JUDGMENT : Sandeep N. Bhatt, J. 1. Rule. The present petition is filed seeking for following the main reliefs: “(A) To admit this application; (B) To allow this application by issuing an appropriate writ, order or direction in nature of writ by quashing and setting aside the impugned FIR being C.R.No.11195016210589 of 2021 registered with Deesa North Police Station, Dist. Banaskantha, in the interest of justice; (C) Pending admission, and hearing final disposal of this application, grant stay as to further investigation into the impugned FIR being C.R.No. 11195016210589 of 2021 registered with Deesa North Police Station, Banaskantha, in the interest of justice;” 2. Brief facts as per the case of the petitioner in this petition are as such that an FIR came to be lodged before Deesa North Police station on 07.08.2021 being C.R.No.11195016210483 of 2021 for the alleged offences punishable under Sections 406, 420, 465, 467, 468 and 471 of the Indian Penal Code. The petitioner came to be arrested in conection with the offence on 09.08.2021 and since then he is behind the bars. The investigation is over and chargesheet is filed. Second FIR came to be filed for the same offence and same subject matter with same issue on 14.10.2021 by the witness of the earlier FIR before same police Station being C.R.No. 11195016210589 of 2021 for the offences punishable 406, 4.1. Mr. Pravin Gondaliya, the learned advocate for the applicant, has submitted that prima facie, the present FIR is nothing but a second FIR identical to the first FIR, filed by Karshanbhai Velaji Chaudhary – private party, who lodged the complaint on 7.8.2021. This complaint is registered under Sections 406, 420, 465, 467, 420, 465, 467, 468, 471, 167 and 120-B of the Indian Penal Code as also under Sections 13(1)(b) and 13(1)(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. As per the case of the petitioner in this petitioner that there can not be two FIRs for the same offence and therefore, second FIR is violative of Article 14 ,20 and 21 of the Constitution of India. misuse of process of law. Hence, the present petition is preferred. 3. Heard Mr. Pravin Gondaliya, the learned advocate for the applicant, Mr. Dhawan Jayswal, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor (APP) for the respondent No.1 – State. 468, and 471 of the Indian Penal Code. Mr. misuse of process of law. Hence, the present petition is preferred. 3. Heard Mr. Pravin Gondaliya, the learned advocate for the applicant, Mr. Dhawan Jayswal, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor (APP) for the respondent No.1 – State. 468, and 471 of the Indian Penal Code. Mr. Gondaliya has asserted that the accused person, namely Sagar Hareshbhai Banawala (the present petitioner), gained the complainant's confidence and prepared bogus challans and documents regarding sales tax (VAT), income tax returns, and income tax records of M/s Lal Petrolium. The same incident is reported to have occurred with Shri Sundheshree Petroleum for the period of 2015-21, as mentioned by a witness in the complaint. Similar incidents are also alleged with other witnesses, Ms. Man Petroleum and Ms. Dharnidhar Petroleum, regarding sales tax and income tax returns, leading to the filing of the complaint against the accused persons. 4.2. Furthermore, Mr. Gondaliya has highlighted that during the investigation of the initial complaint, the police recorded the statement of Bhartiben, daughter of Revabhai Khengarbhai Desai, on 29.9.2021, Assistant Commissioner Sales Tax Department, Unit No.35 at Deesa, Dist. Bansskantha, and provided details about similar incidents involving other individuals in her statement. He has drawn attention to another FIR filed by Bhartiben on 14.10.2021, where the Sections 406, 420, 465, 467, 468, 471, 167, and 120-B of the Indian Penal Code, read with Sections 13(1)(b) and 13(1)(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, are invoked. Mr. Gondaliya has argued that despite the addition of sections and accused in the second FIR, the narration of incidents remains the same, making the second FIR based on the same set of facts and circumstances as the first FIR. 4.3. Moreover, he has pointed out that such a second FIR is not maintainable in the eyes of the law, citing judgments from the Hon’ble Apex Court in cases of Amitbhai Anilchandra Shah versus Central Bureau of Investigation and Anr. (2013) 6 SCC 348 , Babubhai versus State of Gujarat (2010 AIR SCW 5126), and T.T. Anthony versus State of Kerala ( AIR 2001 SC 2637 ). Considering the settled position of the law and the fact that the second FIR was filed after about 2 and a half months after the first FIR, Mr. Gondaliya has submitted that filing such a proceeding pursuant to the second FIR would amount to an abuse of the process of law. Considering the settled position of the law and the fact that the second FIR was filed after about 2 and a half months after the first FIR, Mr. Gondaliya has submitted that filing such a proceeding pursuant to the second FIR would amount to an abuse of the process of law. Therefore, in view of the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Haryana V/s Bhajan Lal ( AIR 1992 SC 604 ), he has prayed to allow the present petition by quashing the proceedings, as such a second FIR cannot be entertained in the eyes of the law. 5.1. Per contra, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor (APP) for respondent No.1 – the State, has strongly opposed the submissions made by the learned advocate for the petitioner. He has submitted that, on a bare reading of the two FIRs, there is a substantial difference between the two. He has contended that charge- sheet has now been filed pursuant to the second FIR, and the investigation carried out in connection with the FIR filed on 19.4.2023, as well as Special (ACB) Case Nos.1 of 2022, 2 of 2022, 1 of 2023, and 2 of 2023, is registered before the Special Court pursuant to the said FIR. Therefore, he has argued that there is no bar to filing the FIR lodged by the sales tax officer on 14.10.2021 with Deesa North Police Station. Furthermore, considering the contents of the FIR, it is registered under Sections 406, 420, 465, 467, 468, 471, 167, and 120-B of the Indian Penal Code, read with Sections 13(1) (b) and 13(1)(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. He has contended that there are almost 35 accused persons named in that FIR, and there is systematic fraud involving the production of bogus receipts and challans related to sales tax transactions of 29 parties, resulting in an amount of Rs.5,98,29,882/-. In contrast, he has noted that the earlier FIR, allegedly filed by the private party, is limited to the offense regarding five persons, where only the present petitioner is named as an accused, and the allegation is the creation of bogus challans and documents for the purpose of filing income tax returns and sales tax returns by the accused. 5.2. In contrast, he has noted that the earlier FIR, allegedly filed by the private party, is limited to the offense regarding five persons, where only the present petitioner is named as an accused, and the allegation is the creation of bogus challans and documents for the purpose of filing income tax returns and sales tax returns by the accused. 5.2. Therefore, he has submitted that if the Court compares the ingredients of both the FIRs, it cannot be said that the FIRs arise from the same transaction, incident, or nature of evidence. He has relied on the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of P. Shreekumar versus State of Kerala reported in 2018 (4) SCC 579 , specifically pointing to paragraph 33 as relevant. Hence, he prays that considering the various other judgments of the Hon’ble Apex Court, which are not required to be considered at this stage, and considering the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. versus State of Maharashtra and Others reported in 2021 SCC OnLine SC 315, with particular emphasis on para 80, no case is made out to exercise the powers under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. Moreover, considering the fact that charge- sheet is now filed pursuant to the impugned FIR, which is the subject matter of the present petition, in view of the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Iqbal @ Bala and Others versus State of Uttar Pradesh reported in (2023) 8 SCC 734 , he has prayed that the present petition may be dismissed. 6.1. I have considered the rival submissions made at the bar by the respective parties. I have also perused the factual aspect of the matter, which is discussed as above. It is evident that the first FIR, filed by Karshanbhai Velaji Chaudhary – a private party on 7.8.2021, primarily accuses the present petitioner. The complainant alleges that the present petitioner prepared bogus challans for the sales tax (VAT). The process was purportedly carried out by the present petitioner, who gained the confidence of the complainant and four other petrol pump owners. When the complainant received a notice in the year 2021 from the Sales Tax Department regarding the non-payment of VAT for his petroleum pump in 2016-17 and 2017-18, he consulted advocate Kamleshbhai Heruwala. The process was purportedly carried out by the present petitioner, who gained the confidence of the complainant and four other petrol pump owners. When the complainant received a notice in the year 2021 from the Sales Tax Department regarding the non-payment of VAT for his petroleum pump in 2016-17 and 2017-18, he consulted advocate Kamleshbhai Heruwala. Kamleshbhai Heruwala informed him that the present petitioner, Sagar Hareshbhai Banawala, who prepared the challan, had sent it to his office but, in reality, the challan was never credited to the treasury office. Consequently, the impugned FIR was filed on 7.8.2023, at Deesa North Police Station, under Sections 406, 420, 465, 467, 468, and 471 of the Indian Penal Code. 6.2. On the other hand, the FIR challenged on the grounds of being a second FIR is filed by Bhartiben, daughter of Revabhai Khengarbhai Desai, the Assistant Commissioner Sales Tax Department, Unit No.35 at Deesa, Dist. Bansskantha on 29.9.2021. This FIR, dated 14.10.2021, implicates 35 persons, including the present petitioner, for offenses punishable under Sections 406, 420, 465, 467, 468, 471, 167, and 120-B of the Indian Penal Code, as well as Sections 13(1)(b) and 13(1)(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. The FIR indicates a large-scale fraud committed in the Sales Tax (VAT) Department, involving certain officials of the VAT Department and individuals like the present petitioner serving as consultants or accountants. The alleged fraud results in a substantial loss of VAT amounting to Rs.5,98,29,882/- across 29 accounts. Primarily, considering the averments and the nature of this FIR registered by the Assistant Commissioner Sales Tax Department in October 2021, it cannot be deemed a second FIR based on the judgment cited by the petitioner. 6.3. Further, considering of the judgment referred by the petitioner, specifically para 32, reveals that it may not be prima facie helpful to the present petitioner. The judgments in T.T. Anthony (supra) and Amitbhai Anilchandra Shah (supra), relied upon by the petitioner, are not directly relevant to the facts and circumstances of the current case. These judgments assert that there cannot be two FIRs related to the same offense or occurrence, and the registration of a fresh FIR under such circumstances is impermissible and violative of Article 21 of the Constitution of India. 6.4. These judgments assert that there cannot be two FIRs related to the same offense or occurrence, and the registration of a fresh FIR under such circumstances is impermissible and violative of Article 21 of the Constitution of India. 6.4. Subsequent to the judgment in the case of Amitbhai Anilchandra Shah (supra), the Hon’ble Apex Court has addressed the issue of the sameness of FIRs in various judgments. Relevant to the present case is the judgment cited by the learned Additional Public Prosecutor (APP) in the case of P. Shreekumar (supra), especially paragraph 33. It is crucial to consider this judgment in determining the legality of the second FIR. Para 33 of that judgment as under: “33) It is for the reasons that firstly, the second FIR was not filed by the same person, who had filed the first FIR. Had it been so, then the situation would have been somewhat different. Such was not the case here; Second, it was filed by the appellant as a counter-complaint against respondent No.3; Third, the first FIR was against five persons based on one set of allegations whereas the second FIR was based on the allegations different from the allegations made in the first FIR; and Lastly, the High Court while quashing the second FIR/charge-sheet did not examine the issue arising in the case in the light of law laid down by this Court in two aforementioned decisions of this Court in the cases of Upkar Singh (supra) and Surender Kaushik (supra) and simply referred three decisions of this Court mentioned above wherein this Court has laid down general principle of law relating to exercise of inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code.” 6.5. Considering this judgment, it is evident that its applicability is clear in the context of the present case, where two different individuals have filed separate FIRs. While some facts may be identical, there are numerous transactions involved in the impugned FIR. Multiple individuals are implicated, and various offenses are alleged, extending beyond those mentioned in the earlier FIR. In light of this, it is pertinent to refer to the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Vasrhaben Kantilal Purani versus State of Gujarat and Others reported in (2019) 11 SCC 774 . The test of sameness, as articulated in paragraphs 4 and 5 of that judgment, is crucial to consider, as under: “4. In light of this, it is pertinent to refer to the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Vasrhaben Kantilal Purani versus State of Gujarat and Others reported in (2019) 11 SCC 774 . The test of sameness, as articulated in paragraphs 4 and 5 of that judgment, is crucial to consider, as under: “4. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and in the facts and circumstances of the case as also the law laid down by this Court, we are of the opinion that the High Court ought not to have exercised its inherent powers to quash the proceedings arising out of the second FIR as the investigation is at nascent stage and it will hamper the investigation in the case. Learned counsel for the appellant has rightly placed reliance on the judgments of this Court in Ram Lal Narang v. State (Delhi Administration), reported in (1979) 2 SCC 322 , and Nirmal Singh Kahlon vs. State of Punjab, reported in (2009) 1 SCC 441 , wherein this Court has observed that IInd FIR/subsequent FIR is permissible where the conspiracy discovered later is found to cover a much larger canvas with broader ramifications and it cannot be equated with the earlier conspiracy which covered a smaller field of narrower dimensions. 5. In the present case the IInd FIR/subsequent FIR was lodged on a complaint made by the same complainant on account of occurrence of a separate incident after a gap of 2½ years of the first complaint in regard to completely different set of allegations and against different set of accused, though including the only accused of first complaint as well. In our opinion, the High Court has erred in quashing the proceedings arising out of the subsequent FIR filed by the appellant by applying the principle of "sameness" and proceeding on the basis that the subsequent FIR lodged by the appellant was in fact a IInd FIR.” 6.6. In our opinion, the High Court has erred in quashing the proceedings arising out of the subsequent FIR filed by the appellant by applying the principle of "sameness" and proceeding on the basis that the subsequent FIR lodged by the appellant was in fact a IInd FIR.” 6.6. It is also relevant to refer the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Chirag M. Pathk & Others versus Dollyben Kantilal & Others rendered in Criminal Appeal Nos.1947-1956 of 2017 (arising out of SLP (Cri.) Nos.1218-1227 of 2014) dated 15.11.2017, more specifically, paragraph 21 to 30 are relevant, as under: “21) In short, having regard to the totality of the factual allegations made for constituting the commission of several offences in relation to every Co-Operative Society, it is not possible to hold that all the FIRs are overlapping on one another and that first FIR alone will be sufficient to take care of the remaining five FIRs. 22) There may be some overlapping allegations in the FIRs but that is due to myriad reasons and one reason could be that all the Co-operative Societies were engaged in the same business of sale/purchase of housing and the plots of land which were sold to different persons in different areas by same accused persons due to their involvement in the affairs of all Co-Operative Societies. However, these facts were not by themselves sufficient to quash the five FIRs at the stage of investigation itself. 23) In our view, such issues and many more, namely, the nature and manner of conspiracy, whether it was confined to each Society or there was one or larger conspiracy, how and in what manner it was accomplished, who were parties to it, who were those persons who secured financial benefits, what was the modus operandi for mis-appropriation of the funds of each Society and how the funds were siphoned off from each Society etc., need detailed investigation with respect to each Cooperative Society. Once the investigation is complete in relation to each Society, the same would form part of the separate charge-sheet for being proved with the aid of evidence in a competent Court against each Society and persons involved in the scam. It is for the Court to examine the factual issues arising in every case by appreciating the evidence once adduced in support thereof and pass appropriate orders in accordance with law. It is for the Court to examine the factual issues arising in every case by appreciating the evidence once adduced in support thereof and pass appropriate orders in accordance with law. 24) The High Court, in exercise of its powers under Section 482 of the Code, cannot undertake a detailed examination of the facts contained in the FIRs by acting as an Appellate Court and draws its own conclusion. It is more so when investigation in other Societies is not yet complete. 25) In our considered opinion, it is only when on reading the FIR, a sheer absurdity in the allegations is noticed and when no prima facie cognizable case is made out on its mere reading due to absurdity in the allegations or when facts disclose prima facie cognizable case and also disclose remarkable identity between the two FIRs as if the first FIR is filed second time with no change in allegations then the Court may, in appropriate case, consider it proper to quash the second FIR. Such is not the case here. 26) Indeed, in our view, few distinguishing factual allegations mentioned above are enough to repel the challenge made by the accused persons to the impugned FIRs and the same should have been made basis to dismiss the Criminal Applications of the accused persons. 27) We may, at this stage, apposite to mention a Three Judge Bench decision of this Court in State of West Bengal & Ors. vs. Swapan Kumar Guha & Ors. ( AIR 1982 SC 949 ) wherein this Court examined somewhat a similar question in the context of the powers of the Court. 28) The learned Chief Justice, Y.V Chandrachud and Justice A.N. Sen, speaking for the Bench in their concurring opinion held as under: “Whether an offence has been disclosed or not must necessarily depend on the facts and circumstances of each particular case. If on a consideration of the relevant materials, the Court is satisfied that an offence is disclosed, the Court will normally not interfere with the investigation into the offence and will generally allow the investigation in the offence to be completed for collecting materials for proving the offence. The condition precedent to the commencement of investigation under S.157 of the Code is that the F.I.R. must disclose, prima facie, that a cognizable offence has been committed. The condition precedent to the commencement of investigation under S.157 of the Code is that the F.I.R. must disclose, prima facie, that a cognizable offence has been committed. It is wrong to suppose that the police have an unfettered discretion to commence investigation under S.157 of the Code. Their right of inquiry is conditioned by the existence of reason to suspect the commission of a cognizable offence and they cannot, reasonably, have reason so to suspect unless the F.I.R., prima facie, discloses the commission of such offence. If that condition is satisfied, the investigation must go on. The Court has then no power to stop the investigation, for to do so would be to trench upon the lawful power of the police to investigate into cognizable offences.” 29) We apply the aforesaid principle which, in our opinion, applies to the facts of the case on hand and accordingly decline to quash the impugned FIRs. 30) Learned counsel for the respondents (accused) however, vehemently tried to support the impugned judgment and took us through the entire factual allegations of all six FIRs. It was his submission that on perusal of the impugned FIRs, there does exist overlapping of the offences in the FIRs on identical allegations with no change in any of the six FIRs except repetition of the words and hence the High Court was right in quashing the five FIRs.” 6.7. Therefore, considering the fact that although the incident to some extent involved in the first FIR is also covered in the second FIR, the second FIR additionally reveals a conspiracy between the accused persons named in the later FIR. Hence, it cannot be concluded that the impugned FIR is in violation of the provisions of Article 21 of the Constitution. On the contrary, considering the allegations, the accused persons involved, and the complainant, there exists a significant difference between the two FIRs. This distinction cannot be overlooked by exercising the powers under Section 482. Consequently, the present petition is required to be dismissed. 6.8. There is another ground for dismissing the present petition, which pertains to the completion of a thorough investigation and the filing of a charge-sheet. The investigation has resulted in the culmination of Special (ACB) Case Nos. 1 of 2022, 2 of 2022, 1 of 2023, and 2 of 2023 pursuant to the said FIR. Currently, the hearing process is also underway. The investigation has resulted in the culmination of Special (ACB) Case Nos. 1 of 2022, 2 of 2022, 1 of 2023, and 2 of 2023 pursuant to the said FIR. Currently, the hearing process is also underway. In light of the decision in the case of Iqbal @ Bala and Others (supra), particularly paragraphs 7, 9, and 10 are relevant, as under: “7. It is relevant to note that the victim has not furnished any information in regard to the date and time of the commission of the alleged offence. At the same time, we also take notice of the fact that the investigation has been completed and charge sheet is ready to be filed. Although the allegations levelled in the FIR do not inspire any confidence more particularly in the absence of any specific date, time, etc. of the alleged offences, yet we are of the view that the appellants should prefer discharge application before the Trial Court under Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) . We say so because even according to the State, the investigation is over and charge sheet is ready to be filed before the competent court. In such circumstances, the Trial Court should be allowed to look into the materials which the investigation officer might have collected forming part of the charge sheet. If any such discharge application is filed, the Trial Court shall look into the materials and take a call whether any case for discharge is made out or not. 9. At this stage, we would like to observe something important. Whenever an accused comes before the Court invoking either the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) or extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution to get the FIR or the criminal proceedings quashed essentially on the ground that such proceedings are manifestly frivolous or vexatious or instituted with the ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance, then in such circumstances the Court owes a duty to look into the FIR with care and a little more closely. 10. We say so because once the complainant decides to proceed against the accused with an ulterior motive for wreaking personal vengeance, etc., then he would ensure that the FIR/complaint is very well drafted with all the necessary pleadings. 10. We say so because once the complainant decides to proceed against the accused with an ulterior motive for wreaking personal vengeance, etc., then he would ensure that the FIR/complaint is very well drafted with all the necessary pleadings. The complainant would ensure that the averments made in the FIR/complaint are such that they disclose the necessary ingredients to constitute the alleged offence are disclosed or not.” 6.9. In light of the aforementioned position of the law and considering the fact that the impugned FIR has now culminated into a charge-sheet and is currently proceeding by way of registering a Special (ACB) Case before the competent court, with ongoing proceedings, I am of the opinion that no grounds are made out to interfere with the impugned FIR. As discussed earlier, it cannot be asserted that there is sameness of FIRs, and both FIRs necessitate separate investigation and trials. Accordingly, allowing the legal processes to continue independently aligns with the interest of justice. 6.10. Further, in the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. versus State of Maharashtra and Others reported in 2021 SCC OnLine SC 315, and more particularly para 80 is relevant, which is as under: “80. Accordingly, allowing the legal processes to continue independently aligns with the interest of justice. 6.10. Further, in the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. versus State of Maharashtra and Others reported in 2021 SCC OnLine SC 315, and more particularly para 80 is relevant, which is as under: “80. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, our final conclusions on the principal/core issue, whether the High Court would be justified in passing an interim order of stay of investigation and/ or “no coercive steps to be adopted”, during the pendency of the quashing petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and in what circumstances and whether the High Court would be justified in passing the order of not to arrest the accused or “no coercive steps to be adopted” during the investigation or till the final report/chargesheet is filed under Section 173 Cr.P.C., while dismissing/disposing of/not entertaining/not quashing the criminal proceedings/complaint/FIR in exercise of powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, our final conclusions are as under: i) Police has the statutory right and duty under the relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure contained in Chapter XIV of the Code to investigate into a cognizable offence; ii) Courts would not thwart any investigation into the cognizable offences; iii) It is only in cases where no cognizable offence or offence of any kind is disclosed in the first information report that the Court will not permit an investigation to go on; iv) The power of quashing should be exercised sparingly with circumspection, as it has been observed, in the ‘rarest of rare cases (not to be confused with the formation in the context of death penalty). v) While examining an FIR/complaint, quashing of which is sought, the court cannot embark upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR/complaint; vi) Criminal proceedings ought not to be scuttled at the initial stage; vii) Quashing of a complaint/FIR should be an exception rather than an ordinary rule; viii) Ordinarily, the courts are barred from usurping the jurisdiction of the police, since the two organs of the State operate in two specific spheres of activities and one ought not to tread over the other sphere; ix) The functions of the judiciary and the police are complementary, not overlapping; x) Save in exceptional cases where non-interference would result in miscarriage of justice, the Court and the judicial process should not interfere at the stage of investigation of offences; xi) Extraordinary and inherent powers of the Court do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the Court to act according to its whims or caprice; xii) The first information report is not an encyclopaedia which must disclose all facts and details relating to the offence reported. Therefore, when the investigation by the police is in progress, the court should not go into the merits of the allegations in the FIR. Police must be permitted to complete the investigation. It would be premature to pronounce the conclusion based on hazy facts that the complaint/FIR does not deserve to be investigated or that it amounts to abuse of process of law. After investigation, if the investigating officer finds that there is no substance in the application made by the complainant, the investigating officer may file an appropriate report/summary before the learned Magistrate which may be considered by the learned Magistrate in accordance with the known procedure; xiii) The power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is very wide, but conferment of wide power requires the court to be more cautious. It casts an onerous and more diligent duty on the court; xiv) However, at the same time, the court, if it thinks fit, regard being had to the parameters of quashing and the self-restraint imposed by law, more particularly the parameters laid down by this Court in the cases of R.P. Kapur (supra) and Bhajan Lal (supra), has the jurisdiction to quash the FIR/complaint; xv) When a prayer for quashing the FIR is made by the alleged accused and the court when it exercises the power under Section 482 Cr.P.C., only has to consider whether the allegations in the FIR disclose commission of a cognizable offence or not. The court is not required to consider on merits whether or not the merits of the allegations make out a cognizable offence and the court has to permit the investigating agency/police to investigate the allegations in the FIR; xvi) The aforesaid parameters would be applicable and/or the aforesaid aspects are required to be considered by the High Court while passing an interim order in a quashing petition in exercise of powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. However, an interim order of stay of investigation during the pendency of the quashing petition can be passed with circumspection. Such an interim order should not require to be passed routinely, casually and/or mechanically. Normally, when the investigation is in progress and the facts are hazy and the entire evidence/material is not before the High Court, the High Court should restrain itself from passing the interim order of not to arrest or “no coercive steps to be adopted” and the accused should be relegated to apply for anticipatory bail under Section 438 Cr.P.C. before the competent court. The High Court shall not and as such is not justified in passing the order of not to arrest and/or “no coercive steps” either during the investigation or till the investigation is completed and/or till the final report/chargesheet is filed under Section 173 Cr.P.C., while dismissing/disposing of the quashing petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. xvii) Even in a case where the High Court is prima facie of the opinion that an exceptional case is made out for grant of interim stay of further investigation, after considering the broad parameters while exercising the powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India referred to hereinabove, the High Court has to give brief reasons why such an interim order is warranted and/or is required to be passed so that it can demonstrate the application of mind by the Court and the higher forum can consider what was weighed with the High Court while passing such an interim order. xviii) Whenever an interim order is passed by the High Court of “no coercive steps to be adopted” within the aforesaid parameters, the High Court must clarify what does it mean by “no coercive steps to be adopted” as the term “no coercive steps to be adopted” can be said to be too vague and/or broad which can be misunderstood and/or misapplied.” 6.11. I am of the opinion that no case is made out to exercise the powers under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 by quashing the impugned FIR filed. 7. As a result, the present petition is dismissed with no order as to costs. Rules stands discharged.