ORDER : S.Vaidyanathan, J. Heard the learned counsel appearing for the Review Applicant and the learned Additional Advocate General appearing for the respondents. 2. This Review Application is filed by the Writ Petitioner to review the order dated 10.02.2022 in Writ Appeal No.978 of 2014 on the file of this Court. 3. The above said Writ Appeal No.978 of 2014 was filed by the State against the order dated 22.03.2013 passed in Writ Petition No.1740 of 2013. 4. The said W.P.No.1740 of 2013 was filed by the review applicant herein (D.Chitharanjan) to call for the records in Na.Ka.No.M1/6241/2012, dated 10.12.2012 on the file of the second respondent (The Superintendent of Police, District Police Office, Kancheepuram) and quash the same and direct the first respondent-Member Secretary of the Tamil Nadu Uniformed Service Recruitment Board, to select and appoint the writ petitioner (review petitioner) for the post of Grade-II Police Constable in the Tamil Nadu Special Police, Kancheepuram. 5. Learned counsel for the review petitioner submitted that the review petitioner is similarly placed like that of one E.Sugumar and Sathish Kumar and that the review petitioner's candidature needs to be considered and the judgment dated 10.02.2022 rendered in W.A.No.978 of 2022 needs to be reviewed. 6. It is seen that the said E.Sugumar earlier had filed W.P.No.7229 of 2020 before this Court to call for the records pertaining to the proceedings of the third respondent therein (Superintendent of Police, Chengalpattu Distict, i/c Kancheepuram District, Kancheepuram) in Na.Ka.No.M1/22432/2019, dated 03.03.2020 and quash the same as illegal and ultra-vires and consequently direct the respondents to appoint the said E.Sugumar in the post of Police Constable Grade-II. The said W.P.No.7229 of 2020 was allowed on 16.12.2020, against which, the State had preferred Writ Appeal No.2367 of 2021, which was dismissed on 21.09.2021, against which, the State had preferred Special Leave to Appeal (C).No.4426 of 2022 before the Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court has dismissed the said Special Leave Petition on 21.03.2022, holding as follows: "1. In the facts and circumstances of this case, and without this Court expressing any opinion on the question of law, which has been raised by the State of Tamil Nadu (which is kept open to be urged in an appropriate case), this is not a fit and appropriate case for the invocation of the jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution. 2. The Special Leave Petition is dismissed. 3. 2. The Special Leave Petition is dismissed. 3. Pending applications, if any, stand disposed of." 7. Moreover, it is relied across the Bar, a decision of the Apex Court in the case of Union of India and others Vs. Methu Meda (in Civil Appeal No.6238 of 2021 arising out of Special Leave to Petition (C).No.23856 of 2014, dated 06.10.2021), wherein it was held by the Apex Court as follows in paragraph 22: "22. ..... the law is well-settled. If a person is acquitted giving him the benefit of doubt, from the charge of an offence involving moral turpitude or because the witnesses turned hostile, it would not automatically entitle him for the employment, that too in disciplined force. The employer is having a right to consider his candidature in terms of the circulars issued by the Screening Committee. The mere disclosure of the offences alleged and the result of the trial is not sufficient. In the said situation, the employer cannot be compelled to give appointment to the candidate. Both the Single Bench and the Division Bench of the High Court have not considered the said legal position, as discussed above in the orders impugned. Therefore, the impugned orders passed by the learned Single Judge of the High Court in Writ Petition No.3897 of 2013 and Division Bench in Writ Appeal No.1090 of 2013 are not sustainable in laws, as discussed hereinabove." 8. This Court, while rendering the judgment dated 10.02.2022 in W.A.No.978 of 2014, which is the subject matter of review in this Review Application, has taken note of the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Avtar Singh Vs. Union of India and others, reported in 2016 (8) SCC 471 , and paragraph 38 of the Avtar Singh (supra) reads as follows: "30. We have noticed various decisions and tried to explain and reconcile them as far as possible. In view of aforesaid discussion, we summarize our conclusion thus: 38.1. Information given to the employer by a candidate as to conviction, acquittal or arrest, or pendency of a criminal case, whether before or after entering into service must be true and there should be no suppression or false mention of required information. 38.2. While passing order of termination of services or cancellation of candidature for giving false information, the employer may take notice of special circumstances of the case, if any, while giving such information. 38.3. 38.2. While passing order of termination of services or cancellation of candidature for giving false information, the employer may take notice of special circumstances of the case, if any, while giving such information. 38.3. The employer shall take into consideration the government orders/instructions/rules, applicable to the employee, at the time of taking the decision. 38.4. In case there is suppression or false information of involvement in a criminal case where conviction or acquittal had already been recorded before filling of the application/verification form and such fact later comes to knowledge of employer, any of the following recourses appropriate to the case may be adopted :- 38.4.1. In a case trivial in nature in which conviction had been recorded, such as shouting slogans at young age or for a petty offence which if disclosed would not have rendered an incumbent unfit for post in question, the employer may, in its discretion, ignore such suppression of fact or false information by condoning the lapse. 38.4.2. Where conviction has been recorded in case which is not trivial in nature, employer may cancel candidature or terminate services of the employee. 38.4.3. If acquittal had already been recorded in a case involving moral turpitude or offence of heinous/serious nature, on technical ground and it is not a case of clean acquittal, or benefit of reasonable doubt has been given, the employer may consider all relevant facts available as to antecedents, and may take appropriate decision as to the continuance of the employee. 38.5. In a case where the employee has made declaration truthfully of a concluded criminal case, the employer still has the right to consider antecedents, and cannot be compelled to appoint the candidate. 38.6. In case when fact has been truthfully declared in character verification form regarding pendency of a criminal case of trivial nature, employer, in facts and circumstances of the case, in its discretion may appoint the candidate subject to decision of such case. 38.7. In a case of deliberate suppression of fact with respect to multiple pending cases such false information by itself will assume significance and an employer may pass appropriate order cancelling candidature or terminating services as appointment of a person against whom multiple criminal cases were pending may not be proper. 38.8. 38.7. In a case of deliberate suppression of fact with respect to multiple pending cases such false information by itself will assume significance and an employer may pass appropriate order cancelling candidature or terminating services as appointment of a person against whom multiple criminal cases were pending may not be proper. 38.8. If criminal case was pending but not known to the candidate at the time of filling the form, still it may have adverse impact and the appointing authority would take decision after considering the seriousness of the crime. 38.9. In case the employee is confirmed in service, holding Departmental enquiry would be necessary before passing order of termination/removal or dismissal on the ground of suppression or submitting false information in verification form. 38.10. For determining suppression or false information attestation/verification form has to be specific, not vague. Only such information which was required to be specifically mentioned has to be disclosed. If information not asked for but is relevant comes to knowledge of the employer the same can be considered in an objective manner while addressing the question of fitness. However, in such cases action cannot be taken on basis of suppression or submitting false information as to a fact which was not even asked for. 38.11. Before a person is held guilty of suppressio veri or suggestio falsi, knowledge of the fact must be attributable to him." 9. In the case pertaining to the said Sathish Kumar, the person was honourably acquitted by a Court of Law. Insofar as the case of E.Sugumar is concerned, the Department has specifically stated that even though the witness and the complainant have turned hostile, there was suppression in Column-15 of the application, dated 23.04.2021 (E.Sugumar, Reg.No.0311103), pertaining to Tamil Nadu Police Verification Roll. It is useful to extract what is stated in Column Nos.15 and 16 of the said application, dated 23.04.2021: Whereas, in the application dated 10.02.2020 (E.Sugumar, Reg.No.0304542), pertaining to Tamil Nadu Police Verification Roll, it is stated as follows: 10. Furthermore, the Division Bench, while disposing of W.A.No.2367 of 2021 on 21.09.2021 (filed by the State against the order dated 16.12.2020 in W.P.No.7229 of 2020), the said E.Sugumar was heard and it is relevant to extract paragraph 2.2 of the said W.A.No.2367 of 2021, as follows: "2.2. Furthermore, the Division Bench, while disposing of W.A.No.2367 of 2021 on 21.09.2021 (filed by the State against the order dated 16.12.2020 in W.P.No.7229 of 2020), the said E.Sugumar was heard and it is relevant to extract paragraph 2.2 of the said W.A.No.2367 of 2021, as follows: "2.2. Learned Government Counsel also submitted that disclosure about the criminal case has not been duly made in the application and his involvement has been subsequently found out through Tamil Nadu Police Verification Roll in Column No.16. The act of the Respondent in not disclosing in the application is fatal to his case. When there is a suppression in the application, rejection on that score is correct and the candidature has been rightly rejected for non disclosure." 11. On verifying the original records relating to the said E.Sugumar, more so, pertaining to application, dated 10.02.2020 of the said E.Sugumar (Reg.No.0304542) in Column No.16 of the Tamil Nadu Police Verification Rolls, the word written as has been deleted. (in Tamil means 'No') and the details are filled in that Column No.16, extracted supra, and the same is also evident from the above said judgment of this Court (extracted supra) in W.A.No.2367 of 2021, dated 21.09.2021. 12. In the above context, it is pertinent to extract paragraph 8 of the judgment dated 21.09.2021 in Writ Appeal No.2367 of 2021 (filed by the State challenging the allowing of W.P.No.7229 of 2020 on 16.12.2020, filed by E.Sugumar): "8. The Writ Petitioner/Respondent herein has not disclosed about the criminal case in the application and the Appellants later on found out his involvement in the criminal case through Verification Roll. The offence, which is minor in nature and is compoundable (even though foisted) cannot be seriously taken note of in the light of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Avtar Singh vs. Union of India and others, reported in (2016) 8 SCC 471 . If a serious offence, like non-compoundable has been committed by the Respondent, definitely, the candidate needs to be rejected. Even after appointment, a candidate can be removed for the non-disclosure of the offence that comes to light at a later point of time, as it can be construed that initial appointment itself is irregular and illegal. Therefore, non-disclosure of the criminal case in the application by the Respondent cannot be treated to be a suppression. Even after appointment, a candidate can be removed for the non-disclosure of the offence that comes to light at a later point of time, as it can be construed that initial appointment itself is irregular and illegal. Therefore, non-disclosure of the criminal case in the application by the Respondent cannot be treated to be a suppression. In case, the criminal case is still pending and the same was found during verification, obviously, the Respondent is not entitled to any relief in terms of Paragraph No.14 of the judgment (cited supra). In the present case on hand, the application was made in the year 2019 and the compromise was entered into in the year 2016." 13. Thus, in the above extracted portion of the judgment dated 21.09.2021, the Division Bench (in which, one of us - S.Vaidyanathan, J - was speaking for the Bench), in W.A.No.2367 of 2021, this Court, had referred to about the involvement of the said G.Sugumar in the criminal case, which was not disclosed earlier and the word was deleted in the application form, dated 10.02.2020 (Reg.No.0304542) subsequently, it was found out and mentioned in the Tamil Nadu Police Verification Roll. 14. Thus, insofar as the application relating to E.Sugumar is concerned, taking note of the family dispute, which is held in the criminal case, this Court has granted the relief to the said E.Sugumar, which has been confirmed by the Supreme Court in S.L.P.No.4426 of 2022, dated 21.03.2022, extracted supra. 15. It is trite from a catena of decisions of this Court and the Supreme Court holding that the scope of review is very limited/minimal and it is outlined by the provisions of the statute. It would be relevant to refer to few Judgments of this Court and the Supreme Court to understand and appreciate the scope of "review jurisdiction" to find out as to whether the review applicant herein has made out a case for reviewing the order under review:- (i) In a decision of a Division Bench of this Court in the case of The Special Officer, Kallal Co-operative Primary Agricultural and Rural Development Bank Ltd., Karaikudi, Sivagangai District Vs. R.M.Rajarathinam and Others [Review Application (MD). No.82 of 2013] decided on 04.02.2015, it was held as follows: “10... It is well settled that the scope of review is very limited. R.M.Rajarathinam and Others [Review Application (MD). No.82 of 2013] decided on 04.02.2015, it was held as follows: “10... It is well settled that the scope of review is very limited. The review applicant cannot re-argue and he is not entitled for re-hearing on merits.” (ii) In another decision of a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Dhanalakshmi Vs. M.Shajahan and others reported in AIR 2004 Madras 512, it was opined that the power of review is not an appeal in disguise. The relevant portion of the said order, is extracted below: "11. From the above judgments, it is seen that the law is well settled inasmuch as the power of review is available only when there is an error apparent on the face of the record and not on erroneous decision. If the parties aggrieved by the judgment on the ground that it is erroneous, remedy is only questioning the said order in appeal. The power of review under Order 47 Rule 1 C.P.C. may be opened inter alia only if there is a mistake or an error apparent on the face of the record. The said power cannot be exercised as is not permissible for an erroneous decision to be "reheard and corrected". A review application also cannot be allowed to be "an appeal in disguise". Similarly, the error apparent on the face of the record must be such an error, which must strikes one on mere looking at record and would not require any long drawn process of reasoning on points, where there may conceivably be two opinions.” (iii) Furthermore, in R.Mohala Vs. M.Siva and others in Review Petition No.61 of 2018 and WMP.No.10818 and 10819 of 2018 decided on 25.04.2018, one of us (SVNJ) elaborately discussed the scope of review and in Paragraph Nos.7 and 8, it was held as follows: “7. The basic principle to entertain the review under Order 47 Rule 1 C.P.C. is to correct the errors but not to substitute a view. The basic principle to entertain the review under Order 47 Rule 1 C.P.C. is to correct the errors but not to substitute a view. The judgment under review cannot be reversed (or) altered taking away the rights declared and conferred by the Court under the said judgment; once a judgment is rendered, the Court becomes functus officio and it cannot set aside its judgment or the decree; no inherent powers of review were conferred on the Court; the review Court cannot look into the trial Court judgment; it can look into its own judgment for limited purpose to correct any error or mistake in the judgment pointed out by the review petitioner without altering or substituting its view in the judgment under review; the review court cannot entertain the arguments touching the merits and demerits of the case and cannot take a different view disturbing the finality of the judgment; the review cannot be treated as appeal in disguise, as the object behind review is ultimately to see that there should not be miscarriage of justice and shall do justice for the sake of justice only and review on the ground that the judgment is erroneous cannot be sustained. 8. It is settled law that even an erroneous decision cannot be a ground for the Court to undertake review, as the first and foremost requirement of entertaining a review petition is that the order under review of which is sought, suffers from any error apparent on the face of the order and in absence of any such error, finality attached to the judgment/order cannot be disturbed.” (iv) The Supreme Court in the case of Meera Bhanja Vs. Nirmala Kumari Choudhury reported in 1995 (1) SCC 170 , considered the scope and power of "review" of the High Court under Order 47, Rule 1, C.P.C., and the relevant portion of the said decision reads as follows: "8. It is well settled that the review proceedings are not by way of an appeal and have to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order 47, Rule 1, CPC. In connection with the limitation of the powers of the court under Order 47, Rule 1, while dealing with similar jurisdiction available to the High Court while seeking to review the orders under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, this Court, in the case of Ariban Tuleshwar Sharma Vs. In connection with the limitation of the powers of the court under Order 47, Rule 1, while dealing with similar jurisdiction available to the High Court while seeking to review the orders under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, this Court, in the case of Ariban Tuleshwar Sharma Vs. Ariban Pishak Sharma ( 1979 (4) SCC 389 : AIR 1979 SC 1047 ), speaking through Chinnappa Reddy, J., has made the following pertinent observations: (SCC p.390, para 3): "It is true as observed by this Court in Shivdeo Singh Vs. State of Punjab ( AIR 1963 SC 1909 ), there is nothing in Article 226 of the Constitution to preclude the High Court from exercising the power of review which inheres in every Court of plenary jurisdiction to prevent miscarriage of justice or to correct grave and palpable errors committed by it. But there are definitive limits to the exercise of the power of review. The power of review may be exercised on the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence was not within the knowledge of the person seeking the review or could not be produced by him at the time when the order was made; it may be exercised where some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record is found; it may also be exercised on any analogous ground. But, it may not be exercised on the ground that the decision was erroneous on merits. That would be the province of a court of appeal. A power of review is not to be confused with appellate power which may enable an appellate court to correct all manner of errors committed by the subordinate court." 9. Now it is also to be kept in view that in the impugned judgment, the Division Bench of the High Court has clearly observed that they were entertaining the review petition only on the ground of error apparent on the face of the record and not on any other ground. So far as that aspect is concerned, it has to be kept in view that an error apparent on the face of the record must be such an error which must strike one on mere looking at the record and would not require any long-drawn process of reasoning on points where there may conceivably be two opinions. So far as that aspect is concerned, it has to be kept in view that an error apparent on the face of the record must be such an error which must strike one on mere looking at the record and would not require any long-drawn process of reasoning on points where there may conceivably be two opinions. We may usefully refer to the observations of this Court in the case of Satyanarayan Laxinarayan Hegde Vs. Mallikarjun Bhavanappa Tirumale ( AIR 1960 SC 137 : 1960 (1) SCR 890 ), wherein K.C.Das Gupta, J., speaking for the Court has made the following observations in connection with an error apparent on the face of the record: "An error which has to be established by a longdrawn process of reasoning on points where there may conceivably be two opinions can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record. Where an alleged error is far from self-evident and if it can be established, it has to be established, by lengthy and complicated arguments, such an error cannot be cured by a writ of certiorari according to the rule governing the powers of the superior court to issue such a writ." (v) In the case in Parsion Devi Vs. Sumitri Devi, reported in 1997 (8) SCC 715 , the Apex Court held as follows: "9. Under Order 47, Rule 1, CPC a judgment may be open to review inter alia if there is a mistake or an error apparent on the face of the record. An error which is not self-evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning, can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record justifying the Court to exercise its power of review under Order 47, Rule 1, CPC. In exercise of the jurisdiction under Order 47, Rule 1, CPC, it is not permissible for an erroneous decision to be "reheard and corrected". A review petition, it must be remembered has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be "an appeal in disguise." 16. From a reading of the above referred Judgments, it is crystal clear that: 1. Review is not an appeal in disguise. 2. The review proceedings are not by way of an appeal and have to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order 47, Rule 1 C.P.C. 3. From a reading of the above referred Judgments, it is crystal clear that: 1. Review is not an appeal in disguise. 2. The review proceedings are not by way of an appeal and have to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order 47, Rule 1 C.P.C. 3. A wrong exposition of the law or a wrong application of the law and failure to apply the correct law cannot be a ground for review. 4. The power to review is a restricted power given through a Court to go through the Judgment only to correct it or improve it, on the basis of some material which ought to have been considered, escaped consideration or failed to be placed before it for any other reason, but not to substitute a fresh or a second Judgment. 5. The power of review cannot be invoked to correct the erroneous Judgment and the finality attached to a Judgment cannot be disturbed. 6. Only errors which are apparent on the face of the record in the sense that errors which strike on mere looking at record, can only be corrected and not those that require long drawn process of reasoning on point. 17. The above are of the basic principles on which the power to review rests. The said principles are not exhaustive, but only illustrative. 18. Further, to review a Judgment/Order, the review applicant needs to satisfy three basic requirements of Order 47 Rule 1 of C.P.C., which are as under: (i) From discovery of new and important matter or evidence which after exercise of due diligence was not within his knowledge (or) could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed (or) order made; (ii) There is some mistake (or) error apparent on the face of the record in the judgment under review; and (iii) or any other sufficient reasons." 19. It is also useful to refer a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2013 (8) SCC 320 (Kamlesh Verma Vs. Mayawati), in which, the Apex Court had considered the scope of the review jurisdiction and summarised the factors as to when the review will be maintainable and when the review will not be maintainable and the same are extracted hereunder: "Summary of the principles 20. Thus, in view of the above, the following grounds of review are maintainable as stipulated by the statute: 20.1. Thus, in view of the above, the following grounds of review are maintainable as stipulated by the statute: 20.1. When the review will be maintainable: (i) Discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within knowledge of the petitioner or could not be produced by him; (ii) Mistake or error apparent on the face of the record; (iii) Any other sufficient reason. The words "any other sufficient reason" have been interpreted in Chhajju Ram Vs. Neki ( (1921-22) 49 IA 144 : (1922) 16 LW 37 : AIR 1922 PC 112 ) and approved by this Court in Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos Vs. Most Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius ( AIR 1954 SC 526 : (1955) 1 SCR 520 ) to mean "a reason sufficient on grounds at least analogous to those specified in the rule". The same principles have been reiterated in Union of India Vs. Sandur Manganese & Iron Ores Ltd. ( (2013) 8 SCC 337 : JT (2013) 8 SC 275). 20.2. When the review will not be maintainable: (i) A repetition of old and overruled argument is not enough to reopen concluded adjudications. (ii) Minor mistakes of inconsequential import. (iii) Review proceedings cannot be equated with the original hearing of the case. (iv) Review is not maintainable unless the material error, manifest on the face of the order, undermines its soundness or results in miscarriage of justice. (v) A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is reheard and corrected but lies only for patent error. (vi) The mere possibility of two views on the subject cannot be a ground for review. (vii) The error apparent on the face of the record should not be an error which has to be fished out and searched. (viii) The appreciation of evidence on record is fully within the domain of the appellate court, it cannot be permitted to be advanced in the review petition. (ix) Review is not maintainable when the same relief sought at the time of arguing the main matter had been negatived." 20. (viii) The appreciation of evidence on record is fully within the domain of the appellate court, it cannot be permitted to be advanced in the review petition. (ix) Review is not maintainable when the same relief sought at the time of arguing the main matter had been negatived." 20. Since the grounds raised by the review applicant herein, are not coming within the "review jurisdiction" of this Court, as enunciated by the Supreme Court in umpteen number of judgments, including the ones extracted above, and there being no error apparent on the face of record in respect of the judgment under review, no ground is made out to review the impugned judgment. The Review Application is accordingly dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.