JUDGMENT : Anubha Rawat Choudhary, J. 1. This appeal has been filed against the judgment dated 18th December 2020 passed in W.P(L) No.2121 of 2008 whereby the Notification dated 21st June 2007 referring the dispute in connection with the dismissal of the appellant-workman for adjudication to the Labour Court at Jamshedpur has been quashed. The learned writ Court has held that the reference was made at a belated stage without a justifiable explanation for the delay and, accordingly, the Government had no jurisdiction or power to make reference of a non-existing dispute for adjudication. 2. Admittedly, the appellant-workman (hereinafter referred to as the workman) was dismissed from the employment of the writ petitioner Management (hereinafter referred to as the Management) vide order dated 25.01.1996. Vide Notification of Reference dated 21st June 2007 the following dispute was referred for adjudication: “Whether the dismissal of the workman Sri A.K. Sharma, Ex.P. No.100218 by the management of M/s Tisco Ltd. (Now Tata Steel Ltd.), Jamshedpur is justified? If not, then what relief he is entitled to?” Argument of the Workman 3. The learned counsel for the workman has submitted that the learned writ Court has failed to consider that there were no latches on the part of the workman in raising the industrial dispute and the delay was well explained. He also submits that the industrial dispute existed and it was neither dead nor stale. 4. He submits that in all eight criminal cases instituted against the workman by the Management on the same and similar charges as involved in eleven disciplinary proceedings, the workman was honorably acquitted in all the criminal cases and the last such acquittal was in the year 2001. Immediately thereafter, the workman raised an industrial dispute which took some time on the part of the State to make reference. The learned counsel has relied upon the judgments passed in “Sapan Kumar Pandit v. U.P State Electricity Board & Ors.” (2001) 6 SCC 222 and “Raghubir Singh v. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar” (2014) 10 SCC 301 . Argument of the Management 5. The learned counsel has relied upon the judgments passed in “Sapan Kumar Pandit v. U.P State Electricity Board & Ors.” (2001) 6 SCC 222 and “Raghubir Singh v. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar” (2014) 10 SCC 301 . Argument of the Management 5. On the other hand, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Management has submitted that the criminal cases have nothing to do with the matter of disciplinary proceedings and it has been rightly observed by the learned writ Court that the plea of the workman that he could approach only after acquittal in the criminal cases was not acceptable as mere acquittal in criminal cases does not give a right to the workman to be reinstated in the service. The departmental proceedings and the criminal proceedings are based and decided on different parameters. The Management has relied upon the judgments passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in “Nedungadi Bank Ltd. v. K.P. Madhavankutty & Ors.” (2000) 2 SCC 455 and in “Prabhakar v. Joint Director, Sericulture Department & Anr.” (2015) 15 SCC 1 . Findings of this Court 6. The foundational facts are as follows: a. The Appellant joined the Management as back as in the year 1974 and was made permanent on 1st January 1979. b. In the year 1993 eight criminal cases were filed against the workman by the Management. c. In the year 1994 as many as eleven chargesheets were issued against the workman and departmental proceeding was initiated. d. The workman was acquitted in all the criminal cases and the last acquittal was on 30th June 2001. e. During the pendency of the criminal cases, the workman was issued a letter dated 16th January 1996 along with a copy of the inquiry report in connection with the charges and was granted 7 days’ time to respond as to why the workman be not discharged from service. On 22nd January 1996, the workman filed his objection denying all the allegations and alleged victimization and false implication in the criminal cases and mentioned that the criminal cases were pending in the Courts. He also alleged violation of the principles of natural justice and fair play. On 25th January 1996, the workman was discharged from service with immediate effect and was asked to contact the office for his settlement. He also alleged violation of the principles of natural justice and fair play. On 25th January 1996, the workman was discharged from service with immediate effect and was asked to contact the office for his settlement. The order of discharge is quoted as under: - “Shri A.K Sharma P.No. 100218 Khalasy, B.F. Shop BFS/25/96 Dated 25th Jan.1996 Sub.: Discharge from service Ref.: GSL/284/96, dated 25.1.1996 This has reference to our letter No.BFS/12/96, dated 16.1.1996, wherein it was proposed to discharge you from the service of the Steel Company. We have received your representation dated 11-1-1996 against the proposed discharge and find no new points warranting reconsideration of the proposed punishment. We, therefore, discharge you from the service of the Steel Co. with immediate effect. You are advised to contact the office of the G.M.(F&A) on any working day for your settlement. Sd/- Divisional Manager Bar Forge Shop" f. After the last judgment of acquittal in the criminal case on 30th January 2001, the workman on 11th September 2003, filed an application before the Management seeking his reinstatement primarily on the ground of his acquittal in all the criminal cases lodged by the Management alleging that the allegations made against him were baseless and motivated. A copy of the letter was marked to the Deputy Labour Commissioner and Conciliation Officer, Jamshedpur, and received by the said authority on 11th December 2003. g. The Management responded as under: - “This has reference to your Notice No.1050 dated 22.3.04 and subsequent discussions held on the subject in your Office. We wish to make the following comments in the said matter: 1. Sri AK Sharma was discharged from the Company's service on 25.1.96. He has preferred to raise this matter before you after about eight years and hence this representation is not maintainable under law on account of being stale. 2. Sri AK Sharma was employed as Khalasy in the Bar Forge Shop of the Company. Sri AK Sharma was discharged from the Company's service on 25.1.96 for a serious act of misconduct after conducting a domestic enquiry wherein he had fully participated in accordance with the principles of natural justice and the charges against him were proved. The charges being serious in nature he was discharged from the Company' service. Therefore his discharge is fully justified. 3. The charges being serious in nature he was discharged from the Company' service. Therefore his discharge is fully justified. 3. It is now well settled that domestic enquiry and criminal proceedings stand on different footings and can be held simultaneously and mere acquittal of an employee in criminal proceedings will not debar the employer to initiate disciplinary proceedings against him. 4. In view of the above you will appreciate that Sri Sharma does not have a case and the matter may be dropped at your end having no merit. Thanking you Yours faithfully Sd/- (RS Ambastha) Manager HR IR Legal h. The conciliation failed and the dispute was referred for adjudication by the Labour Court, Jamshedpur vide notification dated 21st June 2007 after duly recording that an industrial dispute exists between the parties. 7. The order of reference was challenged in the writ proceedings on the sole ground that the dispute was hopelessly stale and accordingly the reference was not maintainable. 8. Before the learned writ Court, it was argued by the Management that the workman was dismissed from service on 25th January 1996 after conducting a fair and proper domestic inquiry for serious acts of misconduct, misappropriation of the Company’s materials, property, and by producing forged documents, etc. The workman fully participated in the inquiry proceedings and after following principles of natural justice, he was held guilty of 11 charges and was discharged from the service vide order dated 25th January 1996. Against the said order of the discharge, the workman raised the dispute only on 11th December 2003 i.e. after about 8 years. 9. On the other hand, the case of the appellant-workman before the learned writ Court was that the workman had joined the service of the Management on 1st January 1974 and made permanent on 1st January 1979. There was no complaint from any quarter and he was working with honesty, sincerity, and devotion. However, one P.R Das, the then Divisional Manager of the Management, acting on behalf of the Management, instituted various criminal cases against the workman, and simultaneously the workman was served with various chargesheets on the same set of allegations. The further case was that the inquiry officer submitted a table report was submitted holding the workman guilty of all charges without taking into account the relevant evidence and without considering that similar allegations were leveled in the criminal cases. The further case was that the inquiry officer submitted a table report was submitted holding the workman guilty of all charges without taking into account the relevant evidence and without considering that similar allegations were leveled in the criminal cases. This was done at the behest of the Management. His further case was that without appreciating the facts involved in the case, the then Divisional Manager proposed to discharge the workman from the service and allowed him seven days’ time to make representation, if any. The workman submitted a written reply and explanation denying all the charges and prayed to exonerate him from the charges as the same was not proved. It was alleged that in order to favour the Management, the workman was discharged from service by the order of the then Divisional Manager dated 25th January 1996. 10. It was alleged by the workman that the inquiry was not fair and proper; the allegations in the departmental inquiry and the criminal cases were similar and identical; the workman represented before the Management that in all criminal cases the Management has failed to produce any evidence and all the charges were found to be false and fictitious and the workman was honorably acquitted of all the criminal cases filed by the Management and the last such acquittal was on 30th January 2001. It was argued that the workman waited for his acquittal from all criminal cases and thereafter raised an industrial dispute demanding the quashing of the discharge order dated 25th January 1996. 11. With respect to delay, it was submitted on behalf of the workman before the learned writ Court that the workman was waiting for the final outcome of the criminal cases in which he has been honorably acquitted on the same and similar charges on which the Management had dismissed him from service. It was also argued that the law does not prescribe any time limit for the appropriate Government to exercise its powers under section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act for referring the dispute for adjudication by the Labour Court. It was asserted that the dispute was not at all stale and immediately after acquittal from all the criminal cases the appellant had filed an application before the Government of Bihar which remained pending for consideration after considering the entire facts a reference was made which did not call for any interference. It was asserted that the dispute was not at all stale and immediately after acquittal from all the criminal cases the appellant had filed an application before the Government of Bihar which remained pending for consideration after considering the entire facts a reference was made which did not call for any interference. It was also argued that the decision of the appropriate Government cannot be substituted by any other authority and is not subject to judicial review. 12. The findings of the learned writ Court in paragraph nos.6 and 13 to 15 are quoted as under: - “6. Be that as it may, having considered the rival submission of the parties across the bar and after examination of documents brought on record, this Court is of the view that admittedly there was unreasonable delay which was unexplained. The dispute was raised after eight years of discharge and three years from the date of acquittal. So far as delay in seeking reference under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act is concerned no formula of universal application can be laid down. It would depend on the facts and circumstances of each individual case. In the instant case, the explanation given by the respondent-workman that as the departmental proceeding was pending, he could approach only after acquittal in the criminal case and as such there cannot be said to be unreasonable delay Nothing has been placed on record to show that the industrial dispute was raised within a reasonable time or the workman was not responsible for the delayed decision. 13. This Court may hasten to clarify that in those cases where the court finds that dispute still existed, though raised belatedly, it is always permissible for the court to take the aspect of delay into consideration and mould the relief. In such cases, it is still open for the court to either grant reinstatement without back wages or lesser back wages or grant compensation instead of reinstatement. This Court is of the opinion that the law on this issue has to be applied in the aforesaid perspective in such matters. To summarise, although there is no limitation prescribed under the Act for making a reference under Section 10(1) of the ID Act, yet it is for the “appropriate Government” to consider whether it is expedient or not to make the reference. To summarise, although there is no limitation prescribed under the Act for making a reference under Section 10(1) of the ID Act, yet it is for the “appropriate Government” to consider whether it is expedient or not to make the reference. The words “at any time” used in Section 10(1) do not admit of any limitation in making an order of reference and laws of limitation are not applicable to proceedings under the ID Act. However, the policy of industrial adjudication is that very stale claims should not be generally encouraged or allowed inasmuch as unless there is satisfactory explanation for delay as, apart from the obvious risk to industrial peace from the entertainment of claims after long lapse of time, it is necessary also to take into account the unsettling effect which is likely to have on the employers' financial arrangement and to avoid dislocation of an industry. 14. On the application of the aforesaid principle to the facts of the present case, this Court is of the view that the reference at such a belated stage without any justifiable explanation for delay, the appropriate Government had no jurisdiction or power to make reference of a non-existing dispute. 15. In view of discussions rendered hereinabove, the plea of the respondent-workman that he could approach only after acquittal in criminal case, is also not acceptable as merely acquittal in a criminal case does not give a right to the workman to be reinstated in service as both the departmental proceedings as well as criminal proceedings are based on different parameters. Said plea of the learned counsel for the respondent is not at all acceptable to this Court as it does not weigh in the eyes of law.” 13. The date of discharge of the workman was 25th January 1996; date of acquittal in the last criminal case was 30th January 2001; date of raising the claim for reinstatement with the Management was on 11th September 2003; date of raising industrial dispute 11th December 2003 and the date of reference is 21st June 2007. However, what is to be essentially examined is whether the dispute was an existing industrial dispute or it was a stale dispute. 14. The learned writ Court has rightly observed that so far as delay in seeking reference under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act is concerned no formula of universal application can be laid down. However, what is to be essentially examined is whether the dispute was an existing industrial dispute or it was a stale dispute. 14. The learned writ Court has rightly observed that so far as delay in seeking reference under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act is concerned no formula of universal application can be laid down. It would depend on the facts and circumstances of each individual case. The learned writ Court has rightly clarified that in those cases where the Court finds that dispute still existed, though raised belatedly, it is always permissible for the Court to take the aspect of delay into consideration and mould the relief. In such cases, it is still open for the Court to either grant reinstatement without back wages or lesser back wages or grant compensation instead of reinstatement. 15. However, the learned writ Court rejected the explanation given by the workman that he could approach only after acquittal in the criminal case by recording that nothing has been placed on record to show that the industrial dispute was raised within a reasonable time or the workman was not responsible for the delayed decision. The learned writ Court held that the reference was at a belated stage without any justifiable explanation for the delay and quashed the order of reference by holding that the appropriate Government had no jurisdiction or power to make the reference of a nonexisting dispute. Thus, the dispute was held to be non-existent only on account of non-acceptable reasons for the delay in raising the dispute. 16. In the judgment in “Nedungadi Bank Ltd.” (supra) the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the power of reference under section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act should be exercised reasonably and in a rational manner and not in a mechanical fashion and that in spite of absence of statutory limitation period such power cannot be exercised to revive settled matters or to refer stale disputes. It has also been held that whether a dispute is live or becomes stale when the workman approaches the appropriate Government is an aspect which would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. 17. It has also been held that whether a dispute is live or becomes stale when the workman approaches the appropriate Government is an aspect which would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. 17. In “Nedungadi Bank Ltd.” (supra) the workman was dismissed from service after conducting the disciplinary proceedings which was upheld in appeal and the benefits legally due to him were also paid but after 7 years the workman raised an industrial dispute solely on the ground that other two employees who were dismissed in a similar situation were reinstated. The Hon’ble Supreme Court was of the view that the reference of the said dispute was bad on the grounds of delay, non-existence of an industrial dispute, and the circumstances under which the other two employees were dismissed and reinstated were not specified. The Hon’ble Supreme Court while considering the scope of writ jurisdiction in the matter of challenge to order of reference passed under section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act has held that the scope of judicial review is limited. It has been held that the order of reference is an administrative order and an administrative order that does not take into consideration statutory requirements or travels outside is certainly subject to judicial review and, therefore, the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India can exercise its powers to consider the question of very jurisdiction of the Labour Court. In “Nedungadi Bank Ltd.” (supra) the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under: “8. It was submitted by the respondent that once a reference has been made under Section 10 of the Act a Labour Court has to decide the same and the High Court in writ jurisdiction cannot interfere in the proceedings of the Labour Court. That is not a correct proposition to state. An administrative order which does not take into consideration statutory requirements or travels outside that is certainly subject to judicial review, limited though it might be. The High Court can exercise its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution to consider the question of the very jurisdiction of the Labour Court. In National Engg. Industries Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan this Court observed: (SCC p. 393, para 24) “24. The High Court can exercise its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution to consider the question of the very jurisdiction of the Labour Court. In National Engg. Industries Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan this Court observed: (SCC p. 393, para 24) “24. It will be thus seen that High Court has jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition when there is an allegation that there is no industrial dispute and none apprehended which could be the subject-matter of reference for adjudication to the Industrial Tribunal under Section 10 of the Act. Here it is a question of jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal, which could be examined by the High Court in its writ jurisdiction. It is the existence of the Industrial Tribunal (sic dispute) which would clothe the appropriate Government with the power to make the reference and the Industrial Tribunal to adjudicate it. If there is no industrial dispute in existence or apprehended the appropriate Government lacks power to make any reference.” 18. In the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in “Prabhakar” (supra) it has been held that power to refer a dispute for adjudication under section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is an administrative function; adequacy or sufficiency of material on which opinion is formed to refer a dispute for adjudication under section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is beyond the scope of judicial review. It has also been held that reference power being an administrative function, order of reference is open to judicial review if it is shown that the appropriate Government had no material before it or had not applied its mind or had not taken into consideration certain vital facts which it ought to have taken. In the said case the service of the appellant was terminated on 1st April 1985 and till the year 1999, the workman did not approach any judicial/quasi-judicial authority challenging his termination and only approached the appropriate Government in the year 1999 alleging violation of section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act,1947 and the matter was referred to the Labour Court by the appropriate Government. The Labour Court found the termination invalid and ordered reinstatement but denied the back wages. The Labour Court found the termination invalid and ordered reinstatement but denied the back wages. The Hon’ble Supreme Court recorded that for a period of 14 years, no grievance was made by the workman qua his alleged termination and rejected the plea of the workman that he had approached the Management time and again and was given assurance that he would be taken back in service as the same was not substantiated by any material on record and decided the case against the workman. The principle of law dealing with delay in seeking reference of industrial dispute for adjudication has been considered in the judgment in “Prabhakar” (supra) in which at paragraph nos.11,12,13,14,15 and 17, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed as under: “11. In Western India Match Co. Ltd. v. Workers’ Union, this Court took support of C.P. Sarathy case to hold that function of the appropriate Government to make reference under Section 10(1) is an administrative function. This view that the appropriate Government is performing an administrative act and not judicial or quasi-judicial act while making reference is found in various judicial pronouncements made by this Court even thereafter. 12. The satisfaction of the existence of an industrial dispute or the satisfaction that an industrial dispute is apprehended is “a condition precedent to the order of reference”. An order of reference cannot be made mechanically without forming an opinion. For formation of the necessary opinion, the “appropriate Government” must also be satisfied that a person whose dispute is being referred for adjudication is a “workman”. If the dispute is not between an employer and his workman, it is not an “industrial dispute” and the Government can justifiably refuse to refer the dispute. From the material placed before it, the Government reaches an administrative decision whether there exists an existing or apprehended industrial dispute. In either event, it can exercise the power under this Section. 13. The adequacy or the sufficiency of the material on which the opinion was formed is beyond the pale of judicial scrutiny. If the action of the Government in making the reference is impugned by a party, it would be open to such a party to show that what was referred to was not an industrial dispute and that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to make the award. If the action of the Government in making the reference is impugned by a party, it would be open to such a party to show that what was referred to was not an industrial dispute and that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to make the award. But if the dispute was an industrial dispute, its factual existence and the expediency of making a reference in the circumstances of a particular case are matters entirely for the Government to decide upon and it will not be competent for the Court to hold the reference bad and quash the proceedings for want of jurisdiction merely because there was, in its opinion, no material before the Government on which it could have come to an affirmative conclusion on those matters. 14. When the “appropriate Government” makes a reference of an industrial dispute for adjudication, it does not decide any question of fact or law. The only condition, which the exercise of that power should satisfy, is that there should be the existence or apprehension of an industrial dispute. When once the Government is satisfied about this question, it acquires jurisdiction to refer the dispute for adjudication. However, the condition precedent to the formation of such opinion, that there should be an existing or apprehended “industrial dispute”, is imperative and the recitals of the existence or apprehension of the industrial dispute cannot preclude the Court to exercise its power of judicial review and to determine whether, in fact, there was any material before the “appropriate Government” and if there was; whether the Government applied its mind in coming to the conclusion that an industrial dispute was in existence or was apprehended and it was expedient to make the reference. Therefore, an order of reference is open to judicial review if it is shown that the appropriate Government had no material before it or it has not applied its mind to the material before it or has not taken into consideration certain vital facts which it ought to have taken into consideration. 15. Therefore, an order of reference is open to judicial review if it is shown that the appropriate Government had no material before it or it has not applied its mind to the material before it or has not taken into consideration certain vital facts which it ought to have taken into consideration. 15. Likewise, when the appropriate Government refuses to make reference, it is also amenable to judicial review if it is shown that the appropriate Government did not take into consideration the relevant material which could show the existence or apprehension of industrial dispute or if it is shown that the reasons for refusing to make reference are irrelevant or not germane to the formation of opinion. 17. From the aforesaid discussion, it clearly follows that even when making a reference by the appropriate Government is an administrative act, before making such a reference it has to form an opinion as to whether any industrial dispute exists or is apprehended. While forming this opinion, the appropriate Government is supposed to take all relevant facts into consideration touching upon this aspect. If the power is not exercised properly, it is amenable to judicial review. Thus, where an industrial dispute exists or is apprehended, but the appropriate Government refuses to make reference, such a refusal can be challenged in the court of law. Conversely, which is equally true, if the reference is made even when no dispute exists or is apprehended, such a reference will also be subject to judicial review.” 19. This Court finds that the appropriate Government has recorded its satisfaction regarding the existence of an industrial dispute while referring the dispute for adjudication after giving an opportunity to both parties at the stage of conciliation. The learned writ Court while holding that the dispute was stale, has not recorded any finding that the satisfaction of the appropriate Government on the point of existence of industrial dispute was not based on any materials on record or that the appropriate Government did not apply its mind to the materials before it or had not taken into consideration certain vital facts which it ought to have taken into consideration. In the absence of any such finding, the impugned order passed by the learned writ Court quashing the order of reference cannot be justified in law. In the absence of any such finding, the impugned order passed by the learned writ Court quashing the order of reference cannot be justified in law. It has been in the aforesaid judgment that an order of reference is open to judicial review if it is shown that the appropriate Government had no material before it or it has not applied its mind to the material before it or has not taken into consideration certain vital facts which it ought to have taken into consideration. 20. The decisive factor is the existence or apprehension of an industrial dispute and for this, it is to be examined as to whether the workman has accepted the decision of the Management or has abandoned his rights and as to whether the workman has been able to give satisfactory explanation for the delay and whether the issue was still alive. 21. Admittedly the appropriate Government exercises administrative powers while referring or refusing to refer the dispute for adjudication. When once the appropriate Government is satisfied with this question, it acquires jurisdiction to refer the dispute for adjudication, and in order to arrive at a satisfaction on the point of existence or apprehension of an industrial dispute there should be some material before the appropriate Government and if it is there, it has to be examined whether the appropriate Government applied its mind in coming to the conclusion that an industrial dispute was in existence or was apprehended and it was expedient to make the reference. The present case has to be examined in the light of the aforesaid parameters. 22. The records of this case reveal that as many as 8 criminal cases were instituted against the workman by the Management in a short span of time. Arising out of the same incidents, disciplinary proceedings were also initiated by the issuance of 11 charge memos followed by the submission of inquiry report a copy of which was forwarded to the workman proposing punishment of discharge. The workman objected to the enquiry report; denied all the charges; pointed to the non-availability of required evidence to hold him guilty for the alleged charges; alleged victimisation at the hand of the Management and one P.R. Das, one officer of the Company in connivance with police resulting in registration of numerous criminal cases which were pending before the Court without any progress. The workman was also taken into custody in connection with the criminal cases. The workman indicated that he deserves acquittal in all the criminal cases as the prosecution does not have any evidence, oral or documentary, to prove their case in the Court. The Management discharged the workman from service vide order dated 25th January 1996 by simply stating that they did not find any new point warranting reconsideration of the proposed punishment and discharged the workman from service with immediate effect. The workman was advised to contact the office of the General Manager for settlement. It is not the case of the Management that the workman accepted the settlement amount and permanently snapped his relationship with the Management. After discharge from service on 25th January 1996, the workman faced all the criminal trials and was acquitted in all one by one and the last acquittal order was passed on 30th January 2001. The workman raised the demand for reinstatement before the Management on 11th September 2003 and raised the industrial dispute on 11th December 2003. Upon failure of conciliation, the appropriate Government was of the view that the industrial dispute exists and referred the dispute for adjudication by the Labour Court, Jamshedpur vide Notification dated 21st June 2007 which was impugned in the writ petition. It is the case of the workman that the criminal charges and the disciplinary proceedings were based on the same set of charges. 23. Considering the aforesaid sequence of events, it cannot be said that there was no material before the appropriate Government or the appropriate Government had not applied its mind to the material before it or the appropriate Government had not taken into consideration any vital facts which it ought to have taken into consideration or the appropriate Government had taken any material into consideration which it ought not to have taken. This Court is of the considered view that in cases where the criminal case and disciplinary proceedings arise out of the same set of facts, the claim of the workman cannot be said to be stale so as to refuse reference where there has been a delay in disposal of the criminal case and the workman approaches for reinstatement upon acquittal in the criminal case. Of course, the impact of the acquittal in the criminal case is required to be examined at the stage of adjudication of the reference. Of course, the impact of the acquittal in the criminal case is required to be examined at the stage of adjudication of the reference. It is not the finding of the learned writ Court that acquittal in a criminal case has no bearing at all on the order passed in the disciplinary proceeding when both the criminal case and disciplinary proceeding are arising out of the same incident. There is no finding that the industrial dispute did not exist or the dispute was a dead dispute or that the workman had accepted the order of discharge and on acquittal in the criminal cases he was trying to revive a dead dispute. It is also not the case of the Management that the workman had accepted the settlement amount after his discharge from service as was the situation in the case reported in “Nedungadi Bank Ltd.” (supra). Rather the finding of the learned writ Court is based on the premise that mere acquittal in a criminal case will not entitle the workman to be reinstated in service and the pendency of a criminal case cannot be a reason for not raising the dispute regarding discharge from service. 24. The learned writ Court has failed to consider that the consequences of the judgments of acquittal were required to be considered by the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal who upon entering into reference would have scrutinized the evidence and considered whether the criminal cases and the departmental proceedings had the same set of witnesses/materials. The learned writ Court also failed to take into consideration that upon reference of a dispute the Labour Court is empowered to pronounce even on the quantum of punishment considering the facts and circumstances of a case under section 11A of the Industrial Disputes Act of 1947. In this regard it would be useful to refer to paragraph 41A of the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of “The Workmen of M/s. Firestone Tyre and Rubber Co. of India (Pvt.) Ltd. v. The Management & Ors.” (1973) 1 SCC 813 , which is quoted as under: “41-A. Another change that has been effected by Section 11-A is the power conferred on a Tribunal to alter the punishment imposed by an employer. of India (Pvt.) Ltd. v. The Management & Ors.” (1973) 1 SCC 813 , which is quoted as under: “41-A. Another change that has been effected by Section 11-A is the power conferred on a Tribunal to alter the punishment imposed by an employer. If the Tribunal comes to the conclusion that the misconduct is established, either by the domestic enquiry accepted by it or by the evidence adduced before it for the first time, the Tribunal originally had no power to interfere with the punishment imposed by the management. Once the misconduct is proved, the Tribunal had to sustain the order of punishment unless it was harsh indicating victimisation. Under Section 11-A, though the Tribunal may hold that the misconduct is proved, nevertheless it may be of the opinion that the order of discharge or dismissal for the said misconduct is not justified. In other words, the Tribunal may hold that the proved misconduct does not merit punishment by way of discharge or dismissal. It can, under such circumstances, award to the workman only lesser punishment instead. The power to interfere with the punishment and alter the same has been now conferred on the Tribunal by Section 11-A.” 25. In the present case, when the workman is making an allegation of victimization in the matter of the institution of 8 criminal cases and issuance of 11 chargesheets arising out of the same incidents and was throughout referring to victimization and filing of false criminal cases even during the departmental proceedings, it cannot be said that there was no material before the appropriate Government to come to a satisfaction that the dispute was existing and consequently refer the dispute for adjudication. 26. The learned counsel for the Management has produced a copy of the ‘works standing order’ governing the appellant and has fairly submitted that there is no provision of appeal in the ‘works standing order’. However, this Court finds that clause 25 (e) of the ‘works standing order’, interalia, deals with the situations when the workman is involved in a criminal case is found guilty and clause 25 (f) deals with a situation when the workman is not found guilty in a criminal case. The portion relevant for the purposes of this case of the said clause 25 is quoted as under: - Works Standing Orders: 25. (a) If misconduct is alleged against an employee, ………….. The portion relevant for the purposes of this case of the said clause 25 is quoted as under: - Works Standing Orders: 25. (a) If misconduct is alleged against an employee, ………….. (b) An employee charged with misconduct or accused in a Court of Law of any criminal offence involving moral turpitude may be suspended forthwith from duty for the alleged misconduct. (c) ……………. …………………. (d)……………… (e) If on the conclusion of the enquiry or, as the case may be, of the criminal proceedings, the employee has been found guilty of the charges framed against him and it is considered, after giving the employee concerned a reasonable opportunity of making representation on the penalty proposed, that an order of dismissal or suspension or fine or stoppage of annual increment or reduction in rank, would meet the ends of justice, the employer shall pass an order accordingly. Provided …………… …………... Provided…………………………. Provided also that, in the case of a workman to whom the provisions of clause (a) of Article 311 of the Constitution apply, the provisions of that Article shall be complied with. (f) If on the conclusion of the inquiry, or as the case may be, of the criminal proceedings, the employee has been found to be not guilty of any of the charges framed against him, he shall be deemed to have been on duty during the period of suspension and shall be entitled to the same wages as he would have received if he had not been placed under suspension, after deducting the subsistence allowance paid to him for such period. (g) ………………… (h) ……………………… 27. This Court is of the considered view that acquittal in criminal cases is required to be considered to find out if those have a bearing in the departmental proceedings by comparing the nature of evidence led in both the proceedings and the nature of acquittal in the criminal cases and may have an impact on the quantum of punishment imposed upon the workman. In the present case, the workman initially approached the Management and having no response approached the Assistant Labour Commissioner for reference of the industrial dispute for adjudication well within three years from the date of his acquittal in the last criminal case. In the present case, the workman initially approached the Management and having no response approached the Assistant Labour Commissioner for reference of the industrial dispute for adjudication well within three years from the date of his acquittal in the last criminal case. Further, there is nothing on record to even suggest that the workman severed his relationship with the Management and had accepted the dismissal by taking his terminal dues from the Management in terms of the order of dismissal and upon his acquittal in the criminal case the workman tried to raise a stale claim and raise a non-existing industrial dispute. 28. The aforesaid aspects of the matter have not been considered properly by the learned writ Court while quashing the reference order dated 21st June 2007 and has committed an error of law while exercising the power of judicial review in the matter of an administrative order of reference and, thereby, the right of the workman to get the existing industrial dispute adjudicated through the process of law has been denied. 29. As a cumulative effect of the aforesaid findings, the impugned order passed by the learned writ Court interfering with the order of reference for adjudication of industrial dispute between the parties, cannot be sustained in the eyes of law and is accordingly set aside. 30. This appeal is allowed. Consequently, the reference is restored. 31. Pending I.A, if any, is closed.