JUDGMENT : 1. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and learned counsel for the respondents-State. 2. The present writ petition has been filed for quashing the charge-sheet dated 08.07.2015 (Annexure – 3), the second show cause notice dated 18.10.2016 (Annexure – 5), the cancellation of caste and residential certificate dated 08.11.2014 (Annexure – 8) and also for quashing the order contained in Memo No.924 dated 05.07.2018 (Annexure - 9) by which the petitioner was put under suspension. 3. The brief facts as appear from the arguments and pleadings of the parties are as follows :- I. The petitioner has been appointed pursuant to the examination held under 4th Jharkhand Public Service Commission (JPSC) under the category of Other backward Class (B.C.-1) in the cadre of State Administrative Service vide appointment letter dated 11.02.2013. II. While the petitioner was posted as Block Development Officer, Chinya, Garhwa, a show cause notice dated 29.12.2014 has been issued to him, which has been brought on record as Annexure – 1 to the amended writ petition. The said notice stipulates that the petitioner is not a member of Other Backward Class (B.C.-1) and as such why not a departmental proceeding should be initiated against him for his dismissal. The said notice has been replied by the petitioner, as contained in letter No.56 dated 10.01.2015 (Annexure – 2) denying the allegation. III. Thereafter, it appears that the department has issued the Memo of charge vide Memo dated 08.07.2015. IV. It further appears that thereafter, Enquiry Officer has started the enquiry and the petitioner has participated in the said proceeding with protest. The enquiry report has been submitted on 13.06.2016 (Annexure – 4) in which the Enquiry Officer has not found the allegation true against the petitioner. Thus, the enquiry is in favour of the petitioner. V. It further appears that thereafter, the department has differed with the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer and accordingly, second show cause notice dated 18.10.2016 (Annexure – 5) has been issued. Although reasons have not been assigned in the second show cause notice, but there is enclosure with the second show cause notice in which there is discussion of the reason and evidence. VI. Although reasons have not been assigned in the second show cause notice, but there is enclosure with the second show cause notice in which there is discussion of the reason and evidence. VI. It further appears that second show cause notice, issued to the petitioner, has been challenged in the present writ petition by way of filing amendment petition, which has been allowed and the same is under challenge in the present writ petition. VII. It also appears that the petitioner has been suspended on 05.07.2018 (Annexure – 9). VIII. It further appears that the petitioner was suspended earlier also on 20.05.2015, but the said suspension order has been revoked on 29.03.2016. Thus, the present suspension order is the second suspension after the second show cause notice. IX. It also appears that the caste certificate, issued to the petitioner, has been cancelled by the Sub-Divisional Officer, Giridih, vide its order dated 08.11.2014 (Annexure -8) which has also been impugned in the present writ petition. 4. The following argument has been advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner :- A. That the petitioner is a Class-II Officer and his appointing authority is the State Government and as such any initiation of the departmental proceedings has to be with the prior approval of the State Government. From perusal of record, it appears that although there is approval for initiation of the departmental proceeding, but the Memo of charge-sheet, issued to the petitioner, has never been approved by the appointing authority and as such the entire proceeding is bad from the stage of the issuance of the charge-sheet dated 08.07.2015. For this purpose, learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Union of India Vs. B.V. Gopinath., reported in (2014) 1 SCC 351 , especially paragraph Nos.21, 22, 26 and 55, which reads as under:- “21. It was further submitted that there may be some situations where even despite the fact that approval has been accorded to initiate the enquiry, charge-sheet may not be issued or approved. To illustrate, it was pointed out that there may be circumstances where the disciplinary authority, after approving the initiation of proceedings but before giving approval to the chargesheet, comes to a conclusion that a lesser charge or no charge is made out against the officer concerned. To illustrate, it was pointed out that there may be circumstances where the disciplinary authority, after approving the initiation of proceedings but before giving approval to the chargesheet, comes to a conclusion that a lesser charge or no charge is made out against the officer concerned. In such circumstances, the disciplinary authority proceeds accordingly and may drop the proceedings. Thus, it is for this reason that Rule 14 provides that the disciplinary authority has to apply its mind separately at two different stages: (i) initiation of proceedings; and (ii) approval of charge-sheet. 22. In this context, similar submissions were also reiterated by Mr Shekhar Kumar, learned counsel for the respondent in SLP (Civil) No. 25839 of 2011. Referring to Rule 14(3), the learned counsel submitted that charge memo ought to have been sanctioned by the disciplinary authority, especially since there was no sub-delegation of such power in favour of any other officer. 26. Mr Patwalia countered the submission of the learned Additional Solicitor General that it will not be in the interest of good administration to drop the inquiries which are already going on if the charge-sheets issued in such inquiries are required to be approved by the Finance Minister. In this context, it was submitted that such a contention has already been rejected by this Court in Coal India Ltd. v. Saroj Kumar Mishra. Our attention was also drawn to the following excerpt from the said case: (SCC p. 632, para 19) “19. The floodgate argument also does not appeal to us. The same appears to be an argument of desperation. Only because there is a possibility of floodgate litigation, a valuable right of a citizen cannot be permitted to be taken away. This Court is bound to determine the respective rights of the parties.” Thus, it was submitted that the civil appeals are required to be dismissed. 55. Although number of collateral issues had been raised by the learned counsel for the appellants as well the respondents, we deem it appropriate not to opine on the same in view of the conclusion that the chargesheet/charge memo having not been approved by the disciplinary authority was non est in the eye of the law.” (Emphasis supplied) Learned counsel for the petitioner has further relied upon the judgment of this Hon'ble Court in the case of Abhay Kumar Vs. The State of Jharkhand, reported in 2016 (3) JBCJ 506, especially paragraph Nos.3, 4 and 5, which reads as under:- “3. The Trial Court on 21.03.2014 has taken note of the supplementary charge sheet no. 20/2014 and observed that the accused Abhay Kumar has not been charge sheeted. Cognizance has been taken for the offences and processes have been issued against some accused persons (Annexure-4). 4. Inquiry proceeded against the petitioner and out of six charges, charge nos. 2 and 4 were partly found to be proved by the Inquiry Officer i.e. Additional MANREGA Commissioner of the Rural Development Department. Petitioner was served with a second show-cause notice which however has not been brought on record. He has also responded vide Annexure-6 seeking exoneration on the grounds that in the criminal case, final form has been submitted exonerating the petitioner and that there could be no basis for holding him guilty even as per the Inquiry Report. Petitioner has approached this Court after issuance of the second show-cause notice and pleaded that the criminal case and the Departmental Proceeding being based on same charges and similar set of facts and evidence, he deserves protection from any precipitate action taken in the Departmental Proceeding which the respondents were inclined to take. 5. The grounds urged on behalf of the counsel for the petitioner in support thereof inter-alia are as follows: (i) Petitioner was on deputation in Rural Development Department from his parent Water Resources Department and though, the initiation of the Departmental Proceeding was approved by the competent authority under the Rural Development Department, but the charge memo was not approved by him, as is the mandatory requirement in view of the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Union of India and Others vs. B. V. Gopinath and analogous cases, (2014) 1 SCC 351 . (ii) Since in the criminal case for the same set of charges, the Investigating Agency has not found any evidence to prosecute him, the Disciplinary Authority should not proceed with the Departmental Inquiry on the same charges, same evidence and set of facts. His exoneration by the Investigating Agency is in effect honourable acquittal and the petitioner deserves exoneration in the Departmental Proceeding as well. His exoneration by the Investigating Agency is in effect honourable acquittal and the petitioner deserves exoneration in the Departmental Proceeding as well. Learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon a judgment rendered by the Apex Court in the case of K. Venkateshwarlu vs. State of Andhra Pradesh (2012) 8 SCC 73 Para-5 to 11 and 13 thereof. (iii) It is also urged that during pendency of the writ application, respondents have forwarded the proposal for imposing punishment of dismissal upon him to the Public Service Commission i.e. JPSC which shows a premeditated state of mind to punish the petitioner, though even as per Inquiry Report, only two charges were partly proved.” (Emphasis supplied) Learned counsel for the petitioner has also relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Tamil Nadu Rep. By Secretary To Govt. (Home) Vs. Pramod Kumar IPS & Anr., passed in Civil Appeal Nos.8427-8428 of 2018, especially paragraph Nos.17, 18 and 19, which reads as under:- “17. It is clear that the approval of the disciplinary authority was taken for initiation of the disciplinary proceedings. It is also clear from the affidavit that no approval was sought from the disciplinary authority at the time when the charge memo was issued to the delinquent officer. The submission made on behalf of the Appellant is that approval of the disciplinary authority for initiation of disciplinary proceedings was sufficient and there was no need for another approval for issuance of charge memo. The basis for such submission is that initiation of disciplinary proceedings and issuance of charge memo are at the same stage. We are unable to agree with the submission in view of the judgment of this Court in B.V. Gopinath (supra). In that case the charge memo issued to Mr. Gopinath under Rule 14(3) of the Central Civil Service (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 was quashed by the Central Administrative Tribunal on the ground that the Finance Minister did not approve it. The judgment of the Tribunal was affirmed by the High Court. The Union of India, the Appellant therein submitted before this Court that the approval for initiation of the departmental proceedings includes the approval of the charge memo. The judgment of the Tribunal was affirmed by the High Court. The Union of India, the Appellant therein submitted before this Court that the approval for initiation of the departmental proceedings includes the approval of the charge memo. Such submission was not accepted by this Court on an interpretation of Rule 14(3) which provides that the disciplinary authority shall “ draw up or cause to be drawn up” the charge memo. It was held that if any authority other than the disciplinary authority is permitted to draw the charge memo, the same would result in destroying the underlying protection guaranteed under Article 311 (2) of the Constitution of India. 18. Rule 8 (4) of the All India Service (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1969 also mandates that the disciplinary authority shall “draw up or cause to be drawn up” the charge memo. We see no reason to take a view different from the one taken by this Court in B.V.Gopinath (supra). We also see no substance in the submission made by the Senior Counsel for the State that the said judgment needs reconsideration. Assuming that Mr.Giri is right in his submission that the initiation of disciplinary proceedings and issuance of charge memo are at the same stage, the mandatory requirement of Rule 8 which provides for the charge memo to be drawn by the disciplinary authority cannot be ignored. We reject the submission on behalf of the Appellant that Gopinath’s case can be distinguished on facts. We are not in agreement with the contention of the Appellant that the business rules and standing orders of the State of Tamil Nadu are quite different from the office orders and circulars issued by Union of India which formed the basis of the judgment in Gopinath’s case. A close reading of the said judgment would disclose that reliance on the office note was only in addition to the interpretation of the Rule. 19. It is also settled law that if the rule requires something to be done in a particular manner it should be done either in the same manner or not at all- Taylor v. Taylor (1875) 1 Ch.D. 426, 431. 19. It is also settled law that if the rule requires something to be done in a particular manner it should be done either in the same manner or not at all- Taylor v. Taylor (1875) 1 Ch.D. 426, 431. In view of the mandatory requirement of Rule 8 (4) and the charge memo being drawn up or cause to be drawn up by the disciplinary authority is not complied with, we are of the considered opinion that there is no reason to interfere with the judgment of the High Court on this issue. The only addition we would like to make is to give liberty to the disciplinary authority to issue a charge memo afresh after taking approval from the disciplinary authority. (Emphasis supplied) Learned counsel for the petitioner while referring to the Rule 17(3) of the Jharkhand Government Servants (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 2016, has also submitted that the Memo of charge has to be issued by the appointing authority. Rule 17(3) of the Jharkhand Government Servants (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 2016, reads as under :- “17. Procedure for imposing major penalties:- (1) …...... (2) …..... (3) Where it is proposed to hold an inquiry against a Government Servant under this rule, the Disciplinary Authority shall draw up or cause to be drawn up :- (i) The substance of the imputations of misconduct or misbehaviour as a definite and distinct article of charge. (ii) A statement of the imputations of misconduct or misbehaviour in support of each article of charge, which shall contain :- (a) A statement of all relevant facts including any admission or confession made by the Government Servant; (b) A list of such document by which, and a list of such witnesses by whom, the articles of charge are proposed to be sustained. B. It has further been argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the Sub-Divisional Officer has no power and authority to cancel the caste certificate, issued in favour of the petitioner and for that purpose he has referred to the Circular issued by the State Government dated 08.07.2004 whereby a Caste Scrutiny Committee has been constituted. B. It has further been argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the Sub-Divisional Officer has no power and authority to cancel the caste certificate, issued in favour of the petitioner and for that purpose he has referred to the Circular issued by the State Government dated 08.07.2004 whereby a Caste Scrutiny Committee has been constituted. It has been mandated under the said Circular that any such dispute has to be placed before the Caste Scrutiny Committee and the said Caste Scrutiny Committee alone is competent to look into the matter and consider the genunity of the caste certificate. Since in the present case, the caste certificate, issued to the petitioner, has been cancelled by the Sub-Divisional Officer and it has not been referred to the Caste Scrutiny Committee and as such the cancellation of the caste certificate is without authorization of law rather it is contrary to the above Circular dated 08.07.2004. For this purpose, learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Kumari Madhuri Patil & Anr. Vs. Addl. Commissioner, Tribal Development & Ors., reported in AIR 1995 SC 94 . C. The third limb of argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that it is settled principle of law that the Disciplinary Authority may differ with the findings recorded by the Enquiry officer, but the reasons for difference has to be assigned in the second show cause. In the present case, the second show cause contains no such reasoning or discussion of the evidence and as such the second show cause is bad in law. It has further been submitted that mere supplying the note-sheet will not suffice the matter. It has to be the part of the second show cause. On above basis, the impugned orders, i.e., (a) the second order of suspension dated 05.07.2018; (b) the Memo of charge dated 08.07.2015; (c) the second show cause dated 18.10.2016; and (d) the cancellation order of the caste certificate dated 08.11.2014 have been assailed and argument has been advanced that the same are wholly without jurisdiction and are contrary to law and against the judicial pronouncements. 5. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents-State, has opposed the submission advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner. 5. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents-State, has opposed the submission advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner. It has been argued by the learned counsel for the respondents-State :- A. that so far as approval of the Memo of charge is concerned it is a combined approval and for this purpose he has relied upon the portion of the Annexure –D of the supplementary counter affidavit affidavit dated 17.12.2019. The relevant portion of the same is quoted herein-below:- ^^vr% izLrko gS fd& 1- Jh dqekj dks vlSfud lsok,¡ ¼oxhZdj.k] fu;a=.k ,oa vihy½ fu;ekoyh] 1930 ds fu;e&49¼d½¼1½¼d½ ds rgr~ rRdky izHkko ls fuyafcr fd;k tk;A fuyacu vof/k esa budk eq[;ky; izeaMyh; vk;qDr dk dk;kZy;] iykew izeaMy] es fnuhuxj jgsxk rFkk >kj[k.M lsok lafgrk ds fu;e&96 ds rgr~ bl vof/k esa bUgsa thou fuokZg HkÙkk ns; gksxk ( 2- Jh dqekj ds fo:) izfrosfnr vkjksiksa dks foHkkx }kjk izi=&^d* esa xfBr djrs gq, fu;e&55 ds rgr~ foHkkxh; dk;Zokgh pyk;h tk;] ftlds fy, Jh 'kqHksUnz >k] lsokfuo`r Hkk0iz0ls0] foHkkxh; tk¡p inkf/kdkjh dks lapkyu inkf/kdkjh fu;qDr fd;k tk ldrk gS rFkk Jh tqfYQdkj vyh] vuqeaMy inkf/kdkjh] fxfjMhg dks miLFkkiu inkf/kdkjh ukfer fd;k tk ldrk gSA ,oa 3- fcuk leqfpr tk¡p ds Jh dqekj dk LFkkuh; fuoklh izek.k&i= rFkk tkfr izek.k&i= fuxZr djus okys nks"kh rnsu iz[k.M fodkl inkf/kdkjh] vapy vf/kdkjh ,oa vuqeaMy inkf/kdkjh dks fpfUgr djrs gq, muds fo:) izi=&^d* esa vkjksi xfBr dj ,d i{k ds Hkhrj miyC/k djkus dk funs'k mik;qDr] fxfjMhg dks fn;k tk ldrk gSA Hkonh; lger gksa] rks mDr izLrko ij eq[; lfpo ds ek/;e ls ekuuh; eq[;ea=h dk vkns'k izkIr fd;k tk ldrk gSA** This has been approved by the Hon’ble Chief Minister of the State. Since the approval order itself stipulates that izi=&^d* has to be issued after initiation of the departmental proceeding and as such the separate approval of the Memo of charge is not required since it was a joint approval. B. that so far as objection of the learned counsel for the petitioner regarding order of cancellation of caste certificate by the Sub-Divisional Officer is concerned, the argument has been advanced by the learned counsel for the respondents -State that the Circular dated 08.07.2004 is of the year 2004 and is with regard to the caste certificate issued to the member of the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe only. This Circular does not cover the caste certificate issued in favour of the petitioner, who belongs to Other Backward Class (B.C.-1). Since the Caste Scrutiny Committee is not for the member of other backward class and as such the said Circular is not applicable in the case of the present petitioner rather the Sub-Divisional Officer has the authority to cancel the caste certificate. C. So far as the assignment of reasons for differing with the enquiry report is concerned, a separate note-sheet has been supplied with the second show cause, wherein the evidence has been discussed and the reasons have been assigned for differing with the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer and as such it is purportedly in accordance with law. The note-sheet has been supplied with the second show cause notice and as such merely on the basis of format, the petitioner cannot claim any relief. 6. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and from perusal of record, it appears :- (i). that although the departmental proceeding has been initiated with the approval of the State Government, but the Memo of charge has never been approved by the council of the Minister or by the Hon’ble Chief Minister of the State. The judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court, as noted above, is clear on this point. Further, Rule 17(3) of the Jharkhand Government Servants (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 2016, which covers the field, also clarifies the position that the Memo of charge has to be issued by the appointing authority. Non-approval of the Memo of charge by the appointing authority makes it unauthorized and nullity in the eyes of law. It is settled principle of law that an action can only be taken by an authorized person, who is authorized in law, otherwise, the action itself is without jurisdiction and void ab-initio. Since the present Memo of charge has been issued without the approval of the State Government and as such this Court finds that the Memo of charge-sheet dated 08.07.2015 is not sustainable in the eye of law and accordingly, the same is hereby, quashed and set aside. (ii). Since the present Memo of charge has been issued without the approval of the State Government and as such this Court finds that the Memo of charge-sheet dated 08.07.2015 is not sustainable in the eye of law and accordingly, the same is hereby, quashed and set aside. (ii). So far as the second issue regarding the cancellation of caste certificate by the Sub-Divisional Officer is concerned, this Court finds that the Circular relied upon by the petitioner is not applicable in the case of the petitioner as because the said Circular covers only for the members belonging to the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe. The Caste Scrutiny Committee, which has been constituted, has not been authorized to look into the caste certificate, issued to the members of the other backward class. In the absence of authorization by the circular itself, the reliance upon the said circular by the petitioner is of no use and accordingly, this Court finds no force in the submission of learned counsel for the petitioner and accordingly, the same is, hereby, rejected. (iii) Since in the present case, the issue involved is the ouster of Sub-Divisional Officer on the strength of Caste Scrutiny Committee constituted vide Circular dated 08.07.2004, has not been accepted by this Court and on this score the challenge to the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer cancelling the caste certificate, has been rejected by this Court. However, it is clarified that the issue of the caste has not been decided by this Court on merit and it is, hereby, kept open to be decided by the competent authority in accordance with law. The liberty is reserved with the petitioner to challenge the order of cancellation of the caste certificate in the appropriate proceeding in accordance with law. (iv). So far as the second show cause is concerned, the evidence has been discussed and the reasons have been assigned by the authority while issuing the second show cause and the same has been supplied along with the second show cause itself. It is settled principle of law that the format has not to be seen rather substance has to be seen. It is settled principle of law that the format has not to be seen rather substance has to be seen. Since in substance the reasons have been shown for differing with the finding recorded by the Enquiry Officer by referring to the evidence available on record and as such this Court finds no illegality in issuance of second show cause notice on the ground of non-assignment of reasons. Accordingly, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner on this score is also not tenable. (v) Since this Court finds that the issuance of Memo of charge itself is unauthorized and as such the entire proceedings from the stage of issuance of the charge-sheet is bad in law and unauthorized and as such the same is hereby, quashed and set aside. Since the charge-sheet has been quashed and as such the suspension order contained in Memo No.924 dated 05.07.2018 also stands quashed. 7. With the above observations and directions, the present writ petition stands disposed of. 8. Pending interlocutory application, if any, also stands disposed of.