JUDGMENT : 1. This appeal has been filed by the appellant-Trust aggrieved against the order dated 13/5/2022 passed by the learned Single Judge, whereby, Civil Writ Petition No. 6594/2022 filed by the appellant has been dismissed in limine. 2. The writ petition was filed seeking to question the validity of the order dated 25/8/2021 passed by the Estate Officer, Govt. of Rajasthan (Mandir Mandal, Nathdwara), whereby, the application filed by the appellant-Trust seeking return of the proceedings was dismissed and order dated 11/4/2022 passed by the District Judge, Rajsamand (appellate authority), whereby, the appeal filed by the appellant was dismissed. 3. The respondent no. 3, Nathdwara Temple Board, a Board constituted under the Nathdwara Temple Act, 1959 (‘the Act, 1959’), initiated proceedings before the Estate Officer for eviction of the appellant-Trust from two shops, owned by it under the provisions of the Rajasthan Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1964 (‘the Act, 1964’). After filing response to the show cause notice, an application dated 13/2/2021 was filed by the appellant-Trust questioning the jurisdiction of the Estate Officer inter alia on the ground that as the Trust has questioned the ownership of the Temple Board, the Estate Officer has no jurisdiction to deal with the matter. 4. The application was contested by the Temple Board. 5. The Estate Officer by his order dated 25/8/2021 dismissed the application with reference to an order dated 8/9/2015 passed by this Court in Seth Jamna Dass Lallu Bhai Charitable Trust, Mumbai & Anr. vs. Estate Officer, Nathdwara & Anr. : S.B.Civil Writ Petition No. 6280/2015 and other 11 connected matters filed by the said Trust and came to the conclusion that the issue was covered by the said determination. 6. Feeling aggrieved, the appellant-Trust field appeal under Section 9 of the Act, 1964 before the District Judge, Rajsamand, wherein, the Temple Board raised objection about the maintainability of the appeal. The appellate authority after hearing the parties came to the conclusion that the appeal against the order dated 25/8/2021 under Section 9 of the Act was not maintainable and consequently rejected the appeal. 7. Feeling aggrieved, a writ petition was filed, wherein, the issues pertaining to the non-maintainability of the appeal as well as the jurisdiction of the Estate Officer were questioned. 8. 7. Feeling aggrieved, a writ petition was filed, wherein, the issues pertaining to the non-maintainability of the appeal as well as the jurisdiction of the Estate Officer were questioned. 8. Learned Single Judge by the impugned order, distinguishing the judgments cited by the appellant, came to the conclusion that the appeal was rightly dismissed as not maintainable and that merely because in response to the show cause notice issued by the Estate Officer, objection was raised about the ownership of the property, the jurisdiction of the Estate Officer to decide the proceedings does not cease and consequently dismissed the writ petition. 9. Feeling aggrieved, the present appeal has been filed. 10. Office has reported that the appeal is barred by limitation by 21 days. An application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act has been filed seeking condonation of delay. 11. When the matter came up before the Court for orders on the application filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, looking to the fact that writ petition was dismissed in limie, by a detailed order by learned Single Judge, learned counsel for the appellant was required to make submissions on merits of the appeal. 12. After attempting to make submissions on merit of the appeal, time was sought to complete the instructions in the matter on 16/5/2023 and 19/5/2023. Whereafter, when the matter came up before the Court on 25/5/2023, the submissions made on merit of the appeal were reiterated. Looking to the fact that apparently there is no substance in the appeal for the reasons, which would follow, issuing notice to the respondents on application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act would be an exercise in futility and, therefore, looking to the small delay of 21 days in filing the appeal, the same is condoned. 13. Learned counsel for the appellant made vehement submissions that the Estate Officer was not justified in rejecting the application filed by the appellant for return of the application to the respondents as the appellant had raised objections about the ownership of the property. 13. Learned counsel for the appellant made vehement submissions that the Estate Officer was not justified in rejecting the application filed by the appellant for return of the application to the respondents as the appellant had raised objections about the ownership of the property. It was submitted that once an objection is raised in response to the notice under Section 4 of the Act, 1964 to show cause against the order of eviction, the Estate Officer has no option but to return back the application requiring the parties to seek adjudication from competent civil court and, therefore, in those circumstances, rejection of the application by the Estate Officer was not justified and the consequent dismissal of the writ petition also is not justified. 14. Further submissions were made that against every order passed by the Estate Officer including an order rejecting the application for return of proceedings, an appeal is maintainable under Section 9 of the Act, 1964 and, therefore, dismissal of the appeal by the appellate authority and writ petition by the learned Single Judge holding the appeal as not maintainable also is contrary to the law and, therefore, the orders impugned passed by the Estate Officer, appellate authority and the learned Single Judge deserve to be set aside. It was prayed that either the matter be remanded back to the appellate authority or all the orders be set aside and the proceedings before the Estate Officer be quashed. 15. Reliance was placed, as before learned Single Judge, on judgments in Smt. Khatoon vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors. : 2016 (3) WLC (Raj.) 555, Raja Fateh Singh vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors. : 1986 RLR 966 and Kaikhosrou (Chick) Kavasji Framji & Anr. vs. Union of India & Anr. : AIR 2019 SC 1692 . 16. We have considered the submissions made by learned counsel for the appellant and have perused the material available on record as well as the order dated 8/9/2015 passed in Civil Writ No. 6280/2015 (supra). 17. So far as the plea raised pertaining to the maintainability of the appeal against the order refusing to return the proceedings to the respondent-Temple Board is concerned, apparently the order dated 25/8/2021 passed by the Estate Officer is interlocutory in nature. The plea raised that every order passed by the Estate Officer is open to appeal, apparently has no substance. 18. The plea raised that every order passed by the Estate Officer is open to appeal, apparently has no substance. 18. The provisions of Section 5 and 9 of the Act, 1964 insofar as relevant, read as under: “5. Eviction of unauthorised occupations -(1) If, after considering the cause, if any, shown by any person in pursuance of a notice under Section 4 and any, evidence he may produce in support of the same and after giving him, a reasonable opportunity of being heard, the estate officer is satisfied that the public premises are in unauthorised occupation the officer may, on a date to be fixed for the purpose, make an order of eviction, for reasons to be recorded therein, directing that the public premises shall be vacated by all persons who may be in occupation thereof or any part thereof, and cause a copy of the order to be affixed on the outer door or some other conspicuous part of the public premises.” “9. Appeals -(1) An appeal shall lie from every order of the estate officer made in respect of any public premises under Section 5 or Section 7 to an appellate officer who shall be the District Judge of the district in which the public premises are situate or such other Judicial Officer in that district of not less than ten years standing, as the District Judge may designate in this behalf. (2) An appeal under sub-section (1), shall be preferred- (a) in the case of an appeal from an order under Section 5, within 15 days from the date of the Publication of the order under sub-section (1) of that section; and (b) in the case of an appeal from an order under Section 7 within fifteen days from the date on which the 'order is communicated to the appellant Provided that the appellate officer may entertain the appeal after the expiry of the said period of fifteen days, if he is satisfied that the appellant was prevented sufficient cause from filling the appeal in time.” 19. A perusal of Section 9 of the Act, 1964 reveals that appeal lies from every order of the Estate Officer made in respect of any public premises inter alia under Section 5. A perusal of Section 9 of the Act, 1964 reveals that appeal lies from every order of the Estate Officer made in respect of any public premises inter alia under Section 5. Clause (a) of subsection (2) provides that an appeal under sub-section (1) shall be preferred in case of an appeal from an order under Section 5 within 15 days from the date of publication of the order under sub-section (1) of that Section. 20. From the above, it is apparent that the appeal which can be filed under Section 9 of the Act, 1964 has to be filed against an order, which is published under sub-section (1) of Section 5 of the Act. 21. A perusal of Section 5 reveals that the Estate Officer on being satisfied that the public premises are in unauthorized occupation may make an order of eviction directing that the public premises shall be vacated and cause a copy of the order to be affixed on outer door or some other conspicuous part of the public premises. The publication of order under Section 5 (1) of the Act, 1964 against which an appeal is envisaged under Section 9(2)(a), from the above it is apparent that the same would only be an order directing vacating of public premises and not an interlocutory order. 22. The judgment in the case of Smt. Khatoon (supra) has been rightly distinguished by the learned Single Judge as the said judgment pertain to a circumstance wherein the application seeking eviction was finally rejected by the Estate Officer against which it was contended that no appeal was maintainable, which was not a case of an interlocutory order. 23. Insofar as the plea raised regarding the Estate Officer losing jurisdiction to decide the proceedings once an objection about the ownership of the premises is raised also has no substance. The submission made that merely because an objection has been raised about the ownership of the property, the same itself is sufficient for the Estate Officer to require the parties to approach the civil court is on face of it mischievous and would render the provisions of the Act providing for a special summary procedure in case of eviction of unauthorized occupants from public premises, as wholly nugatory. 24. 24. As noticed, the Estate Officer, while rejecting the application filed by the appellant relied on the order dated 8/9/2015 passed by this Court in CWP No.6280/2015 and other connected matters filed by the appellant. 25. Interestingly, the appellant neither filed the copy of the order dated 8/9/2015 in the writ petition nor raised any issue worth the name in the writ petition about applicability of the said order. 26. Even in the present appeal no issue in this regard has been raised. In fact, on perusal of the order passed by the Estate Officer, the order dated 8/9/2015 was got produced for perusal, in appeal. 27. It would be noticed that the appellant Trust when sought to question the validity of the proceedings initiated by the Estate Officer against other tenants of the same premises, approached this Court by filing 12 writ petitions, which came to be decided on 8/9/2015 led by CW No. 6280/2015 (supra), wherein, the learned Single Judge after thoroughly examining the material available on record came to the following conclusion: “The contention of the petitioners that premises in question is not owned by the Temple Board appears to be quite alluring but not of substance inasmuch as the document(Annex.3) cannot be construed as conferment of valid title on Seth Jamna Dass Lallu Bhai Charitable Trust, Mumbai. Moreover, the property in question was owned by the Deity Lord Shrinathji who is a perpetual minor and therefore there was no authority with any one to transfer or alienate the said property. The respondent-Temple Board has seriously disputed Annexure-3 including its legal sanctity. There is yet another aspect of the matter that if the document(Annex.3) is examined on the touch stone of “Pratigya Patra”(Annex.4), the alleged compromise between Temple Board andsome of the trustees of Seth Jamna Dass Lallu Bhai Charitable Trust, Mumbai then it would ipso facto reveal that Seth Jamna Dass Lallu Bhai Charitable Trust, Mumbai was simply authorised to collect rent from some of the shops on behalf of the Temple Board. The relevant excerpt from Annexure-4 containing terms of compromise are reproduced infra in vernacular:- ^^1- ;g fd /keZ'kkyk ds eq[; }kjk ds mÙkj&nf{k.k dh pkjksa nqdkuksa o vUnj xzkÅ.M yksj esa uo fufeZr 'kksfiax lsaVj ds :i esa i{kdkj laŒ 1 }kjk cktkj fodflr fd;k tk jgk gS] ftldk foLr`r Lo:i layXu CY;wfizaV esa funf'kZr gS] dk HkkM+k i{kdkj laŒ 1 }kjk fdjk;snkjksa ls ,df=r dj i{kdkj laŒ2 ds ;gkW fujUrj tek djk;k tkdj jlhn izkIr djsaxsA fu/kkZfjr 'krZ ds vuqlkj tks Hkh nqdkusa fufeZr dh xbZ gSa] mudk fdjk;k Jhd`".k Hk.Mkj esa tek gksxkA lapkfyr dSUVhu ds fdjk;s dh jkf'k dk iPphl izfr'kr Hkkx Jhd`".k Hk.Mkj esa tek gksxkA 2- i{kdkj laŒ 1 }kjk tks nqdkusa fdjk;s nh xbZ gS] os fdjk;snkj i{kdkj laŒ1 ds fdjk;snkj gSa] rFkk os gh fdjk;snkjksa ls fdjk;k olwy dj Jhd`".k Hk.Mkj ea tek djkus ds fy;s ikcUn gSa] ftu fdjk;snkjksa ds nqdkus fdjk;s ij nh xbZ] mudh lwph ;Fkkle; i{kdkj laŒ 2 dks ns nh tk;sxhA 3- ;g fd mDr nqdkuksa esa ls ;fn dksbZ nqdku vU; dks vUrfjr dh tk;sxh rks fdjk;k fpVBh fu"ikfnr djkus ds iwoZ i{kdkj laŒ 1 i{kdkj laŒ 2 ls mlds fy;s fyf[kr esa lgefr izkIr djsaxs] rFkk mlds vuqlkj gh i{kdkj laŒ 1 fdlh vU; dks nqdku vUrfjr dj ldsaxsA 4- ;g fd izLrqr izfrKk i= ds vuqlkj flfoy U;k;k/kh'k ¼dfu"B [k.M½ ukFk}kjk ds U;k;ky; esa yfEcr ckn esa vkilh jkthukesa dk izkFkZuk i= izLrqr dj fn;k tk;sxk] rFkk i{kdkj laŒ 2 rnuqlkj U;k;ky; ls eqdnek mBk ysxkA 5- ;g fd i{kdkj laŒ1 us i{kdkj laŒ2 ds i{k esa tks ;g izfrKk i= fu"ikfnr fd;k gS] mldh vfHk&Lohd`fr Lo:i 15]00]000@& v{kjsa iUnzg yk[k :i;s HkasV Lo:i i{kdkj laŒ 2 ds Jhd`".k Hk.Mkj esa tek djk;s tk;saxsA 6- ;g fd /keZ'kkyk ds nf{k.k fn'kk esa i{kdkj laŒ 1 us ,d u;k njoktk [kksyk gSa] rFkk mlds iwoZ if'pe esa tks nqdkus cukbZ x;h gSa mudk fdjk;k i{kdkj laŒ1 gh olwy djsaxs] rFkk mls /keZ'kkyk dk izcU/k o fodkl esa [kpZ fd;k tk;sxk] rFkk blds fy;s i{kdkj laŒ2 us LosPNk ls viuh lgefr iznku dj nh gSA^^ Therefore, contention of the petitioners that premises in question is owned by Seth Jamna Dass Lallu Bhai Charitable Trust, Mumbai falls flat and decks are cleared about the title of the Temple Board regarding the premises. Moreover, on the face of it, on the strength of Annexure-4, the so-called title of Seth Jamna Dass Lallu Bhai Charitable Trust, Mumbai has lost all its efficacy and is of no avail and consequence to the petitioners. The question that whether property belonging to Temple Board falls within the ambit of public premises is free from any doubt in view of exhaustive definition of “public premises” under clause (b) of Section 2 of the Act of 1964. Clause (xii) of clause (b) of Section 2 of the Act of 1964 clearly postulates that premises belonging to Deity of Shri Shrinathji Temple, Nathdwara is a public premises. Subclause (xii) of clause (b) of Section 2 of the Act of 1964 reads as under:- 2(b) “public premises” means any premises belonging to, or taken on lease or requisitioned by, or on behalf of the State Government; and includes any premises belonging to.….. …... (xii) The Deity of Shri Shrinathji Temple, Nathdwara administered in accordance with the provisions of Nathdwara Temple Act, 1959 (Rajasthan Act No.13 of1959); or” (emphasis supplied) 28. In view of the categoric findings recorded in the writ petitions filed by the Trust led by CW No. 6280/2015, repeated plea sought to be raised by the appellant Trust is nothing but abuse of the process of the Court. 29. The learned Single Judge, though did not advert to the said order in CW No. 6280/2015, however, came to a specific conclusion that the plea raised regarding the Estate Officer losing jurisdiction only on account of objection having been raised in response to the show cause notice about ownership was baseless, which finding, as discussed herein-before, is in accordance with the scheme of the Act and acceptance of such plea would result in rendering the provisions of the Act nugatory. 30. The judgments relied on by learned counsel for the appellant have been elaborately discussed and distinguished by the learned Single Judge and the learned counsel for the appellant failed to make out any case for taking a different view. 31. In view of the above discussion, there is no substance in the appeal and the same is, therefore, dismissed in limine.