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2023 DIGILAW 1172 (PAT)

Sudhakar Jha v. State of Bihar

2023-10-13

K.VINOD CHANDRAN, PARTHA SARTHY

body2023
Partha Sarthy, J. – The petitioners in these applications have challenged the constitutional validity of the Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land) (Amendment) Act, 2016 (herein after referred to as the ‘Amendment Act, 2016’) as also that of the Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Surplus Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land) (Amendment) Act, 2019 (herein after referred to as the ‘Amendment Act, 2019’). The petitioners have also challenged the orders passed in their respective case by different authorities including the Additional Collector, the Commissioner of the Division and the Bihar Land Tribunal, all of which arise out of applications for pre-emption filed under section 16(3) of the Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land) Act, 1961 (herein after referred to as ‘the Act’ or ‘the principal Act’). 2. The case of the petitioners as evident from the contents of the applications are that the amendments are against the fundamental rights guaranteed by Part III of the Constitution as also against the principles of natural justice. It is ultra vires Article 14 of the Constitution, against the legal rights and also takes away the vested right of an individual. Section 16(3) of the Act has been repealed in an arbitrary manner without assigning any cogent reasons and the amendment is arbitrary, unconstitutional, unreasonable and ultra vires the parent Act. It should not be made applicable with retrospective affect. The amendment effected has not only been done in excess of the power granted under the Constitution; assent of the President; without which it is otiose, has not been taken before its promulgation. The parties have been harassed on account of pendency of the cases for decades and now the petitioners’ peremptory rights have been ordered to have abated. It is further contended that the amendment affected is beyond the competence of the State legislature and on account of repeal of section 45B of the Act, the statutory remedy of appeal/revision as was earlier available has been taken away without providing for any forum for adjudication of the disputes. As such, the contention is that the amendments be declared ultra vires the Constitution and the same be set aside. 3. Learned counsels who made their submissions on behalf of the petitioners were Senior Advocates Sri Kamal Nayan Choubey and Mr. J. S. Arora and Advocates Sri Jitendra Kishore Verma and Mr. As such, the contention is that the amendments be declared ultra vires the Constitution and the same be set aside. 3. Learned counsels who made their submissions on behalf of the petitioners were Senior Advocates Sri Kamal Nayan Choubey and Mr. J. S. Arora and Advocates Sri Jitendra Kishore Verma and Mr. Nagendra Rai. Sri P. K. Shahi, learned Advocate General led the argument on behalf of the respondent- State of Bihar. The other learned counsels who appeared in support of the amendment were Sri Basant Kumar Choudhary, Senior Advocate and Sri Sanjeev Kumar, Advocate. The other counsels depending on the sides that they were appearing for, adopted the arguments made by the above learned counsels. 4. Sri Kamal Nayan Choubey, learned Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioners submitted that pursuant to Article 38 of the Constitution which provides a mandate for the State to secure a social order for the promotion of welfare of the people and Article 39, which lays down six Directive Principles, some of which are to ensure means of equal livelihood to men and women, ownership and control of resources be distributed to serve the best interest of the people, avoid concentration of wealth, ensure equal pay for equal work of men and women etc; legislative steps were taken in all the States as also in the State of Bihar. The same led to the enactment of the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950, the Bihar Consolidation of Holdings and Prevention of Fragmentation Act, 1956 and the Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land) Act, 1961. 5. It was further contended that the Act which provided for fixation of ceiling area of land which a person could hold and the object of which was equitable distribution of land, after receiving the assent of the President was published in the gazette on 19.4.1962. At the time of all important amendments in the Act, whenever the State Government felt that major provisions are being deleted, the assent of the President was obtained. As the Presidential assent has not been obtained in the instant case, in absence thereof, the amendment is unconstitutional. 6. Learned Senior Advocate further submitted that the Act was promulgated by the Government of Bihar pursuant to the subjects enumerated at item no.18 of the State List and item no.42 of the Concurrent List, of the 7th Schedule of the Constitution. 6. Learned Senior Advocate further submitted that the Act was promulgated by the Government of Bihar pursuant to the subjects enumerated at item no.18 of the State List and item no.42 of the Concurrent List, of the 7th Schedule of the Constitution. Further, the Act having been enacted after obtaining the assent of the President, the same cannot be taken away in this manner. Even if it is held to be a curable defect, unless the defect is cured the same cannot be implemented. Referring to the principles of law laid down in Taylor vs. Taylor, (1875) 1 Ch. D. 426 that where a power is given to do a certain thing in a certain way, the thing must be done in that way or not at all, learned Senior Counsel contended that the Presidential assent was a mandatory requirement and even now assent could be obtained; without which the amendments would have no effect. 7. It was next contended that the protection of Article 31A of the Constitution will not be available to the Amendment Acts, impugned herein, in absence of the President’s assent in view of the first proviso to Article 31A. 8. Sri Choubey, learned Senior Advocate in support of his contentions placed reliance on the judgments in the case of Mahant Shankarshan Ramanuja Das Goswami vs. State of Orissa & Anr., AIR 1967 SC 59 ; Sriram Narayan Medhi vs. The State of Maharashtra, AIR 1971 SC 199; State of Haryana vs. Jai Singh & Ors., 2022 SCC OnLine SC 418; Pt. Rishikesh & Anr. vs. Salma Begum, (1995) 4 SCC 718 and Anita Kushwaha vs. Pushap Sudan, AIR 2016 SC 3506 . 9. Sri Jitendra Kishore Verma, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the right to pre-emption is a very old right, history of which could be traced to the period of Mughals. The question to be asked is as to why Section 16(3) of the Act was brought and has the constitutional goal or it’s purpose been achieved. For the purpose behind the ceiling law as also the law of pre-emption, learned counsel placed reliance on the judgments in the case of Bhau Ram vs. Baij Nath Singh & Ors., AIR 1962 SC 1476 and Kedar Mishra vs. State of Bihar & Ors., AIR 2016 SC 2110 . For the purpose behind the ceiling law as also the law of pre-emption, learned counsel placed reliance on the judgments in the case of Bhau Ram vs. Baij Nath Singh & Ors., AIR 1962 SC 1476 and Kedar Mishra vs. State of Bihar & Ors., AIR 2016 SC 2110 . Reliance was placed on judgment in the case of Ram Sagar Rai vs. The State of Bihar & Ors., 2017 (1) PLJR 2019 to submit that section 16(3) of the Act was a beneficial legislation enacted to prevent fragmentation of holding and to facilitate consolidation. A statute is best interpreted when we know as to why it was enacted; reference may be made to the case of Gaurav Aseem Avtej vs. U.P. State Sugar Corporation. Ltd. & Ors., (2018) 6 SCC 518 . In Atam Prakash vs. State of Haryana & Ors., AIR 1986 SC 859 the right of pre-emption was held to be reasonable as also constitutionally valid. Learned counsel also placed reliance on the judgment in the case of Suresh Prasad Singh vs. Dulhin Phulkumari Devi & Ors., 2010 (2) PLJR 167 (SC) wherein it was held that the right has been recognised by the statute. 10. Sri J. S. Arora, learned Senior Advocate, appearing on behalf of the petitioners placing reliance on the judgment in the case of Godavari Sugar Mills Ltd. vs. S.B. Kamble & Ors., AIR 1975 SC 1193 submitted that for the State to claim immunity of Article 31B of the Constitution, although, the original Act was in the 9th Schedule, it is required that the amending Act also be in the 9th Schedule and for the same, assent of the President is required to be obtained. It was further submitted that the amendment creates ambiguity in so far as it does not provide as to how the landlord gets his land back. Even if a person was entitled to get the land as pre-emptor, the proceedings having abated, the person gets back his amount which included the consideration amount with 10% thus causing great hardship. The Court should examine it’s rationality, which in view of the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of I.R. Coelho vs. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 2007 SC 861 , could be done even if the law was granted protection by including the same in the 9th Schedule of the Constitution. 11. The Court should examine it’s rationality, which in view of the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of I.R. Coelho vs. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 2007 SC 861 , could be done even if the law was granted protection by including the same in the 9th Schedule of the Constitution. 11. With respect to the Amendment Act, 2016, Sri Arora submitted that in case land of some person is sold without his knowledge and later he comes to know about it being subject matter of a ceiling proceeding, on deletion of section 45B of the Act, he becomes remedy-less. This type of amendment cannot be upheld. 12. Mr. Nagendra Rai, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners submitted that Section 45B of the Act was introduced by way of amendment in the year 1978. There are three categories of transfers. One of the period prior to 1959 for which there was no embargo, the second for the period from 1959 to 1970 when permission of the Collector was to be sought and lastly for the period after the cut-off date of 9.9.1970. Section 9 of the Act deals with exercise of option and how land transferred is to be adjusted. The judgment in the case of Bisheshwar Prasad Yadav vs. State of Bihar & Ors., 1999 (3) PLJR 117 provides that land transferred in contravention of Section 5 of the Act, to the extent not exceeding ceiling area be deemed to have been selected by him within the ceiling area. Reliance was also placed on the case of Mohammad Kajimuddin vs. State of Bihar, 2005 (4) PLJR 718 where it was held that transfers made in contravention of Section 5(i) and (ii) of the Act will go in share of the land holder and shall not form part of surplus to be acquired by the State. It was lastly submitted that in the case of Sunil Kumar vs. State of Bihar, 2004 (2) PLJR 820 the scope of application of Section 45B of the Act has been dealt with. By deletion of Section 45B, large number of persons will be left remedy-less. 13. Sri P. K. Shahi, learned Advocate General appearing for the State of Bihar submitted that there has been no argument by the petitioners on the legislative competence of the State to legislate. By deletion of Section 45B, large number of persons will be left remedy-less. 13. Sri P. K. Shahi, learned Advocate General appearing for the State of Bihar submitted that there has been no argument by the petitioners on the legislative competence of the State to legislate. The grounds that an Act can be held to be not constitutionally valid, are mainly the same being in violation of Part III of the Constitution, the State lacking legislative competence or the same being violative of some other provision of the Constitution. The power to legislate is solely with the State, which would be evident form perusal of Item no.18 of the State List under the Seventh Schedule. It was submitted that only in the case of a law falling under the scope of Article 31A of the Constitution that the assent of the President was required. So far as the principal Act as originally enacted in the year 1961 is concerned, the same deals with the acquisition and vesting of land. The Act received the President’s assent on 8.3.1962 and was published in the Bihar Gazette (Extraordinary) on 19.4.1962. Section 16(3) or section 45B of the Act not being in violation of any provision of the Constitution, no presidential assent was required. It was submitted that the right of preemptor was not a fundamental right but a statutory right which flowed from the Act. No law can be invalidated only on account of some person facing difficulty. The ground on which an Act could be declared unconstitutional are that it contravenes any fundamental right, legislating on a subject which is not assigned to the relevant legislature, contravenes a mandatory provision of the Constitution or in case of a State law it seeks to operate beyond its boundaries and impinges upon the legislative power of the Union Parliament. 14. Learned Advocate General submitted that it is not that section 45D of the Amending Act, 2016 has been challenged but the entire Amendment Act is under challenge. The newly added section 45D provides that after repeal of section 45B of the Act, the proceedings pending before the State Government or the Bihar Land Tribunal shall be deemed to be abated and the proceedings reopened earlier under the now deleted section 45B of the Act and pending before the Collector shall also stand abated. The newly added section 45D provides that after repeal of section 45B of the Act, the proceedings pending before the State Government or the Bihar Land Tribunal shall be deemed to be abated and the proceedings reopened earlier under the now deleted section 45B of the Act and pending before the Collector shall also stand abated. This amendment has been introduced to give a quietus to the issues. It was lastly submitted that whole of the principal Act could also be repealed and in so repealing, neither any Presidential assent was required nor any other provision of the Constitution would come in the way of such repeal. 15. Mr Sanjeev Kumar, learned counsel appearing in support of the amendments submitted that perusal of Item no.18 of the State List in the 7th Schedule clearly gives the legislative competence to the State legislature to legislate on the subject. Referring to the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Syed Ahmed Aga vs. State of Mysore, [ (1975) 2 SCC 131 ] it was submitted that where the principal Act has received the sanction of the President, in case the amendments do not impose additional restrictions, but are covered by the objects of the principal Act and do not go beyond the principal Act, no Presidential sanction is required for the amendment Acts. Learned counsel submitted that so far as the instant case is concerned, by the amending Act, the statutory right of preemption as given under section 16(3) of the Act, has been taken away. There being no restriction on fundamental rights nor the amendment going beyond the principal Act, no Presidential assent is required. Referring to the judgment in the case of Vishwant Kumar vs. Madan Lal Sharma, (2004) 4 SCC 1 , learned counsel submitted that the right governed by the Act is a mere right and not a vested right. 16. With respect to no vested right having been taken away, learned counsel Mr. Sanjeev Kumar also relied on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Gajraj Singh vs. State Transport Appellate Tribunal & Ors., (1997) 1 SCC 650 . Further, relying on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Subodhayya Chit Fund (P) Ltd. & Ors. Sanjeev Kumar also relied on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Gajraj Singh vs. State Transport Appellate Tribunal & Ors., (1997) 1 SCC 650 . Further, relying on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Subodhayya Chit Fund (P) Ltd. & Ors. vs. Director of Chits, Madras & Ors., 1991 Supp (2) SCC 131, learned counsel submitted that it has been held therein that as the principal Act had sanction of the President, it is not necessary to obtain sanction of the President for the amending Act. It was submitted that the purpose of the amending Acts is to give quietus to disputes and with respect to the contentions made by learned counsel appearing for the petitioners, hardships and inconvenience cannot be grounds for setting aside an amendment. Learned counsel lastly referred to a judgment in the case of Punyadeo Sharma and Ors. vs. Kamla Devi and Ors., 2022(1) BLJ 434 (SC) to submit that all pending proceedings before any court would abate. 17. Sri Basant Kumar Choudhary, learned Senior Advocate appearing for the respondents, submitted that the original Ceiling Act is a progressive legislation. So far as Section 16(3) of the Act which dealt with the right of preemption is concerned, the same was a supplementary right and not main purpose of the Act. This Court in the case of Banarsi Yadav vs. Krishna Chandra Das, 1971 BLJR 1077 held that the Act being a protective legislation cannot be challenged on the ground of violation of Articles 14 and 19, Section 16(3) of the Act was held to be valid and the reference made held to be incompetent. It was further submitted that Section 16 of the Act did not help in consolidation and section 16(3) is not protected by the 9th Schedule. The informed wisdom of the State Legislature cannot be questioned nor are the amendments ultra vires. 18. A Full Bench of this court vide its judgment dated 12.3.1951 declared the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950 as ultra vires on the ground of it infringing Article 14 of the Constitution, which led to the first Constitutional amendment and such laws were included in the 9th Schedule of the Constitution. 18. A Full Bench of this court vide its judgment dated 12.3.1951 declared the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950 as ultra vires on the ground of it infringing Article 14 of the Constitution, which led to the first Constitutional amendment and such laws were included in the 9th Schedule of the Constitution. The Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land) Act, 1961 was enacted, it received the assent of the President on 8.3.1962 and was published in Bihar Gazette (Extraordinary) on 19.4.1962. It is an Act to provide for fixation of ceiling, restriction on subletting and resumption by certain raiyats for personal cultivation of land, acquisition of status of raiyat by certain under-raiyats and acquisition of surplus land by the State, the object being equitable distribution of land. 19. By the Amendment Act, 2019, sub-section (3) of section 16 of the Act, which gave the right of pre-emption was repealed and sub-section (4) was added to Section 16 which provided that all cases or proceedings pending before any of the authorities/tribunals/Court shall be deemed to have abated and the purchase money together with the sum equal to 10% shall be refunded to the depositor without any interest. The Amendment Act, 2019 is extracted herein below for ready reference: – “The Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land) (Amendment) Act, 2019 fofèk foHkkx] vfèklwpuk lañ ,yñthñ&01-15-2018@1569@yst] fnukad 25 Qjojh] 2019& – fcgkj foèkku eaMy }kjk ;Fkkikfjr dk fuEufyf[kr vfèkfu;e] ftlij egkefge jkT;iky fnukad 23 Qjojh] 2019 dks vuqefr ns pqds gSa] blds }kjk loZ&lkèkkj.k dh lwpuk ds fy, izdkf'kr fd;k tkrk gSA An Act to Amend The Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land) Act, 1961 (Bihar Act 12 of 1962). Be it enacted by the Legislature of the State of Bihar in the Seventieth year of the Republic of India as follows: – 1. Short title, Extent and Commencement. – (1) This Act may be called The Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land) (Amendment) Act, 2019. (2) It shall extend to the whole of the State of Bihar. (3) It shall come into force immediately. 2. Amendment in Section 16 of the Act, 1961. – (1) Sub-section (3) of Section 16 of the said Act is hereby repealed. (2) It shall extend to the whole of the State of Bihar. (3) It shall come into force immediately. 2. Amendment in Section 16 of the Act, 1961. – (1) Sub-section (3) of Section 16 of the said Act is hereby repealed. (2) In the Section 16 of the said Act, the following new sub-section (4) shall be added: – “(4)(i) After the repeal of sub-section (3) of Section 16 of this Act, all cases or proceedings pending before the State Government, the Board of Revenue, the Bihar Land Tribunal, the Divisional Commissioner, the Collector, the Additional Collector, the Deputy Collector Land Reforms or in any other Court, shall be deemed to be abated. (ii) Pursuant to the repeal of sub-section (3) of Section 16 of this Act, any purchase money together with a sum equal to 10% thereof, already legally deposited shall be refunded, without any interest, to the depositor.” 20. By the Amendment Act, 2019, amendments were carried out in section 16 of the Act. Section 16(3) which gave the Right of Pre-emption was repealed and newly added Section 16(4) provided that all cases of proceedings after repeal of section 16(3) shall abate and the purchase money together with 10% thereof, without any interest, shall be refunded to the depositor. 21. By the Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land) (Amendment) Act, 2016, besides adding new sub-sections (3) and (4) to Section 30 and sub-section (4) to section 32, Section 45B of the Act was repealed. Further, a new section 45D was added which provided that the proceedings pending before the State Government or the Bihar Land Tribunal or those reopened under the deleted Section 45B and pending before the Collector shall all stand abated. Further, a new section 45D was added which provided that the proceedings pending before the State Government or the Bihar Land Tribunal or those reopened under the deleted Section 45B and pending before the Collector shall all stand abated. The Amendment Act, 2016 is extracted herein below for ready reference: – “The Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling and Acquisition of Surplus Land) (Amendment) Act, 2016 fcgkj Hkwfe lqèkkj ¼vfèkdre lhek fuèkkZj.k ,oa vfèk'ks"k Hkwfe vtZu½ vfèkfu;e] 1961 dh èkkjk 30 esa vihy dk izkoèkku gS] ijUrq vihy ds fu"iknu dh le;&lhek fuèkkZfjr ugha gksus ds dkj.k ekeys dkQh yEcs le; rd yfEcr jg tkrs gSaA vr,o] vihy oknh ds fu"iknu gsrq N% ekg dh le;&lhek fuèkkZfjr dj bls vfèkfu;e dh èkkjk 30¼2½ ds i'pkr~ u;h mi&èkkjk ¼3½ ds :i esa tksM+k x;k gSA lkFk gh vfèkfu;e ds vèkhu dh tk jgh dkjZokbZ ds Øe esa Hkw&èkkjh }kjk diViwoZd vFkok rF;ksa esa gsjQsj dj mlds vèkhuLFk fdlh izkfèkdkj ls vfèkfu;e ds mís';ksa vFkok fdlh izkoèkku ds izfrdwy vkns'k izkIr dj fy;k x;k gks] oSlh fLFkfr esa ftys dk lekgÙkkZ u;s fljs ls vfèkfu;e ds vèkhu dk;Zokgh izkjEHk dj ldrk gS] ,rn~ lEcUèkh izkoèkku vfèkfu;e dh èkkjk 30 dh mi&èkkjk ¼4½ ds :i esa tksM+k x;k gSA vfèkfu;e dss vèkhu iqujh{k.k lEcUèkh ekeys ds fu"iknu dh le;&lhek fuèkkZfjr ugha gSA ekeys ds 'kh?kz ,oa Rofjr xfr ls fu"iknu gsrq rhu ekg dk le;&lhek fuèkkZfjr djrs gq, bls vfèkfu;e dhs èkkjk 32 dh mi&èkkjk 4 ds :i esa tksMk x;k gSA vfèkfu;e dhs èkkjk 45¼[k½ ds rgr lekgÙkkZ }kjk fu"ikfnr dkjZokbZ ls lEcfUèkr vfHkys[k ek¡xus] ijhf{kr djus ,oa Re-open djus rFkk u;s fljs ls vkns'k ikfjr djus dk vfèkdkj ljdkj dks iznÙk gSA oÙkZeku esa Hkw&èkkjh }kjk vfèkfu;e dh mDr èkkjk dk mi;ksx vfèkfu;e ds fgrksa dks izHkkfor djus ds mn~ns'; ls fd;k tk jgk gSA ifj.kker% èkkjk 45¼[k½ vfèkfu;e dh ewy fgr dh j{kk djus esa lQy ughs gS] vr,o bls fujflr djus dk izkoèkku fd;k x;k gS rFkk mDr èkkjk ds fujlu ds i'pkr jkT; ljdkj vFkok vU; izkfèkdkj ds vUrxZr izkjEHk dh xbZ@yafcr dk;Zokgh mi'kfer djus gsrq èkkjk 45 esa u;h mi&èkkjk&¼?k½ tksM+k x;k gSA vr% vihy ,oa iqujh{k.k ds ekeys esa le;&lhek fuèkkZfjr djus gsrq vfèkfu;e dh èkkjk 30 esa u;h mi&èkkjk ¼3½ ,oa ¼4½ rFkk èkkjk 32 esa u;h mi&èkkjk ¼4½ dk tksM+k tkuk] vfèkfu;e dh èkkjk 45¼[k½ dk fujlu rFkk èkkjk 45 esa u;h mi&èkkjk ¼?k½ tksM+k tkuk bl la'kksèku foèks;d dk eq[; mn~ns'; gS bls vfèfu;fer djkuk gh bl la'kksèku foèks;d dk vHkh"V gSA An Act to amend The Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling and Acquisition of Surplus Land) Act, 1961. Be it enacted by the Legislature of the State of Bihar in the sixty seventh year of the Republic of India as follows: – 1. Short title, extent and Commencement. – (1) This Act may be called The Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling and Acquisition of Surplus Land) (Amendment) Act, 2016. (2) It shall extend to the whole of the State of Bihar. (3) It shall come into force immediately. 2. Amendment in Section-30 of the Act, 1961. – After sub-section (2) of Section 30 of the said Act, 1961 the following new sub-sections (3) and (4) shall be added: – “(3) An appeal shall be disposed of within the period of six months:” Provided that if for any reason it is not disposed of within the period of six months, the reasons shall be recorded in writing by the Appellate Authority. (4) (i) The Collector of a district may initiate a fresh proceeding under the Act if, upon his own knowledge or information, he is satisfied that a land holder, in a proceeding under the Act, by fraudulently or by misrepresentation of facts or law, has managed to obtain an order from any of his subordinate authority with a view to defeat the objects of the Act or any provision there of and retains land in excess of the ceiling area. (ii) The Commissioner of a division shall exercise the similar power & authority as the Collector of a district where a land holder has obtained similar order from the Collector of a district falling with his Jurisdiction under similar circumstances: Provided that before initiating such proceeding under the Act, the Collector of a district or the Commissioner of a division, as the case may be, shall issue a notice to the land holder to show cause as to why land ceiling proceeding may not be initiated on the ground mentioned in the notice: Provided further that no such proceedings shall be initiated in the cases decided by Board of Revenue or other Higher Courts.” 3. Amendment in Section-32 of the Act, 1961. Amendment in Section-32 of the Act, 1961. – After sub-section (3) of Section 32 of the said Act, 1961 the following new sub-section (4) shall be added: – “(4) A revision shall be disposed of within the period of three months.” Provided that if for any reason it is not disposed of within the period of three months, the reasons shall be recorded in writing by the revisional authority.” 4. Repeal of Section 45B of the Act, 1961. – Section- 45B of the said Act, 1961 is here by repealed. 5. Addition of a new section-45 D after Section-45C of the Act, 1961. – After Section 45C a new Section 45D shall be added: – “45D.- After repeal of Section-45 B of this Act, proceedings pending before the State Government or the Bihar Land Tribunal shall be deemed to be abated and the proceeding reopened earlier under deleted Section 45 B and pending before the Collector shall also stand abated.” 22. By the Amendment Act, 2016, amendments were affected in sections 30, 32 and 45 of the Act. Section 30 provided that an appeal shall lie from any final order passed by the Collector under the Act. Earlier no time was prescribed for disposal of the appeal. However, the newly added Section 30(3) provides that an appeal shall be disposed of within the period of six months. Further Section 30(4) was added which gave power to the Collector of a District to initiate a fresh proceeding under the Act on being satisfied that a land holder fraudulently or by misrepresentation has obtained an order with a view to defeat the object of the Act. In the same section, similar powers were given to the Commissioner of a Division. Further in Section 32 which deals with revision to the Board of Revenue, sub-section (4) was added, which provided that revision shall be disposed of within three months. Lastly Section 45B which gave power to the State Government to call for and examine records was repealed and section 45D was added. Section 45D provided that after repeal of Section 45B, the proceedings pending before the State Government or the Bihar Land Tribunal shall be deemed to have abated. 23. Lastly Section 45B which gave power to the State Government to call for and examine records was repealed and section 45D was added. Section 45D provided that after repeal of Section 45B, the proceedings pending before the State Government or the Bihar Land Tribunal shall be deemed to have abated. 23. Coming to the judgments referred to and relied upon by learned counsels appearing for the parties, learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Mahant Sankarshan Ramanuja Das Goswami (supra). It was held therein that benefit of Article 31A is available not only to those laws which by themselves provide for compulsory acquisition of property for public purposes but also to amending such laws, provided assent of the President is obtained to such amending Act. It may be mentioned here that the facts of the said case were different as by the amending law therein, the provisions of the earlier law relating to compulsory acquisition of property for public purposes were sought to be extended to new kinds of properties. Thus, it was stated that the assent of the President having been taken to the amendment Act, the President assented to the new categories of properties being brought within the operation of the existing law and in effect assented to a law for compulsory acquisition for public purposes of these new categories of property. So far as the instant case is concerned, though assent of the President has not been obtained to the Amendment Acts, however, by the amendments, no law is being promulgated nor any existing law being supplemented with respect to acquisition of any land by the State. What has been done is that some of the statutory rights granted by way of pre-emption has been taken away. While creation of such rights, in derogation of the guarantees enshrined in Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution requires a Presidential assent under Article 31A; the deletion/omission of such rights created would not require a Presidential assent. 24. In the case of Sriram Narayan Medhi (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court considered the challenge to the vires of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Amendment) Act, 1964. By the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951, the parent Act was included in the 9th Schedule and came within the purview of Article 31B of the Constitution. 24. In the case of Sriram Narayan Medhi (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court considered the challenge to the vires of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Amendment) Act, 1964. By the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951, the parent Act was included in the 9th Schedule and came within the purview of Article 31B of the Constitution. Both the parent Act and the amendment Act received the assent of the President. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the impugned amendment Act does not in any way affect the main purpose of the Act or the object which it seeks to achieve nor do the amendments effected thereby take the provisions out of the protection given to it under Article 31A of the Constitution. So far as the amendments herein are concerned, they do not at all affect the main purpose of the Act, which was to provide for fixation of ceiling and equitable distribution of the surplus land. Only the pre-emptive rights granted to an adjacent land owner, presumed to be in furtherance of ensuring equitable distribution of land, was taken away on better wisdom prevailing with the State Legislature. The issue as to what would be the effect, in case the amendment Act not affecting the main purpose of the Act, which has not received the assent of the President, did not arise in the case of Sriram Narayan Medhi (supra). 25. In the next judgment relied on by the petitioners that is the case of Jai Singh (supra) the Hon’ble Supreme Court in paragraph no.57 has relied on the judgment of Mahant Sankarshan Ramanuja Das Goswami (supra) wherein it was held that the benefit of Article 31A is available also to the amending Act, provided the assent of the President is obtained to such amending Act. Once again, this is not a case where if the amending Act was not sent to the President for his assent or a case where even when the amendment did not provide for acquisition of land by the State, what would be the affect of not obtaining the President’s assent. 26. Sri Choubey, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners, next relied on the judgment in the case of Pt. Rishikesh (supra) to submit that the Central Act came into operation on the date it received the assent of the President and is published in the gazette. 26. Sri Choubey, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners, next relied on the judgment in the case of Pt. Rishikesh (supra) to submit that the Central Act came into operation on the date it received the assent of the President and is published in the gazette. It may be mentioned that while considering the validity of the amendment to Section 4 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act whereby, the Court of Small Causes were empowered to decree a suit for possession of immovable property and for recovery of arrears of rent, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that if there is inconsistency between the Central law and the State law and as a result thereof repugnancy arises, to the extent of the repugnancy the State law becomes void under Article 254(1). This judgment has no applicability to the facts of the instant case. 27. Sri Jitendra Kishore Verma, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners relied on the judgment in the case of Bhau Ram (supra) wherein it was held that the ostensible reason for preemption may be vicinage, the real reason behind the law was to prevent a stranger from acquiring property in any area which had been populated by a particular fraternity or class of people. The advantage was much greater in case of a residential house. It was a right in favour of the co-sharer and in case of agricultural land, the same resulted in consolidation of holdings which would be of great benefit to the agriculturists and the community as a whole. Referring to the case of Kedar Mishra (supra) it was submitted that the Hon’ble Supreme Court held therein that the object of Section 16(3) of the Act is to secure consolidation by giving the right of reconveyance to a co-sharer or a raiyat of an adjoining area so that the land in question can be used in the most advantageous manner and also to prevent fragmentation of the land. Similarly, in the case of Ram Sagar Rai (supra) a Division Bench of this Court held that Section 16(3) of the Act was a beneficial legislation intended to prevent fragmentation of the holding and to facilitate consolidation. In Suresh Prasad Singh (supra) this Court held that where the right of pre-emption is recognised by a statute it has to be treated as mandatory and not discretionary. In Suresh Prasad Singh (supra) this Court held that where the right of pre-emption is recognised by a statute it has to be treated as mandatory and not discretionary. In Atam Prakash (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that the cardinal rule with respect to interpretation of Constitution or the Constitutional validity of a statute is to look at the preamble to the Constitution as the guiding light and the Directive Principles of State Policy as the book of interpretation. It observed that the State is enjoined to direct its policy to ensure that there is no concentration of wealth and means of production. The Court examining the pre-emption law in the State of Punjab held the same to be reasonable and Constitutionally valid. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in its judgment in the case of Gaurav Aseem Avtej (supra) held that a statute is best interpreted when we know why it was enacted. It may be stated here that none of these judgments have a direct bearing on the issue in the present batch of cases which relates to the Constitutional validity of the Amendment Act, 2016 and the Amendment Act, 2019, whereby some of the provisions of the principal Act were deleted and a few provisions supplemented. 28. Mr. J.S. Arora, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners relied on the judgment in the case of Godavari Sugar Mills Ltd. (supra) wherein it was held that the protection and immunity afforded by Article 31B is restricted to the provisions of the Act or Regulation as they exist on the date the Act or Regulation is included in the 9th Schedule. The protection or immunity would not extend to the amendments made in the Act or Regulation after the date of its inclusion in the 9th Schedule. It may be stated here that besides the learned Advocate General taking a categorical stand that the State is not claiming protection of Article 31A, it is to be noted that by the Amendment Act the provision of pre-emption as contained in Section 16(3) in the principal Act was repealed, no new provisions added; creating or in derogation of any rights, and thus the Principal Act will continue to have the protection of Article 31A. 29. 29. Learned Senior Advocate, Mr Arora, further relied on the judgment in the case of I.R. Coelho (supra) to submit that since the basic structure of the Constitution includes some of the fundamental rights, any law granted the 9th Schedule protection deserves to be tested against these principles. On a statute being challenged, it is for the judiciary to test as to whether the same has been passed by the legislature without authority or whether the authority has been exceeded or some fundamental right contravened. Even if the Act has the protection of 9th Schedule, they are still open to challenge on the ground of the same violating the basic structure. In the opinion of this Court, there is no dispute with respect to the principles of law laid down in the judgments cited, however, the same are of no assistance to the petitioners. 30. Mr Nagendra Rai, has relied on the judgment in the case of Bisheshwar Prasad Yadav (supra) which is on the point that, if lands are transferred in contravention of section 5 of the Act, to the extent not exceeding the ceiling area, they will be deemed to have been selected by the land holder for retaining within the ceiling area. The next judgment relied upon is in the case of Mohammad Kajimuddin (supra), which again deals with transfers made in contravention of Section 5 by the land holder and it has been held therein that the land so transferred will go in the share of the land holder and shall not form part of surplus to be acquired by the State. The next judgment relied on, which is in the case of Sunil Kumar (supra) deals with the scope of application of the provision of Section 45B of the Act which stood deleted by the Amendment Act, 2016. None of these judgments deal with the issue of Constitutional validity of an amendment Act or an Act and are of no assistance to the petitioners. 31. Mr Sanjeev Kumar, learned counsel appearing in support of the validity of the Amendment Acts, relies on the cases of Syed Ahmed Aga (supra) and Vishwant (supra), both of which have already been dealt with herein above. 31. Mr Sanjeev Kumar, learned counsel appearing in support of the validity of the Amendment Acts, relies on the cases of Syed Ahmed Aga (supra) and Vishwant (supra), both of which have already been dealt with herein above. The next judgment relied on by learned counsel is in the case of Subodhayya Chit Fund (supra), wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that the High Court relying upon the judgment in the case of Syed Ahmed Aga (supra), came to the conclusion that the amended provision only varied the form of restriction which was already inherent in the original Act. Accordingly, the High Court held that since the principal Act had the sanction of the President, it was not necessary to obtain the sanction of the President for the amending Act. The Hon’ble Supreme Court approved the reasoning and the conclusion reached by the High Court. Relevant paragraph nos. 5 and 6 of this judgment are reproduced herein below, for ready reference: – “5. On the second question the High Court relied upon the judgment of this Court in Syed Ahmed Aga vs. State of Mysore and came to the conclusion that the amended provision only varied the form of restriction which was already inherent in the original Act. According to the High Court since the principal Act had the sanction of the President it was not necessary to obtain the sanction of the President for the amending Act. 6. We have been taken through the judgment of the High Court. We see no infirmity in the same. We approve the reasoning and the conclusions reached by the High Court.” 32. Sri Basant Kumar Choudhary, learned Senior Advocate, relied on the judgment in the case of Banarsi Yadav (supra). The matter therein arose out of a reference made by the Commissioner in an appeal under section 30 of the Act. A Full Bench of this Court held that the Act being a protective legislation cannot be challenged on the grounds of violation of Article 14 and Article 19. Section 16(3) of the Act was held to be valid and the reference made by the Commissioner held to be incompetent. 33. A Full Bench of this Court held that the Act being a protective legislation cannot be challenged on the grounds of violation of Article 14 and Article 19. Section 16(3) of the Act was held to be valid and the reference made by the Commissioner held to be incompetent. 33. The issue as to on what grounds the validity of an Act can be called in question arose in the case of State of Bombay vs. R.M.D. Chamarbaugwala, AIR 1957 SC 699 , wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that on validity of an Act being called in question, the Court is to examine as to whether the Act is law with respect to a topic assigned to the particular legislature, which enacted it, whether its operation extends beyond the boundaries of the State and whether the Constitution places any fetters on the legislative power and the legislature. Paragraph no.14 of the judgment is extracted herein below: – “14) The principal question canvassed before us relates to the validity or otherwise of the impugned Act. The Court of Appeal has rightly pointed out that when the validity of an Act is called in question, the first thing for the court to do is to examine whether the Act is a law with respect to a topic assigned to the particular Legislature which enacted it. If it is, then the court is next to consider whether, in the case of an Act passed by the Legislature of a Province (now a State) its operation extends beyond the boundaries of the Province or the State, for under the provisions conferring legislative powers on it such Legislature can only make a law for its territories or any part thereof and its laws cannot, in the absence of a territorial nexus, have any extraterritorial operation. If the impugned law satisfies both these tests, then finally the court has to ascertain if there is anything in any other part of the Constitution which places any fetter on the legislative powers of such Legislature. The impugned law has to pass all these three tests.” 34. In the case of Namit Sharma vs. Union of India; (2013) 1 SCC 745 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court stated the grounds on which a law may be declared unconstitutional. Paragraph no.11 thereof reads as follows: – “11. An enacted law may be constitutional or unconstitutional. The impugned law has to pass all these three tests.” 34. In the case of Namit Sharma vs. Union of India; (2013) 1 SCC 745 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court stated the grounds on which a law may be declared unconstitutional. Paragraph no.11 thereof reads as follows: – “11. An enacted law may be constitutional or unconstitutional. Traditionally, this Court had provided very limited grounds on which an enacted law could be declared unconstitutional. They were legislative competence, violation of Part III of the Constitution and reasonableness of the law. The first two were definite in their scope and application while the cases falling in the third category remained in a state of uncertainty. With the passage of time, the law developed and the grounds for unconstitutionality also widened. D.D. Basu in Shorter Constitution of India (14th Edn., 2009) has detailed, with reference to various judgments of this Court, the grounds on which the law could be invalidated or could not be invalidated. Reference to them can be made as follows: “Grounds of unconstitutionality. – A law may be unconstitutional on a number of grounds: (i) Contravention of any fundamental right, specified in Part III of the Constitution. (ii) Legislating on a subject which is not assigned to the relevant legislature by the distribution of powers made by the Seventh Schedule, read with the connected articles. (iii) Contravention of any of the mandatory provisions of the Constitution which impose limitations upon the powers of a legislature e.g. Article 301. (iv) In the case of a State law, it will be invalid insofar as it seeks to operate beyond the boundaries of the State. (v) That the legislature concerned has abdicated its essential legislative function as assigned to it by the Constitution or has made an excessive delegation of that power to some other body.” 35. The Constitutional validity of the Amendment Act, 2016 and the Amendment Act, 2019 are under challenge in the instant batch of applications. There is neither any dispute nor any challenge to the Constitutional validity of the principal Act. By the two amendment Acts, as stated above, sub-section (3) to section 16 and section 45B of the Act have been repealed while sub-sections (3) and (4) to Section 30, sub-section (4) to Section 32 and Section 45D were added. 36. There is neither any dispute nor any challenge to the Constitutional validity of the principal Act. By the two amendment Acts, as stated above, sub-section (3) to section 16 and section 45B of the Act have been repealed while sub-sections (3) and (4) to Section 30, sub-section (4) to Section 32 and Section 45D were added. 36. Although great stress was laid by learned senior counsels appearing for the petitioners on the Amendment Acts not being constitutional on account of Presidential assent not having been obtained, however no provision of the Constitution has been shown to demonstrate that in the present circumstance obtaining President’s assent is a constitutional requirement. So far as the principal Act ie the Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land) Act, 1961 is concerned, it received the assent of the President on 8.3.1962 and legislation of the same is covered by item no.18 of the State List as also item no.42 of the Concurrent List, of the 7th Schedule. 37. Article 31A, which was introduced by the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951 provides that notwithstanding anything contained in Article 13, no law providing for acquisition by the State shall be deemed to be void on the ground of it being violative of Article 14 or Article 19 of the Constitution, provided that where the law is made by the State legislature, the same has received the assent of the President. Thus, it appears that the contention on behalf of the petitioners on the President’s assent not having been obtained would be for the reason that in absence thereof, it would not get the protection of Article 31A. Here itself it would be relevant to mention the categorical stand of learned Advocate General that by the Amendment Acts there is neither any violation of Article 14 and Article 19 of the Constitution nor of any other provision of the Constitution. The right of pre-emption created under the statute could have violated Articles 14 and 19, requiring Presidential assent, without which it would be rendered unconstitutional. However, the subject amendments which deleted/omitted such rights created on the pre-emptor does not violate Articles 14 and 19 and hence require no Presidential assent under Article 31A. 38. It would be relevant to mention here that the purpose of the principal Act was fixation of ceiling area of land which a family could hold. However, the subject amendments which deleted/omitted such rights created on the pre-emptor does not violate Articles 14 and 19 and hence require no Presidential assent under Article 31A. 38. It would be relevant to mention here that the purpose of the principal Act was fixation of ceiling area of land which a family could hold. It provided that any land held by the family in excess of the ceiling area would be acquired by the State Government under the Act, for distribution to the landless. Thus, in effect the purpose of the Act was fixing a ceiling area for holding of land and equitable distribution of the land available. As the Act related to acquisition of land which was in excess of ceiling area, the same having received the assent of the President also got the protection of the saving clause as provided under Article 31A of the Constitution and the principal Act thus is protected from the challenge on the ground of it being inconsistent with or in violation of Articles 14 or Article 19. 39. So far as the Amendment Act, 2016 and Amendment Act, 2019 are concerned, we may now examine the amendments brought about in the principal Act and as to what affect these amendments have on the objects and reasons for which the principal Act was promulgated. 40. Section 30 of the principal Act provided that appeal shall lie to the Collector of the District from any final order passed by an officer vested with the power of the Collector under the Act and before the Commissioner of the Division against an order passed by the Collector of the District. Although the period for filing of appeal was provided as 30 days, however no period was provided for disposal of the appeal. By Amendment Act, 2016, sub-section (3) was added to section 30 which provided that an appeal shall be disposed of within a period of six months. On similar lines sub-section (4) was added to Section 32 (which deals with Revision to the Board of Revenue) and the same provided that a revision shall be disposed of within a period of three months. On similar lines sub-section (4) was added to Section 32 (which deals with Revision to the Board of Revenue) and the same provided that a revision shall be disposed of within a period of three months. Section 45B of the Act gave powers to the State Government to call for and examine records of any proceeding disposed of by a Collector under the Act and if it thinks fit direct the case to be reopened and disposed of afresh in accordance with the provisions of the Act. This provision of Section 45B was repealed and at the same time section 4(i) and (ii) were added to section 30. Section 30 (4)(i) gave the powers to Collector of a District to initiate a fresh proceeding under the Act if he was satisfied that a land holder fraudulently or by misrepresentation has managed to obtain an order from a subordinate authority. Similarly, Section 30 (4)(ii) provided similar powers to the Commissioner of a Division in case the order had been obtained from the Collector of a District. These were the amendments carried out in the principal Act by the Amendment Act, 2016. 41. So far as Amendment Act, 2019 is concerned, it may be mentioned that sub-section (3) of Section 16 which gave Right of Pre-emption to a co-sharer or a raiyat of adjoining land of the transferor was repealed. Sub-section (4)(i) and (ii) were added to section 16. Section 16(4)(i) provided that all the cases and proceedings pending at different stages before different authorities after repeal of section 16(3) shall abate. Section 16(4)(ii) provided that pursuant to repeal of section 16(3), the purchase money together with a sum equal to 10% thereof shall be refunded to the depositor, without any interest. 42. So far as the Amendment Act, 2016 is concerned, time for disposal of appeal (filed under Section 30) and for disposal of revision (filed under section 32) were fixed by adding Section 30(3) and Section 32(4) to the Act. Further while Section 45B which gave powers to the State Government to call for and examine the records and to reopen and dispose of afresh any case was repealed and at the same time similar powers were given to the Collector and the Commissioner as the case may be to initiate a fresh proceeding under the Act by adding Section 30(4). Lastly Section 45D only provided that consequent to repeal of section 45B all the proceedings reopened and pending before the State Government or the Bihar Land Tribunal or the Collector shall stand abated. Thus it can clearly be seen that the amendments affected by Amendment Act, 2016 in the principal Act in no way affected the object and purpose for which the principal Act had been promulgated. In the opinion of the Court, the amendments are procedural in nature and to make the working of the Act more effective by fixing a time for disposal of appeal and revision. 43. So far as the Amendment Act, 2019 is concerned, Section 16(3) of the Act was repealed and Section 16(4) was added that consequent of the repeal, all pending proceedings shall abate. It may be stated that Right to pre-emption was a statutory right which flowed from Section 16(3) of the Act. As per the said provision, in case of transfer of a land to a person other than a co-sharer or raiyat of adjoining land, the co-sharer of the transferor or any raiyat holding land adjoining the land transferred was entitled to make an application before the Collector within three months of the date of registration, for transfer of the said land to him on deposit of the amount as prescribed. Thus the Amendment Act, 2019 in no way affected the object or purpose of the principal Act. Further, the said statutory right flowing from Section 16(3) was not a vested right of an individual. The Hon’ble Supreme Court while dealing with the right of statutory tenant in the case of Vishwant Kumar (supra) to pay standard rent as per the Act has held that if the legislature repeals the Act or part of it, the statutory tenant can do nothing about it as it is a mere right and not a vested right. 44. In paragraph no.4 in the case of Vishwant Kumar (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as follows: – “4. We do not find merit in the above arguments. There is a difference between a mere right and what is right acquired or accrued. We have to examine the question herein with reference to Sections 4, 6 and 9 of the Act. We do not find merit in the above arguments. There is a difference between a mere right and what is right acquired or accrued. We have to examine the question herein with reference to Sections 4, 6 and 9 of the Act. It is correct that under Section 4 of the Rent Act, the tenant is not bound to pay rent in excess of the standard rent, whereas under Section 9 he has a right to get the standard rent fixed. Such a right is the right to take advantage of a enactment and it is not an accrued right. In the case of D.C. Bhatia vs. Union of India it has been held that right of a statutory tenant to pay standard rent is a right to be governed by the Act and if the legislature repeals the Act or a part of it, the statutory tenant can do nothing about it. It is a mere right and not a vested right. To the same effect is the judgment of this Court in the case of Thyssen Stahlunion GmbH vs. Steel Authority of India Ltd. in which it is held that right to be governed by the Act is not a right of an enduring nature. What is unaffected by repeal is a right acquired or accrued under the Act. That till the decree is passed, there is no accrued right. The mere right existing on date of repeal to take advantage of the repealed provisions is not right accrued within Section 6(c) of the General Clauses Act. Further, there is a vast difference between rights of a tenant under the Rent Act and the rights of the landlord. The right of a statutory tenant to pay rent not exceeding standard rent or the right to get standard rent fixed are protective rights and not vested rights. On the other hand, the landlord has rights recognized under the law of contract and the Transfer of Property Act which are vested rights and which are suspended by the provisions of the Rent Act but the day the Rent Act is withdrawn, the suspended rights of the landlord revive. On the other hand, the landlord has rights recognized under the law of contract and the Transfer of Property Act which are vested rights and which are suspended by the provisions of the Rent Act but the day the Rent Act is withdrawn, the suspended rights of the landlord revive. (See Parripati Chandrasekharrao & Sons vs. Alapati Jalaiah.) Lastly, as held by this Court in the case of D.C. Bhatia the object of the amending Act, 1988 was to rationalize the Rent Act whereby the protection given to the richer tenant is withdrawn. The object of the Amendment Act, 1988 is to strike a balance between the claims of the landlords who get meagre rent, particularly in times of inflation and the tenants who equally need protection from arbitrary eviction. In the circumstances, we hold that in view of Section 3(c) as amended, the application for fixation of standard rent filed by the tenant on 11.4.1978 has been correctly dismissed as infructuous. We have gone through the decisions cited by the learned counsel for the appellant. The case of Ambalal Sarabhai Enterprises Ltd. vs. Amrit Lal and Co. was a case involving rights of a landlord under Section 14(1)(b) of the said Act. It was held that a ground of eviction based on illegal sub-letting under Section 14(1)(b) of the Rent Act would not constitute a vested right of landlord, but it would be a right within the meaning of Section 6(c) of the General Clauses Act if proceeding for eviction is pending, however, the tenant has no vested right under the Rent Act as the tenant has only a protective right. In the present case, we are concerned with the nature of rights of the tenant under the Rent Act. The ratio of this decision supports our above view.” (Emphasis Supplied) 45. In both cases that is the Amendment Act, 2016 and the Amendment Act, 2019, none of the amendments affect the main purpose of or go beyond the principal Act. Article 31A provides that no law providing for the acquisition by the State, notwithstanding anything contained in Article 13 shall be deemed to be void on the ground of it being inconsistent with Articles 14 or 19 provided it has received the assent of the President; if it is a state legislation. Article 31A provides that no law providing for the acquisition by the State, notwithstanding anything contained in Article 13 shall be deemed to be void on the ground of it being inconsistent with Articles 14 or 19 provided it has received the assent of the President; if it is a state legislation. Thus, this would mean that, if the President’s assent has not been obtained, the Act would not get the benefit of protection of the saving provision as provided in Article 31A; not that, by the very fact of not having obtained President’s assent, the Act would be rendered unconstitutional. The principal Act, as stated above has received the assent of the President and has the protection of Article 31A. So far as the Amendment Act, 2016 and the Amendment Act, 2019 are concerned, they do not in any way provide for a law of acquisition by the State nor do they take away or abridge any rights conferred by Article 14 or 19. They do not go beyond the provisions of the principal Act and thus in the opinion of the Court do not require the President’s assent. 46. At this stage, it would be relevant to refer to the judgment in the case of Syed Ahmand Aga vs. State of Mysore, (1975) 2 SCC 131 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as follows: – “………4. The only question, on merits, which has been argued before us on behalf of the petitioners is: Do the changes introduced by the Amending Act amount to such additional restrictions as to require the sanction of the President even though the principal Act had received such sanction at the appropriate stage? The reasonableness of any restrictions, new or old, has not been challenged before us. All that is urged is that the additional restrictions introduced by the amending Act were bound to obtain the previous sanction of the President before they are introduced in the form of a Bill in the Legislature of a State because that is the constitutional mandate. ………………………………………………………. 24. Thus, even if we were to apply the test of regulation to distinguish it from restriction which may be deduced from Hughes’ case (supra), it will be seen that a decision on it depends upon the circumstances to which a legislative measure is meant to apply and its consequences. ………………………………………………………. 24. Thus, even if we were to apply the test of regulation to distinguish it from restriction which may be deduced from Hughes’ case (supra), it will be seen that a decision on it depends upon the circumstances to which a legislative measure is meant to apply and its consequences. In the case before us, the amendments did not, in our opinion, go beyond a regulation which was fully authorised by the language of the provisions of the principal Act. Even any additional licensing involved did not go beyond the purview of the provisions of the Principal Act and the rules framed thereunder. The mere change in form, from statutory rules to statutory provisions, could hardly constitute even additional “regulation”. It is only an additional “restriction” from the special point of view of Article 304 (b) which requires Presidential sanction.” (Emphasis supplied) 47. So far as the other contentions raised by learned counsel for the petitioners, like the difficulties which would be faced by the persons, being left remedy-less as a result of the amendments, the hardships which may be caused on enforcement etc. are concerned, in the opinion of the Court, the same cannot be grounds for challenging the Constitutional validity of an Act. The same can be challenged only on the grounds mentioned in the case of R.M.D. Chamarbaugwala (supra) or on the grounds as mentioned in paragraph no.11 in the case of Namit Sharma (supra) which broadly speaking is contravention of any of the fundamental rights or a mandatory provision of the Constitution, the State Legislature not having the legislative competence or seeking to operate beyond the boundaries of the State etc.. In the opinion of the Court, the petitioners have not been able to make out any case on any of the grounds as mentioned in the aforesaid cases to challenge the constitutional validity of the two amendment Acts. 48. In view of the facts and circumstances stated herein above, the Court finds no merit in the challenge by the petitioners in these batch of cases to the Constitutional validity of the two Amendment Acts. Both, the Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land) (Amendment) Act, 2016 and the Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land) (Amendment) Act, 2019 are held to be constitutionally valid. 49. Both, the Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land) (Amendment) Act, 2016 and the Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land) (Amendment) Act, 2019 are held to be constitutionally valid. 49. Both the amendment Acts of 2016 and 2019 having been held to be Constitutionally valid, the question which would arise is as to how would the individual cases, arising out of an application of right to pre-emption under Section 16(3) of the Act and which are pending adjudication at different stages are to be decided. The right of preemption which arose from Section 16(3) of the Act having been repealed by the Amendment Act, 2019, it may be stated that clause 2(2) of the Amendment Act, 2019 provides that after repeal of Section 16(3) of the Act, all cases or proceedings pending before the State Government, Board of Revenue, the Bihar Land Tribunal, the Divisional Commissioner, the Collector, the Additional Collector, the Deputy Collector Land Reforms or in any other Court shall be deemed to be abated and pursuant to the repeal any purchase money together with the sum equal to 10% thereof shall be refunded to the depositor, without any interest. 50. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Punyadeo Sharma & Ors. vs. Kamla Devi & Ors., 2022(1) BLJ 434 (SC) held as follows : – “4. The question examined by the Division Bench of the High Court was whether an application for preemption was filed within three months of the registration as required by Section 16(3) of the Act or was it required to be filed within three months of the day of execution of the sale deed i.e. 9.2.1990. However, the said question does not survive for consideration in view of the subsequent development whereby the right of pre-emption itself has been taken away by the Bihar Act No. 6 of 2019 when the Act was amended. The Amending Act reads thus: ……………………………… 7. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and find that the right of pre-emption, after the Amending Act, abates as sub-section 4(i) is specifically dealing with all pending proceedings before whatsoever forum. Therefore, the right of preemption will stand abated on and after 25.2.2019 including the proceedings which were pending before any forum. ……………………………… 12. …………….. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and find that the right of pre-emption, after the Amending Act, abates as sub-section 4(i) is specifically dealing with all pending proceedings before whatsoever forum. Therefore, the right of preemption will stand abated on and after 25.2.2019 including the proceedings which were pending before any forum. ……………………………… 12. …………….. Any other Court is wide enough to include the Constitutional Courts i.e. the High Court and the Supreme Court. ………………. Thus, keeping in view the object of the Statute, purpose to be achieved and the express language of the Amending Act, all proceedings of pre-emption under the Act pending before any authority under the Act or before any Court shall stand abated. 13. Consequently, the present appeals are allowed. The entire pre-emption proceedings stand abated. It shall be open to the respondents to withdraw 10% of the amount deposited by them in terms of Section 16 of the Act in accordance with law.” 51. Thus, in view of section 16 of the Act as it stands after amendment by the Amendment Act, 2019 as also in view of the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Punyadeo Sharma (supra), all cases or proceedings which may be pending before any authority or Court stands abated and the amount deposited shall be refunded in the manner as provided in Section 16(4) of the Act. 52. The applications stand disposed of in the following terms: – (i) The applications so far as the challenge to the constitutional validity of the Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land) (Amendment) Act, 2016 as also that of the Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Surplus Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land) (Amendment) Act, 2019 are concerned, stand dismissed. (ii) The following cases either challenge the Amendment Act, 2019 and/or arise out of an application under Section 16(3) of the Act. The cases arising out of an application under Section 16(3) of the Act stand abated. They are all the cases in the instant batch of applications except CWJC no.1840 of 2019, CWJC no.2728 of 2019 and CWJC no. 10416 of 2020. The cases arising out of an application under Section 16(3) of the Act stand abated. They are all the cases in the instant batch of applications except CWJC no.1840 of 2019, CWJC no.2728 of 2019 and CWJC no. 10416 of 2020. (iii) It may be mentioned here that by Amendment Act, 2016, Section 45B of the Act was repealed and Section 45D added, which provided that after repeal of section 45B of the Act, proceedings pending before the State Government or the Bihar Land Tribunal as also pending before the Collector shall stand abated. Both Section 45D and 16(4) provide for the consequence upon repeal of section 45B and Section 16(3) of the Act. The language of Section 45D is different from that of Section 16(4). While Section 16(4) provides that all cases of proceedings pending before the Tribunal or the Authorities mentioned therein ‘or in any other Court’ shall abate, the words ‘or in any other Court’ does not find mention in Section 45D. Thus, in this view of the matter, the Court is of the opinion that those matters arising out of an application under Section 45B of the Act having been decided by the Authorities or the Tribunal and applications preferred against the said orders being pending in this Court, though the Constitutional validity of the Amendment Act, 2016 has been upheld, these cases will have to be listed before the appropriate bench having roster, for it to be decided on it’s own merits. The cases falling under this category are CWJC no.1840 of 2019, CWJC no.2728 of 2019 and CWJC no. 10416 of 2020. K. Vinod Chandran, CJ. – I agree.