ORDER : Both these petitions are preferred by accused No.2. Criminal Revision Petition 768 of 2020 arises out of an order dated 09-01-2020 passed in Special C.C.No.106 of 2008 rejecting an application in I.A.No.21 seeking discharge of the petitioner from the array of accused. Criminal Revision Petition No.624 of 2020 calls in question an order dated 27-01-2020 by which the discharge applications of several accused including the petitioner are turned down in the very Special C.C.No.106 of 2008. It is therefore, these petitions are taken up together and considered by this common order. 2. Facts adumbrated are as follows:- The petitioner was at the relevant point in time working as Registrar of the Rajiv Gandhi University of Health Sciences (‘the University’ for short) and was in-charge conduct of Post Graduate Entrance Test (‘PGET’) in the month of February 2006 for allotment of seats to candidates for postgraduate degree courses in medical sciences. The petitioner being the Registrar was further in charge of complete conduct of examination right from safe keep of prepared question papers and their execution in an appropriate manner on the date of examination. The examination takes place on 12-02-2006. The result of the examination is, a few of the candidates do not get selected and a few do. Complaints galore on the conduct of examination and the manner in which the candidates are selected. The media projects lot of foul play in the conduct of PGET 2006. Therefore, owing to blowing controversy, Government constitutes a Committee – a Three Member Committee to go into the veracity of the allegations projected in the conduct of examination. The Committee submits its report opining that all was not well with the conduct of examination and leakage of question paper or fraud has been played at the higher levels in the office. It is for those higher levels in the office, entrustment comes to be made to the hands of the CBI by the State of Karnataka for conduct of thorough investigation into the matter. 3. The CBI takes over the issue and conducts preliminary inquiry. The preliminary inquiry leads to registration of a FIR against 30 accused including the petitioner. On registration of FIR, further investigation is conducted and the CBI files the charge sheet on 28-07-2008 finally against accused 1 to 20. The petitioner is accused No.2, a public servant. 3. The CBI takes over the issue and conducts preliminary inquiry. The preliminary inquiry leads to registration of a FIR against 30 accused including the petitioner. On registration of FIR, further investigation is conducted and the CBI files the charge sheet on 28-07-2008 finally against accused 1 to 20. The petitioner is accused No.2, a public servant. The offences alleged while filing the charge sheet against the petitioner were for the offences punishable under Section 13(1)(d) and 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (‘the Act’ for short) and under Section 409, 420 and 120B r/w 34 of the IPC. 4. On filing of the charge sheet by the CBI, the petitioner moves an application before the concerned Court seeking his discharge from the array of accused. The application is preferred on a solitary ground that the petitioner being a public servant, cognizance and further proceedings could not have been conducted without sanction for such prosecution at the hands of the Competent Authority. The learned Sessions Judge by his order dated 09-01-2020 answers the application -I.A.No.21 by rejecting it and holding that sanction to prosecute the petitioner who had by then retired from service was not necessary under Section 19 of the Act and no part of the act of the petitioner would amount to action taken in discharge of his official duty. Therefore, both sanction under Section 19 of the Act or under Section 197 of the CrPC is not required is what the concerned Court holds to reject the application. It is, therefore, the petitioner is before this Court in Criminal Revision Petition No.768 of 2020. 5. In Criminal Revision Petition No.624 of 2020 what is called in question is an order dated 27-01-2020 rejecting a discharge application which was filed by the petitioner along with other accused. Therefore, the challenge is to the rejection of discharge of the petitioner from the array of accused in Special C.C.No.106 of 2008. 6. Heard Sri Kiran S.Javali, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner and Sri P.Prasanna Kumar, learned Special Public Prosecutor appearing for the respondent. 7. The learned senior counsel Sri Kiran S.Javali representing the petitioner would vehemently contend that the petitioner is a public servant. Any act performed by him which has nexus to the discharge of official duty would require sanction. 7. The learned senior counsel Sri Kiran S.Javali representing the petitioner would vehemently contend that the petitioner is a public servant. Any act performed by him which has nexus to the discharge of official duty would require sanction. What is alleged against the petitioner is leakage of question paper and fraud being played in the conduct of PGET 2006. The allegation is made against the petitioner on the score that he was the Registrar of the University at the relevant point in time. He would submit that without sanction the concerned Court could not be permitted to proceed against the petitioner. Apart from the aforesaid ground of sanction, the petitioner also submits that there are no ingredients of offences alleged against the petitioner. Therefore, on both these grounds he would seek quashment of proceedings against him. 8. On the other hand, the learned Special Public Prosecutor Sri P.Prasanna Kumar representing the CBI would submit that the acts alleged against the petitioner are grave in nature. By the time cognizance was taken by the concerned Court, the petitioner had retired from the service of the State on attaining the age of superannuation and, therefore, no sanction under Section 19 of the Act was required and acts of the petitioner would completely form the ingredients of whatever offence that is alleged against him. It is at the behest of the petitioner every illegality in the conduct of entrance examination has happened. 9. I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions made by the respective learned counsel and have perused the material on record. 10. The afore-narrated facts are not in dispute. The petitioner was, at the relevant point in time, Registrar of the University. Under the Rajiv Gandhi University of Health Sciences Act, 1994 the Vice-Chancellor and other officers are public servants. Section 61 of the said Act reads as follows: “61. Vice-Chancellor and other officers etc., to be public servants. -The Vice-Chancellor, Registrar, Finance Officer and other employees of the University shall be deemed, when acting or purporting to act in pursuance of any of the provisions of this Act, to be public servants within the meaning of section 21 of the Indian Penal Code (Central Act XLV of 1860).” The Vice-Chancellor, Registrar, Finance Officer and other employees of the University shall be deemed to be public servants within the meaning of Section 21 of the IPC. Therefore, there can be no qualm about the fact that the petitioner is a public servant. 11. If the petitioner is a public servant, against any public servant if offence under the Act is to be laid, sanction under Section 19 of the Act would become imperative. The offences alleged against the petitioner are the ones punishable under Section 13(1)(d) and 13(2) of the Act. The said provisions read as follows: “Section 13(1)(d) if he,— (i) by corrupt or illegal means, obtains for himself or for any other person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage; or (ii) by abusing his position as a public servant, obtains for himself or for any other person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage; or (iii) while holding office as a public servant, obtains for any person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage without any public interest; or Section 13(2)-Any public servant who commits criminal misconduct shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall be not less than [four years] but which may extend to [ten years] and shall also be liable to fine.” For the said offences sanction would become imperative under Section 19 of the Act. Section 19 of the Act reads as follows: “19. Previous sanction necessary for prosecution.— (1) No court shall take cognizance of an offence punishable under Sections 7, 11, 13 and 15] alleged to have been committed by a public servant, except with the previous sanction save as otherwise provided in the Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act, 2013,— (a) in the case of a person who is employed, or as the case may be, was at the time of commission of the alleged offence employed] in connection with the affairs of the Union and is not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the Central Government, of that Government; (b) in the case of a person who is employed, or as the case may be, was at the time of commission of the alleged offence employed in connection with the affairs of a State and is not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the State Government, of that Government; (c) in the case of any other person, of the authority competent to remove him from his office. Provided that no request can be made, by a person other than a police officer or an officer of an investigation agency or other law enforcement authority, to the appropriate Government or competent authority, as the case may be, for the previous sanction of such Government or authority for taking cognizance by the court of any of the offences specified in this sub-section, unless— (i) such person has filed a complaint in a competent court about the alleged offences for which the public servant is sought to be prosecuted; and (ii) the court has not dismissed the complaint under Section 203 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) and directed the complainant to obtain the sanction for prosecution against the public servant for further proceeding: Provided further that in the case of request from the person other than a police officer or an officer of an investigation agency or other law enforcement authority, the appropriate Government or competent authority shall not accord sanction to prosecute a public servant without providing an opportunity of being heard to the concerned public servant: Provided also that the appropriate Government or any competent authority shall, after the receipt of the proposal requiring sanction for prosecution of a public servant under this sub-section, endeavour to convey the decision on such proposal within a period of three months from the date of its receipt: Provided also that in case where, for the purpose of grant of sanction for prosecution, legal consultation is required, such period may, for the reasons to be recorded in writing, be extended by a further period of one month: Provided also that the Central Government may, for the purpose of sanction for prosecution of a public servant, prescribe such guidelines as it considers necessary. Explanation.—For the purposes of sub-section (1), the expression “public servant” includes such person— (a) who has ceased to hold the office during which the offence is alleged to have been committed; or (b) who has ceased to hold the office during which the offence is alleged to have been committed and is holding an office other than the office during which the offence is alleged to have been committed. (2) Where for any reason whatsoever any doubt arises as to whether the previous sanction as required under sub-section (1) should be given by the Central Government or the State Government or any other authority, such sanction shall be given by that Government or authority which would have been competent to remove the public servant from his office at the time when the offence was alleged to have been committed. (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974),— (a) no finding, sentence or order passed by a Special Judge shall be reversed or altered by a Court in appeal, confirmation or revision on the ground of the absence of, or any error, omission or irregularity in, the sanction required under sub-section (1), unless in the opinion of that court, a failure of justice has in fact been occasioned thereby; (b) no court shall stay the proceedings under this Act on the ground of any error, omission or irregularity in the sanction granted by the authority, unless it is satisfied that such error, omission or irregularity has resulted in a failure of justice; (c) no court shall stay the proceedings under this Act on any other ground and no court shall exercise the powers of revision in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any inquiry, trial, appeal or other proceedings. (4) In determining under sub-section (3) whether the absence of, or any error, omission or irregularity in, such sanction has occasioned or resulted in a failure of justice the court shall have regard to the fact whether the objection could and should have been raised at any earlier stage in the proceedings. Explanation.—For the purposes of this section,— (a) error includes competency of the authority to grant sanction; (b) a sanction required for prosecution includes reference to any requirement that the prosecution shall be at the instance of a specified authority or with the sanction of a specified person or any requirement of a similar nature.” Section 19 mandates that no Court shall take cognizance of the offence against the public servant except with the previous sanction of the Competent Authority. It is an admitted fact, in the case on hand, that sanction is not accorded for prosecuting the petitioner. It is an admitted fact, in the case on hand, that sanction is not accorded for prosecuting the petitioner. The day on which the Court took cognizance and sought to continue with the prosecution against the petitioner, the petitioner had retired from service on attaining the age of superannuation. Once the Government servant has retired on attaining the age of superannuation, sanction under Section 19 of the Act would not be required. Therefore, the contention of the learned senior counsel for the petitioner that sanction under Section 19 is not granted and, therefore, further proceedings cannot be continued is unacceptable. 12. The other provision that is pressed into service is Section 197 of the CrPC. Section 197 of the CrPC reads as follows: “197. Prosecution of Judges and public servants.— (1) When any person who is or was a Judge or Magistrate or a public servant not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the Government is accused of any offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty, no Court shall take cognizance of such offence except with the previous sanction save as otherwise provided in the Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act, 2013— (a) in the case of a person who is employed or, as the case may be, was at the time of commission of the alleged offence employed, in connection with the affairs of the Union, of the Central Government; (b) in the case of a person who is employed or, as the case may be, was at the time of commission of the alleged offence employed, in connection with the affairs of a State, of the State Government: Provided that where the alleged offence was committed by a person referred to in clause (b) during the period while a Proclamation issued under clause (1) of Article 356 of the Constitution was in force in a State, clause (b) will apply as if for the expression “State Government” occurring therein, the expression “Central Government” were substituted. Explanation.—For the removal of doubts it is hereby declared that no sanction shall be required in case of a public servant accused of any offence alleged to have been committed under Section 166-A, Section 166-B, Section 354, Section 354A, Section 354-B, Section 354-C, Section 354-D, Section 370, Section 375, Section 376, Section 376-A, Section 376-AB, Section 376-C, Section 376-D, Section 376-DA, Section 376-DB or Section 509 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860). (2) No Court shall take cognizance of any offence alleged to have been committed by any member of the Armed Forces of the Union while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty, except with the previous sanction of the Central Government. (3) The State Government may, by notification, direct that the provisions of sub-section (2) shall apply to such class or category of the members of the Forces charged with the maintenance of public order as may be specified therein, wherever they may be serving, and thereupon the provisions of that sub-section will apply as if for the expression “Central Government” occurring therein, the expression “State Government” were substituted. (3-A) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (3), no court shall take cognizance of any offence, alleged to have been committed by any member of the Forces charged with the maintenance of public order in a State while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty during the period while a Proclamation issued under clause (1) of Article 356 of the Constitution was in force therein, except with the previous sanction of the Central Government. (3-B) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Code or any other law, it is hereby declared that any sanction accorded by the State Government or any cognizance taken by a court upon such sanction, during the period commencing on the 20th day of August, 1991 and ending with the date immediately preceding the date on which the Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1991, receives the assent of the President, with respect to an offence alleged to have been committed during the period while a Proclamation issued under clause (1) of Article 356 of the Constitution was in force in the State, shall be invalid and it shall be competent for the Central Government in such matter to accord sanction and for the court to take cognizance thereon. (4) The Central Government or the State Government, as the case may be, may determine the person by whom, the manner in which, and the offence or offences for which, the prosecution of such Judge, Magistrate or public servant is to be conducted, and may specify the Court before which the trial is to be held.” The offences alleged against the petitioner are not restricted to the ones under the Act. They stretch to the offences under the IPC. The offences under the IPC are Sections 409, 420, 120B and 34 of the IPC. Therefore, for a Court to take cognizance of an offence under Section 197 of the CrPC against a public servant, sanction is imperative, as the language of the section is that no Court shall take cognizance of the offence under the aforesaid provisions without the previous sanction. 13. The language employed in Section 197 of the CrPC is sanction to prosecute a public servant for any offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty. The words used are ‘acting or purporting to act in discharge of his official duty’. Therefore, what is required is nexus with the discharge of official duty of any public servant if they have to seek the protective umbrella of Section 197 of the CrPC. The interpretation of Section 197 of the CrPC need not detain this Court for long or delve deep into the matter. The Apex Court in the case of A.SRINIVASULU v. STATE, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 900 has held as follows: “……. ……. …….. ………” “21. But the High Court found in paragraph 44 of the impugned judgment that the handwriting expert had not furnished any opinion in his report as to the comparison of the writings found in Exhibit P-75 with the demand draft application forms Exhibits P-66, P-76, P-90 and P-92. The High Court also found (in paragraph 49 of the impugned judgment) that the admitted handwritings and the signatures were not compared by the handwriting expert. After recording such a finding, the High Court took upon itself the task of making a comparison by itself, by invoking Section 73 of the Evidence Act. The High Court also found (in paragraph 49 of the impugned judgment) that the admitted handwritings and the signatures were not compared by the handwriting expert. After recording such a finding, the High Court took upon itself the task of making a comparison by itself, by invoking Section 73 of the Evidence Act. By so invoking Section 73, the High Court came to the conclusion that the signatures found in the demand draft applications were that of A-7 and that the diversion of funds to M/s. Insecticides & Allied Chemicals is a circumstance which corroborated the same. 22. It was argued before the High Court on behalf of A-3 and A-4 that BHEL Administration had refused to accord sanction to prosecute them for the offences under the PC Act and that therefore they cannot be held guilty of other offences. But this contention was rejected by the High Court, on the ground that the decision taken by the Management of the Company cannot have a bearing upon the prosecution case. 23. On the basis of the above findings, the High Court dismissed the appeals and confirmed the conviction and sentence awarded by the Trial Court. 24. Appearing on behalf of A-1, Shri Huzefa Ahmadi, learned senior counsel contended:— (i) That there was no evidence to connect A-1 with the commission of any of the offences and that none of the charges stood established beyond reasonable doubt; (ii) That the substratum of the allegations was based entirely upon the statement of the approver (PW-16), but the same suffers from serious irregularities; (iii) That though no sanction was required to prosecute A-1 for the offences under the PC Act in view of his retirement before the filing of the final report, a previous sanction was necessary under Section 197(1) of the Code, but the same was not obtained; and (iv) That the prosecution failed to establish the necessary ingredient of “obtaining any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage either for himself or for any other person” for holding him guilty of the offences under Section 13(1)(d) of the PC Act. 25. 25. Appearing on behalf of A-4, it was contended by Shri S.R. Raghunathan, learned counsel:— (i) that A-4 played no role either in the preparation of tender or in choosing the tenderers; (ii) that what was constituted on 23.12.1992, after the tenderers were shortlisted, allegedly by PW-16 at the instance of A-1, was only a Negotiation Committee; (iii) that in the said Committee comprising of three members, namely A-3, A-4 and PW-16, he (A-4) was the one who was subordinate to the other two members and hence the logic applied to A-2 should have been extended to him also; (iv) that both the Special Court and the High Court overlooked the evidence of PW-14 to the effect that no tender committee was constituted; (v) that no wrongful loss was caused to BHEL; (vi) that on the contrary, due to the role played by A-4, a bank guarantee to the tune of Rs. 4.84 crores was obtained from Entoma Hydro Systems; (vii) that the bank guarantee was invoked and the entire amount paid by BHEL towards mobilization advance was recovered; (viii) that as a matter of fact a sum of Rs. 2.60 crores is due and payable by BHEL to Entoma Hydro Systems, after the bank guarantee was invoked and the accounts reconciled; (ix) that despite repeated requests of the CBI, the Management of BHEL refused to give sanction to prosecute A-3 and A-4, on the ground that they acted in the best commercial interest of the Company; and (x) that once A-4 is not held guilty of the offence under Section 120B, it was not possible to convict him for the other offences, especially in the facts and circumstances of the case. 26. 26. Appearing on behalf of A-7, it was contended by Shri S. Nagamuthu, learned senior counsel:— (i) that the confession statement of PW-16 was recorded by the XVIII Metropolitan Magistrate, Chennai, but pardon was granted by the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Madurai and the final report was filed directly before the Special Court for CBI cases; (ii) that since the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate granted pardon in this case, this case is covered by Sub-section (1) of Section 306 and hence the prosecution ought to have followed the procedure prescribed under Section 306(4)(a) of the Code; (iii) that there is no particular reason as to why the petition for pardon was made before the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, when the confession statement was recorded by the Metropolitan Magistrate and there is no reason why the prosecution chose to file the final report directly before the Special Court under section 5(1) of the PC Act, 1988; (iv) that neither the evidence of PW-44 (I.O.) nor the evidence of PW-16 (approver) had anything incriminating A-7; (v) that A-7 has been roped in, merely because of his relationship with A-5 and also on account of a sum of Rs. 1,52,50,000/-being transferred to the firm of which he is a partner, from out of the account of Entoma Hydro Systems; (vi) that while the Special Court, without going into the report of the handwriting expert marked as Exhibit P-68 and without putting any question to A-7 under Section 313 of the Code in relation to his specimen signatures marked as Exhibit P75 came to the conclusion that the applications for demand drafts bore his handwriting and signatures, the High Court rejected the said reasoning but took to the route available under Section 73 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. (vii) That the procedure under Section 73 of the Evidence Act is available to a Court only when there are admitted or proved handwritings, which were absent in this case; (viii) That in any case there was no loss caused to BHEL, which is a sine qua non for the offence under the PC Act; and (ix) That by a strange logic A-7 was convicted for the offence under Section 13(1)(e) of the PC Act. 27. 27. Countering the submissions made on behalf of the appellants, it was argued by Shri Padmesh Mishra, learned counsel for the State: (i) that there was cogent evidence, both oral and documentary, to connect all the accused with the offences for which they were found guilty; (ii) that the evidence of the Approver (PW-16) stood corroborated by the testimonies of other witnesses, on all aspects such as the deliberate act of going in for limited tender, predetermining the person in whose favour the contract was to be awarded, sanction of an interest free mobilisation advance far in excess of the normal business norm, diversion of such advance by the contractor to another firm in which he was a partner along with is father and brother and the eventual termination of the contract on account of these malpractices; (iii) that there is no requirement in law that actual loss should have been suffered for an offence under Section 13(1)(d) of the PC Act to be made out; (iv) that in any case what was recovered by the invocation of the bank guarantee was the loss suffered in the first instance; (v) that it is well settled that previous sanction to prosecute under Section 197(1) of the Code is necessary only when the act complained of is in the discharge of official duties; (vi) that an offence of cheating cannot by any stretch of imagination be seen as part of official duties; (vii) that the power to grant pardon is available concurrently to the Chief Judicial Magistrate/Metropolitan Magistrate as well as the Court of Session; (viii) that therefore there was nothing wrong in the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Madurai granting pardon; and (ix) that therefore the concurrent judgments of conviction of the appellants do not warrant any interference. 28. We have carefully considered the rival contentions. For the purpose of easy appreciation, we shall divide the discussion and analysis into three parts, the first dealing with the contention revolving around Section 197 of the Code, the second dealing with the correctness of the procedure adopted while granting pardon under Section 306 of the Code and the third revolving around the merits of the case qua culpability of each of the appellants before us. 29. 29. There is no dispute about the fact that A-1 to A-4, being officers of a company coming within the description contained in the Twelfth item of Section 21 of the IPC, were ‘public servants’ within the definition of the said expression under Section 21 of the IPC. A-1 to A-4 were also public servants within the meaning of the expression under Section 2(c)(iii) of the PC Act. Therefore, there is a requirement of previous sanction both under Section 197(1) of the Code and under Section 19(1) of the PC Act, for prosecuting A-1 to A-4 for the offences punishable under the IPC and the PC Act. 30. Until the amendment to the PC Act under the Prevention of Corruption (Amendment) Act, 2018 (Act 16 of 2018), with effect from 26.07.2018, the requirement of a previous sanction under Section 19(1)(a) was confined only to a person “who is employed”. On the contrary, Section 197(1) made the requirement of previous sanction necessary, both in respect of “any person who is” and in respect of “any person who was” employed. By the amendment under Act 16 of 2018, Section 19(1)(a) of the PC Act was suitably amended so that previous sanction became necessary even in respect of a person who “was employed at the time of commission of the offence”. 31. The case on hand arose before the coming into force of the Prevention of Corruption (Amendment) Act, 2018 (Act 16 of 2018). Therefore, no previous sanction under Section 19(1) of the PC Act was necessary insofar as A-1 was concerned, as he had retired by the time a final report was filed. He actually retired on 31.08.1997, after 7 months of registration of the FIR (31.01.1997) and 5 years before the filing of the final report (16.07.2002) and 6 years before the Special Court took cognizance (04.07.2003). But previous sanction under Section 19(1) of the PC Act was required in respect of A-3 and A-4, as they were in service at the time of the Special Court taking cognizance. Therefore, the Agency sought sanction, but the Management of BHEL refused to grant sanction not once but twice, insofar as A-3 and A-4 are concerned. 32. But previous sanction under Section 19(1) of the PC Act was required in respect of A-3 and A-4, as they were in service at the time of the Special Court taking cognizance. Therefore, the Agency sought sanction, but the Management of BHEL refused to grant sanction not once but twice, insofar as A-3 and A-4 are concerned. 32. It is by a quirk of fate or the unfortunate circumstances of having been born at a time (and consequently retiring at a particular time) that the benevolence derived by A3 and A-4 from their employer, was not available to A-1. Had he continued in service, he could not have been prosecuted for the offences punishable under the PC Act, in view of the stand taken by BHEL. 33. It appears that BHEL refused to accord sanction by a letter dated 24.11.2000, providing reasons, but the CVC insisted, vide a letter dated 08.02.2001. In response to the same, a fresh look was taken by the CMD of BHEL. Thereafter, by a decision dated 02.05.2001, he refused to accord sanction on the ground that it will not be in the commercial interest of the Company nor in the public interest of an efficient, quick and disciplined working in PSU. 34. The argument revolving around the necessity for previous sanction under Section 197(1) of the Code, has to be considered keeping in view the above facts. It is true that the refusal to grant sanction for prosecution under the PC Act in respect of A-3 and A-4 may not have a direct bearing upon the prosecution of A-1. But it would certainly provide the context in which the culpability of A-1 for the offences both under the IPC and under the PC Act has to be determined. 35. It is admitted by the respondent-State that no previous sanction under section 197(1) of the Code was sought for prosecuting A-1. The stand of the prosecution is that the previous sanction under Section 197(1) may be necessary only when the offence is allegedly committed “while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty”. Almost all judicial precedents on Section 197(1) have turned on these words. Therefore, we may now take a quick but brief look at some of the decisions. 36. Dr. Almost all judicial precedents on Section 197(1) have turned on these words. Therefore, we may now take a quick but brief look at some of the decisions. 36. Dr. Hori Ram Singh v. The Crown is a decision of the Federal Court, cited with approval by this court in several decisions. It arose out of the decision of the Lahore High Court against the decision of the Sessions Court which acquitted the appellant of the charges under Sections 409 and 477A IPC for want of consent of the Governor. Sir S. Varadachariar, with whose opinion Gwyer C.J., concurred, examined the words, “any act done or purporting to be done in the execution of his duty” appearing in Section 270(1) of the Government of India Act, 1935, which required the consent of the Governor. The Federal Court observed at the outset that this question is substantially one of fact, to be determined with reference to the act complained of and the attendant circumstances. The Federal Court then referred by way of analogy to a number of rulings under Section 197 of the Code and held as follows:— “The reported decisions on the application of sec. 197 of the Criminal Procedure Code are not by any means uniform. In most of them, the actual conclusion will probably be found to be unexceptionable, in view of the facts of each ease; but, in some, the test has been laid down in terms which it is difficult to accept as exhaustive or correct. Much the same may be said even of decisions pronounced in England, on the language, of similar statutory provisions (see observations in Booth v. Clive. It does not seem to me necessary to review in detail the decisions given under sec. 197 of the Criminal Procedure Code which may roughly be classified as falling into three groups, so far as they attempted to state something in the nature of a test. In one group of cases, it is insisted that there must be something in the nature of the act complained of that attaches it to the official character of the person doing it : cf. In re Sheik Abdul Khadir Saheb; Kamisetty Raja Rao v. Ramaswamy, Amanat Ali v. King-emperor, King-Emperor v. Maung Bo Maung and Gurushidayya Shantivirayya Kulkarni v. King-Emperor. In re Sheik Abdul Khadir Saheb; Kamisetty Raja Rao v. Ramaswamy, Amanat Ali v. King-emperor, King-Emperor v. Maung Bo Maung and Gurushidayya Shantivirayya Kulkarni v. King-Emperor. In another group, more stress has been laid on the circumstance that the official character or status of the accused gave him the opportunity to commit the offence. It seems to me that the first is the correct view. In the third group of cases, stress is laid almost exclusively on the fact that it was at a time when the accused was engaged in his official duty that the alleged offence was said to have been committed [see Gangaraju v. Venki, quoting from Mitra's Commentary on the (criminal Procedure Code). The use of the expression “while acting” etc., in sec. 197 of the Criminal Procedure Code (particularly its introduction by way of amendment in 1923) has been held to lend some support to this view. While I do not wish to ignore the significance of the time factor, it does not seem to me right to make it the test. To take an illustration suggested in the course of the argument, if a medical officer, while on duty in the hospital, is alleged to have committed rape on one of the patients or to have stolen a jewel from the patient's person, it is difficult to believe that it was the intention of the Legislature that he could not be prosecuted for such offences except with the previous sanction of the Local Government” 37. It is seen from the portion of the decision extracted above that the Federal Court categorised in Dr. Hori Ram Singh (supra), the decisions given under Section 197 of the Code into three groups namely (i) cases where it was held that there must be something in the nature of the act complained of that attaches it to the official character of the person doing it; (ii) cases where more stress has been laid on the circumstance that the official character or status of the accused gave him the opportunity to commit the offence; and (iii) cases where stress is laid almost exclusively on the fact that it was at a time when the accused was engaged in his official duty that the alleged offence was said to have been committed. While preferring the test laid down in the first category of cases, the Federal Court rejected the test given in the third category of cases by providing the illustration of a medical officer committing rape on one of his patients or committing theft of a jewel from the patient's person. 38. In Matajog Dobey v. H.C. Bhari a Constitution Bench of this Court was concerned with the interpretation to be given to the words, “any offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty” in Section 197 of the Code. After referring to the decision in Dr. Hori Ram Singh, the Constitution Bench summed up the result of the discussion, in paragraph 19 by holding : “There must be a reasonable connection between the act and the discharge of official duty; the act must bear such relation to the duty that the accused could lay a reasonable, but not a pretended or fanciful claim, that he did it in the course of the performance of his duty.” 39. In State of Orissa through Kumar Raghvendra Singh v. Ganesh Chandra Jew, a two Member Bench of this Court explained that the protection under Section 197 has certain limits and that it is available only when the alleged act is reasonably connected with the discharge of his official duty and is not merely a cloak for doing the objectionable act. The Court also explained that if in doing his official duty, he acted in excess of his duty, but there is a reasonable connection between the act and the performance of the official duty, the excess will not be a sufficient ground to deprive the public servant of the protection. 40. The above decision in State of Orissa (supra) was followed (incidentally by the very same author) in K. Kalimuthu v. State by DSP and Rakesh Kumar Mishra v. State of Bihar. 41. In Devinder Singh v. State of Punjab through CBI, this Court took note of almost all the decisions on the point and summarized the principles emerging therefrom, in paragraph 39 as follows: “39. The principles emerging from the aforesaid decisions are summarised hereunder: 39.1. Protection of sanction is an assurance to an honest and sincere officer to perform his duty honestly and to the best of his ability to further public duty. The principles emerging from the aforesaid decisions are summarised hereunder: 39.1. Protection of sanction is an assurance to an honest and sincere officer to perform his duty honestly and to the best of his ability to further public duty. However, authority cannot be camouflaged to commit crime. 39.2. Once act or omission has been found to have been committed by public servant in discharging his duty it must be given liberal and wide construction so far its official nature is concerned. Public servant is not entitled to indulge in criminal activities. To that extent Section 197 CrPC has to be construed narrowly and in a restricted manner. 39.3. Even in facts of a case when public servant has exceeded in his duty, if there is reasonable connection it will not deprive him of protection under Section 197 CrPC. There cannot be a universal rule to determine whether there is reasonable nexus between the act done and official duty nor is it possible to lay down such rule. 39.4. In case the assault made is intrinsically connected with or related to performance of official duties, sanction would be necessary under Section 197 CrPC, but such relation to duty should not be pretended or fanciful claim. The offence must be directly and reasonably connected with official duty to require sanction. It is no part of official duty to commit offence. In case offence was incomplete without proving, the official act, ordinarily the provisions of Section 197 CrPC would apply. ….” 42. In D. Devaraja v. Owais Sabeer Hussain, this Court explained that sanction is required not only for acts done in the discharge of official duty but also required for any act purported to be done in the discharge of official duty and/or act done under colour of or in excess of such duty or authority. This Court also held that to decide whether sanction is necessary, the test is whether the act is totally unconnected with official duty or whether there is a reasonable connection with the official duty. 43. This Court also held that to decide whether sanction is necessary, the test is whether the act is totally unconnected with official duty or whether there is a reasonable connection with the official duty. 43. Keeping in mind the above principles, if we get back to the facts of the case, it may be seen that the primary charge against A-1 is that with a view to confer an unfair and undue advantage upon A-5, he directed PW-16 to go for limited tenders by dictating the names of four bogus companies, along with the name of the chosen one and eventually awarded the contract to the chosen one. It was admitted by the prosecution that at the relevant point of time, the Works Policy of BHEL marked as Exhibit P-11, provided for three types of tenders, namely (i) Open Tender; (ii) Limited/Restricted Tender; and (iii) Single Tender. 44. Paragraph 4.2.1 of the Works Policy filed as Exhibit P11 and relied upon by the prosecution laid down that as a rule, only works up to Rs. 1,00,000/-should be awarded by Restricted Tender. However, paragraph 4.2.1 also contained a rider which reads as follows: “4.2.1 … However even in cases involving more than Rs. 1,00,000/-if it is felt necessary to resort to Restricted Tender due to urgency or any other reasons it would be open to the General Managers or other officers authorised for this purpose to do so after recording reasons therefor.” 45. Two things are clear from the portion of the Works Policy extracted above. One is that a deviation from the rule was permissible. The second is that even General Managers were authorised to take a call, to deviate from the normal rule and resort to Restricted Tender. 46. Admittedly, A-1 was occupying the position of Executive Director, which was above the rank of a General Manager. According to him he had taken a call to go for Restricted Tender, after discussing with the Chairman and Managing Director. The Chairman and Managing Director, in his evidence as PW-28, denied having had any discussion in this regard. 47. For the purpose of finding out whether A-1 acted or purported to act in the discharge of his official duty, it is enough for us to see whether he could take cover, rightly or wrongly, under any existing policy. The Chairman and Managing Director, in his evidence as PW-28, denied having had any discussion in this regard. 47. For the purpose of finding out whether A-1 acted or purported to act in the discharge of his official duty, it is enough for us to see whether he could take cover, rightly or wrongly, under any existing policy. Paragraph 4.2.1 of the existing policy extracted above shows that A-1 at least had an arguable case, in defence of the decision he took to go in for Restricted Tender. Once this is clear, his act, even if alleged to be lacking in bona fides or in pursuance of a conspiracy, would be an act in the discharge of his official duty, making the case come within the parameters of Section 197(1) of the Code. Therefore, the prosecution ought to have obtained previous sanction. The Special Court as well as the High Court did not apply their mind to this aspect. 48. Shri Padmesh Mishra, learned counsel for the respondent placed strong reliance upon the observation contained in paragraph 50 of the decision of this Court in Parkash Singh Badal v. State of Punjab. It reads as follows:— “50. The offence of cheating under Section 420 or for that matter offences relatable to Sections 467, 468, 471 and 120-B can by no stretch of imagination by their very nature be regarded as having been committed by any public servant while acting or purporting to act in discharge of official duty. In such cases, official status only provides an opportunity for commission of the offence.” 49. On the basis of the above observation, it was contended by the learned counsel for the respondent that any act done by a public servant, which constitutes an offence of cheating, cannot be taken to have been committed while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of official duty. 50. But the above contention in our opinion is farfetched. The observations contained in paragraph 50 of the decision in Parkash Singh Badal (supra) are too general in nature and cannot be regarded as the ratio flowing out of the said case. 50. But the above contention in our opinion is farfetched. The observations contained in paragraph 50 of the decision in Parkash Singh Badal (supra) are too general in nature and cannot be regarded as the ratio flowing out of the said case. If by their very nature, the offences under sections 420, 468, 471 and 120B cannot be regarded as having been committed by a public servant while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of official duty, the same logic would apply with much more vigour in the case of offences under the PC Act. Section 197 of the Code does not carve out any group of offences that will fall outside its purview. Therefore, the observations contained in para 50 of the decision in Parkash Singh Badal cannot be taken as carving out an exception judicially, to a statutory prescription. In fact, Parkash Singh Badal cites with approval the other decisions (authored by the very same learned Judge) where this Court made a distinction between an act, though in excess of the duty, was reasonably connected with the discharge of official duty and an act which was merely a cloak for doing the objectionable act. Interestingly, the proposition laid down in Rakesh Kumar Mishra (supra) was distinguished in paragraph 49 of the decision in Parkash Singh Badal, before the Court made the observations in paragraph 50 extracted above. 51. No public servant is appointed with a mandate or authority to commit an offence. Therefore, if the observations contained in paragraph 50 of the decision in Parkash Singh Badal are applied, any act which constitutes an offence under any statute will go out of the purview of an act in the discharge of official duty. The requirement of a previous sanction will thus be rendered redundant by such an interpretation. 52. It must be remembered that in this particular case, the FIR actually implicated only four persons, namely PW-16, A3, A-4 an A-5. A-1 was not implicated in the FIR. It was only after a confession statement was made by PW-16 in the year 1998 that A-1 was roped in. The allegations against A-1 were that he got into a criminal conspiracy with the others to commit these offences. A-1 was not implicated in the FIR. It was only after a confession statement was made by PW-16 in the year 1998 that A-1 was roped in. The allegations against A-1 were that he got into a criminal conspiracy with the others to commit these offences. But the Management of BHEL refused to grant sanction for prosecuting A-3 and A-4, twice, on the ground that the decisions taken were in the realm of commercial wisdom of the Company. If according to the Management of the Company, the very same act of the co-conspirators fell in the realm of commercial wisdom, it is inconceivable that the act of A-1, as part of the criminal conspiracy, fell outside the discharge of his public duty, so as to disentitle him for protection under Section 197(1) of the Code. 53. In view of the above, we uphold the contention advanced on behalf of A-1 that the prosecution ought to have taken previous sanction in terms of Section 197(1) of the Code, for prosecuting A-1, for the offences under the IPC.” (Emphasis supplied) The Apex Court scans through the entire law on Section 197 of the CrPC and holds that sanction is required even if the acts of the Government servant would travel beyond the discharge of official duty. But the golden thread that runs through the aforesaid paragraph of the Apex Court is that it should have nexus to the discharge of official duty. The Apex Court has further clarified the position in the case of A. SREENIVASA REDDY v. RAKESH SHARMA AND ANOTHER, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 952 wherein the Apex Court considers A.SRINIVASULU (supra) as well and observes as follows: “60. Thus, although in the present case, the appellant has been discharged from the offences punishable under the PC Act, 1988 yet for the IPC offences, he can be proceeded further in accordance with law. 61. From the aforesaid, it can be said that there can be no thumb rule that in a prosecution before the court of Special Judge, the previous sanction under Section 19 of the PC Act, 1988 would invariably be the only prerequisite. 61. From the aforesaid, it can be said that there can be no thumb rule that in a prosecution before the court of Special Judge, the previous sanction under Section 19 of the PC Act, 1988 would invariably be the only prerequisite. If the offences on the charge of which, the public servant is expected to be put on trial include the offences other than those punishable under the PC Act, 1988 that is to say under the general law (i.e. IPC), the court is bound to examine, at the time of cognizance and also, if necessary, at subsequent stages (as the case progresses) as to whether there is a necessity of sanction under Section 197 of the CrPC. There is a material difference between the statutory requirements of Section 19 of the PC Act, 1988 on one hand, and Section 197 of the CrPC, on the other. In the prosecution for the offences exclusively under the PC Act, 1988, sanction is mandatory qua the public servant. In cases under the general penal law against the public servant, the necessity (or otherwise) of sanction under Section 197 of the CrPC depends on the factual aspects. The test in the latter case is of the “nexus” between the act of commission or omission and the official duty of the public servant. To commit an offence punishable under law can never be a part of the official duty of a public servant. It is too simplistic an approach to adopt and to reject the necessity of sanction under Section 197 of the CrPC on such reasoning. The “safe and sure test”, is to ascertain if the omission or neglect to commit the act complained of would have made the public servant answerable for the charge of dereliction of his official duty. He may have acted “in excess of his duty”, but if there is a “reasonable connection” between the impugned act and the performance of the official duty, the protective umbrella of Section 197 of the CrPC cannot be denied, so long as the discharge of official duty is not used as a cloak for illicit acts. 62. Before, we close this matter, we would like to observe something which, this Court may have to consider sooner or later. The object behind the enactment of Section 19 of the PC Act, 1988 is to protect the public servants from frivolous prosecutions. 62. Before, we close this matter, we would like to observe something which, this Court may have to consider sooner or later. The object behind the enactment of Section 19 of the PC Act, 1988 is to protect the public servants from frivolous prosecutions. Take a case wherein, the sanctioning authority at the time of declining to accord sanction under Section 19 of the PC Act, 1988 observes that sanction is being declined because the prosecution against the accused could be termed as frivolous or vexatious. Then, in such circumstances what would be its effect on the trial so far as the IPC offences are concerned? Could it be said that the prosecution for the offences under the PC Act, 1988 is frivolous but the same would not be for the offences under the IPC? We are not going into this question in the present matter as sanction initially was not declined on the ground that the prosecution against the appellant herein is frivolous or vexatious but the same was declined essentially on the ground that what has been alleged is mere procedural irregularities in discharge of essential duties. Whether such procedural irregularities constitute any offence under the IPC or not will be looked into by the trial court. What we have highlighted may be examined by this Court in some other litigation at an appropriate time.” (Emphasis supplied) The Apex Court holds that sanction under Section 19 of the Act would be a pre-requisite if the offences alleged are the ones punishable under the provisions of the Act. But, insofar as Section 197 of the CrPC is concerned, the Apex Court again emphasizes on the factum of nexus between the act of commission or omission in official duty of the public servant. The Apex Court clearly holds that the protective umbrella under Section 197 of the CrPC cannot be denied so long as the discharge of official duty is not used as a cloak for illicit acts. On the bedrock of the principles laid down by the Apex Court in the cases of A. SRINIVASULU and A.SREENIVASA REDDY (supra), the facts obtaining in the case at hand are required to be noticed. 14. As observed hereinabove, the petitioner at the relevant point in time, was the Registrar of the University. The charge sheet filed by the CBI against the petitioner is in specific with regard to his acts. 14. As observed hereinabove, the petitioner at the relevant point in time, was the Registrar of the University. The charge sheet filed by the CBI against the petitioner is in specific with regard to his acts. This is based upon Section 164 CrPC statement of two of the accused one of whom is Dr. Hanumantha Prasad, an officer of the University, who turns out to be an approver and granted pardon under Section 306 of the CrPC. The charge against the petitioner in detail reads as follows: “3. That Shri P.S.Prabhakaran (A-1), Shri V.I.Hukkeri (A-2), Shri Hanumanth Prasad had hatched a conspiracy with Shri Rajgopal Reddy (A-19) r/o No.19, Shivashankara Nilaya, 7th Cross, 17th E-Main Road, 6th Block, Koramangala, Bangalore during January-2006 for leaking the question papers of PGET-2006 to a select list of candidates. In furtherance of the said conspiracy, Dr. Hanumantha Prasad, Assistant Registrar, RGUHS, Bangalore had booked rooms in Hotel UD Residency, Basavanagudi, Bangalore for the stay of the candidates of PGET-06 on 11-02-2006 with the assistance of his friend, Shri K.L. Anil Kumar, Proprietor of M/s Xcelware Global INC, at No. 248, 9th A Main, 3rd Block, Jayanagar, Bangalore. Shri K.L.Anil Kumar had picked up the candidates namely Shri Sandeep B.E (A-7), Ms.Neha Bhansl 8), Shri H.Srinivas (A-10), Ms.R.Babitha (A-13) and Smt Nandita Shetty (A-14), from Various parts of the city as per the list given by Shri Hanumantha Prasad and had brought them to Hotel U.D Residency, Basavanagudi, Bangalore on 11-02-2006. He had also co-ordinated with Shri Rajagopal Reddy (A-19) in bringing candidates namely Shri Giridhar S.A (A-5). Shri S.C Ashoka (A-9). Smt Bhavani M.Hulinayakar (A-11), Shri S.K.Harsha (A-15). Shri Raman M.H (A-16) and Shri Santhanu Savkur (A17) to Hotel UD Residency, Basavanagudi, Bangalore. He collected question papers of PGET-06 from Shri Hanumantha Prasad which delivered to him by Dr. V.I.Hukkeri (A-2) and had distributed the same to the aforesaid candidates housed in Hotel U.D.Residency, Basavanagudi, Bangalore. The candidates were allowed to leave the hotel in the morning of 12-02-2006 for appearing for the examinations in various centres. Thus, Shri-Nitish Desai (A-3) and 15-other candidates had secured high marks in the examination and figured in the top-20 of the merit list. 4. That under the directions of Dr. V.I.Hukkeri, Dr. The candidates were allowed to leave the hotel in the morning of 12-02-2006 for appearing for the examinations in various centres. Thus, Shri-Nitish Desai (A-3) and 15-other candidates had secured high marks in the examination and figured in the top-20 of the merit list. 4. That under the directions of Dr. V.I.Hukkeri, Dr. Hanumantha Prasad booked 6-rooms for 11.02.2006 & 12.02.2006 in the name of a 'marriage party" in Hotel UD Residency for the stay of the candidates of PGET-06. Dr. Hanumantha Prasad had used the visiting cards of his friend Shri Anil Kumar. He had also obtained 3-SIM cards by using the employee data of 2-employees of M/s. Xcel Globalware, Jayanagar, Bangalore and the same were used by Dr. Hanumantha Prasad, Dr. V.I.Hukkeri and Shri Anil Kumar for coordinating with the candidates for the leakage of question papers On 11-02-06 around noon, a list of candidates was passed on to Shri Anil Kumar by Dr. Hanumantha Prasad who were to be picked up from various locations in Bangalore and dropped in Hotel UD Residency. Shri Anil Kumar picked them up in the evening around 7 pm and lodged them in Hotel UD Residency. Later, Dr. V.I.Hukkeri (A2) went to hotel Ramanashree along with Dr. Hanumantha Prasad and he had given a list of candidates to Dr. Hanumantha Prasad and had asked him to co-ordinate with Shri Rajgopal Reddy (A-19) for mobilising those candidates. Accordingly, Shri Hanumanth Prasad had passed on the list of candidates and the telephone number of Shri Rajgopal Reddy to Shri Anil Kumar for bringing the candidates to Hotel UD. Residency Shri Rajgopal Reddy had brought Shri Giridhar S.A (A-5), Shri S.C.Ashoka (A-9)Smt. Bhavani M.Hulinayakar (A-11), Shri Harsha S.K (A-15), Shri Raman M.H (A-16) and Shri Shanthanu Savkur (A-17) in a car to a place near Lalbagh West Gate, bangalore and they were picked up by Shri Anil Kumar and were brought to Hotel UD Residency. 5. That Dr. V.I.Hukkeri (A-2) was staying at Hotel Ramanshree on 11-02-2006 and he had handed over a packet containing copies of question papers as well as hall tickets of the candidates to Dr. Hanumantha Prasad for distributing the same to the candidates housed in Hotel UD Residency. Dr. Hanumantha Prasad had handed over the said copies of question papers to Shri Anil Kumar near R V Teacher's Training College Road, Bangalore. Hanumantha Prasad for distributing the same to the candidates housed in Hotel UD Residency. Dr. Hanumantha Prasad had handed over the said copies of question papers to Shri Anil Kumar near R V Teacher's Training College Road, Bangalore. Shri Anil Kumar then went with the copies of question papers collected from Dr. Hanumantha Prasad to Hotel UD Residency and distributed the same to the candidates lodged there. The candidates were allowed to leave the hotel after returning the copies of question paper to Shri Anil Kumar on 12.02.2006 in the morning for appearing for the examination. The copies of question papers which were collected back next morning were returned to Dr. Hanumantha Prasad on 12.02.2006. Dr. Hanumantha Prasad returned these copies to Dr. V.I. Hukkeri (A-2) in the same evening. Shri Anil Kumar had collected Rs.10 lakhs from Ms.R.Babitha (A-13) and had handed over the same to Dr. Hanumantha Prasad on 11-02-2006 as a consideration for providing question papers of PGET-2006. 6. That the call data analysis of telephone / mobile numbers of Shri P.S. Prabhakaran (A-1) and Shri V.I.HUkkeri (A-2). during the relevant period has revealed that they were in touch with Shri Rajgopal Reddy (A-19), Shri Nitish R.Desai (A-3) and other candidates directly and indirectly for facilitating the fraud. Investigation has revealed that Shri Rajagopal Reddy (A-19) was in touch with Shri K.L.Anil Kumar, Proprietor of M/s. Xcelware Global Incorporated, No. 248, 9th A Main Road, 3rd Block, Jayanagar, Bangalore and some of the aforesaid candidates. They had acted as middle men in mobilising the aforesaid candidates for leaking the question papers of PGET 2006.” (Emphasis added) The allegations against the petitioner, are preparation of question bank, out of which accused No.1 had personally finalized two sets of question papers and the same was entrusted to the petitioner for getting it printed. After printing the question papers, same were kept in sealed trunks and were distributed to various centres on 11-02-2006. 15. What happens in between answering the question papers and the results is what forms the fulcrum of the allegations against the petitioner. Dr. Hanumantha Prasad, Assistant Registrar of the University working under the petitioner was directed to book rooms in the hotel U.D. Residency, Basavanagudi, Bengaluru for stay of candidates with the assistance of his friend K.L. Anil Kumar, proprietor of M/s Xcelware. Dr. Hanumantha Prasad, Assistant Registrar of the University working under the petitioner was directed to book rooms in the hotel U.D. Residency, Basavanagudi, Bengaluru for stay of candidates with the assistance of his friend K.L. Anil Kumar, proprietor of M/s Xcelware. It is then alleged that K.L. Anil Kumar had picked up several candidates from different parts of the city as per the list given by Dr. Hanumantha Prasad and had brought them into the U.D. Residency. Under the directions of the petitioner rooms were booked in the name of “marriage party” for the stay of the candidates who were to answer PGET 2006. The petitioner was staying at hotel Ramanashree on 11-02-2006 and he had handed over a packet containing copies of question papers and hall tickets to Dr. Hanumantha Prasad for distributing the same to the candidates separately housed in U.D. Residency. The copies of question papers were collected back on the next morning and returned back to Dr. Hanumantha Prasad who in turn returns the same to the petitioner on the same evening. 16. Throughout the petitioner has been in close contact with accused No.19, accused No.3 and accused No.1 along with Dr. Hanumantha Prasad. An amount of Rs.10,00,000/-was also exchanged is what is indicated qua the petitioner. Therefore, the accused who turned approvers have made full disclosure by rendering their statements under Section 164 of the CrPC. By the time the charge sheet was filed both accused Nos. 1 and 2 were no longer public servants as they had retired on attaining the age of superannuation. Criminal conspiracy was what was alleged on account of fraudulent transaction of question papers and gaining access to the question papers which has led to few candidates securing high marks. These are the acts alleged against the petitioner. I fail to understand as to what nexus, the acts of the petitioner of playing fraud on the University, in connivance with the students, to hatch a criminal conspiracy in exchange of huge sums of money would be in the discharge of official duties. These are the allegations against the petitioner which forms a part of the charge sheet. 17. In the considered view of this Court, the official position of the petitioner is misused for illicit acts albeit, prima facie. The illicit act, I mean, the aforesaid. These are the allegations against the petitioner which forms a part of the charge sheet. 17. In the considered view of this Court, the official position of the petitioner is misused for illicit acts albeit, prima facie. The illicit act, I mean, the aforesaid. Therefore, as observed by the Apex Court in the case of A.SREENIVASA REDDY, the protective umbrella under Section 197 of the CrPC cannot be spread for protecting illicit acts of the petitioner, done in the garb of discharging the official duty. Therefore, the plea of the learned senior counsel for the petitioner that further proceedings cannot be continued against the petitioner for want of sanction either under Section 19 of the Act or under Section 197 of the CrPC is a submission that requires to be rejected, as it is fundamentally flawed. I do not find any nexus with the allegations against the petitioner, to the discharge of official duty. Committing fraud/misappropriation, by personal acts and for personal gain cannot be seen to be protected under Section 197 of the CrPC. 18. The other submission made that there are no witnesses and no links in the evidence, that led to framing of the charge is also imaginary, as the afore-quoted charge sheet, filed against the petitioner, clearly brings out copious evidence against the petitioner both before the Inquiry Committee and in the investigation conducted by the CBI. These are in the realm of seriously disputed questions of fact, which would require a full-blown trial, for the petitioner to come out clean. No fault can be found with the order that is passed by the concerned Court rejecting the application seeking discharge. If the submissions of the learned senior counsel are accepted qua no evidence to continue the trial against the petitioner and the proceedings are closed, it would run foul of the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of KAPTAN SINGH v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH, (2021) 9 SCC 35 wherein the Apex Court holds as follows: “9.1. At the outset, it is required to be noted that in the present case the High Court in exercise of powers under Section 482 CrPC has quashed the criminal proceedings for the offences under Sections 147, 148, 149, 406, 329 and 386 IPC. At the outset, it is required to be noted that in the present case the High Court in exercise of powers under Section 482 CrPC has quashed the criminal proceedings for the offences under Sections 147, 148, 149, 406, 329 and 386 IPC. It is required to be noted that when the High Court in exercise of powers under Section 482 CrPC quashed the criminal proceedings, by the time the investigating officer after recording the statement of the witnesses, statement of the complainant and collecting the evidence from the incident place and after taking statement of the independent witnesses and even statement of the accused persons, has filed the charge-sheet before the learned Magistrate for the offences under Sections 147, 148, 149, 406, 329 and 386 IPC and even the learned Magistrate also took the cognizance. From the impugned judgment and order [Radhey Shyam Gupta v. State of U.P., 2020 SCC OnLine All 914] passed by the High Court, it does not appear that the High Court took into consideration the material collected during the investigation/inquiry and even the statements recorded. If the petition under Section 482 CrPC was at the stage of FIR in that case the allegations in the FIR/complaint only are required to be considered and whether a cognizable offence is disclosed or not is required to be considered. However, thereafter when the statements are recorded, evidence is collected and the charge-sheet is filed after conclusion of the investigation/inquiry the matter stands on different footing and the Court is required to consider the material/evidence collected during the investigation. Even at this stage also, as observed and held by this Court in a catena of decisions, the High Court is not required to go into the merits of the allegations and/or enter into the merits of the case as if the High Court is exercising the appellate jurisdiction and/or conducting the trial. As held by this Court in Dineshbhai Chandubhai Patel v. State of Gujarat, (2018) 3 SCC 104 : (2018) 1 SCC (Cri) 683 in order to examine as to whether factual contents of FIR disclose any cognizable offence or not, the High Court cannot act like the investigating agency nor can exercise the powers like an appellate court. As held by this Court in Dineshbhai Chandubhai Patel v. State of Gujarat, (2018) 3 SCC 104 : (2018) 1 SCC (Cri) 683 in order to examine as to whether factual contents of FIR disclose any cognizable offence or not, the High Court cannot act like the investigating agency nor can exercise the powers like an appellate court. It is further observed and held that that question is required to be examined keeping in view, the contents of FIR and prima facie material, if any, requiring no proof. At such stage, the High Court cannot appreciate evidence nor can it draw its own inferences from contents of FIR and material relied on. It is further observed it is more so, when the material relied on is disputed. It is further observed that in such a situation, it becomes the job of the investigating authority at such stage to probe and then of the court to examine questions once the charge-sheet is filed along with such material as to how far and to what extent reliance can be placed on such material. 9.2. In Dhruvaram Murlidhar Sonar [Dhruvaram Murlidhar Sonar v. State of Maharashtra, (2019) 18 SCC 191 : (2020) 3 SCC (Cri) 672] after considering the decisions of this Court in Bhajan Lal [State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 426], it is held by this Court that exercise of powers under Section 482 CrPC to quash the proceedings is an exception and not a rule. It is further observed that inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC though wide is to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution, only when such exercise is justified by tests specifically laid down in the section itself. It is further observed that appreciation of evidence is not permissible at the stage of quashing of proceedings in exercise of powers under Section 482 CrPC. Similar view has been expressed by this Court in Arvind Khanna [CBI v. Arvind Khanna, (2019) 10 SCC 686 : (2020) 1 SCC (Cri) 94], Managipet [State of Telangana v. Managipet, (2019) 19 SCC 87 : (2020) 3 SCC (Cri) 702] and in XYZ [XYZ v. State of Gujarat, (2019) 10 SCC 337 : (2020) 1 SCC (Cri) 173], referred to hereinabove. 9.3. 9.3. Applying the law laid down by this Court in the aforesaid decisions to the facts of the case on hand, we are of the opinion that the High Court has exceeded its jurisdiction in quashing the criminal proceedings in exercise of powers under Section 482 CrPC. 10. The High Court has failed to appreciate and consider the fact that there are very serious triable issues/allegations which are required to be gone into and considered at the time of trial. The High Court has lost sight of crucial aspects which have emerged during the course of the investigation. The High Court has failed to appreciate and consider the fact that the document i.e. a joint notarised affidavit of Mamta Gupta Accused 2 and Munni Devi under which according to Accused 2 Ms Mamta Gupta, Rs 25 lakhs was paid and the possession was transferred to her itself is seriously disputed. It is required to be noted that in the registered agreement to sell dated 27-10-2010, the sale consideration is stated to be Rs 25 lakhs and with no reference to payment of Rs 25 lakhs to Ms Munni Devi and no reference to handing over the possession. However, in the joint notarised affidavit of the same date i.e. 27-10-2010 sale consideration is stated to be Rs 35 lakhs out of which Rs 25 lakhs is alleged to have been paid and there is a reference to transfer of possession to Accused 2. Whether Rs 25 lakhs has been paid or not the accused have to establish during the trial, because the accused are relying upon the said document and payment of Rs 25 lakhs as mentioned in the joint notarised affidavit dated 27-10-2010. It is also required to be considered that the first agreement to sell in which Rs 25 lakhs is stated to be sale consideration and there is reference to the payment of Rs 10 lakhs by cheques. It is a registered document. The aforesaid are all triable issues/allegations which are required to be considered at the time of trial. The High Court has failed to notice and/or consider the material collected during the investigation. 11. It is a registered document. The aforesaid are all triable issues/allegations which are required to be considered at the time of trial. The High Court has failed to notice and/or consider the material collected during the investigation. 11. Now so far as the finding recorded by the High Court that no case is made out for the offence under Section 406 IPC is concerned, it is to be noted that the High Court itself has noted that the joint notarised affidavit dated 27-10-2010 is seriously disputed, however as per the High Court the same is required to be considered in the civil proceedings. There the High Court has committed an error. Even the High Court has failed to notice that another FIR has been lodged against the accused for the offences under Sections 467, 468, 471 IPC with respect to the said alleged joint notarised affidavit. Even according to the accused the possession was handed over to them. However, when the payment of Rs 25 lakhs as mentioned in the joint notarised affidavit is seriously disputed and even one of the cheques out of 5 cheques each of Rs 2 lakhs was dishonoured and according to the accused they were handed over the possession (which is seriously disputed) it can be said to be entrustment of property. Therefore, at this stage to opine that no case is made out for the offence under Section 406 IPC is premature and the aforesaid aspect is to be considered during trial. It is also required to be noted that the first suit was filed by Munni Devi and thereafter subsequent suit came to be filed by the accused and that too for permanent injunction only. Nothing is on record that any suit for specific performance has been filed. Be that as it may, all the aforesaid aspects are required to be considered at the time of trial only. 12. Therefore, the High Court has grossly erred in quashing the criminal proceedings by entering into the merits of the allegations as if the High Court was exercising the appellate jurisdiction and/or conducting the trial. The High Court has exceeded its jurisdiction in quashing the criminal proceedings in exercise of powers under Section 482 CrPC. 13. Even the High Court has erred in observing that original complaint has no locus. The High Court has exceeded its jurisdiction in quashing the criminal proceedings in exercise of powers under Section 482 CrPC. 13. Even the High Court has erred in observing that original complaint has no locus. The aforesaid observation is made on the premise that the complainant has not placed on record the power of attorney along with the counter filed before the High Court. However, when it is specifically stated in the FIR that Munni Devi has executed the power of attorney and thereafter the investigating officer has conducted the investigation and has recorded the statement of the complainant, accused and the independent witnesses, thereafter whether the complainant is having the power of attorney or not is to be considered during trial. 14. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, the impugned judgment and order [Radhey Shyam Gupta v. State of U.P., 2020 SCC OnLine All 914] passed by the High Court quashing the criminal proceedings in exercise of powers under Section 482 CrPC is unsustainable and the same deserves to be quashed and set aside and is accordingly quashed and set aside. Now, the trial is to be conducted and proceeded further in accordance with law and on its own merits. It is made clear that the observations made by this Court in the present proceedings are to be treated to be confined to the proceedings under Section 482 CrPC only and the trial court to decide the case in accordance with law and on its own merits and on the basis of the evidence to be laid and without being influenced by any of the observations made by us hereinabove. The present appeal is accordingly allowed.” (Emphasis supplied) 19. Finding no merit in the petitions, the petitions stand rejected. Consequently, interim orders operating in these cases are dissolved.