JUDGMENT : (Anil Kumar Upman, J.) 1. Heard. 2. The aforesaid writ petition has been filed challenging the order dated 28.11.2022 passed by Armed Forces Tribunal, Regional Bench, Jaipur (hereinafter referred to as 'the Tribunal' for brevity) whereby the Original Application (No.81/2011) filed by the petitioner was dismissed. 3. Brief facts of the case are that an application under Section 14 of the Armed Forces Tribunal Act, 2007 was filed by the petitioner wherein it was prayed that the respondents be directed to grant Service Pension along with consequential benefits for the lifetime of her husband Late Ex Sep Anji Singh from 30.09.1963 to 04.08.1966 and thereafter Family Pension. In the application, it was averred by the petitioner that her husband was enrolled in the Army on 05.05.1960 and after rendering more than three years of service, he was found medically unfit for further retention in service and was consequently discharged from service on 30.09.1963 under Army Rule 13 (3) III (iii). It was further averred by the petitioner that at the time of enrolment, her husband was physically and mentally fit but later on, he suffered from the disability while in service and was consequently discharged form service on medical grounds. In these circumstances, her husband was eligible for grant of service pension and disability pension and after his death, she is eligible for grant of family pension. For the aforesaid relief, the petitioner approached the respondent and legal notice was also sent through her advocate but no heed was paid by the respondents to the grievances of the petitioner. Under these circumstances, the petitioner had no option but to approach the Tribunal for redressal of her grievances. 4. Detailed reply to the application was submitted by the respondents wherein it was averred that service documents of Late Ex Sep Anji Singh have been destroyed after expiry of mandatory retention period. However, as per the Long Roll, late Ex Sep Anji Singh was discharged from service on 30.09.1963 and other columns of the Long Roll, which were required to be filled up are blank. It was further averred by the respondents that Late Ex Sep Anji Singh has not completed minimum qualifying service of 15 years, therefore, he was not eligible for grant of service pension. It was further averred by the respondents that Late Ex Sep Anji Singh has not completed minimum qualifying service of 15 years, therefore, he was not eligible for grant of service pension. He was also not eligible for grant of Invalid Pension as he has not completed minimum 10 years of service in terms of Rule 198 of Pension Regulations for the Army, 1961 (Part-1). It was also averred that disability pension is granted to those Armed Forces Personnel who are discharged/invalided on account of a disability which is assessed above 20% and considered as attributable to or aggravated by military service. Finally, it was prayed by the respondents that the husband of the petitioner does not come under any of the above categories for grant of pension and therefore, the Original Application filed by the petitioner is liable to be dismissed. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the learned tribunal has committed grave illegality in rejecting the claim of the petitioner and that the tribunal has not considered the case of the petitioner in right perspective and rejected the claim of the petitioner in an arbitrary manner. He further submits that in identical fact situation, same benefit has been granted to other person. Learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the following judgments:- 1. Union of India & Anr. vs Rajbir Singh : 2015 (12) SCC 264 2. Dharamvir Singh vs UOI : 2013 (7) SCC 316 3. Union of India vs Angad Singh Titaria : 2015 (12) SCC 257 4. Veer Pal Singh vs Secretary, Ministry of Defence : 2013(10) SCR 579 & 5. Union of India vs Manjeet Singh : 2015 (12) SCC 275 6. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the respondents supported the impugned order and submits that after considering each and every aspect of the matter, the learned Tribunal has passed the impugned order. He thus, sought dismissal of the writ petition. 7. We have given our thoughtful consideration to the submissions advanced by counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record. 8. From perusal of the record, it appears that death certificate of the husband of the petitioner was issued on 20.05.2005 but same was not produced along with the original application which was filed as late as in the year 2011 before the Tribunal. 8. From perusal of the record, it appears that death certificate of the husband of the petitioner was issued on 20.05.2005 but same was not produced along with the original application which was filed as late as in the year 2011 before the Tribunal. We further find that the petitioner approached the Tribunal after more than four decades of the death of her husband and for such inordinate/unexplained delay, no proper or sufficient cause was shown by the petitioner. The application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act filed before the Tribunal does not contain any cogent reasons and same was filed on the basis of general and vague grounds. We further find that the petitioner failed to produce any document before the Tribunal proving the fact that the petitioner is a legally wedded wife of Late Ex Sep Anji Singh. During the pendency of the original application, the petitioner was directed by the Tribunal to produce original copy of discharge book. Upon production of copy of discharge book, same was examined by the Tribunal and it was found that Late Ex Sep Anji Singh was discharged from service on 30.09.1963 by the order of Commandant, the Grenadiers Regimental Centre as a consequence of "Having been found Medically Unfit for Service" under Item III (iii) of Rule 13(3) of Army Rules, 1954 after serving for 3 years and 148 days service. It is also evident from the record that minimum qualifying service of 15 years was not completed by the husband of the petitioner for grant of service pension so also, he has not completed 10 years of service which is the minimum requirement for grant of invalid pension in terms of Rule 198 of Pension Regulations for the Army, 1961 (Part-1). 9. It is an admitted fact that the petitioner approached the Tribunal after four decades of the death of her husband and this delay was not explained by her by giving cogent reasons. We are of the firm view that a person to get his rights enforced or to get an indulgence in equity side has to be vigilant for putting the system in motion if required but if he keeps mum and maintains silence then things are to be permitted to take rest. Grievance for redressal has to be lodged well within time and if no time is provided then also within a reasonable time. Grievance for redressal has to be lodged well within time and if no time is provided then also within a reasonable time. In the present case, admittedly, the Original Application has been filed after 47 years and same was not properly explained. On this sole ground, the claim of the petitioner is liable to be rejected. Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of C. Jacob vs Director of Geology and Mining Indus. Est. and Ors. : (2008) 10 SCC 115 has considered the fact of delay in raising dispute and held as under:- "9. When a government servant abandons service to take up alternative employment or to attend to personal affairs, and does not bother to send any letter seeking leave or letter of resignation or letter of voluntary retirement, and the records do not show that he is treated as being in service, he cannot after two decades, represent that he should be taken back to duty. Nor can such employee be treated as having continued in service, thereby deeming the entire period as qualifying service for purpose of pension. That will be a travesty of justice. Where an employee unauthorizedly absents himself and suddenly appears after 20 years and demands that he should be taken back and approaches court, the department naturally will not or may not have any record relating to the employee at that distance of time. In such cases, when the employer fails to produce the records of the enquiry and the order of dismissal/ removal, court cannot draw an adverse inference against the employer for not producing records, nor direct reinstatement with back-wages for 20 years, ignoring the cessation of service or the lucrative alternative employment of the employee. Misplaced sympathy in such matters will encourage indiscipline, lead to unjust enrichment of the employee at fault and result in drain of public exchequer. Many a time there is also no application of mind as to the extent of financial burden, as a result of a routine order for back-wages." 10. We further fortify our view from the judgment passed by Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the case of Shiba Shankar Mohapatra & Ors. vs State of Orissa & Ors. : (2010) 12 SCC 471 wherein it was held that a person should raise his grievance well within reasonable time and he cannot be allowed to raise his claim after an inordinate delay. vs State of Orissa & Ors. : (2010) 12 SCC 471 wherein it was held that a person should raise his grievance well within reasonable time and he cannot be allowed to raise his claim after an inordinate delay. The Hon'ble Apex Court held as under:- "18. In R.S. Makashi v. I.M. Menon & Ors. 16 AIR 1982 SC 101 , this Court considered all aspects of limitation, delay and laches in filing the writ petition in respect of inter se seniority of the employees. The Court referred to its earlier judgment in State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr. v. Bhailal Bhai etc. etc., 17 AIR 1964 SC 1006 , wherein it has been observed that the maximum period fixed by the Legislature as the time within which the relief by a suit in a Civil Court must be brought, may ordinarily be taken to be a reasonable standard by which delay in seeking the remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution can be measured. The Court observed as under:-“We must administer justice in accordance with law and principle of equity, justice and good conscience. It would be unjust to deprive the respondents of the rights which have accrued to them. Each person ought to be entitled to sit back and consider that his appointment and promotion effected a long time ago would not be set-aside after the lapse of a number of years..... The petitioners have not furnished any valid explanation whatever for the inordinate delay on their part in approaching the Court with the challenge against the seniority principles laid down in the Government Resolution of 1968... We would accordingly hold that the challenge raised by the petitioners against the seniority principles laid down in the Government Resolution of March 2, 1968 ought to have been rejected by the High Court on the ground of delay and laches and the writ petition, in so far as it related to the prayer for quashing the said Government resolution, should have been dismissed.” (Emphasis added) 19. The issue of challenging the seniority list, which continued to be in existence for a long time, was again considered by this Court in K.R. Mudgal & Ors. v. R.P. Singh & Ors. 18 AIR 1986 SC 2086 . The issue of challenging the seniority list, which continued to be in existence for a long time, was again considered by this Court in K.R. Mudgal & Ors. v. R.P. Singh & Ors. 18 AIR 1986 SC 2086 . The Court held as under:- “A government servant who is appointed to any post ordinarily should at least after a period of 3-4 years of his appointment be allowed to attend to the duties attached to his post peacefully and without any sense of insecurity......... Satisfactory service conditions postulate that there shall be no sense of uncertainty amongst the Government servants created by writ petitions filed after several years as in this case. It is essential that any one who feels aggrieved by the seniority assigned to him, should approach the Court as early as possible otherwise in addition to creation of sense of insecurity in the mind of Government servants, there shall also be administrative complication and difficulties.... In these circumstances we consider that the High Court was wrong in rejecting the preliminary objection raised on behalf of the respondents to the writ petition on the ground of laches.” (Emphasis added) 20. While deciding the case, this Court placed reliance upon its earlier judgment in Malcom Lawrance Cecil D’Souza v. Union of India & Ors. 19 AIR 1975 SC 1269 , wherein it had been observed as under:- “Although security of service cannot be used as a shield against the administrative action for lapse of a public servant, by and large one of the essential requirement of contentment and efficiency in public service is a feeling of security. It is difficult no doubt to guarantee such security in all its varied aspects, it should at least be possible to ensure that matters like one’s position in a seniority list after having been settled for once should not be liable to be re-opened after lapse of many years in the instance of a party who has itself intervening party chosen to keep quiet. Raking up old matters like seniority after a long time is likely to resort in administrative complications and difficulties. It would, therefore, appear to be in the interest of smoothness and efficiency of service that such matters should be given a quietus after lapse of some time.” (Emphasis added) 21. In B.S. Bajwa v. State of Punjab & Ors. Raking up old matters like seniority after a long time is likely to resort in administrative complications and difficulties. It would, therefore, appear to be in the interest of smoothness and efficiency of service that such matters should be given a quietus after lapse of some time.” (Emphasis added) 21. In B.S. Bajwa v. State of Punjab & Ors. 20 AIR 1999 SC 1510 , this Court while deciding the similar issue re-iterated the same view, observing as under:- “It is well settled that in service matters, the question of seniority should not be re-opened in such situations after the lapse of reasonable period because that results in disturbing the settled position which is not justifiable. There was inordinate delay in the present case for making such a grievance. This along was sufficient to decline interference under Article 226 and to reject the writ petition”. (Emphasis added) 22. In Dayaram Asanand v. State of Maharashtra & Ors. 21 AIR 1984 SC 850 , while reiterating the similar view this Court held that in absence of satisfactory explanation for inordinate delay of 8-9 years in questioning under Article 226 of the Constitution, the validity of the seniority and promotion assigned to other employee could not be entertained. 23. In P.S. Sadasivaswamy v. State of Tamil Nadu, 22 AIR 1975 SC 2271, this Court considered the case where the petition was filed after lapse of 14 years challenging the promotion. However, this Court held that aggrieved person must approach the Court expeditiously for relief and it is not permissible to put forward stale claim. The Court observed as under :- “A person aggrieved by an order promoting a junior over his head should approach the Court at least within 6 months or at the most a year of such promotion.” 24. The Court further observed that it was not that there was any period of limitation for the Courts to exercise their powers under Article 226 nor was it that there could never be a case where the Courts cannot interfere in a matter after certain length of time. The Court further observed that it was not that there was any period of limitation for the Courts to exercise their powers under Article 226 nor was it that there could never be a case where the Courts cannot interfere in a matter after certain length of time. It would be a sound and wise exercise of jurisdiction for the Courts to refuse to exercise their extra ordinary powers under Article 226 in the case of persons who do not approach it expeditiously for relief and who standby and allow things to happen and then approach the Court to put forward stale claim and try to unsettle settled matters. 25. A similar view has been re-iterated by this Court in Smt. Sudama Devi vs. Commissioner & Ors. 23 (1983) 2 SCC 1 ; State of U.P. vs. Raj Bahadur Singh & Anr. 24 (1998) 8 SCC 685 ; and Northern Indian Glass Industries vs. Jaswant Singh & Ors. 25 (2003) 1 SCC 335 . 26. In Dinkar Anna Patil & Anr. vs. State of Maharashtra, 26 AIR 1999 SC 152 , this Court held that delay and laches in challenging the seniority is always fatal, but in case the party satisfies the Court regarding delay, the case may be considered. 27. In K.A. Abdul Majeed vs. State of Kerala & Ors. 27 (2001) 6 SCC 292 , this Court held that seniority assigned to any employee could not be challenged after a lapse of seven years on the ground that his initial appointment had been irregular, though even on merit it was found that seniority of the petitioner therein had correctly been fixed. 28. It is settled law that fence-sitters cannot be allowed to raise the dispute or challenge the validity of the order after its conclusion. No party can claim the relief as a matter of right as one of the grounds for refusing relief is that the person approaching the Court is guilty of delay and the laches. The Court exercising public law jurisdiction does not encourage agitation of stale claims where the right of third parties crystallises in the interregnum. (vide Aflatoon & Ors. vs. Lt. Governor, Delhi & Ors. 28 AIR 1974 SC 2077 ; State of Mysore vs. V.K. Kangan & Ors., 29 AIR 1975 SC 2190 ; Municipal Council, Ahmednagar & Anr. The Court exercising public law jurisdiction does not encourage agitation of stale claims where the right of third parties crystallises in the interregnum. (vide Aflatoon & Ors. vs. Lt. Governor, Delhi & Ors. 28 AIR 1974 SC 2077 ; State of Mysore vs. V.K. Kangan & Ors., 29 AIR 1975 SC 2190 ; Municipal Council, Ahmednagar & Anr. vs Shah Hyder Beig & Ors., 30 AIR 2000 SC 671 ; Inder Jit Gupta vs. Union of India & Ors. 31 (2001) 6 SCC 637 ; Shiv Dass vs. Union of India & Ors., 32 AIR 2007 SC 1330 ; Regional Manager, A.P.SRTC vs. N. Satyanarayana & Ors. 33 (2008) 1 SCC 210 ; and City and Industrial Development Corporation vs. Dosu Aardeshir Bhiwandiwala & Ors. 34 (2009) 1 SCC 168 )." 11. So far as the judgments relied upon by counsel for the petitioner are concerned, we are of the view that those judgments were passed in a different factual matrix. In the present case, the original application has been filed with a great delay of nearly 47 years and there is no document to show the fact that the petitioner is the legally weeded wife of late Ex Sep Anji Singh. It is also evident that the husband of the petitioner has not completed minimum qualifying service for grant of service pension. 12. In wake of the aforesaid discussion, we find that that there is no illegality or perversity in the order passed by the learned Tribunal as the case of the petitioner was considered by the Tribunal at length. The writ petition is sans merit. Consequently, the writ petition stands dismissed as being devoid of merit.