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2023 DIGILAW 1166 (JHR)

Shahnawaz Sheikh v. State of Jharkhand

2023-09-18

RAJESH SHANKAR

body2023
ORDER : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH SHANKAR The present writ petition has been filed for issuance of direction upon the respondents to pay compensation to the petitioner with respect to the land appertaining to Khata No. 1, Plot No. 1, measuring an area of 2.50 acres of Mouza-Naisarai, P.S Ramgarh Cantt. (Old P.S Mandu), District-Hazaribagh (now Ramgarh) or for issuance of direction upon the respondent-CCL to hand over the vacant possession of the said land to the petitioner as according to him, the respondent-CCL has forcibly taken possession of the said land. 2. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that petitioner’s father namely, Haider Sheikh @ Sheikh Mohammad Haider Ali and his brother namely, Sheikh Ahmad Raja had purchased the said land by virtue of sale deed dated 30.11.1972 from the erstwhile owner namely, Shri Mahesh Tiwari and thereafter they got their name mutated vide order dated 21/29.04.1975 passed in Mutation Case No. 383 of 1974-75. The rent of the said land was also paid from the year 1975 to 1979. However, the respondent-CCL illegally took possession of the said land and constructed houses thereupon. As soon as the petitioners’ father came to know about the said fact, he wrote several letters to the respondent-company, however, all went in vain. 3. It is further submitted that a proceeding under Section 144 Cr.P.C was initiated vide Case No. M-146/1975 on the application of the petitioner’s father and uncle, wherein Director of Mines, Rescue Station, Ramgarh, Karanpura Coal Field was made second party. The said proceeding was subsequently converted into a proceeding under Section 145 Cr.P.C upon application filed by the petitioner’s father and uncle. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner also submits that the petitioner’s father wrote letter to the respondent no. 5 – the General Manager (Land and Revenue), Central Coalfields Ltd., Ranchi on 07.07.2003 seeking compensation for the said land, however, the said respondent vide letter dated 30.08.2003, rejected the claim of compensation made by him. Thereafter, the petitioner raised online grievance in the portal of Ministry of Coal, Government of India, New Delhi through Centralised Public Grievance Redress and Monitoring System (CPGRAMS) on 22.10.2014, however, till date neither any compensation for the said land has been paid to the petitioner nor possession of the same has been restored in his favour. 5. Thereafter, the petitioner raised online grievance in the portal of Ministry of Coal, Government of India, New Delhi through Centralised Public Grievance Redress and Monitoring System (CPGRAMS) on 22.10.2014, however, till date neither any compensation for the said land has been paid to the petitioner nor possession of the same has been restored in his favour. 5. Learned counsel for the respondent-State submits that the said land is recorded in the khatian as Gair Majarua Khas land and the rent receipt of the said land has not been issued since 1979. On inspection of revenue records, jamabandi of the said land is also not found in the name of Haider Sheikh @ Sheikh Md. Haider Ali. 6. Learned counsel for the respondent-CCL submits that the said land was transferred to the CCL by the State Government in September 1972 after following due procedure of law and the CCL had also paid ‘Salami’ for the same on 28.09.1972. Thus, the claim of the petitioner for payment of compensation of the said land is not tenable. It is further submitted that the present writ petition has been filed after a huge delay and as such, the same is liable to be dismissed on the said score as well. 7. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the materials available on record. 8. On bare perusal of the reply of the respondent no. 5 (Annexure-2 to the supplementary affidavit dated 08.09.2023 filed on behalf of the petitioner), it is evident that the said land including other lands measuring an area of 9.68 acres were transferred to the CCL by the State Government in the year 1972, nature of which was Gair Majarua and the compensation for the said land was deposited by the CCL in favour of the State Government. The possession of the said land was also delivered to the CCL by the Circle Officer, Ramgarh on 01.09.1973. It is also evident that a proceeding under Section 144 Cr.P.C vide Case No. 66 of 1975 was dropped in favour of the respondent-CCL. 9. The stand of the petitioner is that the said land was purchased by his father and uncle by way of sale deed dated 30.11.1972. However, before execution of the sale deed in favour of the petitioner’s father and uncle, the said land was transferred to the respondent-CCL. 9. The stand of the petitioner is that the said land was purchased by his father and uncle by way of sale deed dated 30.11.1972. However, before execution of the sale deed in favour of the petitioner’s father and uncle, the said land was transferred to the respondent-CCL. The filing of petition under Section 144 Cr.P.C before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Hazaribagh vide Case No. M-146 of 1975 by the petitioner’s father and uncle against the Director of Mines, Rescue Station, Ramgarh suggests that in the year 1975 itself, the petitioner’s father was well aware of the acquisition of the said land by the respondent-CCL, however, he kept mum for about 28 years and thereafter raised the claim by sending letter dated 07.07.2003 to the General Manager (Land and Revenue), CCL which was rejected by the said authority vide letter dated 30.08.2003. He again kept silent and did not challenge the said decision before any court of law. The last representation seeking payment of compensation for the said land was filed online by the petitioner in the portal of Ministry of Coal, Government of India, New Delhi through CPGRAMS on 22.10.2014 i.e., after more than 11 years of rejection of the representation filed by his father. 10. In the case “Syed Maqbool Ali Vs. State of U.P & Anr.” reported in (2011) 15 SCC 383 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under: 12. The High Courts should also be cautious in entertaining writ petitions filed decades after the dispossession, seeking directions for acquisition and payment of compensation. It is not uncommon for villagers to offer/donate some part of their lands voluntarily for a public purpose which would benefit them or the community as for example, construction of an access road to the village or their property, or construction of a village tank or a bund to prevent flooding/erosion. When they offer their land for such public purpose, the land would be of little or negligible value. But decades later, when land values increase, either on account of passage of time or on account of developments or improvements carried out by the State, the landholders come up with belated claims alleging that their lands were taken without acquisition and without their consent. But decades later, when land values increase, either on account of passage of time or on account of developments or improvements carried out by the State, the landholders come up with belated claims alleging that their lands were taken without acquisition and without their consent. When such claims are made after several decades, the State would be at a disadvantage to contest the claim, as it may not have the records to show in what circumstances the lands were given/donated and whether the land was given voluntarily. Therefore, belated writ petitions, without proper explanation for the delay, are liable to be dismissed. Be that as it may. 11. In the case of “Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply & Sewerage Board & Ors. Vs. T.T. Murali Babu” reported in (2014) 4 SCC 108 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under: 16. Thus, the doctrine of delay and laches should not be lightly brushed aside. A writ court is required to weigh the explanation offered and the acceptability of the same. The court should bear in mind that it is exercising an extraordinary and equitable jurisdiction. As a constitutional court it has a duty to protect the rights of the citizens but simultaneously it is to keep itself alive to the primary principle that when an aggrieved person, without adequate reason, approaches the court at his own leisure or pleasure, the court would be under legal obligation to scrutinise whether the lis at a belated stage should be entertained or not. Be it noted, delay comes in the way of equity. In certain circumstances delay and laches may not be fatal but in most circumstances inordinate delay would only invite disaster for the litigant who knocks at the doors of the court. Delay reflects inactivity and inaction on the part of a litigant — a litigant who has forgotten the basic norms, namely, “procrastination is the greatest thief of time” and second, law does not permit one to sleep and rise like a phoenix. Delay does bring in hazard and causes injury to the lis. 12. Thus, inordinate delay can be one of the grounds for refusing to entertain a writ petition if the same is not sufficiently explained by the litigant. It is well settled that delay reflects apathy and inaction on the part of a litigant. 13. Delay does bring in hazard and causes injury to the lis. 12. Thus, inordinate delay can be one of the grounds for refusing to entertain a writ petition if the same is not sufficiently explained by the litigant. It is well settled that delay reflects apathy and inaction on the part of a litigant. 13. Learned counsel for the petitioner puts reliance on the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of “Vidya Devi Vs. The State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors.” reported in (2020) 2 SCC 569 . In the said case, the land of the appellant was taken by the State in the year 1967-68 for construction of the Nadaun-Sujanpur Road, a major district road without taking recourse to acquisition proceedings or following due process of law. The stand of the State was that the land of the appellant was being used on the verbal consent of her predecessors-in-interest. Their Lordships observed that in the year 2004, similarly situated persons had moved before the High Court of Himachal Pradesh by filing a writ petition being C.W.P. No. 1192/2004 and vide order dated 23.04.2007 passed by the High Court, the land acquisition proceeding was started by the respondent-State in the year 2008 under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, however, only with respect to the lands of the writ petitioners. Thereafter, the appellant along with her two daughters filed a writ petition being C.W.P. No. 1736/2010 before the Himachal Pradesh High Court for grant of compensation for the land occupied by the State since 1967-1968. The said writ petition was disposed of vide order dated 11.09.2013 holding that the matter involved disputed questions of law and fact for determination on the starting point of limitation, which could not be adjudicated in writ proceeding. The appellant was, however, granted liberty to file a civil suit. Aggrieved with the said order, the appellant filed a review petition which was also dismissed vide order dated 13.05.2014. The matter travelled to the Hon’ble Supreme Court and Their Lordships allowed the appeal preferred by the appellant holding as under: 12.8. The contention of the State that the appellant or her predecessors had “orally” consented to the acquisition is completely baseless. We find complete lack of authority and legal sanction in compulsorily divesting the appellant of her property by the State. 12.12. The contention of the State that the appellant or her predecessors had “orally” consented to the acquisition is completely baseless. We find complete lack of authority and legal sanction in compulsorily divesting the appellant of her property by the State. 12.12. The contention advanced by the State of delay and laches of the appellant in moving the Court is also liable to be rejected. Delay and laches cannot be raised in a case of a continuing cause of action, or if the circumstances shock the judicial conscience of the Court. Condonation of delay is a matter of judicial discretion, which must be exercised judiciously and reasonably in the facts and circumstances of a case. It will depend upon the breach of fundamental rights, and the remedy claimed, and when and how the delay arose. There is no period of limitation prescribed for the courts to exercise their constitutional jurisdiction to do substantial justice. 12.13. In a case where the demand for justice is so compelling, a constitutional court would exercise its jurisdiction with a view to promote justice, and not defeat it. [P.S. Sadasivaswamy v. State of T.N., (1975) 1 SCC 152 ]. 13. In the present case, the appellant being an illiterate person, who is a widow coming from a rural area has been deprived of her private property by the State without resorting to the procedure prescribed by law. The appellant has been divested of her right to property without being paid any compensation whatsoever for over half a century. The cause of action in the present case is a continuing one, since the appellant was compulsorily expropriated of her property in 1967 without legal sanction or following due process of law. The present case is one where the demand for justice is so compelling since the State has admitted that the land was taken over without initiating acquisition proceedings, or any procedure known to law. We exercise our extraordinary jurisdiction under Articles 136 and 142 of the Constitution, and direct the State to pay compensation to the appellant. 14. In the aforesaid case, Their Lordships have held that delay and laches cannot be raised in a case of continuing cause of action, or if the circumstances shock the judicial conscience of the Court. We exercise our extraordinary jurisdiction under Articles 136 and 142 of the Constitution, and direct the State to pay compensation to the appellant. 14. In the aforesaid case, Their Lordships have held that delay and laches cannot be raised in a case of continuing cause of action, or if the circumstances shock the judicial conscience of the Court. Delay may be condoned in exercise of judicial discretion in the facts and circumstances of a case and there is no period of limitation prescribed for the Courts to exercise their Constitutional jurisdiction to do substantial justice. The appeal preferred by the appellant was allowed in exercise of power conferred under Articles 136 & 142 of the Constitution of India observing that the appellant had been divested of her right to property without being paid any compensation whatsoever for over half a century. 15. The facts and circumstance of the present case is entirely different from the aforesaid case. In the present case, neither the petitioner’s father nor the petitioner seems to be ignorant of the situation. The petitioner’s father was fully aware of his right and after acquisition of the said land by the respondent-CCL, he had filed a petition under Section 144 Cr.P.C against the respondent no. 6 in the year 1975 itself. However, subsequently he kept silent and thus he himself was negligent with respect to enforcement of his legal rights. In the case of “Vidya Devi” (supra), Their Lordships had found that the land of the appellant was acquired without taking recourse of acquisition proceedings or following due process of law. However, in the present case, on perusal of letter dated 30.08.2003 issued by the respondent no. 5 to the petitioner’s father suggests that the said land was transferred to the respondent-CCL by the State Government on payment of Salami for the same as nature of the said land was Gair Majarua. Moreover, in the case of “Vidya Devi” (supra), the title of the appellant upon the acquired land was not in dispute, however, in the present case, the title of the petitioner is in dispute since the State of Jharkhand is claiming its title over the said land as the nature of the same is recorded in the khatian as Gair Majarua. 16. In view of the aforesaid discussion, I find no merit in the writ petition and the same is accordingly dismissed. 17. 16. In view of the aforesaid discussion, I find no merit in the writ petition and the same is accordingly dismissed. 17. The petitioner is, however, at liberty to take appropriate recourse before the competent court of civil jurisdiction, if permissible under law.