JUDGMENT : Sujit Narayan Prasad, J. 1. In pursuance of the order dated 28.08.2023, a report has been submitted by the learned Registrar General, basis upon which, explanation has been submitted by the Office. 2. We have perused the same. We are accepting the said explanation with caution to the Office not to repeat such type of mistake in future. 3. Let such explanation be kept on record. 4. The instant intra-court appeal preferred under Clause-10 of Letters Patent, is directed against the order dated 13.05.2022 passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P.(S) No.2450 of 2011, whereby and whereunder, the order of punishment of dismissal from service has been refused to be interfered with by dismissing the writ petition. 5. The brief facts of the case, as per the pleading made in the writ petition, required to be enumerated, which reads as under:- 6. It is the case of the writ petitioner that he was appointed on the post of Constable vide memo no.1877 dated 19.05.1995 by the order of the Superintendent of Police, Hazaribagh on humanitarian grounds. The writ petitioner was posted in the District of Hazaribagh and since the date of joining, the petitioner started discharging his duties as Constable, thereafter, he was transferred in the district of Ranchi. All of a sudden while discharging his duties, he has receive memo no.1365 dated 25.03.2011, whereby, one draft charge has been issued wherein it has been alleged that the appointment of the petitioner has been made on the basis of forged documents which has been prepared by the petitioner himself, he has got his appointment in illegal manner. The said allegation has been leveled against the petitioner on the basis of the report submitted by one Birendra Kumar Verma, Inspector of Police, who was posted in the district of Chatra. 7. It is the further case of the writ petitioner/appellant that although, in the said inquiry the petitioner has never been issued any notice to defend his case, rather, on the basis of unwanted complaint, the inquiry has been conducted behind the back of the petitioner, even knowing the full facts that the petitioner was never posted in the district of Chatra. But the inquiry officer has not called for the entire records from the district of Hazaribagh or even not bothered to call for the records from the existing State of Bihar, but without verifying the said documents, the charge has been framed that the petitioner has got his appointment on the basis of forged documents and thereafter, draft charge has been issued asking the petitioner to give reply within a period of 15 days otherwise departmental proceeding will be initiated. From perusal of the draft charge dated 25.03.2011, it would be evident that the inquiry officer has only seen the document, which was lying in the district of Chatra, hence, the entire draft charge, having been based upon the wrong documents and on the basis of frivolous complaint, made by some unwanted persons, is misconceived. 8. It is the further case of the writ petitioner that the main charge, i.e., the petitioner has got his appointment on the basis of forged document itself is absolutely false and illegal. The authority concerned has acted without any application of mind, because at one hand, it is stated that the departmental proceeding has already been initiated while on the other hand, the show cause reply has been sought for from the petitioner which suggests that asking reply to the show cause notice from the petitioner, was merely a formality and the respondents authorities have already initiated a departmental proceeding and made up their mind to dismiss the petitioner from service. Being aggrieved with the same, writ petition being W.P.(S) No.2450 of 2011 has been filed. 9. It is evident from the factual aspect that the writ petitioner while working as Constable, he was departmentally proceeded by serving memo of charge on the allegation that he has obtained service as Constable by back door entry and by commission of fabricating the documents. 10. The appellant, has although, made a request for supply of exhibits. But according to the appellant, the exhibits have not been supplied. The departmental proceeding was concluded and the inquiry report was submitted. The appellant-writ petitioner was found to be guilty in the inquiry proceeding. According to the appellant, even the second show cause notice was not issued to the writ petitioner. 11. But according to the appellant, the exhibits have not been supplied. The departmental proceeding was concluded and the inquiry report was submitted. The appellant-writ petitioner was found to be guilty in the inquiry proceeding. According to the appellant, even the second show cause notice was not issued to the writ petitioner. 11. The disciplinary authority has passed an order of dismissal against the writ petitioner on 25.08.2014, which came in force w.e.f. 01.08.2014 by holding the appointment of the writ petitioner itself was illegal. The writ petitioner, being aggrieved with the order of dismissal, had preferred an appeal but the said appeal was dismissed. 12. The order of appeal was challenged by filing interlocutory application being I.A. No.221 of 2018. The said interlocutory application was allowed vide order dated 05.11.2018 passed by the learned Writ Court and in consequence thereof, the entire disciplinary proceedings including the order of disciplinary as also the appellate authority have been assailed. 13. The writ petitioner has taken the ground that by not supplying the relevant documents and the second show cause notice, has greatly prejudiced the case of the appellant since, the adequate and sufficient opportunity were not provided while inflicting the major punishment of removal from service. 14. While on the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the State has taken the plea that no prejudice will be said to have caused to the appellant, since, the appellant had participated in the inquiry proceeding without any demeanor and the inquiry officer has found the charge proved. 15. The inquiry officer, came to the conclusion that the appointment since was made, as reflected from the appointment letter that the same, was on humanitarian ground, hence, considering the non-availability of said ground for making appointment, the inquiry officer has found the charge proved, therefore, it cannot be said any prejudice has been caused to the appellant. 16. The learned Single Judge, on appreciation of the rival submission, has refused to interfere with the impugned order by taking note of the conduct of the appellant who has got the service, as per the appointment letter itself, on humanitarian ground and even by fabricating the documents, against which, the present appeal. 17. Mr. 16. The learned Single Judge, on appreciation of the rival submission, has refused to interfere with the impugned order by taking note of the conduct of the appellant who has got the service, as per the appointment letter itself, on humanitarian ground and even by fabricating the documents, against which, the present appeal. 17. Mr. Alok Anand, learned counsel appearing for the appellant-writ petitioner has taken the following grounds in challenging the order passed by the learned Single Judge:- (i) The learned Single Judge, while dismissing the writ petition, has not appreciated the fact about the prejudice caused due to non-supply of the relevant documents as was referred in the memorandum of charge. (ii) The learned Single Judge has also not appreciated the fact of non-supply of the second show cause notice, which is the mandatory requirement before inflicting major punishment of removal from service. (iii) The learned Single Judge has also not appreciated that the grievance about non-supply of exhibits was raised before the inquiry officer but no decision has been taken, rather, in absentia of the documents, the inquiry proceeding proceeded and concluded finding the charge proved against the writ petitioner, based upon which, the major punishment has been imposed. (iv) The appellant has taken the ground of applicability of Rule 663 of the Jharkhand Police Manual wherein it is stipulated that the relaxation may be given by the appointing authority but the same has not been appreciated by the learned Single Judge. 18. Learned counsel, on the aforesaid premise, has submitted that the order passed by the learned Single Judge suffers from an error, hence, not sustainable in the eye of law. 19. Mr. Gaurang Jajodia, learned AC to GP-II appearing for the State of Jharkhand has taken the following grounds in rebuttal to the argument advanced on behalf of the appellant, as referred hereinabove:- (i) The question of non-supply of document is not available for the appellant to raise this ground before this Court, since, the appointment letter itself suggests that the appointment of the writ petitioner was made on humanitarian ground based upon fabrication of documents. (ii) The cause of prejudice being raised on behalf of the appellant but when the appointment letter itself speaks that the appointment having been made on humanitarian ground which itself suggests the violation of Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. (ii) The cause of prejudice being raised on behalf of the appellant but when the appointment letter itself speaks that the appointment having been made on humanitarian ground which itself suggests the violation of Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. (iii) The ground, so taken with respect to the applicability of the provision as contained under Rule 663 of the Jharkhand Police Manual does not stipulate that the appointment is to be made on humanitarian ground, rather, said provision speaks about a relaxation is to be given by the appointing authority. The appointment made on the humanitarian ground is quite different to that of the power to relax the eligibility criteria. (iv) The non-supply of the exhibits and the second show cause notice said to have not supplied even accepted as the ground is being taken, the said non-supply, cannot be said to cause prejudice, since, it is known to the appellant that the appointment was made against the vacancy of the year 1988-1989, but the appointment was provided in the year 1995. The aforesaid fact has not been disputed, as to how the recruitment process initiated way back in the year 1988-89, in which, the appellant had participated in the process of selection, but had not being selected on account of the fact that he was not matching with the educational qualification, hence, he was declared unsuccessful, then how, the appellant was appointed after lapse of about 6 to 7 years, once his candidature has been rejected. The aforesaid fact having been admitted by the appellant and as available on record, so the said fact since is not in dispute and as such, there is no question of causing prejudice. 20. The learned State Counsel, on the basis of the aforesaid submission, has submitted that the order passed by the learned Single Judge, therefore, suffers from no error. 21. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the documents available on record as also considered the finding recorded by the learned Single Judge in the impugned order. 22. The undisputed fact in this case, as would appear from the material available on record that the writ petitioner had participated in the recruitment process which was conducted on 20.08.1989. A master chart was prepared. The writ petitioner was stood at serial no.755. 22. The undisputed fact in this case, as would appear from the material available on record that the writ petitioner had participated in the recruitment process which was conducted on 20.08.1989. A master chart was prepared. The writ petitioner was stood at serial no.755. The writ petitioner could not be selected on account of the fact that he was not matching with the required qualification. His height has also not at par with the selected candidates, hence, he was declared un-successful. 23. The writ petitioner was appointed under the signature of Ajay Bhatnagar, the then Superintendent of Police, Hazaribagh. The said appointment letter itself refers the candidature no.4/94 dated 14.11.1994. One letter of higher official from Patna bearing memo no.2766/P2 dated 20.07.1994 has also been mentioned in the appointment letter stating that the appointment letter was being issued in compliance of the direction issued in the said memo no. 2766/P2 dated 20.07.1994 on ‘humanitarian ground’. It was also mentioned that the appointment was completely temporary. 24. The disciplinary authority, after coming to know about such appointment has asked a reply, as to why a proceeding be not initiated for removal of the service of the appellant, thereafter, the departmental proceeding was initiated by serving memorandum of charge, wherein, the following charge was framed, which reads as under:- ^^lat; dqekj jk¡ph ftyk cy ds fo:} QthZ dkxtkr ,oa vkns'k cukdj mlesa ekuoh; vk/kkj n'kkZrs gq;s iqfyl ds in ij gtkjhckx ftyk cy esa voS/k :i ls fu;qDr gksus dk vkjksi yxk;k tkrk gS** 25. The appellant has, although, sought for document as the claim, is being taken but which document when the reference of document is already there in the appointment letter, has not been referred in the said requisition as also not referred in the paper book. 26. The inquiry officer, on consideration of the content of appointment letter, whereby and whereunder, the appointment has been made on the direction of the higher authority of Patna as contained in letter dated 20.07.1994, has found the charge proved regarding fabrication of documents for the purpose of getting public employment. Accordingly, the disciplinary authority has accepted the aforesaid finding and removed the writ petitioner from service. The said order was challenged before the appellate authority and the appellate authority has also declined to be interfered with, against which, the writ petition being W.P.(S) No.2450 of 2011 has been filed. 27. Accordingly, the disciplinary authority has accepted the aforesaid finding and removed the writ petitioner from service. The said order was challenged before the appellate authority and the appellate authority has also declined to be interfered with, against which, the writ petition being W.P.(S) No.2450 of 2011 has been filed. 27. But, the learned Single Judge has dismissed the writ petition taking the ground of commission of forgery by fabricating the document and getting appointment on humanitarian ground, cannot be said in consonance of the Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India, which is the subject matter of the instant appeal. 28. The ground has been taken on behalf of the appellant of causing prejudice due to non-supply of relevant document and no second show cause notice. 29. The law is well settled in this regard by the Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad & Ors. Vs. B. Karunakar & Ors., reported in (1993) 4 SCC 727 , wherein, it has been held that ipso facto due to non-supply of the second show cause notice, the departmental proceeding cannot be vitiated unless, the concerned delinquent employee will be able to show the prejudice caused due to non-supply of the show cause notice, the relevant paragraphs of the said judgment is being referred as under:- “28. The position in law can also be looked at from a slightly different angle. Article 311(2) says that the employee shall be given a “reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of the charges against him”. The findings on the charges given by a third person like the enquiry officer, particularly when they are not borne out by the evidence or are arrived at by overlooking the evidence or misconstruing it, could themselves constitute new unwarranted imputations. What is further, when the proviso to the said Article states that “where it is proposed after such inquiry, to impose upon him any such penalty, such penalty may be imposed on the basis of the evidence adduced during such inquiry and it shall not be necessary to give such person any opportunity of making representation on the penalty proposed”, it in effect accepts two successive stages of differing scope. Since the penalty is to be proposed after the inquiry, which inquiry in effect is to be carried out by the disciplinary authority (the enquiry officer being only his delegate appointed to hold the inquiry and to assist him), the employee's reply to the enquiry officer's report and consideration of such reply by the disciplinary authority also constitute an integral part of such inquiry. The second stage follows the inquiry so carried out and it consists of the issuance of the notice to show cause against the proposed penalty and of considering the reply to the notice and deciding upon the penalty. What is dispensed with is the opportunity of making representation on the penalty proposed and not of opportunity of making representation on the report of the enquiry officer. The latter right was always there. But before the Forty-second Amendment of the Constitution, the point of time at which it was to be exercised had stood deferred till the second stage viz., the stage of considering the penalty. Till that time, the conclusions that the disciplinary authority might have arrived at both with regard to the guilt of the employee and the penalty to be imposed were only tentative. All that has happened after the Forty-second Amendment of the Constitution is to advance the point of time at which the representation of the employee against the enquiry officer's report would be considered. Now, the disciplinary authority has to consider the representation of the employee against the report before it arrives at its conclusion with regard to his guilt or innocence of the charges. 30. Hence the incidental questions raised above may be answered as follows : [i] Since the denial of the report of the enquiry officer is a denial of reasonable opportunity and a breach of the principles of natural justice, it follows that the statutory rules, if any, which deny the report to the employee are against the principles of natural justice and, therefore, invalid. The delinquent employee will, therefore, be entitled to a copy of the report even if the statutory rules do not permit the furnishing of the report or are silent on the subject. The delinquent employee will, therefore, be entitled to a copy of the report even if the statutory rules do not permit the furnishing of the report or are silent on the subject. [ii] The relevant portion of Article 311(2) of the Constitution is as follows: “(2) No such person as aforesaid shall be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank except after an inquiry in which he has been informed of the charges against him and given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges.” Thus the article makes it obligatory to hold an inquiry before the employee is dismissed or removed or reduced in rank. The article, however, cannot be construed to mean that it prevents or prohibits the inquiry when punishment other than that of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank is awarded. The procedure to be followed in awarding other punishments is laid down in the service rules governing the employee. What is further, Article 311(2) applies only to members of the civil services of the Union or an all-India service or a civil service of a State or to the holders of the civil posts under the Union or a State. In the matter of all punishments both Government servants and others are governed by their service rules. Whenever, therefore, the service rules contemplate an inquiry before a punishment is awarded and when the enquiry officer is not the disciplinary authority the delinquent employee will have the right to receive the enquiry officer's report notwithstanding the nature of the punishment. [iii] Since it is the right of the employee to have the report to defend himself effectively and he would not know in advance whether the report is in his favour or against him, it will not be proper to construe his failure to ask for the report, as the waiver of his right. Whether, therefore, the employee asks for the report or not, the report has to be furnished to him. [iv] In the view that we have taken, viz., that the right to make representation to the disciplinary authority against the findings recorded in the enquiry report is an integral part of the opportunity of defence against the charges and is a breach of principles of natural justice to deny the said right, it is only appropriate that the law laid down in Mohd. Ramzan case should apply to employees in all establishments whether Government or non-Government, public or private. This will be the case whether there are rules governing the disciplinary proceeding or not and whether they expressly prohibit the furnishing of the copy of the report or are silent on the subject. Whatever the nature of punishment, further, whenever the rules require an inquiry to be held, for inflicting the punishment in question, the delinquent employee should have the benefit of the report of the enquiry officer before the disciplinary authority records its findings on the charges levelled against him. Hence question (iv) is answered accordingly. [v] The next question to be answered is what is the effect on the order of punishment when the report of the enquiry officer is not furnished to the employee and what relief should be granted to him in such cases. The answer to this question has to be relative to the punishment awarded. When the employee is dismissed or removed from service and the inquiry is set aside because the report is not furnished to him, in some cases the non-furnishing of the report may have prejudiced him gravely while in other cases it may have made no difference to the ultimate punishment awarded to him. Hence to direct reinstatement of the employee with back-wages in all cases is to reduce the rules of justice to a mechanical ritual. The theory of reasonable opportunity and the principles of natural justice have been evolved to uphold the rule of law and to assist the individual to vindicate his just rights. They are not incantations to be invoked nor rites to be performed on all and sundry occasions. Whether in fact, prejudice has been caused to the employee or not on account of the denial to him of the report, has to be considered on the facts and circumstances of each case. Where, therefore, even after the furnishing of the report, no different consequence would have followed, it would be a perversion of justice to permit the employee to resume duty and to get all the consequential benefits. It amounts to rewarding the dishonest and the guilty and thus to stretching the concept of justice to illogical and exasperating limits. It amounts to an “unnatural expansion of natural justice” which in itself is antithetical to justice.” 30. It amounts to rewarding the dishonest and the guilty and thus to stretching the concept of justice to illogical and exasperating limits. It amounts to an “unnatural expansion of natural justice” which in itself is antithetical to justice.” 30. So far as the issue of non-supply of the document is concerned, which has also been taken to be a ground of causing prejudice, there is no dispute that the document upon which the disciplinary authority is relying upon, is to be supplied to the delinquent employee so as to provide adequate and sufficient opportunity. But the aforesaid order is to be tested on the facts of the each case in order to come to the conclusion as to whether any prejudice has been caused or not. 31. Herein, the appointment letter itself suggests that the appointment has been made on humanitarian ground on the reference of the higher authority, basis upon which, the argument has been advanced on behalf of the appellant that serious prejudice has been caused. 32. This Court is to consider, “as to whether, if the party is knowing about the commission of fault/irregularity, is it be available for the party concerned to raise the issue of prejudice?” 33. The issue of prejudice is to be agitated by the party, if anything has come and the concerned party has been confronted with anything which the party concerned is knowing earlier to the said confrontation. 34. This Court needs to refer herein the interpretation of the word ‘prejudice’ as what exactly ‘prejudice’ means. 35. ‘Prejudice’ means that if the adverse decision is taken leading to the civil consequences and in that circumstances, if the opportunity of hearing will not be given, certainly prejudice will be said to be caused since, the fact is required to be disputed by the party concerned. 36. Further, it requires to refer herein that if the parties are knowing fully well the fact and there is no chance of any dispute so as to arrive at a contrary conclusion as per the imputation, then, the question of prejudice will have paramount importance and in that eventuality, the opportunity of hearing said to have provided so as to provide adequate and sufficient opportunity by providing the relevant documents etc. 37. The law is well settled that the principle of prejudice or the natural justice is having no straight jacket formula. 37. The law is well settled that the principle of prejudice or the natural justice is having no straight jacket formula. The same depends upon the factual aspects. The principle of natural justice is not to be applicable in a case where there is no chance dispute of the factual aspects, reference in this regard may be made to the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Escorts Farms Ltd. Vs. Commissioner, Kumaon Division, Nainital, U.P. and Ors., reported in (2004) 4 SCC 281 , wherein it has been held at paragraph-64 which is being quoted herein below:- “64. Right of hearing to a necessary party is a valuable right. Denial of such right is serious breach of statutory procedure prescribed and violation of rules of natural justice. In these appeals preferred by the holder of land and some other transferees, we have found that the terms of government grant did not permit transfers of land without permission of the State as grantor. Remand of cases of a group of transferees who were not heard, would, therefore, be of no legal consequence, more so, when on this legal question all affected parties have got full opportunity of hearing before the High Court and in this appeal before this Court. Rules of natural justice are to be followed for doing substantial justice and not for completing a mere ritual of hearing without possibility of any change in the decision of the case on merits. In view of the legal position explained by us above, we therefore, refrain from remanding these cases in exercise of our discretionary powers under Article 136 of the Constitution of India”. 38. In the case of Dharampal Satyapal Ltd Vs. Deputy Commissioner of Central Excise, Gauhati and Ors., reported in (2015) 8 SCC 519 , wherein, their Lordships have held at paragraph-39 which is being quoted herein below:- “39. We are not concerned with these aspects in the present case as the issue relates to giving of notice before taking action. While emphasizing that the principles of natural justice cannot be applied in straight jacket formula, the aforesaid instances are given. We have highlighted the jurisprudential basis of adhering to the principles of natural justice which are grounded on the doctrine of procedural fairness, accuracy of outcome leading to general social goals, etc. While emphasizing that the principles of natural justice cannot be applied in straight jacket formula, the aforesaid instances are given. We have highlighted the jurisprudential basis of adhering to the principles of natural justice which are grounded on the doctrine of procedural fairness, accuracy of outcome leading to general social goals, etc. Nevertheless, there may be situations wherein for some reason perhaps because the evidence against the individual is thought to be utterly compelling-it is felt that a fair hearing “would make no difference”-meaning that a hearing would not change the ultimate conclusion reached by the decision-maker”. 39. This Court is now proceeding to examine the factual aspect in order to appreciate the argument that due to alleged ground of non-supply of the relevant documents and second show cause notice at all caused prejudice to the appellant. 40. There is no dispute about the settled position of law that in a departmental proceeding, effective opportunity is to given to the concerned delinquent employee. 41. We have considered the inquiry report as also the material available on record, wherefrom, it is evident that the appellant has participated in the inquiry proceeding, although, it has been claimed by the writ petitioner that the relevant documents have not been supplied. 42. Even accepting the said ground to be correct, then the question will be that if the document has not been supplied then why the appellant has not approached to the Court of law at the appropriate stage. 43. Herein, the appellant has participated in the inquiry proceeding as also given its reply. He has not denied the fact that why the recruitment process which was initiated in the year 1988-1989, even though, he was declared to be unsuccessful, then how, he has been declared to be successful in the year 1995, i.e., after lapse of about 6 years. 44. The appellant has also failed to satisfy by giving a satisfactory reply that under which provision of recruitment rules, the appellant has been appointed on humanitarian ground that to on the instruction of the higher authority of Patna, as would be evident from letter no.2766/P-2 dated 20.07.1994 which was referred in the appointment letter. 45. However, the justification has been tried to be given by making reference of the provision of Rules 663 of Police Manual. 46. 45. However, the justification has been tried to be given by making reference of the provision of Rules 663 of Police Manual. 46. We have considered the provision of Rule 663 of the Police Manual, wherefrom it is evident that the authority has been given power to grant relaxation, for ready reference, the provision of Rule 663 of the Jharkhand Police Manual is being referred as under:- “663. Selection of recruits. – (a) Strong, healthy young men between the ages of 19 and 27 years and who have passed secondary (i.e. Matriculation) examination shall be selected as recruits as far as possible. The standard of physical tests shall be same as given in Appendix 38, Clause 9 for Sub-Inspectors. For scheduled castes and tribes, the upper age – limit is up to 32 years and educational qualification can be reduced to middle pass if matriculates are not available. The standards of height and chest measurements are given below. These are the minima and Superintendents should endeavour to get men of higher standard: - (i) for general – height 163 centimetres and chest 80 centimetres. (ii) for scheduled caste and tribe – height 158 centimetres and chest 78 centimetres. Note. – In measuring the chest, the measuring tape must be applied evenly but not tightly, its upper edge touching the lower border of the shoulder blades, and its lower edge passing just above the nipples, the arms hanging by the sides. The standard is the minimum measurement, with the chest fully deflated. Just before the measurement is taken the candidate shall be made to count up to thirty, without taking breath and without hurrying. (iii) There is no physical standard for Gurkhas, who are residents of India and men of the best physique obtainable and at least literate shall be enlisted. N.B. – Nepalese subjects cannot be enlisted. (b) Recruits shall be measured by the reserve inspector in the Superintendent’s presence at the time of enlistment. (c) The Selection Board is not precluded from ‘selecting men over 27 years of age or, for special reasons, men beneath the standard of measurement, but it shall do so only on good grounds. Before enlistment the Deputy Inspector-General can give relaxation in height and chest by 2.5 cms. only. (c) The Selection Board is not precluded from ‘selecting men over 27 years of age or, for special reasons, men beneath the standard of measurement, but it shall do so only on good grounds. Before enlistment the Deputy Inspector-General can give relaxation in height and chest by 2.5 cms. only. (d) The recruitment shall be made twice a year in such a way that recruits are ready to go to Constables Training School before the start of the session. There shall be no necessity for training in district headquarters. The Superintendent shall publish notice of selection of candidates in newspapers giving the exact number of vacancies and also advertise through employment exchange. He shall endeavour that selection is completed and results are laid before the candidates the same day or on the following day so that they are not made to stay unnecessarily. No waiting list of candidates beyond the number advertised except for few extra men for possible unfitness in medical test is to be kept.” 47. There is no dispute from the position of law that the power to grant relaxation is one thing and influencing the process of selection is another thing. The power of relaxation does not include the decision of the higher authority for filling up the post on humanitarian ground. 48. The ‘relaxation’ always means that a condition is to be relied depending upon the condition, if provided under the rules of recruitment and the advertisement. Herein, nothing has been brought on record, save and except the provision of Rule 663 of the Jharkhand Police Manual that the appointment can also be made on humanitarian ground, rather, it has been tried to be impressed upon this Court that the said humanitarian ground may be construed to be relaxation in the eye of law by taking into consideration the provision of Rule 663 of the Police Manual. 49. But, we are not in agreement with such submission, since, the relaxation cannot be equated with the dictate of the higher authority for filling up of the post. 50. The implied meaning of ‘relaxation’ would be that a condition is to be relaxed for consideration of candidature and when the word ‘consideration’ has come, then it is the prerogative of the appointing authority to consider it in consonance with the law.. 51. 50. The implied meaning of ‘relaxation’ would be that a condition is to be relaxed for consideration of candidature and when the word ‘consideration’ has come, then it is the prerogative of the appointing authority to consider it in consonance with the law.. 51. Herein, it is not the case of consideration of relaxation, rather, as would appear from appointment letter, wherein, the reference of letter issued by the higher authority of Patna as contained in letter no.2766/P-2 dated 20.07.1994, has been referred, based upon which, the writ petitioner has been appointed by the order of the Superintendent of Police of the concerned district. 52. The public employment since is to be filled up by following the Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India so as to maintain the fairness and transparency in the recruitment process. Once the recruitment process begun, there is no business of the appointing authority to influence the Selection Board of the Committee. 53. Herein, it is a clear cut case of influence by the higher authority upon the lower authority for the purpose of appointment of the writ petitioner said to be made on humanitarian ground. 54. We have not been confronted with on behalf of the appellant on any law/rule/regulation that appointment can also be made on humanitarian ground. 55. We have also not come across any rule that the public post can be filled up on humanitarian ground, save and except, the appointment to be made on compassionate ground if the scheme does provide. 56. This Court, in the aforesaid background of the case, is of the view that even if the second show cause notice would have been given to the writ petitioner then the question would be that whether the appellant/writ petitioner was in position to rebut the allegation of getting appointment through back door entry and the dictate of the higher authority. 57. The said appointment, according to our considered view, is totally a back door entry in the teeth of Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. 58. Hence, applying the principle of empty formality and futile exercise taking into consideration the fact of the given case, we are of the view that merely because the second show cause notice has not been given, the decision taken by the disciplinary authority inflicting punishment of removal of service, cannot be said to suffer from an error. 58. Hence, applying the principle of empty formality and futile exercise taking into consideration the fact of the given case, we are of the view that merely because the second show cause notice has not been given, the decision taken by the disciplinary authority inflicting punishment of removal of service, cannot be said to suffer from an error. 59. We, after discussing the entire fact along with the legal position and coming to the order passed by the learned Single Judge, have found that thoughtful consideration has been given of the factual aspect coupled with the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad & Ors. (supra) and the implication of Article 311(2)(b) of the Constitution of India, which led the learned Single Judge to decline to interfere with the decision taken by the authority which was passed on conclusion of the departmental proceeding by issuance of order of punishment of removal of service. 60. Accordingly, we are of the view that the order passed by the learned Single Judge suffers from no illegality. 61. In the result, the instant appeal fails and is dismissed. 62. Pending Interlocutory Application(s), if any, stands disposed of.