JUDGMENT : Ajay Bhanot, J. The judgement is being structured in the following conceptual framework to facilitate the discussion : I. Introduction II. Case of the claimants & the respondents before the learned tribunal III. Compensation awarded by the learned tribunal IV Submissions of learned counsels for parties V. Issues for consideration : A. Factum of the accident B. Liability of Insurance Company C. Maintainability of oral cross objection D. Quantum of compensation under different heads : a. Future Prospects b. Conventional Heads c. Multiplier d. Interest E. Determination of Compensation to which claimants-respondents are entitled VI Conclusion and Directions I. INTRODUCTION 2. This first appeal from order arises from the judgment and award dated 5.3.2012 passed by the learned Motor Accident Claims Tribunal/learned Additional District Judge/Special Judge, in Motor Accident Claim Petition No. 171 of 2010 (Smt. Nirmala Devi and others v. Ramdev Shukla and others), partly allowing the claim made by the claimants. 3. The first appeal from order has been filed by the Insurance Company contesting the liability to pay the compensation and also the quantum of compensation awarded by the learned Tribunal. II. Case of the claimants and the respondents before the learned Tribunal: 4. Briefly the case of the claimants before the learned tribunal was that the deceased-Rajesh Kumar was serving a constable in Border Security Force. On the fateful day of 6.5.2010, he was riding a motorcycle bearing registration No. UP 30-M-1588 when tractor trolley laden with sand bearing Registration No. UP27-C-2688 collided with the said motorcycle. The accident was caused by solely rash and negligent driving of the driver of the offending tractor trolley. The deceased sustained died of injuries sustained in the said accident. On the date of the accident the offending vehicle was insured by the appellant-New India Assurance Company Ltd. The claimants were dependants of the deceased. The deceased was 39 years of age at the time of the accident. III. Compensation awarded by the learned tribunal: 5. The learned tribunal found that the accident was caused by the rash and negligent driving of the driver of tractor trolley. The insurance company was liable to pay the compensation. 6. The learned tribunal in the impugned judgment dated 5.3.2012 awarded compensation depicted in a tabulated form hereunder : Sr. No. Heads Amount Awarded by the tribunal 1. Monthly Income (A) 15,801/- 2. Annual Income (B) 15801 x 12 = 1,89,612/- 3. The insurance company was liable to pay the compensation. 6. The learned tribunal in the impugned judgment dated 5.3.2012 awarded compensation depicted in a tabulated form hereunder : Sr. No. Heads Amount Awarded by the tribunal 1. Monthly Income (A) 15,801/- 2. Annual Income (B) 15801 x 12 = 1,89,612/- 3. Future prospects (C) NILL 4. Annual Income + Future Prospects (B + C = D) NILL 5. Deduction towards personal expenses 1,89,612 x 1/3 = 63,204/- 6. Total income after deduction (E) 1,89,612 - 63,204 =1,26,410/- 7. Multiplier (F) 11 8. Total loss of dependency (E x F) 1,26,410 x 11 = 13,90,510/- 9. Funeral expenses 2000/- 10. Loss of love and affection 5000/- 11. Loss estate 2500/- 12. Total compensation 14,00,010/- 13. Interest 6% IV. Submissions of learned counsels for parties: 7. Shri Aditya Singh Parihar, learned counsel holding brief of Shri Rahul Sahai, learned counsel for the appellant-Insurance Company contends that the accident never occurred. This is a false claim. Secondly, the liability was that of the tractor owner since there was a breach of the Insurance policy. Thirdly the compensation was wrongly awarded. 8. Shri Vipul Singh, learned counsel for the respondents-claimants supports the findings affirming the liability of the insurance company and has raised an oral cross objection to the effect that the future prospects to which the claimants were undisputedly entitled have been unlawfully denied by the learned trial Court. 9. Per contra, Shri Aditya Singh Parihar, learned counsel holding brief of Shri Rahul Sahai, learned counsel for the appellant Insurance Company contends that the claimants-respondents cannot raise oral cross objection at the stage of the appeal. V. Issues for consideration: 10. After advancing their arguments, learned counsel for both the parties agree that though many grounds have been pleaded, only the following questions fall for consideration in this appeal : (A) Whether the accident as depicted in the claim petition actually happened or the offending vehicle was falsely implicated only for the purpose of seeking compensation? (B) Whether there was breach of the insurance policy by the owner of the offending vehicle? (C) Whether the oral cross objection can be raised by the claimants at the stage of appeal? If yes, to what extent? (D) Whether learned Tribunal correctly computed the compensation these various heads : future prospects, multiplier, conventional heads and interest ? (E) Compensation amount to which the claimants-respondents are entitled. (C) Whether the oral cross objection can be raised by the claimants at the stage of appeal? If yes, to what extent? (D) Whether learned Tribunal correctly computed the compensation these various heads : future prospects, multiplier, conventional heads and interest ? (E) Compensation amount to which the claimants-respondents are entitled. V A. Issue No. 1 : Factum of the accident 11. The claimants introduced two witnesses to establish the factum of the accident and negligence of the driver of the offending tractor trolley. 12. P.W. 2-Mahesh who is the brother of the deceased testified before the learned tribunal that he had witnessed the accident. He deposed that on the fateful day he was riding pillion on the motorcycle being driven by his deceased brother. The offending tractor trolley came at an uncontrollable speed and collided head on with the motorcycle. The accident was caused solely by the rash and negligent driving of the offending tractor trolley. The deceased fell to the ground under the impact of the collision and died of injuries sustained in the accident. The tractor trolley driver tried to flee at the spot. However, he was overpowered by the villagers who gathered at the site of the accident. The tractor trolley as well as driver were taken to the police station by the witnesses and the villagers. The police authorities detained the driver and seized the vehicle. P.W. 2 Mahesh was also the informant who had promptly lodged an F.I.R. He had stated under cross-examination that the registration number of the tractor trolley painted on the vehicle was illegible. 13. P.W.-3 Sheesh Ram upon entering the witness box asserted that he was an eye-witness to the accident. He too confirmed the death of the deceased in the accident and the fault of the driver of the offending vehicle. 14. The testimonies of both P.W.2 Mahesh and P.W. 3-Sheesh Ram were not shaken under cross-examination. Some minor contradictions were highlighted on behalf of the Insurance Company as regards the testimony of the two witnesses. However, these contradictions are not material and do not take away the credit of the said witnesses. 15. The F.I.R. version is in conformity with the statements of the witnesses before the learned tribunal. The argument on behalf of the Insurance Company that the vehicle details were missing in the F.I.R., does not adversely impact the compensation claim made by the claimants. 15. The F.I.R. version is in conformity with the statements of the witnesses before the learned tribunal. The argument on behalf of the Insurance Company that the vehicle details were missing in the F.I.R., does not adversely impact the compensation claim made by the claimants. It is well-settled that the F.I.R. is not an encyclopedia of all facts. Moreover satisfactory reasons have been given by the informant for absence of said details in the F.I.R. 16. The learned trial Court which had the advantage of observing the demeanour of the witnesses also found them to be worthy of credit and believed their testimonies. This Court has no reason to take any other view regarding the depositions of the said witnesses. The oral testimonies of the eye-witnesses are also corroborated in substance by the F.I.R. 17. The learned counsel for the Insurance Company emphasised some discrepancies in evidence collected during investigations and faulted the seizure memo. This may reflect that some aspects deficiencies in the police investigations. But the same cannot have an adverse bearing on the claim made by the claimants under the M V Act. Criminal proceedings including police investigations into the offence are distinct from compensations claims under the Motor Vehicles Act. Both proceedings differ in scope, purpose, procedure, standard of evidence and relief sought. 18. In this wake, this Court finds that all relevant facts to establish the factum of the accident and the rash and negligent driving on the part of the driver of the offending vehicle were fully established by the applicable standards of evidence before the learned Motor Accident Claims Tribunal. The findings of the learned tribunal on the issue are upheld. V B. Issue No. 2 : Liability of Insurance Company 19. The submission on behalf of the Insurance Company that there was breach in the insurance policy by the owner of the tractor trolley, inasmuch, it was being used for commercial purposes. Mere fact of loading the tractor trolley with sand and wooden doors ipso facto does not lead to inference that the vehicle was for commercial purposes and there was breach of insurance policy. 20. The burden of proof of breach of the insurance policy was on the Insurance Company which they failed to do before the learned tribunal. No such material was brought to the notice of this Court as well. 21. 20. The burden of proof of breach of the insurance policy was on the Insurance Company which they failed to do before the learned tribunal. No such material was brought to the notice of this Court as well. 21. The finding of the learned tribunal to the effect that the breach of the insurance policy could not be established by the Insurance Company is not liable to be interference with. This Court finds for the claimant and respondent against the appellant-Insurance company on this issue. 22. To sum up, the accident was caused solely by the negligence of the driver of the tractor trolley, and the Insurance Company and is fully liable to pay compensation. V C. Issue No. 3 : Maintainability of oral cross objection 23. Grant of compensation under the head of future rise in income is indispensable part of just compensation which duly settled by good authorities in point. Both learned counsels for the parties agree on the position of law. However, the argument on behalf of the appellant-Insurance Company that this ground cannot be taken in oral cross objection at this stage of the appeal, shall now be dealt with. Various judgements have been cited at the Bar by the respective parties to support their case. 24. The question whether oral objections can be raised for an enhancement of compensation at the stage of appeal has been well-settled by good authorities in point. 25. The jurisdiction of the appellant Court to allow the parties to take oral objections is traceable to the power of the Court of appeal enumerated in Order XLI Rule 33 of the CPC. The Order XLI Rule 33 of the CPC is reproduced hereinafter : ''Rule 33. 25. The jurisdiction of the appellant Court to allow the parties to take oral objections is traceable to the power of the Court of appeal enumerated in Order XLI Rule 33 of the CPC. The Order XLI Rule 33 of the CPC is reproduced hereinafter : ''Rule 33. Power of Court of Appeal.-The Appellate Court shall have power to pass any decree and make any order which ought to have been passed or made and to pass or make such further other decree or order as the case may require, and this order may be exercised by the Court notwithstanding that the appeal is as to part only of the decree and may be exercised in favour of all or any of the respondents or parties may not have filed any appeal or objection and may, where there have been decrees in cross suits or where two or more decrees are passed in one suit, be exercised in respect of all or any of the decrees, although an appeal may not have been filed against such decree.'' 26. The phraseology implied by the legislature in Order XLI Rule 33 of the CPC empowers the Appellate Court as under : ''to pass or make such further or other decree or order as the case may require''. (emphasis supplied) 27. The provision ensures that the arms of law are long enough to reach injustice and the arms of the Court strong enough to serve justice. Drawing its power from the aforesaid provision to the Appellate Court may issue necessary directions to serve the ends of justice. Specifically in cases arising out of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 the appellate Court may exercise these powers for grant of just compensation. 28. A Division Bench of this Court in National Insurance Co. Drawing its power from the aforesaid provision to the Appellate Court may issue necessary directions to serve the ends of justice. Specifically in cases arising out of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 the appellate Court may exercise these powers for grant of just compensation. 28. A Division Bench of this Court in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Smt. Vidyawati Devi and others, First Appeal From Order No. 2389 of 2016, while construing the ambit of Order XLI Rule 33 of the CPC held as under : ''Order XLI Rule 33 of the Code of Civil Procedure prescribing the power of Court of appeal clearly provides that the Appellate Court shall have power to pass any decree and make any order which ought to have been passed or made as the case may require, and this power may be exercised in favour of all or any of the respondents or parties though they may not have filed any cross appeal or objection.'' 29. Scope of Order XLI Rule 33 of the CPC also fell for consideration before the Supreme Court in Mahant Dhangir and another v. Madan Mohan and others, AIR 1988 SC 54 . While interpreting the vast ambit of the phrase ''as the case may require'' employed in Order XLI Rule 33 of the CPC the Court opined that the provision enjoins the appellate Court to do complete justice by in Mahant Dhangir (supra) holding as under : ''The sweep of the power under Rule 33 is wide enough to determine any question not only between the appellant and respondent, but also between respondent and co-respondents. The appellate Court could pass any decree or order which ought to have been passed in the circumstances of the case. The appellate Court could also pass such other decree or order as the case may require. The words ''as the case may require'' used in Rule 33 Order 41 have been put in wide terms to enable the appellate Court to pass any order or decree to meet the ends of justice. What then should be the constraint ? We do not find many. We are not giving any liberal interpretation. The rule itself is liberal enough. The only constraint that we could see, may be these : That the parties before the lower Court should be there before the appellate Court. What then should be the constraint ? We do not find many. We are not giving any liberal interpretation. The rule itself is liberal enough. The only constraint that we could see, may be these : That the parties before the lower Court should be there before the appellate Court. The question raised must properly arise out of the judgment of the lower Court. If these two requirements are there, the appellate Court could consider any objection against any part of the judgment or decree of the lower Court. It may be urged by any party to the appeal. It is true that the power of the appellate Court under Rule 33 is discretionary. But it is a proper exercise of judicial discretion to determine all questions urged in order to render complete justice between the parties. The Court should not refuse to exercise that discretion on mere technicalities.'' 30. The powers of the appellate Court were interpreted in similar terms in Delhi Electric Supply Undertaking v. Basanti Devi, AIR 2000 SC 43 : ''We are of the considered view that the conditions as laid down in provisions of Order XLI Rule 33 are satisfied in the present case. In Delhi Electric Supply Undertaking (Supra) the Hon'ble Apex Court has observed that when circumstances exist which necessitate the exercise of discretion conferred by Rule 33, the Court cannot be found wanting when it comes to exercise its powers.'' 31. Per contra, the judgement relied upon by the Insurance Company rendered by the Supreme Court in Ranjana Prakash v. Divl. Manager, 2011 (14) SCC 639 , restricts the scope of the appellate Court according to the learned counsel for the appellant. In particular, the following observations in Ranjana (supra) relied upon to support their contention to negate the claim of the claimants : ''7. This principle also flows from Order 41 Rule 33 of the Code of Civil Procedure which enables an appellate Court to pass any order which ought to have been passed by the trial Court and to make such further or other order as the case may require, even if the respondent had not filed any appeal or cross-objections. This power is entrusted to the appellate Court to enable it to do complete justice between the parties. This power is entrusted to the appellate Court to enable it to do complete justice between the parties. Order 41 Rule 33 of the Code can however be pressed into service to make the award more effective or maintain the award on other grounds or to make the other parties to litigation to share the benefits or the liability, but cannot be invoked to get a larger or higher relief. For example, where the claimants seek compensation against the owner and the insurer of the vehicle and the Tribunal makes the award only against the owner, on an appeal by the owner challenging the quantum, the appellate Court can make the insurer jointly and severally liable to pay the compensation, alongwith the owner, even though the claimants had not challenged the non-grant of relief against the insurer. Be that as it may. 8. Where an appeal is filed challenging the quantum of compensation, irrespective of who files the appeal, the appropriate course for the High Court is to examine the facts and by applying the relevant principles, determine the just compensation. If the compensation determined by it is higher than the compensation awarded by the Tribunal, the High Court will allow the appeal, if it is by the claimants and dismiss the appeal, if it is by the owner/insurer. Similarly, if the compensation determined by the High Court is lesser than the compensation awarded by the Tribunal, the High Court will dismiss any appeal by the claimants for enhancement, but allow any appeal by the owner/insurer for reduction. The High Court cannot obviously increase the compensation in an appeal by the owner/insurer for reducing the compensation, nor can it reduce the compensation in an appeal by the claimants seeking enhancement of compensation.'' 32. I am afraid the judgement of the Supreme Court rendered in Ranjana (supra) has to be read in light of the law settled by good authorities in point which do not import any such restrictions on the appellate power. The said authorities including Smt. Vidyawati Devi (supra), Mahant Dhangir (supra) and Basanti Devi (supra) were not referred to the Court in Ranjana (supra). 33. The scope of the powers of the appellate Court should also be construed in light of the nature of the legislation. The said authorities including Smt. Vidyawati Devi (supra), Mahant Dhangir (supra) and Basanti Devi (supra) were not referred to the Court in Ranjana (supra). 33. The scope of the powers of the appellate Court should also be construed in light of the nature of the legislation. Motor Vehicles Act is a welfare legislation and the endeavour of the appellate Court should be to ensure that the beneficial entitlements under the Motor Vehicles Act are not denied to any party and the lis is decided quickly. Error in the face of the record by the learned tribunal cannot remain uncorrected by the appellate Court if cross objections are raised. Remanding the matters in such cases will only prolong the litigation. This may result in the exhaustion of the claimants who are already suffering from the privation imposed by misfortune. 34. Upon consideration of the authorities discussed in the preceding paragraphs, the legal position in regard to the scope of the appellate Court to entertain oral cross objections at the stage of hearing of the appeal is distilled thus : A. Oral cross objections have to be considered only in the event that the case requires the Court to do so for doing complete justice between the parties and to award just compensation. B. Parties before the lower Court should arrayed as parties in the appeal. C. The oral cross objections should arise directly out of the judgement rendered by the learned tribunal. D. Parties which are likely to be adversely affected by the findings of the appellate Court have to be afforded an opportunity of hearing while exercising the powers under Order 41 Rule 33 CPC. E. If the award of the tribunal is contrary to or in ignorance of the holdings of constitutional Courts which settle the fundamental heads of just compensation and the issue only requires application of simple math formula the Court may entertain and allow the oral cross objection. F. The appellate may always take measures, pass orders, or mould relief to mitigate hardship or obviate prejudice to the parties while entertaining oral cross objections at a belated stage in the interests of justice. G. In case the oral cross objections require a complex reappraisal of evidence or consideration of elaborate arguments or laboured reasoning the appellate Court may even decline the prayer for consideration of oral cross objection. 35. G. In case the oral cross objections require a complex reappraisal of evidence or consideration of elaborate arguments or laboured reasoning the appellate Court may even decline the prayer for consideration of oral cross objection. 35. The entitlement of the claimants for future prospects is settled by good judicial authorities. The fundamental facts (income etc.) have been established before the learned tribunal. Computing future prospects requires application of a simple mathematical formula in this case. The learned tribunal has admittedly failed to make any award under the aforesaid head consistent with said authorities. 36. The pre-requisites of exercising the powers to entertain the oral cross objections by exercising powers under Order 41 Rule 33 of C.P.C. are established in this case. 37. In the instant case, rise in future income is a given and grant of future prospects has been held to be an entitlement of the claimants in Sarla Verma and others v. Delhi Transport Company and another, 2009 (6) SCC 121 and National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi and others, 2017 (16) SCC 680 . 38. Settled holdings of Court, Courts crystallise entitlements of rival parties. Refusal of entitlement results in denial of just compensation. 39. The appellate Court can take all necessary steps to exercise its power to award just compensation at the stage of the appeal. Once law is settled, endeavour of the Court is to award just compensation in terms of such authorities in point and the statute empowers the appellate Court to do so. [See: Jitendra Kimshankar Trivedi and others v. Kasam Daud Kumbhar and others, 2015 (4) SCC 237 , Arun Kumar Agarwal and another v. National Insurance Company Ltd. and others, 2010(9) SCC 218 ] V D. Issue No. 4: Quantum of compensation under different heads a. Future Prospects : 40. The future prospects are liable to be calculated in accordance with the Uttar Pradesh Motor Vehicles Rules, 1998 (hereinafter referred to as the ''UP Rules, 1988). Rule 220A-3(i) of the Rules is relevant and is reproduced hereunder : ''(3) The future prospects of a deceased, shall be added in the actual salary or minimum wages of the deceased as under- (i) Below 40 years of age : 50% of the salary.'' 41. The UP Rules, 1998 came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Urmila Shukla and others, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 822. The UP Rules, 1998 came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Urmila Shukla and others, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 822. In Urmila Shukla (supra) upon consideration of various judgements including National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi and others, 2017 (16) SCC 680 , held : ''10. The discussion on the point in Pranay Sethi was from the standpoint of arriving at ''just compensation'' in terms of Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. 11. If an indicia is made available in the form of a statutory instrument which affords a favourable treatment, the decision in Pranay Sethi cannot be taken to have limited the operation of such statutory provision specially when the validity of the Rules was not put under any challenge. The prescription of 15% in cases where the deceased was in the age bracket of 50-60 years as stated in Pranay Sethi cannot be taken as maxima. In the absence of any governing principle available in the statutory regime, it was only in the form of an indication. If a statutory instrument has devised a formula which affords better or greater benefit, such statutory instrument must be allowed to operate unless the statutory instrument is otherwise found to be invalid.'' (emphasis supplied) 42. The Rules of the Uttar Pradesh Motor Vehicles Rules, 1998 were not under consideration before the Supreme Court in Pranay Sethi (supra) or Sarla Verma (Smt) and others v. Delhi Transport Company and another, 2009 (6) SCC 121 . Future prospects in Pranay Sethi (supra) were determined without noticing the U.P. Rules,1998. This fact was adverted to in Urmila Shukla (supra) : ''8. It is submitted by Mr. Rao that the judgment in Pranay Sethi does not show that the attention of the Court was invited to the specific rules such as Rule 3(iii) which contemplates addition of 20% of the salary as against 15% which was stated as a measure in Pranay Sethi. In his submission, since the statutory instrument has been put in place which affords more advantageous treatment, the decision in Pranay Sethi ought not to be considered to limit the application of such statutory Rule.'' 43. The U.P. Rules, 1998 are statutory in nature and their operation is not stymied by Pranay Sethi (supra). In his submission, since the statutory instrument has been put in place which affords more advantageous treatment, the decision in Pranay Sethi ought not to be considered to limit the application of such statutory Rule.'' 43. The U.P. Rules, 1998 are statutory in nature and their operation is not stymied by Pranay Sethi (supra). The U.P. Rules, 1998 have the force of law and shall apply with full force in appropriate cases. The U.P. Rules, 1998 are more beneficial for the claimants than the provisions made in Pranay Sethi (supra) for them. The holdings in Pranay Sethi (supra) cannot dilute the advantages conferred by U.P. Rules, 1998 upon the eligible beneficiaries. 44. This Court finds that the claimants/respondents are entitled to 50% enhancement in wages towards future prospects, consistent with the UP Rules, 1998. The necessary changes in the award shall be accordingly made. 45. In this wake, the issue of grant of future prospects and oral cross objection are found in favour of the claimants and against the Insurance Company. b. Conventional Heads: 46. The amount determined under conventional heads in the impugned award is at variance with Pranay Sethi (supra). The conventional heads were fixed in Pranay Sethi (supra) by holding as under : ''54....The conventional and traditional heads, needless to say, cannot be determined on percentage basis because that would not be an acceptable criterion. Unlike determination of income, the said heads have to be quantified. Any quantification must have a reasonable foundation. There can be no dispute over the fact that price index, fall in bank interest, escalation of rates in many a field have to be noticed. The Court cannot remain oblivious to the same. There has been a thumb rule in this aspect. Otherwise, there will be extreme difficulty in determination of the same and unless the thumb rule is applied, there will be immense variation lacking any kind of consistency as a consequence of which, the orders passed by the tribunals and Courts are likely to be unguided. Therefore, we think it seemly to fix reasonable sums. It seems to us that reasonable figures on conventional heads, namely, loss of estate, loss of consortium and funeral expenses should be Rs.15,000/-, Rs.40,000/- funeral expenses should be Rs.15,000/-, Rs.40,000/- And Rs.15,000/- respectively.'' 47. The figure under conventional heads determined in Pranay Sethi (supra) shall be applicable to the facts of this case. It seems to us that reasonable figures on conventional heads, namely, loss of estate, loss of consortium and funeral expenses should be Rs.15,000/-, Rs.40,000/- funeral expenses should be Rs.15,000/-, Rs.40,000/- And Rs.15,000/- respectively.'' 47. The figure under conventional heads determined in Pranay Sethi (supra) shall be applicable to the facts of this case. The award is modified accordingly. c. Multiplier: 48. The age of the deceased was 39 years at the time of his death. Multiplier of 15 which has been correctly applied by the learned tribunal and in line with the Pranay Sethi (supra) and Sarla Verma (supra). d. Interest: 49. Interest of 7% is just and lawful in the facts of this case. V E. Issue No. 5: Determination of Compensation to which claimants-respondents are entitled: 50. In the wake of preceding discussion, the amount of compensation awarded to the claimants is tabulated below : i. Date of Accident - 6.5.2010 iii. Name of the deceased - Rajesh Kumar iv. Age of the deceased - 39 years v. Occupation of the deceased - Constable (BSF) (Government Servant) vi. Income of the deceased - 15,801/- vii. Name, Age and Relationship of claimants with the deceased Sr. No. Name Age Relation 1. Smt. Nirmala Devi 38 Wife 2. Km. Anuradha 15 Daughter 3. Km. Anupam 13 Daughter 4. Abhishek 11 Son 5. Vivek 8 Son 6. Smt. Ram Shree 60 Mother vii. Computation of Compensation Sr. No. Heads Amount (in Rupees) 1. Monthly Income 15,801/- 2. Annual Income 1,89,612/- 3. Future Prospects 30% 1,89,612 x 30% = 94,806/- 4. Annual Income + Future Prospects 1,89,612+ 94,806 = 2,84,418/- 6. Deduction 1/4th 2,84,418 x 1/4 = 71,104/- 7. Total income after 1/4th deduction 2,84,418 - 71,104 = 2,13,314/- 8. Multiplier (G) 2,13,314 x 15 = 31,99,710/- 9. Total loss of dependency 31,99,710/- 10. Conventional Heads (a) Loss of consortium (b) Loss of Estate (c) Funeral Expenses 70,000/- 11. Total Compensation 32,69,710/- 12. Interest 7% VI. Conclusion and Directions: 51. The amount of compensation to which the claimants have thus been found entitled shall be deposited by the Insurance Company within three months before the learned tribunal. Thereafter the learned tribunal shall release the amount to the claimants without delay. The amount already disbursed to the claimants (if any) shall be duly adjusted. 52. Conclusion and Directions: 51. The amount of compensation to which the claimants have thus been found entitled shall be deposited by the Insurance Company within three months before the learned tribunal. Thereafter the learned tribunal shall release the amount to the claimants without delay. The amount already disbursed to the claimants (if any) shall be duly adjusted. 52. The amount of Rs.25,000/- deposited by the appellant while instituting the appeal shall be forthwith remitted to the learned tribunal. The amount shall be paid to the claimants as part of the awarded compensation amount. 53. The cross-objection filed on behalf of the respondents-claimants is allowed and the appeal is accordingly dismissed.