JUDGMENT : Anubha Rawat Choudhary, J. Learned counsels for the parties are present. 2. This Letters Patent Appeal has been filed against the judgment dated 23rd July 2018 passed in W.P.(L). No.3661 of 2016 whereby the writ petition filed by the appellant has been dismissed. 3. The writ petition was filed for the quashing of orders dated 20th October 2014 and 04th February 2016 passed in Bihar Shops and Establishment Case No.01 of 2003 and Miscellaneous Case No.01 of 2016 passed by the learned Labour Court, Jamshedpur whereby the claim of the writ petitioner/appellant for dues/wages, as well as compensation, has been rejected. 4. The appellant filed a case before the learned Labour Court, Jamshedpur under the provisions of The Bihar Shops and Establishments Act, 1953 (hereinafter referred to as the Act of 1953) which was numbered as B.S. & E Case No.1 of 2003. In the said case, the Community Development and Social Welfare Department of M/s Tata Iron and Steel Company Limited (TISCO) was the respondent no. 1 and TISCO now Tata Steel Limited was respondent no.2. 5. This is the case of the appellant that she was employed in the Community Development and Social Welfare Department of M/s Tata Steel Limited which was a unit of respondent no.2. The wages were not paid to the appellant for the period from June 2002 to February 2003 @ Rs.1,415/- per month and, apart from non-payment of wages for the period of her medical leave, she was not allowed to rejoin the service. Her further grievance was that the benefits applicable to the Tata Steel Limited employees were not being paid to her, although, she had worked all along under the control of management of Tata Steel Limited. The appellant sought a direction in term of section 28 (2) of the Act of 1953 for payment of wages amounting to Rs.12,735/- for the period from 01st June 2002 to 28th February 2003 @ Rs.1,415/- per month and compensation amounting to 10 times of the estimated value which came to Rs.1,27,350/-, total being Rs.1,40,085/-. The appellant further prayed for a direction upon the respondents to pay the difference of wages and other benefits which were payable to the appellant which she should have received as an employee of Tata Steel Limited right from the beginning of her service. The said claim of the appellant was opposed by the respondents. 6. The appellant further prayed for a direction upon the respondents to pay the difference of wages and other benefits which were payable to the appellant which she should have received as an employee of Tata Steel Limited right from the beginning of her service. The said claim of the appellant was opposed by the respondents. 6. Both the parties adduced oral and documentary evidence before the learned Labour Court. However, the learned Labour Court, Jamshedpur dismissed the claim of the appellant on the ground that the application under section 28 of the aforesaid Act of 1953 was not maintainable against Tata Steel Limited as it was not an establishment and also on the ground that the appellant was not being paid any wages but only ‘honorarium’. The appellant filed a review petition which was also dismissed. The appellant challenged both the aforesaid orders before the learned writ Court which has been dismissed by the impugned order. Arguments of the Appellant 7. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant has referred to the definition of “establishment” as defined under section 2(6) of the Act of 1953 and has submitted that the establishment in which the appellant was working is covered within the said definition. The learned counsel has submitted that the learned Labour Court as well as the learned writ Court has not considered this aspect of the matter. He has referred to a judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in “Tata Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. Vs. Chief Inspecting Officer and others” (2005) 9 SCC 605 and has submitted that with respect to the hospital maintained by Tata Steel Limited, it has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the hospital falls within the definition of “establishment” as defined under the aforesaid Act of 1953. He has submitted that the aforesaid judgment was not placed before the learned writ Court but it may be considered by this Court as the point involved in the present case is squarely covered by the said judgment. Arguments of the Respondents 8. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents, on the other hand, has opposed the prayer. It has been submitted that there was no relationship of employer and employee and the learned Labour Court has considered all the aspects of the matter. Arguments of the Respondents 8. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents, on the other hand, has opposed the prayer. It has been submitted that there was no relationship of employer and employee and the learned Labour Court has considered all the aspects of the matter. He submits that the learned Labour Court has also recorded that no appointment letter, identity card, medical card, ticket number etc. which are normally issued to an employee were ever issued to the appellant and the learned Labour Court, after considering the materials, has held that the organization in which the appellant was working is not covered under the definition of “establishment” under the aforesaid Act of 1953 and has dismissed the case. It is submitted that the learned writ Court has rightly dismissed the writ petition. 9. The learned counsel, while distinguishing the aforesaid judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court relied on by the appellant, has submitted that the matter of a hospital being maintained by an industrial establishment has a different status altogether. The Tata Steel Limited is under legal obligation to maintain a hospital for the employees and in the said case some payments were also being made by the patients for the services of the hospital. Findings of this Court 10. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties and considering the facts and circumstances of this case, this Court finds that before the learned Labour Court, the matter was well contested by both the parties and after considering the rival contentions, the learned Labour Court framed three issues which are as under:- “I. Whether the Community Development and Social Welfare Department of Tata Iron and Steel Company Ltd., Jamshedpur is an establishment? II. Whether the applicant is an employee of Tata Iron and Steel Company Ltd., Jamshedpur? III. Whether the applicant is entitled to get the reliefs sought by her?” 11. The evidence, oral as well as documentary, were produced by the parties and ultimately the learned Labour Court recorded its findings on all the issues against the appellant. 12. The learned Labour Court recorded a finding that the Community Centre run by Tata Steel Limited is an educational institution that works for the development of society through various development programs. In the Community Centre, no fees are taken from the beneficiaries. 12. The learned Labour Court recorded a finding that the Community Centre run by Tata Steel Limited is an educational institution that works for the development of society through various development programs. In the Community Centre, no fees are taken from the beneficiaries. The expenses in connection with the Community Development and Social Welfare Department are borne by Tata Steel Limited. The Community Development and Social Welfare Department of Tata Steel Limited is not involved in any kind of business, trade, or profession for profit and this department has no connection with the main business, trade, or profession or any work connected with or incidental or ancillary to any business, trade or profession and, therefore, the Community Development and Social Welfare Department of Tata Steel Limited does not come within the definition of “establishment” under the Act of 1953. Consequently, the issue no.(i) was decided against the appellant. While deciding this issue, the learned Labour Court has considered both oral and documentary evidence of the witnesses produced on behalf of the parties. 13. So far as issue no.(ii) is concerned, the learned Labour Court scrutinized the materials on record and came to a finding that the appellant was never issued an appointment letter, identity card, medical book, ticket number, personal number, etc. by Tata Steel Limited and the appellant was not even a member of Tata workers’ union. It has been further recorded that as per Exhibit-6, the appellant was earlier working at Sonary Community Centre as a tailoring teacher on a part-time basis and was receiving only honorarium, and in Exhibit-8/A, the appellant was shown as a worker in receipt of honorarium. Exhibits-10, 15, 16, and 17 indicated that the Community Development and Social Welfare Department of Tata Steel Limited had a separate union in connection with those who were receiving honorariums and there is a separate wage agreement for them. With this, the learned Labour Court recorded a finding that the appellant was not an employee of Tata Steel Limited and decided issue no.(ii) against the appellant. 14. So far as the issue no. (iii) is concerned, the learned Labour Court again considered the materials on record and recorded that the appellant had claimed wages for the period from 01st June 2002 to 28th February 2003 although she had not done any work during this period and decided the issue against the appellant. 14. So far as the issue no. (iii) is concerned, the learned Labour Court again considered the materials on record and recorded that the appellant had claimed wages for the period from 01st June 2002 to 28th February 2003 although she had not done any work during this period and decided the issue against the appellant. Exhibit-1 was the document dated 26th March 2002 which was an application for one month leave and Exhibit-2 was the application seeking medical leave for the period from 02nd May 2002 to 31st May 2002. While deciding the said issue, the learned Labour Court had recorded a finding that Exhibits-1 and 2 produced by the appellant were later on manufactured by the appellant and also took note of various cuttings on the documents. The issue no.(iii) was also decided against the appellant after scrutinizing the materials on record. 15. This Court finds that the learned Labour Court has scrutinized the materials on record and has come to a finding that the organization in which the appellant was working was not covered within the definition of “establishment” as defined under the aforesaid Act of 1953. The learned writ Court has also passed a detailed order and has referred to the definition of “establishment” as defined under the aforesaid Act of 1953 and has clearly held that as per section 2(6) of the Act of 1953, a systematic activity for rendering services by an organization by itself may not make it an “establishment” unless a business, trade or profession is carried on therein. The learned writ Court has held that from the records it appeared that the Community Development and Social Welfare Department of Tata Steel Limited was not involved in any such activity which would be said to be a trade or business for profit making purposes. Its object was to carry on welfare activities in the fields of education, health, and hygiene. The learned writ Court also recorded that merely because the appellant was being paid honorarium, the Community Development and Social Welfare Department of Tata Steel Limited cannot be treated as an “establishment” under the Act of 1953. 16. The appellant claimed that the appellant was an employee of Tata Steel Limited but this plea was also rejected by the learned Labour Court after considering the materials on record. The learned Labour Court has considered all the aspects of the matter. 16. The appellant claimed that the appellant was an employee of Tata Steel Limited but this plea was also rejected by the learned Labour Court after considering the materials on record. The learned Labour Court has considered all the aspects of the matter. The learned writ Court has also considered all the aspects of the matter within its limited jurisdiction and has dismissed the writ petition by a reasoned order. This Court finds no illegality or perversity in the orders passed by the learned Labour Court as well as in the impugned order dismissing the writ petition. 17. So far as the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court reported in (2005) 9 SCC 605 (supra) is concerned, the same does not apply to the facts and circumstances of this case. While deciding the said case, it has been recorded that maintenance of the hospital for employees of Tata Steel Limited and its associate industries was in discharge of statutory obligations under the Employees State Insurance Act, 1948 and it has the business activity as it was charging fees from the government servant as well as the private patients receiving treatment in the hospital. In the present case, the appellant has not been able to show any statutory obligation on the part of the respondents to undertake any kind of social and welfare activity nor has been able to show that the respondents were engaged in any kind of trade, business or profession for profit, rather the entire activity of the respondent no.1 was found to be free of cost. Consequently, the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court is clearly distinguishable and it does not help the appellant in any manner whatsoever. The perusal of paragraph no. 16 and the relevant portion of paragraph no. 17 of the judgment would clearly reflect the fact under which the aforesaid judgment was passed which is totally absent in the present case. Paragraph no. 16 and the relevant portion of paragraph no. 17 of the judgment in “TISCO Ltd. v. Chief Inspecting Officer” (2005) 9 SCC 605 are quoted as under: “16. Under the scheme of the Act, when the Hospital did not apply for registration, then a notice was sent to the Hospital for registration. The appellant objected to the registration. The said objections were overruled and the appellant was asked to get the Hospital registered. Under the scheme of the Act, when the Hospital did not apply for registration, then a notice was sent to the Hospital for registration. The appellant objected to the registration. The said objections were overruled and the appellant was asked to get the Hospital registered. Against this order, the present writ petition was filed before the High Court. The question is whether the present Hospital is an establishment or not. If it is an establishment, then it is under obligation to apply for registration. It is an admitted position that the Hospital is a part of the appellant management and as is more than evident that it is one of the divisions of the appellant, as per the budgetary provisions pointed out above. Therefore, there are no two opinions in the matter that the Hospital is a part of the appellant management. But the question is whether this Hospital is covered by the definition of “establishment” or not. The definition of “establishment” as reproduced above, clearly shows that any establishment which carries on any business, trade or provisions or any work connected with or incidental or ancillary to, any business, trade or profession and it includes shop, restaurant and other place of amusement and it further says that the State Government by notification may declare such other establishment to be an establishment to which this Act applies. The only exception is the motor transport undertaking as defined in clause (g) of the Motor Transport Workers Act, 1961. The question is whether this Hospital is engaged in business or not. In this connection, Mr T.R. Andhyarujina, learned Senior Counsel for the appellant has submitted that the definition of “business” is too wide and normally business or trade is for some profit or gain. But this Hospital is not working for any profit or gain and he emphasised with reference to the particulars given by him, that the Hospital is running in loss. Therefore, the question is what are the attributes of the business. But this Hospital is not working for any profit or gain and he emphasised with reference to the particulars given by him, that the Hospital is running in loss. Therefore, the question is what are the attributes of the business. In this connection, learned counsel has invited our attention to the dictionary meaning of the word “business” as given in Black’s Law Dictionary, which reads as under: “business.—A commercial enterprise carried on for profit; a particular occupation or employment habitually engaged in for livelihood or gain.” So far as the definition of “business” is concerned, it is clear from the facts that right from the beginning when the Hospital was established, it was catering to the needs of the employees and their families at TISCO and its associated companies but at the same time it was open for the government servants and private patients also. The government servants and private patients were charged for their treatment in the Hospital. It is not primarily meant to cater to the employees of the appellant or their associated companies but for private individuals also. Therefore, it cannot be said that the Hospital was only meant to cater to the needs of the employees of the appellant. It had business activities by charging fees from the government servants as well as private patients for their treatment in the Hospital. It may also be relevant to mention here that the establishment of the present Hospital is an obligation on the part of the appellant management because otherwise they had to contribute under the Employees’ State Insurance Act, 1948. Under the said Act, the employees as well as the employer, both have an obligation to make contribution for the medical facilities by the ESI Hospitals. All the establishments have to get themselves registered under Section 2-A of the ESI Act. They have also to make necessary contribution as per the provisions of the Act. At the same time, under Section 87 of the Act, exemption can also be granted by the Government by issuing notification exempting any factory or establishment or class of establishments in any specified area from operation of this Act for a period of one year and may from time to time by like notification renew any such exemption for periods not exceeding one year at a time. It is admitted by learned counsel for the appellant that the present establishment had obtained exemption up to the year 1996 but after that exemption was not granted and a petition was filed in the court and stay order has been granted. Therefore, even if the establishment of the Hospital may be for the purpose of taking care of their employees, it is under statutory obligation of the appellant management, otherwise they would have to make registration under Section 2-A of the ESI Act, 1948. It is admitted that the appellant sought exemption from operation of the Act which was granted up to the year 1996. Be that as it may, the fact remains that from the materials available on record it is apparent that the Hospital is not only catering for the employees but it caters to the government and private patients as well for which it is charging fee for the services rendered, it is irrelevant whether it is running for profit or loss. Profit or loss is part of the business and it is incidental to every business. Therefore, it is not decisive of the matter whether the establishment is running for profit or gain. Our attention was drawn to a decision of this Court in the case of Ruth Soren v. Managing Committee, East I.S.S.D.A. There also, Their Lordships have observed that an establishment for the purpose of this Act i.e. the Bihar Shops and Establishments Act, 1953 means an establishment which carries on any business, trade or profession or any work in connection with or incidental or ancillary thereto. In the context of educational institution after referring to the case of Bangalore Water Supply & Sewerage Board, Their Lordships observed that in the case of an educational institution, it may be industry but not establishment under the Act of 1953, it was observed as under: (SCC p. 118, para 5) “Even so, the question for consideration is whether educational institution falls within the definition of ‘establishment’ carrying business, trade or profession or incidental activities thereto. ‘Establishment’, as defined under the Act, is not as wide as ‘industry’ as defined under the Industrial Disputes Act. Hence, reliance on Bangalore Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. A. Rajappa for the appellant is not of any help.” Therefore, this case does not provide any assistance with regard to the present case at hand. ‘Establishment’, as defined under the Act, is not as wide as ‘industry’ as defined under the Industrial Disputes Act. Hence, reliance on Bangalore Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. A. Rajappa for the appellant is not of any help.” Therefore, this case does not provide any assistance with regard to the present case at hand. In the said case it was also held that the respondent which was running an educational institution in which the appellant was employed, being not an establishment, the application under Section 26(2) before the Labour Court against the appellant made by the respondent was incompetent and it was observed that running of the educational institution will not be covered by the establishment. But in the present case, from the facts as mentioned above, it is more than evident that the Hospital is not being run for the employees of the appellant management or their associated industries only but it caters to the need of the government servants as well as private patients and fee is charged from them. Therefore, the Hospital is doing business and it is not doing charity. 17. … Another aspect that was emphasised was that since it is running in loss and it is not making any profit, therefore it is not covered by the definition of establishment. It may be relevant to mention that the profit or loss is not decisive of the matter with regard to the business. … …….. Therefore, from the materials placed by the parties, it is more than apparent that the present Hospital is a part of the establishment of the appellant management and it caters not only for the employees of the appellant management and its associated companies but for government servants and private patients as well from whom fee is charged. Therefore, they are doing business and they fall within the definition of establishment as defined in Section 2(6) of the Act.” (emphasis supplied) 18. From the judgment in “Tata Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. Vs. Chief Inspecting Officer and others”, it is apparent that a finding was recorded on the basis of materials on record that the hospital was a part of the establishment of the Tata Steel Limited and it catered not only to the employees of Tata Steel Limited and its associated companies but also for the government servant and private patients from whom fees was charged. It has also been recorded that Tata Steel Limited and their associated companies were under the statutory obligation to maintain a hospital for their employees otherwise they would have to make a registration under section 2A of the Employees’ State Insurance Act, 1948. The aforesaid correspondent foundational facts to bring the activity of respondent no.2 within the meaning of “establishment” as defined under the aforesaid Act of 1953 are totally missing in the present case and accordingly the aforesaid judgment does not apply to the facts and circumstances of the present case. 19. We do not find any perversity/illegality in the orders passed by the learned Labour Court as well as the order passed by the learned writ Court dismissing the writ petition. Accordingly, this Letters Patent Appeal is dismissed. 20. I.A. No.5327 of 2020 filed for an early hearing of the present Letters Patent Appeal is closed.