Raghunath Thakur v. State of Jharkhand through the Chief Secretary, Government of Jharkhand, Ranchi
2023-09-14
RAJESH SHANKAR
body2023
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT : The present writ petition has been filed for quashing the order as contained in memo no. 9275 dated 19.09.2013 (Anneuxre-10 to the writ petition) passed by the Deputy Secretary to the Government, Department of Personnel, Administrative Reforms and Rajbhasha, Government of Jharkhand (the respondent no. 3) whereby the petitioner has been imposed following punishments : (i) Censor (ii) Nothing would be payable to the petitioner except the subsistence allowance for his period of suspension, however the suspension period would be counted for the purpose of his pension. 2. Further prayer has been made for quashing the order as contained in memo mo. 1547 dated 18.02.2014 (Anneuxre-12 to the writ petition) passed by the Chief Secretary, Government of Jharkhand (respondent no. 1) whereby the appeal preferred by the petitioner against the order dated 19.09.2013 passed by the respondent no. 3 has been dismissed. The petitioner has also prayed for issuance of direction upon the respondents to pay him full salary for the period of his suspension i.e., from 17.12.2012 to 17.02.2013 after adjusting subsistence allowance paid during the said period. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner was appointed as Personal Assistant in the Department of Personnel, Administrative Reforms and Rajbhasha of erstwhile State of Bihar on 06.08.1998 and after its reorganisation, the petitioner was allocated the State of Jharkhand. The petitioner, while working as Personal Secretary in the Department of Information Technology, Government of Jharkhand, Ranchi, was suspended vide order as contained in memo no. 13820 dated 17.12.2012 issued by the respondent no. 3 under rule-3A of the Bihar and Orissa Subordinate Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1935 on the ground of dereliction of duty and indiscipline. During the said period, he was to be paid subsistence allowance and his headquarter was to be the Department of Science and Technology, Government of Jharkhand. Subsequently, suspension of the petitioner was revoked vide notification as contained in memo no. 1550 dated 18.02.2013 issued by the respondent no. 3 and he was posted in the Department of Labour, Employment & Training, Government of Jharkhand as well as was also served a copy of memo of charge in “Prapatra-K” seeking response on the charges levelled against him. 4.
1550 dated 18.02.2013 issued by the respondent no. 3 and he was posted in the Department of Labour, Employment & Training, Government of Jharkhand as well as was also served a copy of memo of charge in “Prapatra-K” seeking response on the charges levelled against him. 4. It is further submitted that four charges were framed against the petitioner i.e., (i) not coming to the office on time, (ii) remaining absent from the office, (iii) not giving reply to the show cause letter no. 111 dated 01.10.2012 and (iv) indecent behaviour with the Special Secretary, Department of Information Technology, Government of Jharkhand. The petitioner submitted his reply on 28.02.2013 denying all the charges. Moreover, the Personal Secretary to the Principal Secretary had put his note in the file on 21.03.2013 mentioning that the petitioner used to come to the office in time and used to leave the office late in the evening. However, the respondent no. 3 without considering the petitioner’s reply, issued the impugned order dated 19.09.2013 by imposing aforesaid punishments. Being aggrieved with the order dated 19.09.2013, the petitioner preferred appeal before the respondent no. 1, however the said appeal was also dismissed vide order as contained in memo no. 1547 dated 18.02.2014. 5. It is also submitted that the petitioner’s reply was not at all considered by the disciplinary authority while passing the impugned order and as such the same is liable to be set aside on the said ground itself. It was alleged in the memo of charge that the petitioner was found absent on 11.11.2012 which was duly replied by the petitioner stating that the said date was Sunday and no order was issued to open the office on the said date. However, the reply submitted by the petitioner was not considered while passing the impugned order dated 19.09.2013. 6. It is further submitted that the sole witness as mentioned in the memo of charge namely Sri Shiv Bilash Sah was not examined at any stage so as to prove the charge and as such the same remained unproved against the petitioner. Despite the said fact, the impugned order imposing two punishments was passed against him. Moreover, neither the inquiry officer was appointed nor any inquiry report was served to the petitioner for the proved charges and as such the respondent no.
Despite the said fact, the impugned order imposing two punishments was passed against him. Moreover, neither the inquiry officer was appointed nor any inquiry report was served to the petitioner for the proved charges and as such the respondent no. 3 did not follow the due procedure of law in imposing punishments against him. 7. Per contra, Mr. Shubham Mishra, learned A.C. to S.C. (Mines)-II appearing on behalf of the respondents, submits that the petitioner was given due opportunity of hearing to reply the allegations levelled against him in the memo of charge and only after considering the petitioner’s reply, the impugned order of punishment was passed in due compliance of the principles of natural justice. 8. It is further submitted that the punishments imposed upon the petitioner were minor in nature and as such there was no need to conduct a full-fledged departmental inquiry before passing the impugned order. The petitioner had himself admitted before the appellate authority that there was exchange of hot talks between him and the Special Secretary, Department of Information Technology, Government of Jharkhand and as such the appeal filed by him was rejected by a reasoned order dated 18.02.2014. 9. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the materials available on record. 10. The main contention of learned counsel for the petitioner is that the impugned order of punishment against the petitioner was passed in a very mechanical manner without considering his reply and as such the same is liable to be set aside. In support of the said contention, learned counsel for the petitioner has put reliance on a judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of The Siemens Engineering & Manufacturing co. of India Ltd. Vs. the Union of India and Another reported in (1976) 2 SCC 981 wherein it has been observed that where an authority makes an order in exercise of a quasi-judicial function, it must record its reasons in support thereof. 11. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also relied upon a judgment rendered by learned Division Bench of Patna High Court in the case of Dr. Rabindra Nath Singh Vs. The State of Bihar and Others reported in 1982 SCC OnLine Pat 137 wherein it has been held that assigning reasons in support of an order which adversely affects a person is also a basic need of the principles of natural justice.
Rabindra Nath Singh Vs. The State of Bihar and Others reported in 1982 SCC OnLine Pat 137 wherein it has been held that assigning reasons in support of an order which adversely affects a person is also a basic need of the principles of natural justice. It has further been held that the authority empowered to deal with the matter must give its independent and unfettered judgment. It is such a duty which cannot be shirked nor be evaded. 12. To appreciate the contention of learned counsel for the petitioner, I have perused the impugned order dated 19.09.2013 from which it is evident that the respondent no. 3 has merely observed that on analysis of the reply submitted by the petitioner, the opinion of the Department of Information Technology, Government of Jharkhand and after considering the evidences available on record, the charge of misconduct and indiscipline was found proved. In the said order, the respondent no. 3 did not discuss the petitioner’s reply submitted against the alleged charges wherein he had elaborately denied each and every charge. The petitioner had specifically stated in his reply that he used to come office in time. Further, the date 11.11.2012 was Sunday and there was no order issued by the aforesaid department regarding opening of the office on the said date. The petitioner had also stated that a show cause notice as contained in letter no. 111 dated 01.10.2012 was issued to him by the Special Secretary, Department of Information Technology, Government of Jharkhand asking as to why he had come late in the office on 28.09.2012 pursuant to which, a reply was submitted by him on 03.10.2012 explaining that while coming to office on 28.09.2012, tyre of his motorcycle got punctured and in getting that repaired, some time was consumed due to which he reached the office at 12.00 noon, whereafter the Special Secretary, Department of Information Technology, Government of Jharkhand put his signature on the said explanation and allowed him half day leave for the said date. 13. In the case of S.N. Mukherjee Vs. Union of India reported in (1990) 4 SCC 594 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:- “36. Reasons, when recorded by an administrative authority in an order passed by it while exercising quasi-judicial functions, would no doubt facilitate the exercise of its jurisdiction by the appellate or supervisory authority.
13. In the case of S.N. Mukherjee Vs. Union of India reported in (1990) 4 SCC 594 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:- “36. Reasons, when recorded by an administrative authority in an order passed by it while exercising quasi-judicial functions, would no doubt facilitate the exercise of its jurisdiction by the appellate or supervisory authority. But the other considerations, referred to above, which have also weighed with this Court in holding that an administrative authority must record reasons for its decision, are of no less significance. These considerations show that the recording of reasons by an administrative authority serves a salutary purpose, namely, it excludes chances of arbitrariness and ensures a degree of fairness in the process of decision-making. The said purpose would apply equally to all decisions and its application cannot be confined to decisions which are subject to appeal, revision or judicial review. In our opinion, therefore, the requirement that reasons be recorded should govern the decisions of an administrative authority exercising quasi-judicial functions irrespective of the fact whether the decision is subject to appeal, revision or judicial review. It may, however, be added that it is not required that the reasons should be as elaborate as in the decision of a court of law. The extent and nature of the reasons would depend on particular facts and circumstances. What is necessary is that the reasons are clear and explicit so as to indicate that the authority has given due consideration to the points in controversy. The need for recording of reasons is greater in a case where the order is passed at the original stage. The appellate or revisional authority, if it affirms such an order, need not give separate reasons if the appellate or revisional authority agrees with the reasons contained in the order under challenge.” 14. Thus, an order of an administrative/quasi-judicial authority adversely affecting the right and interest of any party is required to be supported by fair decision making process which includes consideration of explanation submitted by the affected party in reply to the show cause notice. Such decision would also facilitate the appellate and revisional authorities to take decision in exercise of their respective jurisdiction. It is not required that the reason should always be elaborate, rather it should be clear and explicit so as to indicate that the authority has given due consideration to the issue raised.
Such decision would also facilitate the appellate and revisional authorities to take decision in exercise of their respective jurisdiction. It is not required that the reason should always be elaborate, rather it should be clear and explicit so as to indicate that the authority has given due consideration to the issue raised. The extent and nature of the reasons would obviously depend on particular facts and circumstances. If an authority is vested with the power to pass an order which is determinative in nature, it is its duty to exercise the discretionary power in conformity with the principles of fairness and good governance. Such action should neither be suggestive of discrimination, nor even apparently give an impression of biasness or favouritism. 15. Thus, I am of the considered view that the impugned order of punishment as contained in memo no. 9275 dated 19.09.2013 was passed by the respondent no. 3 in a mechanical manner without appropriately considering the petitioner’s reply and as such the same cannot be sustained in law. The appellate authority i.e., the respondent no. 1, also failed to appreciate the said aspect in the order as contained in memo no. 1547 dated 18.02.2014 and as such the same is also liable to be set aside. 16. In the aforesaid facts and circumstance, the impugned order as contained in memo no. 9275 dated 19.09.2013 passed by the respondent no. 3 as well as the appellate order as contained in memo no. 1547 dated 18.02.2014 passed by the respondent no. 1 are quashed. 17. Since about 10 years have elapsed from the date of passing of the impugned order of punishment, I do not find it appropriate to remand the matter to the respondent no.3 to decide it afresh after such a long time also keeping in view that the charges against the petitioner were not so grave as well as that the punishment imposed upon him was minor in nature. 18. The writ petition is, accordingly, allowed. The respondents are directed to release salary to the petitioner for the suspension period by adjusting the subsistence allowance paid to him.