JUDGMENT : Sujit Narayan Prasad, J. I.A. No. 7926 of 2023 This interlocutory application has been preferred under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condoning the delay of 76 days in preferring the instant appeal. 2. Heard the parties. 3. Considering the sufficient cause as has been referred in the interlocutory application and having no objection on the part of the Respondent State, the delay of 76 days in preferring the appeal is hereby condoned. 4. I.A. No. 7926 of 2023 stands allowed. L.P. A. No. 590 of 2022 5. The instant appeal preferred under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent, is directed against the order/judgment dated 26.07.2022 passed in W.P.(S) No. 3859 of 2019 whereby and whereunder the order passed by the Deputy Commissioner, Sahibganj dated 14.05.2019 by which the claim of the writ petitioner for engagement as anganwari sevika has been rejected, has been refused to be interfered with by the learned Single Judge as the claim of the respondent no. 8 has been found to be genuine. Hence this appeal. 6. Brief facts of the case as per the pleadings made in the writ proceeding, which are required to be enumerated herein, read as under :- The Aam Sabha was convened on 02.03.2016 for the appointment of Anganbari sevika for Tilbhittha III Centre. 6(i). The writ petitioner as well as the Respondent No. 8 applied for the said post and their candidatures were considered and the meeting was concluded by granting provisional appointment letter to the respondent No.8. 6(ii). Soon after the appointment of the Respondent no.8 the writ petitioner objected to her appointment and requested for the cancellation of the same by writing letter to the Child Development Project Officer, Pathna, Sahibganj on 04.03.2016 and a copy of same was also served to the Deputy Commissioner, Sahibganj, the Social Welfare Officer, Sahibganj and the Block Development Officer, Pathna. 6(iii). Further one another candidate namely Janki Devi had also made objections regarding the appointment of the Respondent No.8 and upon such grievances raised by her Letter No.824 was issued by the Office of the Social Welfare Women Child Development and Social Security Department, Project Bhawan, Ranchi dated 06.04.2016 whereby and where under the Child Development Project Officer, Sahibganj was directed to reconsider the said appointment and select a suitable candidate on the post of Anganbari Sevika. A copy of said letter was also served upon the District Social Welfare Officer, Sahibganj. 6(iv). Since no action was taken on the grievance raised by the writ petitioner regarding illegal appointment of the Respondent No.8, writ petitioner again wrote letter to the Deputy Commissioner, Sahibganj on 04.08.2017 wherein she has very clearly stated that the respondent no. 8 is a resident outside of the Poshak Kshetra (beneficiary area) as the Respondent No.8 resides at Plot No.1293 and the same falls within Anganbari Kendra Code No.77 and not in Anganbari Kendra Code No.119 for which the appointment was given and therefore, she complained before the Chief Minister Jan Samwad. 6(v). The grievances of the writ petitioner was taken up but to her utter surprise the compliance report was given by the Child Development Project Officer, Sahibganj by Memo dated 07.10.2017 stating therein that, the appointment has been done on the basis of the Residence Certificate and she belongs to the Poshak Kshetra. 6(vi). The writ petitioner is a student of Bachelor of Arts and she was already B.A. Part-II pass at the time of appointment and as such she was more qualified than the Respondent no. 8. The Writ petitioner resides at House No. 52, Daag No. 1167, Jamabandi No. 5, which falls within the Poshak Kshetra of Anganbari Kendra Code No. 119. 6(vii). The writ petitioner seeing no other alternative moved before this Court in W.P.(S) No. 7695 of 2017, which was disposed of vide order dated 25.06.2018 by the learned Single Judge directing the Deputy Commissioner, Sahibganj to take decision. 6(viii). In pursuant to the order of this Court writ petitioner appeared before the Deputy Commissioner, Sahibganj to which a report was called from the Circle Officer, Sahibganj, who suggested that the respondent no. 8 is a permanent resident of Anganbari Kendra Code No. 77 and at present the father-in-law of respondent no. 8 has constructed a house on the land one Adivasi. 6(ix). The Deputy Commissioner, Sahibganj, however, in terms of the order dated 14.05.2019 held that the respondent no. 8 is residing at Anganbari Kendra No. 119, which is the Poshak Kshetra of the Centre and hence the claim of the writ petitioner is rejected. 6(x). 8 has constructed a house on the land one Adivasi. 6(ix). The Deputy Commissioner, Sahibganj, however, in terms of the order dated 14.05.2019 held that the respondent no. 8 is residing at Anganbari Kendra No. 119, which is the Poshak Kshetra of the Centre and hence the claim of the writ petitioner is rejected. 6(x). Being aggrieved the writ petitioner preferred W.P.(S) No. 3859 of 2019 before this Court, which was dismissed by the learned Single Judge of this Court vide order dated 26.07.2022 and hence this appeal. 7. It appears from the pleadings that the writ petitioner and the Respondent No.8 participated in the process of engagement as Aanganvari Sevika for Tilbhita III Centre. The candidature of both the candidates has been considered. The candidature of respondent no. 8 has been considered to be fit in comparison to that of appellant. 8. The appellant / writ petitioner being aggrieved with the decision of the Selection Committee has approached this Court by filing writ petition being W.P.(S) No. 7695 of 2017. The co-ordinate learned Single Judge had remitted the matter back to the Deputy Commissioner, Sahibganj to take a decision in consonance with the direction of the Deputy Secretary after giving proper notice to the respondent no. 8 as well as the writ petitioner. The Deputy Commissioner, Sahibganj passed the order dated 14.05.2019 whereby and whereunder the decision of the Selection Committee selecting the Respondent no. 8 has been found to be proper. The writ petitioner being aggrieved with the aforesaid decision has again come to this Court in W.P.(S) No. 3859 of 2019. The writ petition has been dismissed and hence the present appeal has been filed. 9. Learned counsel for the appellant has taken the ground by showing infirmity in the decision of the Deputy Commissioner to the effect that respondent no. 8 cannot be said to be residing permanently where the Aanganvari centre is located i.e., Aanganvari Centre no. 119. It has been contended by referring to the order passed by the Deputy Commissioner, where the report of the Circle Officer, Pathna dated 04.01.2019 has been taken note of in which it has come that the appellant is the permanent resident of Aanganvari centre no. 119. It has been reported that the respondent no. 8 had constructed her house in the area falling under aanganvari centre no. 119. It has been reported that the respondent no. 8 had constructed her house in the area falling under aanganvari centre no. 77 and has been reported to be the permanent resident of that area. It has further came in the report of the Circle Officer, Pathna that the respondent no. 8 at present, is residing along with her father-in-law in that house constructed over the tribal land which falls under the aanganvari centre no. 119. 10. The contention therefore has been made that since it is an admitted case of the respondent no. 8 that she is permanent resident of aanganvari centre no. 77, then her candidature ought to be have been rejected in the threshold, since, as per the condition stipulated under circular of 2006 the engagement as aanganvari sevika is to be made of such candidates who are residing permanently in the area where the anganvari centre falls. 11. Therefore, learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that the aforesaid aspect of matter has not been considered in right perspective by the learned Single Judge and the respondent no. 8, in term of the aforesaid policy decision dated 02.06.2006 was not eligible to be engaged as aaanganvari sevika, hence the instant appeal. 12. Learned counsel for the respondent State has defended the impugned order. It has been contended that the learned Single Judge after taking into consideration the very purport of the policy decision and taking into consideration the fact that respondent no. 8 is residing in the house of her father-in-law, which falls under the aanganvari centre no. 119, hence, by considering the candidature of respondent no. 8 more suitable in comparison to the writ petitioner, the learned Single Judge has declined to interfere with the decision of the Deputy Commissioner, Sahibganj. 13. We have heard learned counsel for the parties, perused the documents available on record as also the findings recorded by the learned Single Judge in the impugned order. 14. The issue involved herein is the eligibility criteria of the appellant vis-à-vis the respondent no. 8. The eligibility criteria has been decided by the State by the Policy decision dated 02.06.2006 one of the policy decision is that the candidate, for the purpose of consideration of the candidature, is required to be permanent resident of the area where the aanganvari centre is situated. 15. 8. The eligibility criteria has been decided by the State by the Policy decision dated 02.06.2006 one of the policy decision is that the candidate, for the purpose of consideration of the candidature, is required to be permanent resident of the area where the aanganvari centre is situated. 15. The aforesaid policy decision is for the purpose of specific object i.e., if a local resident will be appointed instead of an outsider as aanganvari sevika then managing the aanganvari centre wherein the kids are be to be dealt with as also the pregnant lady will be looked into, will be more easier since there will be comfort zone between the aanganvari sevika with the kids/ pregnant ladies of that area and more will be achieved so as to achieve the very purpose of opening the aanganvari centre in the particular area. It is for this reason, the locality of the candidate has been made condition precedent for consideration of candidature of the candidates for engagement as aanganvari sevika. 16. Herein the limited fact as well as the report of Circle Officer has been taken note of by the Deputy Commissioner, Sahibganj that the writ petitioner and the respondent no. 8, on comparative assessment of their candidature leaving apart the issue of locality, the selection committee has come to the conclusion that the respondent no. 8 is the fittest in comparison to that of the appellant. 17. However, as per the report of the Circle Officer when it came to the notice of the Deputy Commissioner, Sahibganj while scrutinizing the decision of the Selection process so as to reach to the conclusion as to whether the process of the selection suffers from error, the Deputy Commissioner, Sahibganj has directed the Circle Officer to conduct an inquiry. 18. The Circle Officer has reported that the appellant resides permanently in the area where aanganvari centre no. 119 is situated. However, respondent no. 8 has been reported to be the permanent resident of the area which falls under the aanganvari centre no. 77 but it has also been reported that father-in-law of the respondent resides in the area falling under aanganvari centre no. 119, the subject matter of engagement (matrimonial home). However, it has been reflected in the report that the aforesaid house has been constructed over the tribal land. 19. 77 but it has also been reported that father-in-law of the respondent resides in the area falling under aanganvari centre no. 119, the subject matter of engagement (matrimonial home). However, it has been reflected in the report that the aforesaid house has been constructed over the tribal land. 19. Learned counsel for the appellant has tried to impress upon the Court by agitating the two issues, one being that the respondent no. 8 has shown herself to be the resident of the area which falls under aanganvari centre no. 77. She has also shown to be the resident of her matrimonial house which is situated in aanganvari centre no. 119, subject matter of the aanganvari centre in question herein. 20. Argument has been advanced that if it is admitted on the part of the respondent no. 8 that she is the permanent resident of the area located under aanganvari centre no.77, then the respondent no. 8 has got no ground for consideration of her candidature for the another area. 21. But we are not impressed upon by such argument, reason being, that the respondent no. 8, if has constructed her own house in another area, cannot debar her if her matrimonial house is located in the aanganvari centre no. 119, the centre in question herein. 22. If the argument of the appellant will be accepted then it will be contrary to the constitutional board to have a property under Article 300A of the Constitution of India. The purpose of the Selection Committee is only to asses as to whether the concerned candidate is possessing the eligibility criteria as per the policy decision and the basic point is that a candidate has to be the permanent resident in that area no. 119. 23. The recruiting agency while selecting the candidate has only to look into whether the candidate is in a position to look into the aanganvari centre being the local or not. Merely because the candidate has two houses, the candidature of such candidate cannot be denied. 24. The second argument has been advanced that the matrimonial house has been found to be constructed over a tribal land but that is not the issue which is to be adjudicated, as per the policy decision. Merely because the candidate has two houses, the candidature of such candidate cannot be denied. 24. The second argument has been advanced that the matrimonial house has been found to be constructed over a tribal land but that is not the issue which is to be adjudicated, as per the policy decision. Even accepting the house has been constructed over a tribal land, the same cannot come to the aid of the appellant to deny the candidature of the respondent no. 8 on that ground. 25. The selection committee on consideration of the aforesaid fact coupled with the merits of both the candidates herein has found that the candidature of the respondent no. 8 is more meritorious in comparison to the appellant on the basis of the marks secured in the educational qualification. 26. The writ petition has been filed for issuance of writ of certiorari. The basic principal in issuance of certiorari is the parties concerned is required to reflect the error on the face of the order or if there is violation of principal of natural justice. The writ of certiorari can be issued on these circumstances, meaning thereby, the High Court while exercise of power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is having very limited scope to interfere in the decision taken by the administrative authority. 27. Reference in this regard is made to the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Indian Rly. Construction Co. Ltd. v. Ajay Kumar reported in (2003) 4 SCC 579 , para 15, 16 and 18 thereof are quoted hereunder : 15. The court will be slow to interfere in such matters relating to administrative functions unless decision is tainted by any vulnerability enumerated above: like illegality, irrationality and procedural impropriety. Whether the action falls within any of the categories has to be established. Mere assertion in that regard would not be sufficient. 16. The famous case commonly known as “The Wednesbury case” [Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corpn., (1948) 1 KB 223 : (1947) 2 All ER 680 (CA)] is treated as the landmark so far as laying down various basic principles relating to judicial review of administrative or statutory direction. 18. Therefore, to arrive at a decision on “reasonableness” the court has to find out if the administrator has left out relevant factors or taken into account irrelevant factors. 18. Therefore, to arrive at a decision on “reasonableness” the court has to find out if the administrator has left out relevant factors or taken into account irrelevant factors. The decision of the administrator must have been within the four corners of the law, and not one which no sensible person could have reasonably arrived at, having regard to the above principles, and must have been a bona fide one. The decision could be one of many choices open to the authority but it was for that authority to decide upon the choice and not for the court to substitute its view. Reference is made to the case of State of U.P. v. Rakesh Kumar Keshari reported in (2011) 5 SCC 341 , para 29 thereof is quoted hereunder : 29. The Court in Johri Mal case [ (2004) 4 SCC 714 ] also held that the decisions and actions which do not have adjudicative disposition would not strictly fall for consideration before a judicial review court. According to this Court the limited scope of judicial review is: (i) Courts, while exercising the power of judicial review, do not sit in an appeal over the decisions of administrative bodies; (ii) A petition for a judicial review would lie only on certain well-defined grounds; (iii) An order passed by an administrative authority exercising discretion vested in it, cannot be interfered in judicial review unless it is shown that exercise of discretion itself was perverse or illegal; (iv) A mere wrong decision without anything more is not enough to attract the power of judicial review; (v) The supervisory jurisdiction conferred on a court is limited to seeing that the Tribunal functions within the limits of its authority and that its decisions do not occasion miscarriage of justice; and (vi) The Court shall not ordinarily interfere with a policy decision of the State. Reference is made to the case of Vinod Kumar v. State of Haryana reported in (2013) 16 SCC 293, para 24 thereof is quoted hereunder : 24. The matter can be looked into from another angle as well. In those cases where courts are concerned with the judicial review of the administrative action, the parameters within which administrative action can be reviewed by the courts are well settled. The matter can be looked into from another angle as well. In those cases where courts are concerned with the judicial review of the administrative action, the parameters within which administrative action can be reviewed by the courts are well settled. No doubt, the scope of judicial review is limited and the courts do not go into the merits of the decision taken by the administrative authorities but are concerned with the decision-making process. Interference with the order of the administrative authority is permissible when it is found to be irrational, unreasonable or there is procedural impropriety. However, where reasonable conduct is expected, the criterion of reasonableness is not subjective but objective; albeit the onus of establishment of unreasonableness rests upon the person challenging the validity of the acts. It is also trite that while exercising limited power of judicial review on the grounds mentioned above, the court can examine whether administrative decisions in exercise of powers, even if conferred in subjective terms are made in good faith and on relevant considerations. The courts inquire whether a reasonable man could have come to the decision in question without misdirecting himself on the law or facts in a material respect. (See M.A. Rasheed v. State of Kerala [ (1974) 2 SCC 687 ], SCC pp. 690-91, para 10.) Reference is also made to the case of Sarvepalli Ramaiah v. District Collector, Chittoor reported in (2019) 4 SCC 500 , para 40 and 43 thereof is quoted hereunder : “40. Administrative decisions are subject to judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution, only on grounds of perversity, patent illegality, irrationality, want of power to take the decision and procedural irregularity. Except on these grounds administrative decisions are not interfered with, in exercise of the extraordinary power of judicial review.” 43. Judicial review under Article 226 is directed, not against the decision, but the decision-making process. Of course, a patent illegality and/or error apparent on the face of the decision, which goes to the root of the decision, may vitiate the decision-making process. In this case there is no such patent illegality or apparent error. In exercise of power under Article 226, the Court does not sit in appeal over the decision impugned, nor does it adjudicate hotly disputed questions of fact.” 28. In this case there is no such patent illegality or apparent error. In exercise of power under Article 226, the Court does not sit in appeal over the decision impugned, nor does it adjudicate hotly disputed questions of fact.” 28. This Court, after discussing the factual aspect and the legal issues and coming to the order passed by the learned Single Judge wherefrom it is evident that the learned Single Judge has considered the entire fact in entirety and on appreciation of the findings recorded by the Deputy Commissioner, Sahibganj, nowhere has found anything for interfering with the writ petition and accordingly has dismissed the writ petition. 29. This court, based upon the decision in the entirety as above, is of the view that order passed by the learned Single Judge does not suffer from any error. 30. Accordingly, the instant appeal is dismissed. 31. Pending I.A., if any, also stands disposed of.