JUDGMENT : 1. Since both the Cr. Misc. Petitions, arise out of same fact situation for which, as per the complainant, different cheques were issued and the complainant filed different cases for their dishonour, therefore, they have been heard together and will be disposed by common order. 2. Cr. M. P. No. 2850 of 2022 has been filed for quashing the order of issuance of process dated 17.03.2020 passed in Complaint Case no. 1051 of 2019 whereby and whereunder, the learned court below found prima facie case to be made out under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instrument Act and Section 420 of IPC. 3. Cr. M. P. No. 2862 of 2022 has been filed for quashing the order dated 17.03.2020 arising out of Complaint Case no. 1052 of 2019 whereby and whereunder, the learned court below found prima facie case to be made out under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instrument Act and Section 420 of IPC. 4. Although separate complaint cases have been filed, but the offence alleged arise out of the same transaction and therefore have been heard together and will be disposed by the common order. 5. As per the case of the complainant in Complaint Case no.1051, a lease agreement being Lease Deed No.77912 was entered on 1.3.2012 at SRO Maraikulum, between the petitioner Raju J Vayalat (A1) and the Complainant (OP2) with respect to land and building in Kerala for running a film studio and allied and incidental business connected with mass media, TV etc. 6. Later, on the request of the accused persons the complainant agreed to terminate the registered lease deed on the condition that accused persons would pay Rs. 35 lakhs to the complainant to partially compensate for the amount spent by the complainant towards the innovation, constructions and maintenance of the buildings in the land leased out by the lease deed dated 1.3.2012. It was also agreed by the accused persons to return the security deposit of Rs.10 lakhs immediately after termination of the lease. An agreement was executed on 11.6.2015 to that effect and a cheque for a sum of Rs.5,00,000/-was given to the complainant. The complainant presented the cheque for payment on 25.02.2019 which got dishonoured and consequently, on 19.06.2019 notice was served by registered post which was duly received on 26.06.2019. When the said amount was not paid, the complaint petition was filed on 09.08.2019. The complainant presented the cheque for payment on 25.02.2019 which got dishonoured and consequently, on 19.06.2019 notice was served by registered post which was duly received on 26.06.2019. When the said amount was not paid, the complaint petition was filed on 09.08.2019. For this Complaint Case no. 1051 of 2019 has been filed. 7. Complaint Case no. 1052 of 2019 also arise out of the same lease deed no.779/12 dated 1.3.2012 between the same parties with regard to the same subject matter. Further narration of the facts leading to termination of the lease agreement is all identical in both the cases. 8. The agreement for the surrender of the lease was entered on 11.6.2015 between Raju J Vayalat on behalf of himself and as power of attorney holder for his mother Annakutty Joseph and by Avinash V Unnithan. As per the term of agreement, duties and responsibilities of the parties, mentioning the amount to be paid to the complainant, and also the cheque numbers being handed over to the complainant to facilitate the payments were set out in the agreement. 9. The complainant handed over the keys and surrendered the vacant possession of the entire property of 121.42 acres and the buildings situated therein to the accused and also the registered lease deed dated 01.03.2012 at SRO Maraikulum. The accused handed over the cheques mentioned in the agreement to the complainant after the termination of the lease deed. 10. Total four cheques for a sum of Rs.40 lakhs were handed over to the complainant. The complainant presented the cheque for payment with his bankers namely the Federal Bank Ltd, Bokaro steel city Branch. All these cheques were dishonoured. After completing the procedural formalities of service of legal notice, the present case has been filed. 11. The order taking cognizance has been assailed on the ground that the cause of action did not arise within the State of Jharkhand rather it took place in Kerala. The complainant expected huge profit in a short span of time and when it did not materialize, he wind up the business. It is submitted that for the offence made under Section 420 of IPC, jurisdiction for enquiry of trial will not be at Jharkhand. The complainant expected huge profit in a short span of time and when it did not materialize, he wind up the business. It is submitted that for the offence made under Section 420 of IPC, jurisdiction for enquiry of trial will not be at Jharkhand. It is also argued that there is no material to make out an offence under Section 420 of the IPC, for which cognizance could not have been taken in a summary proceeding, on evidence taken on affidavit under Sections 143 and 145 of the N.I. Act. Accused no.2 was neither the party to the agreement of lease, nor the drawer of the cheque, still she has been implicated in the present case to bring pressure on the petitioner. 12. Learned counsel for the State has opposed the petition and submitted that the cheque had been drawn by accused no. 1 on behalf of accused no. 2 as well and, therefore, cognizance has been taken against both the accused persons. There was an intention of deception since the very inception therefore the offence under Section 420 was made out. At this stage the defence of the accused cannot be considered and the earlier petition for transfer of case has been rejected by Hon’ble Supreme Court. 13. The plea that the Court at Bokaro lacked territorial jurisdiction with respect to offence u/s 138 of the N.I. Act is not tenable for the reason that cheque was presented for payment at Bokaro Steel City where the drawee had his account. Section 142(2) of the N.I. Act specifically confers jurisdiction on the Court which provides that it can be tried only by a court within whose local jurisdiction— (a) if the cheque is delivered for collection through an account, the branch of the bank where the payee or holder in due course, as the case may be, maintains the account, is situated; or (b) if the cheque is presented for payment by the payee or holder in due course, otherwise through an account, the branch of the drawee bank where the drawer maintains the account, is situated. Explanation. Explanation. —For the purposes of clause (a), where a cheque is delivered for collection at any branch of the bank of the payee or holder in due course, then, the cheque shall be deemed to have been delivered to the branch of the bank in which the payee or holder in due course, as the case may be, maintains the account.] 14. The second line of argument is that there was no legally enforceable debt for issuance of the cheque, cannot be considered at this stage. There is a presumption under Section 118 of the NI Act that until the contrary is proved, every negotiable instrument was made or drawn for consideration. Further, under Section 139 there is a presumption that unless the contrary is proved, the holder of a cheque received the cheque, of the nature referred to in Section 138 for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability. These presumptions are rebuttable statutory presumptions and the petitioner will be at liberty to rebut the same during the course of trial. However, this cannot be looked at this stage to quash the order of issuance of process. 15. This Court does not find any infirmity in the order taking cognizance against petitioner no.1 Raju Vayalat under Section 138 of the N.I. Act. 16. With regard to the order taking cognizance under Section 420 of the IPC, there is much force in the argument on behalf of the petitioner that order of cognizance suffers from infirmity. From the impugned order dated 17.3.2020 it is apparent that the cognizance has been taken on the basis of evidence of the complainant Dr. Avinash V Unnithant taken on affidavit and the documents on record. This is permissible for offence under Section 138 of the N.I. Act, as provided under Sections 143 and 145 of the said Act. 17. The procedure for taking cognizance under the Negotiable Instruments Act and the criminal procedure code is different. For offence under section 138 a summary procedure is provided, whereas for trial of offence under section 420 of the IPC warrant trial procedure will be applicable. Cognizance for IPC offence can be taken on any of the ground as provided under Section 190(1) of the Cr. For offence under section 138 a summary procedure is provided, whereas for trial of offence under section 420 of the IPC warrant trial procedure will be applicable. Cognizance for IPC offence can be taken on any of the ground as provided under Section 190(1) of the Cr. P.C. In case of complaint case the procedure to be followed is as laid down under Chapter XV of the Code, under which the complainant is to be examined upon oath and the witnesses present if any, save and except when it is an official complaint. 18. In the instant case that cognizance under section 420 IPC is bad in law primarily for the reason that cognizance cannot be taken as per the procedure envisaged under the Negotiable Instrument Act, only on the statement of the complainant on affidavit. Cognizance under Section 420 IPC cannot be taken as per the summary procedure laid down for enquiry under the NI Act in which evidence on affidavit is taken in terms of Section 145 of the N.I .Act. Further, the averments in the complaint petition do not reflect an intention to deceive right from the inception which is an essential ingredient for the offence under Section 420 of the IPC. The lease agreement was terminated on mutually agreed terms and conditions, under which cheques were handed over to the complainant which on presentation were dishonoured. There is no material to show that there was an intention of deception from the very inception. 19. Accused no.2 (the mother of the petitioner/A1) is neither the drawer of cheque nor was a party to the lease agreement or to the agreement of its termination. All this took place with her son the petitioner/A1. There is no material to disclose an offence under sections 420 of IPC or Section 138 N.I. Act against Accused no.2 and therefore the order of issuance of process against accused no.2 is quashed. Under the circumstance, the impugned order of taking cognizance under Section 420 IPC is set aside qua both the accused persons. Further, the order of cognizance under Section 138 of the N.I. Act is quashed against Accused no. 2 Annakuty Joseph. There is no infirmity in the order of cognizance under Section 138 of N.I. Act against the petitioner (A1). Both the criminal miscellaneous petitions are partly allowed as at above.