Drugs and Cosmetics Rules. The plaintiffs manufacture with the trade names, under licenses in the trade names and the consequent user of the trade names establish a prima facie case for passing off action and the balance of convenience, requiring and the status quo to be maintained, the plaintiff having had the benefit of the injunction from 23.09.1988 till 2-3-1989 when it was vacated and from 02.05.1989 when this Court granted the injunction, the plaintiff would be entitled to have the interim injunction as prayed for by them. " 13. On a consideration of the matter, we are afraid, the Appellate Bench fell into error on own important propositions. " 13. On a consideration of the matter, we are afraid, the Appellate Bench fell into error on own important propositions. The first is a misdirection in regard to the very scope and nature of the appeals before it and the limitations on the powers of the Appellate Court to substitute its own discretion in an appeal preferred against a discretionary order. The second pertains to the infirmities in the ratiocinations as to the quality of Antox's alleged user of the Trade-Mark on which the passing-off action is founded. We shall deal with these two separately. 14. The appeals before the Division Bench were against the exercise of discretion by the Single Judge. In such appeals, the Appellate Court will not interfere with the exercise of discretion of the court of first instance and substitute its own discretion except where the discretion has been shown to have been exercised arbitrarily, or capriciously or perversely or where the court had ignored the settled principles of law regulating grant or refusal of interlocutory injunctions. An appeal against exercise of discretion is said to be an appeal on principle. Appellate Court will not reassess the material and seek to reach a conclusion different from the one reached by the court below if the one reached by the court was reasonably possible on the material. The appellate court would normally not be justified in interfering with the exercise of discretion under appeal solely on the ground that if it had considered the matter at the trial stage it would have come to a contrary conclusion. If the discretion has been exercised by the Trial Court reasonably and in a judicial manner the fact that the appellate court would have taken a different view may not justify interference with the trial court's exercise of discretion. After referring to these principles Gajendragadkar, J. in Printers (Mysore) Private Ltd. v. Pothan Joseph : ... These principles are well established, but as has been observed by Viscount Simon in Charles Osention & Co. v. Johnston the law as to the reversal by a court of appeal of an order made by a judge below in the exercise of his discretion is well established, and any difficulty that arises is due only to the application of well settled principles in an individual case. The appellate judgment does not seem to defer to this principle." 9. Considered the submissions made. The appellate judgment does not seem to defer to this principle." 9. Considered the submissions made. 10. The judgments referred to by the learned counsel for the appellant to seek protection of his rights have been passed in distinguishable facts and circumstances. The reproduced portion of the judgment would make it manifestly clear that the parties in the case, referred to by the learned counsel for the appellant, had entered into a contract, the prospective buyer was a vendee in such contract and he had also paid an entire sale consideration to the vendor. In the instant case the appellant, on his own showing, is claiming the benefit of alleged advance payment of Rs. 10,000/- having been paid towards the total sale consideration of Rs. 50,000/-. The said plea is also without any documentary support. While as on the other hand, the respondent no. 3 has produced before the trial court a valid sale deed pursuant to which he claims ownership of the land in question, therefore, the appellant in no way can be said to have been prejudiced if the trial court declined to confirm the interim relief in his favour. 11. Since the trial court has only dealt with an application for grant of interim relief and the main suit is yet to culminate, therefore, the trial court had to confine itself to the three essential ingredients for confirmation of the temporary injunction granted in terms of order dated 25.05.2015, and it does not transpire that the view taken by the trial court holding that the three essential ingredients for confirmation of temporary injunction are not favouring the appellant, is in anyway unjustified. It rather appears quite reasoned. 12. In view of above, the appeal filed by the appellants fails and is dismissed as such. The impugned order dated 17.02.2016 passed by the learned Principal District Judge, Pulwama, is held to be in consonance with law and needs no interference. The suit filed by the appellant is pending since 2015, therefore, it is directed that an expeditious disposal of the suit be ensured. It goes without saying that this Court has not expressed any opinion on the merits of the case which shall be decided by the trial court on its own merits without getting influenced by any of the observations made in this order. 13. The appeal is dismissed on the above lines along with connected CMs. It goes without saying that this Court has not expressed any opinion on the merits of the case which shall be decided by the trial court on its own merits without getting influenced by any of the observations made in this order. 13. The appeal is dismissed on the above lines along with connected CMs. There shall be, however, no order as to costs. 14. Record of the trial court be returned.