JUDGMENT : 1. The Appeal, under Section 96 of the Code of the Civil Procedure, is filed by the appellants/plaintiffs challenging the decree and Judgment dated 23.03.2009 in O.S. No.195 of 2005 passed by the learned IV Additional District Judge, Visakhapatnam (for short, 'trial court'). 2. The appellants, who are the plaintiffs, filed the suit vide O.S. No.195 of 2005 seeking recovery of possession of the schedule property after evicting the defendants, their men and agents from the suit schedule property and also for damages of Rs.1,00,000/-for unauthorized occupation of the schedule property. 3. The parties will hereinafter be referred to as arrayed before the trial Court. 4. The brief averments of the plaint are as under : The plaintiffs are the absolute owners of property spanning 170 sq. yards inclusive of an R.C.C., House with Door No.39-6-59 situated in Sy.No.9/5-part, 9/5A at Muralinagar (for short, ‘the suit schedule property’). The acquisition of the property took place through a registered sale deed dated 17.08.2005 for valid consideration from Ganni Veera Lakshmi. The plaintiffs could understand that the plaintiffs' vendors permitted the defendants to stay in the suit schedule property, despite giving time by the previous owners, the defendants failed to vacate the suit schedule property. Upon the transfer of ownership to the plaintiffs, the permission, if any, given to the defendants came to an end. The plaintiffs issued a quit notice dated 27.08.2005 demanding the defendants to vacate the suit schedule property by the night of 30.09.2005. The defendants refused to receive the registered notices. Since the defendants have been in unauthorized possession of the suit schedule property, they are liable to pay damages of Rs.1,00,000/-. 5. The defendants filed their written statements, asserting that the ages of defendants 1 and 2 were wrongly shown, which highlight the plaintiffs lack of knowledge and the suit was filed to have a wrongful gain over the defendants. Smt.Ganni Veera Lakshmi and the defendants entered into an agreement of sale dated 12.05.1998 regarding the suit schedule property for a consideration of Rs.1,90,000/-. An initial payment of Rs.1,00,000/-was made to Ganni Veera Lakshmi, and she promised to execute the registered sale deed within three months after obtaining the necessary clearance from the competent authorities, but she could not get the same. An initial payment of Rs.1,00,000/-was made to Ganni Veera Lakshmi, and she promised to execute the registered sale deed within three months after obtaining the necessary clearance from the competent authorities, but she could not get the same. On 11.04.1999, G.Veera Lakshmi’s husband, G.V.V.S.Murthy, received Rs.80,000/-from the defendants and executed another agreement on the even date and took away the earlier agreement of sale dated 12.05.1998. Assurance was given that U.L.C., clearance certificate would be obtained within a month. However, G.Veera Laksmi and her husband handed over the suit schedule property to these defendants, who have been in possession. After that, the defendants sent a demand draft bearing No.544541 dated 17.05.1999 for Rs.8, 200/- drawn on S.B.I., Kailasapuram Branch, Visakhapatnam. Even on receipt of the total consideration, G.Veera Lakshmi and her husband used to postpone the execution of a registered sale deed. Since the defendants’ vendors did not respond to their demands, they issued a legal notice dt.20.06.1999 to G.Veera Lakshmi’s husband. The G.Veera Lakshmi's husband replied, denying the facts of the defendants' notice. The defendants paid the sale consideration with the mediation of one P.Radha Krishnaiah, Principal I.T.I, Visakhapatnam. The defendants have constructed a shop adjacent to the suit schedule property, and one of the tenants has been doing Kirana business in the shop for the last three years. G.Veera Lakshmi influenced the authorities of the Municipal Corporation, Visakhapatnam and got her name mutated in the records by suppressing the sale of the suit schedule property in favour of the defendants. G.Veera Lakshmi, in active collusion with the plaintiffs, fabricated an agreement of sale for Rs.13,00,500/-and filed this suit through the plaintiffs to have a wrongful gain. 6. Based on the above pleadings, the trial Court framed the following issues: (1) Whether the plaintiffs are the owners of the suit schedule property? (2) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to the recovery of possession of the suit schedule property by evicting the defendants, their men and agents from the suit schedule property? (3) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to the alternative relief of eviction of the defendants, their men and agents etc., from the plaint schedule property and hand over the vacant possession of the same to the plaintiffs in case the defendants are found to be tenants? (4) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to damages? If so, to what amount? (5) To what relief ? 7. (4) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to damages? If so, to what amount? (5) To what relief ? 7. During the trial, on behalf of the plaintiffs, P.W.1 was examined, and Exs.A1 to A.6 were marked. On behalf of the defendant, D.Ws.1 and 2 were examined, and Exs.B1 to B.15 were marked. 8. After completing the trial and hearing the arguments of both sides, the trial Court dismissed the suit. Aggrieved by the trial Court’s Judgment and decree, the appellants/plaintiffs filed the present Appeal. 9. Sri P.Durga Prasad, learned counsel for the appellants/plaintiffs contends that the trial Court ought to have acknowledged that the primary object of the suit is to evict the defendants from the schedule property, based on the rightful ownership. The trial Court failed to understand, once it is established that the defendants put forth a false claim of purchasing the property, the onus does not remain with the plaintiffs and the burden shifts on to the defendants to effectively prove their alleged acquisition of the property in question. When the defendants failed to substantiate their case, the trial Court ought to have ordered eviction, the law does not specify a particular procedure for the termination of any granted permission; the trial Court finding on the omission of correct ages of the defendants in the plaint appears unwarranted. 10. Per contra, Sri C.Venkaiah, learned counsel appearing for the respondents/defendants contends that the trial Court correctly appreciated the facts of the case and came to a correct conclusion. The reasons given by the trial Court do not want any modification. 11. The findings recorded by the Trial Court having regard to the pleadings in the suit and in light of the rival contentions and submissions made on either side before this Court, the following points would arise for determination: 1) Whether the trial Court is justified in holding that the plaintiffs are not entitled to recover the schedule property? 2) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to damages? If so, to what amount? 3) Whether the Judgment passed by the trial Court needs any interference? POINT NO.1: 12. 2) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to damages? If so, to what amount? 3) Whether the Judgment passed by the trial Court needs any interference? POINT NO.1: 12. Learned counsel for the respondents/defendants contends that the plaintiffs must be able to establish the title to claim possession; the plaintiffs have failed to establish their title, so, the maxim that possession follows title does not help them to recover possession; that plaintiffs cannot seek mere relief of recovery of possession without seeking declaration of title. 13. In Anathula Sudhakar V. P. Buchi Reddy, (2008) 4 SCC 594 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court in paragraph No.14 has held as under: “We may, however, clarify that a prayer for declaration will be necessary only if the denial of title by the defendant or challenge to the plaintiff’s title raises a cloud on the title of the plaintiff to the property. A cloud is said to raise over a person’s title, when some apparent defect in his title to a property, or when some prima facie right of a third party over it, is made out or shown. An action for declaration, is the remedy to remove the cloud on the title to the property. On the other hand, where the plaintiff has clear title supported by documents, if a trespasser without any claim to title or an interloper without any apparent title, merely denies the plaintiff’s title, it does not amount to raising a cloud over the title of the plaintiff and it will not be necessary for the plaintiff to sue for declaration and a suit for injunction may be sufficient. Where the plaintiff, believing that the defendant is only a trespasser or a wrongful claimant without title, files a mere suit for injunction, and in such a suit, the defendant discloses in his defence the details of the right or title claimed by him, which raise a serious dispute or cloud over the plaintiff’s title, then there is a need for the plaintiff, to amend the plaint and convert the suit into one for declaration. 14. In light of the settled legal position, now I consider whether the denial of the plaintiffs’ title by the defendants raises a cloud on the plaintiff’s title to the schedule property, if any or it is a mere denial to contest the suit. 15. 14. In light of the settled legal position, now I consider whether the denial of the plaintiffs’ title by the defendants raises a cloud on the plaintiff’s title to the schedule property, if any or it is a mere denial to contest the suit. 15. The plaintiffs’ case is that they purchased the schedule property through Ex.A.1 from Smt.G.Veera Lakshmi, while the defendants contend that they purchased the schedule property from Smt.G.Veera Lakshmi under an agreement of sale. It is evident that, both parties acknowledge that the schedule property was belonged to G.Veera Lakshmi. The defendant's stand that plaintiffs colluded with G.Veera Lakshmi to create Ex.A.1 sale deed. Thus, it is manifest that it is not the defendant's case that G. Veera Lakshmi did not execute Ex.A.1 sale deed in favour of the plaintiffs. Though the trial Court has referred to the defendants’ stand, it has observed that no other witnesses were examined on behalf of the plaintiffs to prove the execution of Ex.A.1 sale deed. The trial Court also observed that there is no reason assigned as to why the plaintiffs failed to examine their vendor or any other witnesses to prove the passing of consideration and the genuineness of transaction under Ex.A.1. It is not the defendants stand that the plaintiffs’ vendor did not receive the consideration covered under Ex.A.1. The trial Court appeared to give undue weight to the defendants’ stand regarding the absence of testimony from the scribe and attestors of Ex.A.1. It is not for the defendants to say that the plaintiffs’ vendor did not receive the consideration. The recitals of the sale deed show that the plaintiff’s vendor received the sale consideration under Ex.A.1 and delivered the possession to the plaintiffs. The trial Court also observed that the plaintiffs’ names were mutated in the records of the Greater Visakha Municipal Corporation. The plaintiffs relied on Ex.A.4 (Receipt showing the payment of mutation fee) and Ex.A.5 (Original receipt issued by the Municipal Corporation, Visakhapatnam) to show the mutation of their names in the municipal records. However, the trial Court noted that since the validity of Ex.A.1 itself is being challenged, the legitimacy of the sale deed becomes a pivotal factor in assessing the implications of the plaintiffs’ names mutation in the Corporation records. 16. The plaintiffs also relied on Ex.A.6 (Tax passbook). However, the trial Court noted that since the validity of Ex.A.1 itself is being challenged, the legitimacy of the sale deed becomes a pivotal factor in assessing the implications of the plaintiffs’ names mutation in the Corporation records. 16. The plaintiffs also relied on Ex.A.6 (Tax passbook). The documents relied on by the plaintiff show that consequent to the Ex.A.1 sale deed, the plaintiffs have taken steps to mutate their names in the records and paid the tax and passbook also obtained. 17. Coming to the defendants’ case, they put forth the claim that the 2nd defendant had acquired the schedule property through original of Ex.B.14 (Ex.B.14 is a photocopy of sale agreement dated 12.05.1998). They contended that an advance payment of Rs.1,00,000/-was made as part of total consideration of Rs.1,90,000/-. Subsequently, an additional payment of Rs.80,000/-was given on 11.04.1999 and a demand draft of Rs.8,200/-along with cash payment of Rs.1,800/-was made on 17.09.1999, completing the full consideration. The plaintiffs contested the admissibility of Ex.B.14 document. Despite the objection, the trial Court marked Ex.B.14 document albeit subject to the objection. In its Judgment, the trial Court rightly addressed the objection and noted that for admissibility of a photocopy, the defendants should demonstrate unavailability of the original document and its loss. The trial Court also noted that it should be established that Ex.B14 copy was generated from the original document through a mechanical process. From the inception, the defendants’ maintained that they had provided original of Ex.B.14 to their vendor and G.Veera Lakshmi’s husband during the execution of the second agreement. 18. The trial Court after appreciation of the evidence on record, arrived at the conclusion that the defendants were unsuccessful in proving the execution of the second agreement by their alleged vendor. There exists no substantiation that the vendor in question took possession of the original Ex.B.14 and that Ex.B.14 was derived from the original. Consequently, the defendants did not succeed in establishing Ex.B.14 as a legitimate document emanating from its original source. This led to the exclusion of Ex.B.14 from the trial Court’s consideration. Importantly, the defendants have not contested the accuracy of the trial Court’s findings and observations and these findings have reached a final and conclusive state. Notably, the trial Court’s Judgment does not provide the reasons for marking Ex.B.14 and raising a point of procedural concern. This led to the exclusion of Ex.B.14 from the trial Court’s consideration. Importantly, the defendants have not contested the accuracy of the trial Court’s findings and observations and these findings have reached a final and conclusive state. Notably, the trial Court’s Judgment does not provide the reasons for marking Ex.B.14 and raising a point of procedural concern. Ideally, the trial Court should have determined the admissibility of Ex.B.14 at the time of marking it. 19. The defendants’ also assert that they received a reply notice (Ex.B.15) from G.V.V.S.Murthy in reply to their legal notice dated 20.06.1999. The reply allegedly issued to the 2nd defendant on 04.12.1998 acknowledged the existence of agreement of sale dated 12.05.1998 concerning the schedule property for a consideration of Rs.1,90,000/-and notice demanded the payment of the remaining sale consideration, totaling Rs.90,000/-. 20. It is evident that the plaintiffs’ also opposed the admission of Ex.B.15 document citing its status as a photocopy. Despite the plaintiffs’ objection, the trial court proceeded to mark Ex.B.15 following a pattern similar to that of Ex.B.14 with the objection noted. The trial Court aptly pointed out that the defendants have not taken a plea regarding the issuance of notice vide Ex.B.15 to the defendant. In fact, the 2d defendants introduced Ex.B.15 without accompanying pleadings or supportive evidence. The defendants have also taken a plea that all the relevant documents including Ex.B.15 were furnished to the District Collector, Visakhapatnam, during the time they lodged a complaint against the plaintiffs. 21. The defendants’ did not adduce any evidence to substantiate their claim that the documents were submitted to the office of the District Collector. To establish the same, they should have taken measures to call for the production of these documents. The trial Court aptly observed that unless the documents can demonstrate that the original of Ex.B.15 is unavailable or cannot be produced in Court, the document cannot be considered. There is a lack of evidence indicating that Ex.B.15 is derived from its original form rendering it inadmissible as secondary evidence. The defendants did not dispute the correctness of the trial court’s findings. The trial Court should have addressed the admissibility of the photocopy of the document (Ex.B.15) at the time of its marking. However, this aspect was not accurately considered by the trial Court. The defendants did not dispute the correctness of the trial court’s findings. The trial Court should have addressed the admissibility of the photocopy of the document (Ex.B.15) at the time of its marking. However, this aspect was not accurately considered by the trial Court. The defendants did present an office copy of the complaint submitted to the Commissioner of Police (Ex.B.3) accompanied by a receipt from the Central Complaint Cell, dated 31.01.2005. Ex.B.3 illustrates that the 1st defendant lodged this complaint well before the execution of Ex.A.1 sale deed. The contents of Ex.B.3 suggest that G.Veera Lakshmi entered into a sale agreement concerning the suit schedule property with the 2nd defendant. Yet, she failed to execute the registered sale deed as agreed. Ex.B.3 does not conclusively prove the existence of an agreement between G. Veera Lakshmi and the 2nd defendant, instead it confirms the act of raising a complaint regarding the alleged breach of such an agreement. 22. Ex.B.6 (Photocopy of the letter addressed to the District Collector) reveals that the 1st defendant lodged a complaint against the G.Veera Lakshmi on 24.10.2004 with similar contentions as in Ex.B.3. A receipt acknowledging the complaint (Ex.B.12) was also provided. Mere claiming of right in Ex.B.6 does not automatically validate the defendants stand regarding G.Veera Lakshmi’s execution of an agreement of sale. Additionally, the defendants filed a complaint with the Sub-Registrar, Akkayyapalem, Visakhapatnam (Ex.B.7) and the Inspector of Police, Kukatpalle (Ex.B.8). These complaints are supported by receipts indicating their submission. However, these receipts indicate that the complaints were filed subsequent to the institution of the suit. The defendants relied on Ex.B.11 which pertains to the encumbrance of the schedule property. It does not provide substantial assistance in determining the case in favour of either party. 23. Ex.B.13 (original demand notice) shows that Municipal Corporation issued demand notices to the defendants in the plaintiffs’ name. It shows that the plaintiffs failed to pay the property tax for three years for Rs.2,058/-on 27.02.2008. Not possessing the schedule property might be the reason for the plaintiffs' non-payment of the municipal tax. 24. Despite acquiring passbook, the plaintiffs have not submitted any receipt as evidence indicating the payment of property tax related to the schedule property. It is worth noting that the defendants are expected to pursue a suit for specific performance of agreement with G.Veera Lakshmi. 24. Despite acquiring passbook, the plaintiffs have not submitted any receipt as evidence indicating the payment of property tax related to the schedule property. It is worth noting that the defendants are expected to pursue a suit for specific performance of agreement with G.Veera Lakshmi. The defendants have not provided an explanation only to send complaints against G.Veera Lakshmi, instead of seeking recourse through the Civil Court to address their grievances and explore potential remedies. 25. Surprisingly, even subsequent to the institution of the suit, the defendants have not undertaken appropriate measures to compel the G.Veera Lakshmi to fulfill the alleged sale agreement by executing the sale deed. To substantiate their possession of the schedule property for a period of eight years before 2006, the defendants submitted Ex.B.4, a declaration provided by the Municipal Corporator of 41st ward of Visakhapatnam Municipal Corporation. As it is a suit filed seeking possession of the schedule property, the defendants’ possession of the schedule property is not in dispute. The plaintiffs' argument is centered on the premise that the defendants were granted permission to occupy the suit schedule property by their respective vendors contending that this permission amounts to a licence. 26. Notably, the trial Court observed that the plaintiffs failed to plead as to when the defendants were to be in possession of the schedule property and how long they have been there; since the possession of the defendants over the suit's schedule property is not in dispute; Ex.B.4 does not establish the defendants' case regarding their right over the suit schedule property under the alleged agreement of sale. Therefore, the defendants failed to prove their case, and the weakness of the defendants in establishing their case cannot strengthen the plaintiffs to establish their case. 27. Learned counsel for the defendants/respondents contends that first of all the plaintiffs have to prove that the defendants have been in possession of the suit schedule property with the permission and the said contention is not established. 28. 27. Learned counsel for the defendants/respondents contends that first of all the plaintiffs have to prove that the defendants have been in possession of the suit schedule property with the permission and the said contention is not established. 28. Learned counsel for the defendants/respondents contends that the plaintiffs cannot succeed on weakness of the defendants case, plaintiffs must establish their own case on the strength of their own title deed in support of their case, they relied on a decision in K.Venkatasubba Reddi V. Bairagi Ramaiah (died) and his L.Rs., 1999 (3) ALT 210 (S.B), wherein the Composite High Court of Andhra Pradesh, referred to the decision in Morn Mar Basselios Calholicos v. Most Rev Mar Poulose Athanasius And others, AIR 1954 SC 526 , wherein, while disposing of a civil appeal in an ejectment suit, three Judges Bench of the Supreme Court laid down the law thus : “The plaintiff in ejectment suit must succeed on the strength of his own title. This can be done by adducing sufficient evidence to discharge the onus that is on him irrespective of whether the defendant has proved his case or not. A mere distinction of the defendant's title in the absence of establishment of his own title carries the plaintiff nowhere". A Division Bench of this Court also in Chakicherla Adilakshmamma v. Almakuru Rama Rao and Ors., 1973 AIR A.P. 149 . Relying on the judgment of the Supreme Court in AIR 1954 SC 526 (cited supra) held that "in a suit for ejectment, the plaintiff is liable to be nonsuited, if he fails to establish his own title irrespective of the question whether the defendants have proved their case or not." 11. The law laid down by the Supreme Court and also by the Division Bench of this Court in the ejectment suits is also applicable to the suits for declaration of title. Thus, the plaintiff must succeed by establishing his own title, by adducing satisfactory evidence and he cannot succeed on the weakness of the defendant's case. 29. The law laid down by the Supreme Court and also by the Division Bench of this Court in the ejectment suits is also applicable to the suits for declaration of title. Thus, the plaintiff must succeed by establishing his own title, by adducing satisfactory evidence and he cannot succeed on the weakness of the defendant's case. 29. In Eerappa V. Golla Nagaiah and others 2008 (2) ALT 416 , the Composite High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad referred K.Ramabrahmam V. G.Narsingh Rao, 2009 (2) ALT 389 , wherein it is observed as under: "An individual who claims to have transacted with the rightful owners, in relation to a property and claims possession, vis--vis the property, on the basis of such a transaction, cannot be permitted to plead adverse possession. In the instant case, apart from basing his claim on Ex.A.1 and other documentary evidence, the appellant has taken the alternative plea of adverse possession, as the basis for declaration of his title. It is true that the adverse possession, which, till recently, used to be a mere defence for recovery of possession; was recognized as a basis for declaration of title. However, once the origin of the possession is traceable to an incomplete transaction, with the rightful owner, the resultant possession, even if true, cannot be treated as adverse, and in that view of the matter, the appellant cannot be granted the relief of declaration of title on the plea of adverse possession, assuming that he had been in possession, for a fairly long time. " It has already been pointed out that the respondents have admitted the title of the appellant and in that view of the matter, it was not open to them to take the plea of adverse possession. Therefore, the inescapable conclusion is that the appellant was entitled to be declared as the owner of the suit schedule property. The first question is answered accordingly. The plea of adverse possession is available only to such person, who does not acquiesce in the title of the person pleading ownership. The very concept of adverse possession connotes that it commenced in wrong and is maintained against the right. Acquiescence in the title of the owner would not go along with the plea of adverse possession. In categorical terms, the appellant pleaded that the land was purchased by Sarvi Rajaiah from the respondent and thereafter he purchased it. The very concept of adverse possession connotes that it commenced in wrong and is maintained against the right. Acquiescence in the title of the owner would not go along with the plea of adverse possession. In categorical terms, the appellant pleaded that the land was purchased by Sarvi Rajaiah from the respondent and thereafter he purchased it. This implies that the appellant admitted that the respondent had title to the land and it is yet to pass on, to himself through his vendor. Therefore, the appellant cannot take the plea of adverse possession. 30. In Meenugu Mallaiah & Others V. Ananthula Rajaiah & Another, 2017 (1) ALD 457 , the High Court of Judicature for the state of Telangana and the state of Andhra Pradesh held that: In India Article 65 of Limitation Act prescribed limitation to recover possession from the person in wrongful possession is 12 years from the date when the person in possession set up hostile title or adverse title, continuing in possession. Article 65, Schedule I of The Limitation Act prescribes limitation of 12 years for a suit for possession of immovable property or any interest therein based on title. It is important to note that the starting point of limitation of 12 years is counted from the point of time when the possession of the defendants becomes adverse to the plaintiff. Article 65 is an independent Article applicable to all suits for possession of immovable property based on title i.e., proprietary title as distinct from possessory title. Article 64 governs suits for possession based on possessory right. 12 years from the date of dispossession is the starting point of limitation under Article 64. Article 65 as well as Article 64 shall be read with Section 27 which bears the heading Extinguishment of right to property. It runs as follows: At the determination of the period hereby limited to any person for instituting the suit for possession of any property, his right to such property shall be extinguished. If Article 65 and Section 27 of the Limitation Act are read conjointly, it indicates that where a cause of action exists to file a suit for possession and if the suit is not filed within the period of limitation prescribed, then, not only the period of limitation comes to an end, but the right based on title or possession, as the case may be, will be extinguished. Article 65 of the Limitation Act assists the person in possession to acquire prescriptive title by adverse possession. When the title to property of the previous owner is extinguished, it passes on to the possessor and the possessory right gets transformed into ownership. Section 27 of Limitation Act lays down a substantive law by declaring that after the lapse of the period, the title ceases to exist and not merely the remedy. It means that since the person who had a right to possession has allowed his right to be extinguished by his inaction, he cannot recover the property from the person in adverse possession and as a necessary corollary thereto, the person in adverse possession is enabled to hold on to his possession as against the owner not in possession. 31. In light of the settled legal position, now I appreciate the contentions raised on behalf of both sides with reference to the evidence adduced. 32. It is the DW.1’s evidence that Smt. G. Veera Lakshmi and her husband never objected to their possession from May 1998, but they colluded with the plaintiff, invented the sale deed and filed a false suit. It is also the defendants' case that the husband of G.Veera Lakshmi received Rs.1,80,000/-after the agreement dated 11.04.1999, and they paid the sale consideration to the said G.V.V.S.Murthy with the mediation of P.Radha Krishna, I.T.I Principal, Visakhapatnam, who is the tenant of the schedule property. 33. The defendants assert that they have held possession of the property since 1998. DW.1, in his chief affidavit, testified that during the execution of the second agreement, G. Veera Lakshmi's husband retrieved the earlier sale agreement dated 12.05.1998 from them. Nonetheless, the defendants assert that they acquired possession of the schedule property through the sale agreement. At most, based on the admitted facts, it can be inferred that the defendants held the property for seven years before the institution of the suit. The plaintiffs did not provide evidence to demonstrate that the defendants took possession of the property as tenants. Conversely, the defendants did not successfully establish their possession through an agreement of sale. However, it is evident that the defendants have indeed been in possession of the schedule property. It's important to note that the defendants are not claiming to be tenants of the schedule property. Rather, their dispute revolves around contesting the plaintiffs' title over the property. Conversely, the defendants did not successfully establish their possession through an agreement of sale. However, it is evident that the defendants have indeed been in possession of the schedule property. It's important to note that the defendants are not claiming to be tenants of the schedule property. Rather, their dispute revolves around contesting the plaintiffs' title over the property. Consequently, the Civil Court retains the jurisdiction to address the possession dispute. Additionally, the defendants have not raised any grievances regarding the plaintiffs' failure to pursue remedies under the Rent Control Act. 34. In a situation where a dispute over title emerges between two parties asserting ownership through a common vendor, both parties may retain the option to approach the Civil Court for resolution. This option remains available primarily due to the fact that the defendants have not contended that their possession of the property is based on a tenant-landlord relationship. 35. According to the defendants’ version, they have been in occupation of the schedule mentioned premises by the sale agreement. When a possession could be referred to as an agreement of sale, it can never be considered adverse. The reason is that a person whose possession can be referred to as an agreement of sale will not be permitted to show that his possession became hostile. As already observed, the defendants claimed to be in possession of the property for seven years before filing the suit. 36. It is not the defendants’ case that they perfected their title to the plaint schedule property by adverse possession. The plaintiffs based their suit on the title. According to Article 65 of the Limitation Act, it is not for the plaintiffs to prove that they were in possession of the property within twelve years from the date of the suit. The burden is on the defendants to show they perfected their title by adverse possession. Thus, it is enough for the plaintiffs to establish their title, and in the instant case, admittedly, Ganne Veera Lakshmi is the property's original owner. 37. When the respondents themselves disclaimed the tenancy with G.Veera Lakshmi, it was for them to establish that they entered into possession of the property by the sale agreement. At the cost of repetition, it is pertinent to note that the defendants have not taken steps to prove the agreement of sale. 38. 37. When the respondents themselves disclaimed the tenancy with G.Veera Lakshmi, it was for them to establish that they entered into possession of the property by the sale agreement. At the cost of repetition, it is pertinent to note that the defendants have not taken steps to prove the agreement of sale. 38. In the given circumstances, the plaintiffs acquired the property through the execution of Ex.A.1 sale deed, whereas the defendants assert their ownership based on an agreement of sale. Notably, the defendants do not contend that they wrongfully took possession of the property by forcibly displacing the original owner. Instead, they claim to have obtained possession as purchasers through an unregistered agreement of sale. This implies that their possession is permissive, lacking the potential to mature into adverse possession unless the defendants maintain possession for a period exceeding 12 years while also asserting a hostile claim to the property's title. This claim must be made known to the original owner, and the defendants must disavow her rights under the unregistered agreement of sale. Importantly, the defendants have not presented evidence to establish a hostile title against G. Veera Lakshmi, the purported seller of the property to them. This absence of evidence demonstrates that the defendants have not taken steps to challenge or undermine G. Veera Lakshmi's ownership rights. 39. It is evident that while Ex.A.1 does not explicitly attorned tenancy, the defendants themselves acknowledge that no tenancy emerged between them and the plaintiffs. Even if considered the plaintiff's assertion to be true, the respondents' disavowal of any tenancy implies that their ongoing presence can be classified as that of a tenant at sufferance. Consequently, they do not possess the right to receive a formal notice to vacate the premises before being asked to quit. 40. As previously noted, the trial Court has determined that the plaintiffs' proof of Ex.A.1 sale deed is inadequate due to the absence of examination of their vendor, attestor, or any other witnesses to prove the passing of consideration. The defendants contend that Ex.A.1 was fabricated in collusion with Ganni Veera Lakshmi, the property's owner. However, given that there is no dispute regarding G.Veera Lakshmi's execution of the sale deed, the onus lies with the defendants to substantiate their claim of collusive execution of Ex.A.1. No evidence has been presented to support this allegation of collusion. The defendants contend that Ex.A.1 was fabricated in collusion with Ganni Veera Lakshmi, the property's owner. However, given that there is no dispute regarding G.Veera Lakshmi's execution of the sale deed, the onus lies with the defendants to substantiate their claim of collusive execution of Ex.A.1. No evidence has been presented to support this allegation of collusion. Furthermore, no material has been provided to suggest that G.Veera Lakshmi questioned the validity of Ex.A.1 sale deed. It is crucial to highlight that the defendants do not dispute G. Veera Lakshmi's execution of Ex.A.1 sale deed. In the context of this case, the failure to produce witnesses to prove the execution of Ex.A.1 sale deed does not invalidate the plaintiffs' right to assert their claim over the schedule property. 41. At this stage, it is pertinent to refer to the observations in Pathan Sabirabi V. Shaik Rasool, 2015 (1) ALT 119 the composite High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad held that: 11. Attestation is a typical process through which the witnesses, present at the time of execution of document are required to subscribe their signature. They must not only be present at the time of execution, but also must have seen the executant signing the document. Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act defines it. Section 68 of the Evidence Act, mandates that a document, which is required to be attested, can be proved only by examining at least one of the attestors. Naturally, the person examined as attestor must speak to the events that are required to take place, for a valid attestation. 12. In the instant case, the document Ex.A-1 is a simple sale deed and it is not required to be attested under law. Therefore, the question of applying the test of attestation to such a document does not arise. The Indian Evidence Act itself provides for presumption of certain degree, in favour of the documents that are required to be attested and once the registration of a document and execution thereof by the executant are not disputed, the document cannot be ignored. 42. In Prem Singh & Ors., V. Birbal & Ors., 2006 0 AIR (SC) 3608, the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed as follows: There is a presumption that a registered document is validly executed. A registered document, therefore, prima facie would be valid in law. 42. In Prem Singh & Ors., V. Birbal & Ors., 2006 0 AIR (SC) 3608, the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed as follows: There is a presumption that a registered document is validly executed. A registered document, therefore, prima facie would be valid in law. The onus of proof, thus, would be on a person who leads evidence to rebut the presumption. 43. Considering the established legal principles and facts of the case, this Court finds that the trial Court's rationale for not accepting the validity of Ex.A.1 sale deed to be flawed. The trial Court failed to consider well established legal precedents. 44. In Ponnia Pillai V. Pannai, A.I.R. (34) 1947 Madras 282, a Division Bench of Madras High Court, relying on Bala Mukund V. Dalu, 25 ALL 498 (F.B.), it is held that in a suit filed based on tenancy in which the defendant denies the title of the plaintiff and sets up adverse possession, even if the issue relating to the title is not framed if the evidence is adduced fully by both sides on the question of title, a decree based on the plaintiff's title can be given against the defendant even if the plaintiff fails to establish and tenancy set up by him. 45. As seen from the record, the plaintiffs have stated that their vendor granted permission for the defendants to reside in the property. Furthermore, the plaintiffs’ have asserted that they issued a notice dated 27.08.2005 directing the defendants to vacate the premises by midnight of 30th September 2005, in case the defendants claimed to be tenants. Though the plaintiffs have not pleaded explicitly as to when the defendants came into possession of the property, it is the defendants' case that their possession commenced seven years before filing the suit. When the evidence on record establishes such a fact, the non-mentioning of the details in the plaint does not impede the plaintiffs’ right in any way, if they can substantiate their ownership of the schedule property. 46. The plaintiffs have explicitly alleged that their vendor granted permission to the defendants for possession of the property. While this assertion might not have been conclusively proven, its absence should not serve as ground for dismissing the suit. The defendants themselves claimed to have held possession of the property for seven years preceding the suit's filing. 46. The plaintiffs have explicitly alleged that their vendor granted permission to the defendants for possession of the property. While this assertion might not have been conclusively proven, its absence should not serve as ground for dismissing the suit. The defendants themselves claimed to have held possession of the property for seven years preceding the suit's filing. In light of this, the lack of complete evidence to support the plaintiffs' plea should not be deemed sufficient to dismiss the suit. 47. Merely because the plaintiffs failed to furnish the defendants' ages correctly, at any stretch of the imagination, it cannot be taken as ground to negative the plaintiffs’ contentions. In consideration of well-established legal principles, this Court perceives that despite the plaintiffs' inability to substantiate the defendants' tenancy, it remains evident that the defendants have contested the plaintiffs' ownership. The defendants assert their possession of the property based on an alleged agreement of sale, which they have not been able to prove. The defendants claim to have possessed the property for duration of seven years before initiating the suit. Conversely, the plaintiffs have succeeded in establishing their ownership of the schedule property through Ex.A.1 sale deed. Accordingly, the point is answered. POINT NO.2: 48. The defendants assert that they have been in possession of the schedule property since 1998. However, PW.1, who acquired the schedule property through Ex.A.1 on 17.08.2005, filed the suit on 18.11.2005. The plaintiffs have also claimed damages amounting to Rs.1,00,000/-. The plaint does not specify the basis on which the plaintiffs arrived at this Rs.1,00,000/-figure for a three-month period. Moreover, no evidence has been presented to substantiate the justification for this damages amount. Given the circumstances of the case, this Court is disinclined to grant the damages requested by the plaintiffs. The lack of clarity and supporting evidence regarding the assessment of damages leads to this conclusion not to award damages in this case. Accordingly, the point is answered. POINT NO.3: 49. For the reasons stated above and regarding the facts of the case, this Court is of the view that the plaintiffs have produced evidence to substantiate their title over the schedule property. Accordingly, the point is answered. POINT NO.3: 49. For the reasons stated above and regarding the facts of the case, this Court is of the view that the plaintiffs have produced evidence to substantiate their title over the schedule property. In this regard, the findings and conclusions recorded by the trial court are not based on proper appreciation of the evidence on record; the Judgment of the trial court is erroneous and cannot be sustained, and is liable to be set aside; the plaintiffs are not entitled to claim for damages. Accordingly, the point is answered. 50. As a result, the Appeal is partly allowed without costs, and the suit is partly decreed with proportionate costs by holding that the plaintiffs are entitled to the possession of the schedule property by evicting the defendants, their men and agents from the plaint schedule property. The defendants are given three months time to vacate the plaint schedule property from the Judgment date. Otherwise, the plaintiffs are entitled to possession of the schedule property by filing Execution Petition. The suit claim in respect of damages is dismissed. 51. Miscellaneous petitions pending, if any, in this Appeal shall stand closed.