ORDER : The subject petition is a part of batch of petitions filed calling in question certain proceedings instituted on one solitary incident. The incident is conduct of examination for Postgraduate Entrance by the Rajiv Gandhi University of Health Sciences. The batch of petitions is by several accused – few of them have sought quashment of entire proceedings and few of them have called in question the order of respective Court rejecting discharge applications filed by the accused. One such case is the subject revision petition. Since facts that lead to the filing of the present petition and respective contentions differ, I deem it appropriate to pass separate orders notwithstanding them being taken up together and arising out of the same incident. The petitioner in the subject petition is accused No.6. 2. Facts adumbrated are as follows: The petitioner is a doctor by profession. On 12-02-2006 the petitioner as a student writes postgraduate entrance exam conducted by the Rajiv Gandhi University of Health Sciences (‘the University’ for short) for admission to postgraduate course. The petitioner comes out successful in the entrance exam by securing higher percentage of marks and was accordingly given admission to the postgraduate course like every other student who participated in the selection process. After the selection was over, newspaper reports exploded certain malpractices in the conduct of entrance examination and they have projected that few of the students whose academic career prior to writing of the entrance examination was too low have all secured higher percentage of marks. The newspaper reports led to the Government of Karnataka constituting a Three Member Committee to go into the matter and submit a report. Based upon the report thereto, investigation was directed to be conducted by the Central Bureau of Investigation (‘CBI’ for short). The CBI conducts investigation and files a charge sheet. The petitioner in the charge sheet is arrayed as accused No.6. The charge sheet is filed against 20 accused including the petitioner. The offences alleged are the ones punishable under Section 13(1)(d) and 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (‘the Act’ for short) and Sections 409, 420 r/w 120B of the IPC. The offence under the Act was alleged as few of the accused were public servants amongst others. The charge sheet is filed against 20 accused including the petitioner. The offences alleged are the ones punishable under Section 13(1)(d) and 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (‘the Act’ for short) and Sections 409, 420 r/w 120B of the IPC. The offence under the Act was alleged as few of the accused were public servants amongst others. Filing of charge sheet leads the petitioner to file an application seeking her discharge from the array of accused like every other accused who sought to file discharge applications before the concerned Court. The discharge application of the petitioner comes to be rejected. The rejection of the discharge application filed by the petitioner leads her to this Court in the subject petition. 3. Heard Sri C.V.Nagesh, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner and Sri P.Prasanna Kumar, learned Special Public Prosecutor appearing for the respondent. 4. The learned senior counsel representing the petitioner would vehemently contend that merely because other students who have secured low marks in the preceding years of their career, the petitioner is also dragged into the web of crime. The petitioner is a rank student throughout her career. Certain statements that are recorded during the evidence by the prosecution would completely absolve the petitioner. Polygraph test and brain mapping tests were also conducted upon the petitioner. Both these have divulged nothing against her. Section 164 CrPC statement of one Anil Kumar, a witness of the prosecution does not even make a remote reference to the petitioner. Dr. Hanumanth Prasad who is also a prosecution witness has deposed that only 2 to 3 days prior to 11-02-2006, the date of conduct of examination he had met the petitioner concerning non-issuance of hall ticket and later hall ticket was issued to her. Except this statement, he would contend, that there is nothing that can drive home the offence against the petitioner. He would take this Court through the evidence recorded and the opinion of the scientist who conducted the brain mapping test. It is his submission that all these factors were placed before the concerned Court while seeking discharge. Though the order rejecting the discharge application runs into several pages, they are all on erroneous observations, presumptions and assumptions contrary to the record. It is his submission that all these factors were placed before the concerned Court while seeking discharge. Though the order rejecting the discharge application runs into several pages, they are all on erroneous observations, presumptions and assumptions contrary to the record. It is his submission that filing of discharge application and its consideration is not an empty formality but a duty cast upon the concerned Court hearing the discharge application to apply its mind and then pass appropriate orders. He would seek to place reliance upon the following judgments of the Apex Court viz., (i) SANJAY KUMAR RAI v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND ANOTHER, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 367, (ii) KANCHAN KUMAR v. STATE OF BIHAR, (2022) 9 SCC 577 and (iii) CAPTAIN MANJITH SINGH VIRDI v. HUSSAIN MOHAMMED SHATTAF AND OTHERS, (2023) 7 SCC 633 . 5. On the other hand, Sri. P Prasanna Kumar, learned Special Public Prosecutor representing the CBI would seek to refute the submissions to contend that evidence whatever is available would be pitted against the petitioner in the trial. The discharge application has been rightly rejected, as the scope of consideration of the material at the time of discharge by the concerned Court is extremely limited. He would seek dismissal of the petition and contend that it is for the petitioner to come out clean in a full-blown trial as the issue is already 17 years old. This Court may direct the concerned Court to expedite the trial. 6. I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions made by the respective learned counsel and have perused the material on record. 7. The incident that led to registration of crime is as afore-quoted. But, I deem it appropriate to elaborate it in some more detail. The University in the month of February 2006 sought to conduct an entrance examination for postgraduate degree in medicine. The examination was conducted and its results were announced. Some candidates who did not get through the entrance test alleged malpractice in the conduct of examination on the score that there was a leakage of question papers to some candidates who have secured very high marks. The Government of Karnataka constituted an Inquiry Committee as by then the issue was blown through the media. The Members of the Inquiry Committee were all members of the Health and Family Welfare Department. The Government of Karnataka constituted an Inquiry Committee as by then the issue was blown through the media. The Members of the Inquiry Committee were all members of the Health and Family Welfare Department. The Inquiry Committee filed its report observing that all was not well with the conduct of entrance examination. The confidentiality that had to be maintained during the conduct of examination was breached and there was malpractice in the conduct of entrance examination. 8. This report led to further seriousness of the issue and the Government of Karnataka then resolves to hand over investigation to the CBI. The CBI then conducts investigation and draws up 20 accused into the web of crime. The allegations were against public servants and the students who had participated in the entrance examination who have been alleged to have secured high marks as accused in the crime. Since the accused were an amalgam of both public servants and private citizens, both offences under Section 13(1)(d) and 13(2) of the Act along with Sections 409, 420 and 120B of the IPC were alleged against the accused. The investigation was, as observed hereinabove, handed over to the CBI. The CBI conducts investigation. Insofar as the present petitioner is concerned, statements were recorded and polygraph and brain mapping tests were conducted. The result of polygraph test is as follows: “9.8. Dr. Mekhala Dwarakanth: The Polygraph examination of Dr. Mekhala Dwarakanth was conducted on 30-05-08. During the Polygraph examination, Dr. Mekhala Dwarakanth was asked the questions which included the relevant (crime related) issues. The relevant issues and the answers given by Dr. Mekhala Dwarakanth were as follows: Issues Answer i. Is it true that you had contacted Sri Prabhakaran for the purpose of obtaining question papers of PGET-06 prior to the exam? No ii. Is it true that you had contacted Dr. Hukkeri for obtaining question papers? No iii. Did you contact any other official from Rajiv Gandhi University for the question papers? No iv. Is it true that Shri. Prabhakaran arranged for leaking question papers of PGET-06 before hand through any one? No v. Is it true that Mr. Hukkeri arranged for question papers before PGET-06 exam? No vi. Is it true that you paid money to obtain the question papers? No vii. Is it true that you were brought by to UD residency from Lalbagh by Shekar in the car? No viii. No v. Is it true that Mr. Hukkeri arranged for question papers before PGET-06 exam? No vi. Is it true that you paid money to obtain the question papers? No vii. Is it true that you were brought by to UD residency from Lalbagh by Shekar in the car? No viii. Did you the amount to Shri Prabhakaran? No ix. Did you the amount to Dr. Hukkeri? No x. Were you given question paper of PGET-06 at your residence? No xi. Did any of your family members contact Dr. Hukkeri for this purpose? No xii. Is it true that you have signed for room bills on receipt on 12-02-06? No xiii. Is it true that you had received paper prior to exams of PGET-067 No Opinion On the basis of Polygraph examination and analysis of Polygraph, the following opinion has been formulated in respect of Dr. Mekhala Dwarakanth. The analysis and evaluation of Polygraph revel no deceptive responses on the issues no (1) to (xiii), which indicates Dr. Mekhala Dwarakanth is not deceptive in her responses and is truthful in her statement given and does not have the knowledge about the crime under reference.” (Emphasis added) The opinion of the polygraph examination is that the petitioner is not deceptive in response and was truthful in her statement and does not have the knowledge about the crime under reference. What was put to her is as found (supra). The examination was conducted and questions were asked including the relevant crime related issues. The relevant questions and answers given by the petitioner nowhere indicate that she was ever in the know of what was happening that led to registration of crime. Therefore, the polygraph test conducted upon the petitioner was completely against the prosecution. What the CBI would do next is conduct of a brain mapping test. The petitioner was subjected to brain mapping test on 28th March, 2008, 24, 25, 28 and 29th April 2008 and 30th May 2008. On all these days of brain mapping what is the methodology adopted and the result is found in the documents appended to the charge sheet. They read as follows: “To, The Superintendent of Police CBI:ACB: Bangalore Sub: BRAIN MAPPING EXAMINATION REPORT IN RC. NO. 07(A)/87-CBI/ACB/BLR. Ref: Letter No: -Nil Dated: 01 April 08 Pursuant to the request made vide letter cited under reference suspect Dr. Anand Halyal, Dr. Bhavani, Dr. Raman, Dr. They read as follows: “To, The Superintendent of Police CBI:ACB: Bangalore Sub: BRAIN MAPPING EXAMINATION REPORT IN RC. NO. 07(A)/87-CBI/ACB/BLR. Ref: Letter No: -Nil Dated: 01 April 08 Pursuant to the request made vide letter cited under reference suspect Dr. Anand Halyal, Dr. Bhavani, Dr. Raman, Dr. Neha Bansal, Dr. Sida Tagore, Dr. Nitish Desai, Dr. Babitha R, Dr. Mekhala Dwarkanth and Dr. Sandeep B.E. was brought for Brain mapping test. The cited suspect were first interviewed and subjected for the polygraph test. To verify the authenticity of their statement they were subjected for polygraph examination at Forensic Science Laboratory,.. Bangalore. They were further subjected for "Brain Mapping" test on 28th March, 24th, 25th, 28th 29th April and 30th May 08 to know whether they were concealing some important information about their involvement in fraudulently leaking the question papers on 11.02.2006 before the conduct of PGET-2006 through a middlemen. Procedure as per manual issued by MHA was followed. No Police officers were present during the examination Methodology The activation of the brain for the associated memory is carried out by presenting a list of words to the subject. There are two types of words in the list used for the "Brain Mapping" test. Part 1 consisted of "neutral words", which have no direct relationship with the case. The part 2 consists of "target words" directly related to the case and accused to elicit concealed information, which all suspects have had opportunity to come to know during the course of events related the case. The part 2 consisted of target, which are not part of the list in part 1, but are based on [1] confidential findings [which the accused does not know], polygraph findings, and possibilities postulated by the investigating Officer [IO]. The words in each target, activates the semantic memory/ episodic memory, if the subject truthfully had participated in the act. This would give rise to characteristic Event Related Potential Responses [ERP] of the brain. If the subject had not participated in the event, the words presented to the subject will fail to evoke any significant Event Related Potential responses. Generation of such ERP responses associated with probe are suggestive of 'primary encoding information in the individual, which would have been acquired only by virtue of the direct participation in the act/event. Procedure: a) Pre recording: The words were presented in English in the "Auditory Mode" only. Generation of such ERP responses associated with probe are suggestive of 'primary encoding information in the individual, which would have been acquired only by virtue of the direct participation in the act/event. Procedure: a) Pre recording: The words were presented in English in the "Auditory Mode" only. The words were programmed and presented in a random order through STIM program. The EEG and ERP responses were acquired by the 32 channel EEG-ERP Neuro SCAN recording system. The target words were so designed to elicit any concealed/ encoded information about the following activities:- Set –VIII Dr. Mekhala Dwarkanth 1. Contacted VC Prabhakaran for question paper of PGET seat 2. Contacted Dr. V.I.Hukkeri for question paper of PGET 2006 3. Contacted University officials for the question papers 4. Made payment for the question papers 5. High marks got from the leaked question papers 6. Family members contacted Dr.V.I.Hukkeri for the question papers 7. Dr. V.I.Hukkeri provided the question papers 8. Question papers of PGET-06 were provided at residence 9. Question papers received as promised 10. Payment made to Dr. V.I.Hukkeri Analysis & Interpretation: A time domain analysis (Averaging) of the time locked (to the words] ERP signals of preset duration was carried out to detect the event related activity associated with the processing of the target words and the neutral words. Average response was determined for each list of words, which were presented randomly. All changes were interpreted using MATLAB based on comparison of activation patterns emanated within the individual. Activation is seen with regard to all the “target words" framed Responses showed auditory semantic processing in both the trials. Increase in activation pattern is seen with regard to the "target words" for Dr. Anand Halyal in Set-I, Dr. Bhavani in Set-II, Dr. Raman in Set-III, Dr. Neha Bansal in Set-IV, Dr. Sida Tagore in Set-V, Dr. Nitish Desai in Set-VI and Dr. Babitha R in Set-VII. Responses for these showed high auditory-semantic processing which were repetitive, consistent and reproducible. Responses of the target words were higher in magnitudes than those obtained for the neutral words. The changes in the activation pattern produced by the list of target words for Dr. Anand Halyal, Dr. Bhavani, Dr. Raman, Dr. Neha Bansal, Dr. Sida Tagore, Dr. Nitish Desai and Dr. Babitha R for the activities listed above have elicited greater positive activation pattern consistent with experiential knowledge of the same. The changes in the activation pattern produced by the list of target words for Dr. Anand Halyal, Dr. Bhavani, Dr. Raman, Dr. Neha Bansal, Dr. Sida Tagore, Dr. Nitish Desai and Dr. Babitha R for the activities listed above have elicited greater positive activation pattern consistent with experiential knowledge of the same. High auditory semantic processing were indicative of their active involvement for the activities listed above. Greater activation seen in the trial 2 further supported their involvement in the activities listed above. The separate analysis of these components showed significant changes. The changes in the activation pattern were not found with the presentation of list of target words for Dr. Mekhala Dwarkanth and Dr. Sandeep. B.E. for the activities listed Activation pattern of the target words were equivalent with that of the neutral words. The separate analysis of these components showed no significant changes. The responses showed greater activation and active processing of the relevant words as seen in the evoked activity than to neutral words. The primary encoding, high level of activation and high auditory semantic processing are seen in both the trails. This is supportive of the active participation of Dr. Anand Halyal, Dr. Bhavani, Dr. Raman, Dr. Neha Bansal, Dr. Sida Tagore, Dr. Nitish Desai and Dr. Babitha R in each of the activities. Conclusion The major findings supported by the "Brain mapping" tests are indicative of the possession of knowledge about the activities listed above by Dr. Anand Halyal, Dr. Bhavani, Dr. Raman, Dr. Neha Bansal, Dr. Sida Tagore, Dr. Nitish Desai and Dr. Babitha R activation during information processing and generation of such ERP responses associated with target words are suggestive of primary encoding information with Dr. Anand Halyal, Dr.Bhavani Dr. Raman, Dr. Neha Bansal, Dr. Sida Tagore, Dr. Nitish Desai, Dr. Babitha R. The major findings supported by the “Brain mapping" tests are indicative of absence possession of knowledge about the activities listed above by Dr.Mekhala Dwarkanth and Dr. Sandeep. B.E.” (Emphasis added) The result of brain mapping test is as stated (supra). Insofar as brain mapping is concerned, it is conducted against several accused. Insofar as the petitioner is concerned, the conclusion is that the petitioner nowhere indicated possession of knowledge about activities against others. The main findings supported by brain mapping tests were indicative of absence of possession of knowledge of candidates by one Dr. Mekhala Dwarakanath and Dr. Insofar as brain mapping is concerned, it is conducted against several accused. Insofar as the petitioner is concerned, the conclusion is that the petitioner nowhere indicated possession of knowledge about activities against others. The main findings supported by brain mapping tests were indicative of absence of possession of knowledge of candidates by one Dr. Mekhala Dwarakanath and Dr. Sandeep B.E. Dr. Mekhala Dwarakanath is the petitioner. Therefore, the polygraph and brain mapping completely absolve the petitioner. 9. Prior to the petitioner being subjected to brain mapping and polygraph test, the Inquiry Committee was constituted by the State of Karnataka to inquire into the alleged malpractice in PGET examination, 2006. The constitution of the Committee is as follows: “In this back drop, Government of Karnataka vide Government Order No.HFW 60 MPS 2006. Bangalore, dated:13-3-2006 constituted a Enquiry Committee consisting of Sri S.T AnjanKumar, K.A.S., Chief Vigilance Officer, Department of Health & Family Welfare Services as Chairman and Dr.(Mrs.)T.Rajeshwari, Pricipal, Bangalore Medical College and Sri Dr.H.R.Mahadev, K.A.S., Chief Administrative Officer, Karnataka Health Systems Development project, Bangalore as members to find out the truth in the allegations of malpractices.” Findings on the petitioner are based upon two witnesses one Dr. Hanumantha Prasad and another Anil Kumar. Their evidence is also a part of the charge sheet. The evidence was tendered before the Inquiry Committee. The only place where the name of the petitioner springs in the evidence is as follows: “Dr. Hukkeri introduced me Dr. Meghala Dwarakanath in his chambers and told me to put up her file immediately, for issuing her Hall-ticket of PGET-06, which I did and that Dr. Hukkeri issued her Hall ticket of PEET-05. My self and Anilkumar decided to take help of prakash-office boy of Anilkumar and of Sadashiv, whose mother was housemaid in my house. On our request these 2 boys i.e., Prakash and Sadashiv ageed to hlep me on 11.2.06, around noon, Dr. Hukkeri gave me a list of 4 candidates and told me that, the said list is list of vice Chancellor Dr. Prabhakaran, After 10 to 15 minutes, there after, vice chancellor Dr. Prabhakaran called upon me through his mobile and gave me a telephone number of one Mr. Sudhakar & told me to contact said sudhakar as said, Sudhakar is having a candidate. An I was busy, I contacted Mr. Prabhakaran, After 10 to 15 minutes, there after, vice chancellor Dr. Prabhakaran called upon me through his mobile and gave me a telephone number of one Mr. Sudhakar & told me to contact said sudhakar as said, Sudhakar is having a candidate. An I was busy, I contacted Mr. Anilkumar and gave him a telephone number of Sudhakar and thereafter, I passed on the list containing names & addresses of 4 candidates, given to me by Dr. Hukkeri to Anilkumar, who intern, picked them up & lodged them with candidate of Sudhakar into UD-Residency where six rooms were already reserved Prakash & Sudhakar. were also taken use of in Hotel UD Residency.” (Emphasis added) Based upon the aforesaid material containing that there was no evidence against the petitioner to file the charge sheet, the petitioner seeks her discharge from the array of accused. The discharge application is turned down by the impugned order dated 27-01-2020. The reason insofar as the petitioner is concerned rendered by the concerned Court can be gathered from paragraphs 86 and 87. They read as follows: “86. As per the opinion of the Scientific expert in the Polygraph examination, the accused No.11 Dr. Bhavani M. Hulinayakar is deceptive in her response and is not truthful in her statement given and have knowledge about the crime under reference. The accused No.7 Dr. Sandeep B.E. is not deceptive in his response and he is truthful in the statement given and does not have the knowledge about the crime under reference. The accused No.16 Dr. Raman M.H. is deceptive in his response and is not truthful in his statement given and has the knowledge about the crime under reference The accused No.12 Dr.Sida Tagore is deceptive in her response and is not truthful in her statement given and has the knowledge about the crime under reference. The accused No.8 Dr. Neha Bansal is deceptive in her response and is not truthful in her statement given and has the knowledge about the crime under reference. The accused No.6 Dr. Mekhala Dwarakanath B. is not deceptive in her response and is truthful in her statement given and does not have knowledge about the crime under reference. The accused No.13 Dr. Babitha R. is deceptive in her response and is not truthful in her statement given and does not have the knowledge about the crime under reference. The accused No.1 Dr. Mekhala Dwarakanath B. is not deceptive in her response and is truthful in her statement given and does not have knowledge about the crime under reference. The accused No.13 Dr. Babitha R. is deceptive in her response and is not truthful in her statement given and does not have the knowledge about the crime under reference. The accused No.1 Dr. P.S. Prabhakaran is deceptive in his response and is not truthful in his statement given and has knowledge about the crime under reference. 87. The accused No.1, 3, 4, 6 to 8 11 to 13 and 16 were subjected to Brain Mapping and as per the report of the said examination, the accused No.1 is indicative and possession of knowledge about the activities listed in the process of Brain Mapping test of accused No.1. Further, the Brain Mapping test of above said other accused persons also indicate the involvement of those accused No.3, 4, 6 to 8 and 11 to 13 and 16 in the alleged incident. Further, during the investigation the Investigation Officer collected the copies of Bank statement in Respect of the account of accused No.13, and the Bank accounts on her father B.M. Ramalingam, mother R. Kamala and sister Anitha R. As per, the statement of Bank account of the father of accused No.13, the amount of Rs.1.75,000/-was withdrawn from the account on 07.02.2006 i.e. about 5 days prior to the date of PGET 2006 and 4 days earlier to the date of alleged conspiracy held on 11.02.2006. As per the Bank account statement of mother of the accused No.13, the amount of Rs.1,50,000/-was withdrawn from the Bank account on 08.02.2006 and the amount of Rs.1,50,000/-was drawn from the account of the accused No.13 on the same day i.e. on 08.02.2006, which was 3 days prior to the date of alleged conspiracy taken place on 11.02.2006. As per the Bank account statement of mother of the accused No.13, the amount of Rs.1,50,000/-was withdrawn from the Bank account on 08.02.2006 and the amount of Rs.1,50,000/-was drawn from the account of the accused No.13 on the same day i.e. on 08.02.2006, which was 3 days prior to the date of alleged conspiracy taken place on 11.02.2006. Further, the statements of the employees of the concerned hotels recorded by the Investigating Officer during the investigation of the case clearly show that some of the candidates of the PGET 2006 who took exam at Bengaluru stayed at the concerned hotel on 11.02.2006 i.e. previous day of the PGET 2006.” (Emphasis added) What shocks the conscience of this Court, is paragraph 87, it is observed that brain mapping test of accused 1, 3, 4, 6 to 8, 11 to 13 and 16 indicate involvement of the petitioner in the alleged incident, while the brain mapping report is completely contrary. The statements recorded in respect of accused No.13 is pitted against the petitioner. 10. Based upon this reasoning that brain mapping test has indicted the petitioner, the discharge application comes to be rejected. Further the concerned Court observes that at this stage it would not be open for the special Court to consider all the material available at the time of discharge and therefore, would reject the discharge application and subject the petitioner to further trial. In the light of discharge application being rejected on the score that the Court at that stage cannot look into the material, it is necessary to notice Section 227 of the CrPC. Section 227 of the Cr.P.C. and its purport: “227. Discharge.—If, upon consideration of the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith, and after hearing the submissions of the accused and the prosecution in this behalf, the Judge considers that there is not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge the accused and record his reasons for so doing.” (Emphasis supplied) Section 227 directs that if, upon consideration of the record of the case and documents submitted therewith and after hearing the submissions of the accused and the prosecution in this behalf, the Judge, considers that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge the accused and record reasons for so doing. The duty of the concerned Court answering an application under Section 227 can by no stretch of imagination be considered to be an empty formality. The words employed in Section 227 of the CrPC are, ‘if upon consideration of the record’. Therefore, the Court has to consider the entire record and the documents appended therewith and after hearing the submissions of the accused and the prosecution, arrive at its decision. Later, if the judge, considers that there are no sufficient grounds for proceeding against the accused, he can discharge the accused. It thus becomes an important step in a proceeding whether the accused, is to be discharged or put to trial. Section 228 of the Cr.P.C. assumes certain significance. Section 228 of Cr.P.C. and its purport: “228. Framing of charge.—(1) If, after such consideration and hearing as aforesaid, the Judge is of opinion that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence which— (a) is not exclusively triable by the Court of Session, he may, frame a charge against the accused and, by order, transfer the case for trial to the Chief Judicial Magistrate, or any other Judicial Magistrate of the first class and direct the accused to appear before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, or, as the case may be, the Judicial Magistrate of the first class, on such date as he deems fit, and thereupon such Magistrate shall try the offence in accordance with the procedure for the trial of warrant-cases instituted on a police report; (b) is exclusively triable by the Court, he shall frame in writing a charge against the accused. (2) Where the Judge frames any charge under clause (b) of sub-section (1), the charge shall be read and explained to the accused, and the accused shall be asked whether he pleads guilty of the offence charged or claims to be tried.” (Emphasis supplied) Section 228 deals with framing of charge. It begins, if after such consideration and hearing as aforesaid, as aforesaid would mean the rigour of Section 227. Only if rigour of Section 227 is satisfied the Judge can proceed on a presumption that the accused have committed the offence and, therefore, proceed to frame the charge. It begins, if after such consideration and hearing as aforesaid, as aforesaid would mean the rigour of Section 227. Only if rigour of Section 227 is satisfied the Judge can proceed on a presumption that the accused have committed the offence and, therefore, proceed to frame the charge. It thus becomes a duty cast upon the concerned court hearing the discharge application to treat an application for discharge with all seriousness, as the Damocles sword hanging on the head of an accused can neither be taken away nor charge can be framed on the said accused. Not for nothing the provision casts a duty upon the concerned Court to answer an application for discharge. It thus has tremendous significance, in the stage of criminal proceedings. 11. In the aforesaid circumstance it becomes apposite to refer to the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of KANCHAN KUMAR v. STATE OF BIHAR wherein it is held as follows: “……. ……. ……. …….” “11. The short question arising for consideration is whether the appellant is entitled to be discharged of the proceedings initiated against him under the PC Act. 12. Section 227 CrPC relating to discharge is as under: “227. Discharge.—If, upon consideration of the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith, and after hearing the submissions of the accused and the prosecution in this behalf, the Judge considers that there is not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge the accused and record his reasons for so doing.” 13. The threshold of scrutiny required to adjudicate an application under Section 227CrPC, is to consider the broad probabilities of the case and the total effect of the material on record, including examination of any infirmities appearing in the case. In Prafulla Kumar Samal [Union of India v. Prafulla Kumar Samal, (1979) 3 SCC 4 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 609] it was noted that : (SCC p. 9, para 10) “10. Thus, on a consideration of the authorities mentioned above, the following principles emerge: (1) That the Judge while considering the question of framing the charges under Section 227 of the Code has the undoubted power to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the accused has been made out. (2) Where the materials placed before the Court disclose grave suspicion against the accused which has not been properly explained the Court will be fully justified in framing a charge and proceeding with the trial. (3) The test to determine a prima facie case would naturally depend upon the facts of each case and it is difficult to lay down a rule of universal application. By and large however if two views are equally possible and the Judge is satisfied that the evidence produced before him while giving rise to some suspicion but not grave suspicion against the accused, he will be fully within his right to discharge the accused. (4) That in exercising his jurisdiction under Section 227 of the Code the Judge which under the present Code is a senior and experienced court cannot act merely as a Post Office or a mouthpiece of the prosecution, but has to consider the broad probabilities of the case, the total effect of the evidence and the documents produced before the Court, any basic infirmities appearing in the case and so on. This however does not mean that the Judge should make a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if he was conducting a trial.” (emphasis supplied) 14. In Sajjan Kumar v. CBI, (2010) 9 SCC 368 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 1371, the Court cautioned against accepting every document produced by the prosecution on face value, and noted that it was important to sift the evidence produced before the Court. It observed that : (SCC pp. 376-77, para 21) “21. On consideration of the authorities about the scope of Sections 227 and 228 of the Code, the following principles emerge: *** (v) At the time of framing of the charges, the probative value of the material on record cannot be gone into but before framing a charge the court must apply its judicial mind on the material placed on record and must be satisfied that the commission of offence by the accused was possible. (vi) At the stage of Sections 227 and 228, the court is required to evaluate the material and documents on record with a view to find out if the facts emerging therefrom taken at their face value disclose the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence. (vi) At the stage of Sections 227 and 228, the court is required to evaluate the material and documents on record with a view to find out if the facts emerging therefrom taken at their face value disclose the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence. For this limited purpose, sift the evidence as it cannot be expected even at that initial stage to accept all that the prosecution states as gospel truth even if it is opposed to common sense or the broad probabilities of the case.” (emphasis supplied) 15. Summarising the principles on discharge under Section 227CrPC, in Dipakbhai Jagdishchandra Patel v. State of Gujarat, (2019) 16 SCC 547 : (2020) 2 SCC (Cri) 361, this Court recapitulated : (SCC p. 561, para 23) “23. At the stage of framing the charge in accordance with the principles which have been laid down by this Court, what the court is expected to do is, it does not act as a mere post office. The court must indeed sift the material before it. The material to be sifted would be the material which is produced and relied upon by the prosecution. The sifting is not to be meticulous in the sense that the court dons the mantle of the trial Judge hearing arguments after the entire evidence has been adduced after a full-fledged trial and the question is not whether the prosecution has made out the case for the conviction of the accused. All that is required is, the court must be satisfied that with the materials available, a case is made out for the accused to stand trial. A strong suspicion suffices. However, a strong suspicion must be founded on some material. The material must be such as can be translated into evidence at the stage of trial. The strong suspicion cannot be the pure subjective satisfaction based on the moral notions of the Judge that here is a case where it is possible that the accused has committed the offence. Strong suspicion must be the suspicion which is premised on some material which commends itself to the court as sufficient to entertain the prima facie view that the accused has committed the offence.” (emphasis supplied) 16. Without getting into too many details, we consider it to be appropriate and in fact sufficient to confine our inquiry to three heads of expenditure indicated in the charge-sheet itself. Without getting into too many details, we consider it to be appropriate and in fact sufficient to confine our inquiry to three heads of expenditure indicated in the charge-sheet itself. This limited inquiry will also satisfy the requirements of Section 227CrPC. 17. The first objection pertains to the inclusion of an amount of Rs 55,000, recorded as the balance amount in the appellant's bank account during the check period, and accordingly counted as an expenditure in the charge-sheet. However, the bank passbook filed by the appellant, which was available to the investigating officer and the Special Judge (Vigilance), evidently records a balance amount of only Rs 11,998 during the check period. The difference in the figures was not explained by the prosecution. Accordingly, the Special Judge (Vigilance) and the High Court failed to reconcile such a simple and straightforward inconsistency in the prosecution's evidence. We are of the opinion that only an amount of Rs 11,998, recorded in the appellant's bank passbook during the check period as the balance amount, is validly admissible as expenditure under this head. 18. The second objection relates to the inclusion of an amount of Rs 53,467 as expenditure towards repayment of the loan from BSFC. However, the amount repaid towards loan instalments was already deducted from the appellant's gross salary, and the deducted figure was recorded as the total disposable income with the appellant during the check period. Hence, the loan repayment cannot be separately counted as an expenditure yet again. This is a glaring mistake. The Special Judge (Vigilance) as well as the High Court did not consider this objection on the ground that a roving inquiry is not permissible at the stage of discharge. 19. The third objection relates to the inclusion of Rs 1,58,562 as the value of the articles found during a search conducted in the appellant's house on 21-2-2000, twelve years after the check period of 1974 to 1988. There is nothing to indicate, even prima facie, that these articles found during the search in the year 2000 were acquired during the check period. In the absence of any material to link these articles as having been acquired during the check period, it is impermissible to include their value in the expenditure. We are therefore of the opinion that the appellant's objection about inclusion of this amount in the list of expenditure is fully justified. In the absence of any material to link these articles as having been acquired during the check period, it is impermissible to include their value in the expenditure. We are therefore of the opinion that the appellant's objection about inclusion of this amount in the list of expenditure is fully justified. Unfortunately, even this objection, which did not require much scrutiny of the material on record, was not considered by the Special Judge (Vigilance) or the High Court. 20. The three heads of expenditure discussed hereinabove must be excluded from the appellant's total alleged expenditure during the check period. First, the appellant's actual balance amount reflected in the bank passbook i.e. Rs 11,998, as against the purported account balance of Rs 55,000, must be taken into account. Further, the second and third amounts, as indicated above, must be excluded from the appellant's total expenditure mentioned in the charge-sheet. Accordingly, the total expenditure comes only to Rs 2,69,355, and not Rs 5,24,386, which is based on certain mistakes that we have indicated hereinabove. It is this expenditure of Rs 2,69,355 which is to be contrasted with the income of Rs 3,01,561 during the check period. These facts clearly demonstrate that there is no prima facie case made out by the prosecution and therefore the appellant was entitled to be discharged. 21. The conclusions that we have drawn are based on materials placed before us, which are part of the case record. This is the same record that was available with the Special Judge (Vigilance) when the application under Section 227 CrPC was taken up. Despite that, the Special Judge (Vigilance) dismissed the discharge application on the simple ground that a roving inquiry is not permitted at the stage of discharge. What we have undertaken is not a roving inquiry, but a simple and necessary inquiry for a proper adjudication of an application for discharge. The Special Judge (Vigilance) was bound to conduct a similar inquiry for coming to a conclusion that a prima facie case is made out for the appellant to stand trial. Unfortunately, the High Court committed the same mistake as that of the Special Judge (Vigilance).” (Emphasis supplied) The conclusions drawn by the Apex Court is that they have not undertaken any rowing enquiry. They are considering the very same record that was available with the concerned Court answering an application under Section 227 of the CrPC. Unfortunately, the High Court committed the same mistake as that of the Special Judge (Vigilance).” (Emphasis supplied) The conclusions drawn by the Apex Court is that they have not undertaken any rowing enquiry. They are considering the very same record that was available with the concerned Court answering an application under Section 227 of the CrPC. The Court observes that both the concerned Court and the High Court unfortunately committed the same mistake of not examining any material. 12. The question would be whether in answering a revision against rejection of an order of discharge this Court can look into all the material. The Apex Court in the case of SANJAY KUMAR RAI v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH has held that in exercise of revisional power the High Court should look into the material which has led to rejection of discharge. The Apex Court holds as follows: “……. …….. ……… …… 13. At the outset, we may note that the High Court has dismissed the Criminal Revision on the ground of lack of jurisdiction under Section 397 of Cr.P.C. The High Court did not examine the issue in detail to find out whether the continuation of proceedings will amount to abuse of process of law in this case. The impugned order cites the decision of this Court in Asian Resurfacing (supra) wherein it was noted as under:— “…Thus, we declare the law to be that order framing charge is not purely an interlocutory order nor a final order. Jurisdiction of the High Court is not barred irrespective of the label of a petition, be it under Sections 397 or 482 CrPC or Article 227 of the Constitution. However, the said jurisdiction is to be exercised consistent with the legislative policy to ensure expeditious disposal of a trial without the same being in any manner hampered. Thus considered, the challenge to an order of charge should be entertained in a rarest of rare case only to correct a patent error of jurisdiction and not to re-appreciate the matter.” 14. It appears to us that while limiting the scope of a criminal revision to jurisdictional errors alone, the High Court apparently under-appreciated the Judgment in Asian Resurfacing (supra). We say so at least for two reasons. First, the material facts in the above-cited case dealt with a challenge to the charges framed under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (“POCA”). It appears to us that while limiting the scope of a criminal revision to jurisdictional errors alone, the High Court apparently under-appreciated the Judgment in Asian Resurfacing (supra). We say so at least for two reasons. First, the material facts in the above-cited case dealt with a challenge to the charges framed under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (“POCA”). The cited judgment itself enlightens that not only is POCA a special legislation, but also contains a specific bar under Section 19 against routine exercise of revisional jurisdiction. Second, This Court in Asian Resurfacing (Supra) while expressing concern regarding the need to tackle rampant pendency and delays in our criminal law system, followed the ratio laid down in an earlier decision in Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra as can be seen from the following extract: “27. Thus, even though in dealing with different situations, seemingly conflicting observations may have been made while holding that the order framing charge was interlocutory order and was not liable to be interfered with under Section 397(2) or even under Section 482 CrPC, the principle laid down in Madhu Limaye [Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra, (1977) 4 SCC 551 : 1978 SCC (Cri) 10] still holds the field. Order framing charge may not be held to be purely an interlocutory order and can in a given situation be interfered with under Section 397(2) CrPC or 482 CrPC or Article 227 of the Constitution which is a constitutional provision but the power of the High Court to interfere with an order framing charge and to grant stay is to be exercised only in a exceptional situation.” (emphasis supplied) 15. In Madhu Limaye (supra), this Court authoritatively held: “9… Sometimes the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court has also been resorted to for the same kind of relief by challenging the order taking cognizance or issuing processes or framing charge on the grounds that the Court had no jurisdiction to take cognizance and proceed with the trial, that the issuance of process was wholly illegal or void, or that no charge could be framed as no offence was made out on the allegations made or the evidence adduced in Court. 10. 10. … Even assuming, although we shall presently show that it is not so, that in such a case an order of the Court taking cognizance or issuing processes is an interlocutory order, does it stand to reason to say that inherent power of the High Court cannot be exercises for stopping the criminal proceeding as early as possible, instead of harassing the accused up to the end? The answer is obvious that the bar will not operate to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court and/or to secure the ends of justice. The label of the petition filed by an aggrieved party is immaterial. (emphasis supplied) 16. The correct position of law as laid down in Madhu Limaye (supra), thus, is that orders framing charges or refusing discharge are neither interlocutory nor final in nature and are therefore not affected by the bar of Section 397 (2) of CrPC. That apart, this Court in the above-cited cases has unequivocally acknowledged that the High Court is imbued with inherent jurisdiction to prevent abuse of process or to secure ends of justice having regard to the facts and circumstance of individual cases. As a caveat it may be stated that the High Court, while exercising its afore-stated jurisdiction ought to be circumspect. The discretion vested in the High Court is to be invoked carefully and judiciously for effective and timely administration of criminal justice system. This Court, nonetheless, does not recommend a complete hands off approach. Albeit, there should be interference, may be, in exceptional cases, failing which there is likelihood of serious prejudice to the rights of a citizen. For example, when the contents of a complaint or the other purported material on record is a brazen attempt to persecute an innocent person, it becomes imperative upon the Court to prevent the abuse of process of law. 17. Further, it is well settled that the trial court while considering the discharge application is not to act as a mere post office. The Court has to sift through the evidence in order to find out whether there are sufficient grounds to try the suspect. The court has to consider the broad probabilities, total effect of evidence and documents produced and the basic infirmities appearing in the case and so on. [Union of India v. Prafulla Kumar Samal]. The Court has to sift through the evidence in order to find out whether there are sufficient grounds to try the suspect. The court has to consider the broad probabilities, total effect of evidence and documents produced and the basic infirmities appearing in the case and so on. [Union of India v. Prafulla Kumar Samal]. Likewise, the Court has sufficient discretion to order further investigation in appropriate cases, if need be. 18. This brings us to the present case wherein the High Court has not gone into the merits of the case and did not analyze the case in light of the settled law referred to above. 19. The High Court has committed jurisdictional error by not entertaining the revision petition on merits and overlooking the fact that ‘discharge’ is a valuable right provided to the accused. In line with the fact that the High Court and the court below have not examined the fairness of criminal investigation in this case and other related aspects concerning improvement of witness statements, it is necessary for the High Court to reconsider the entire matter and decide the revision petition afresh. Accordingly, we set aside the impugned order dated 28.11.2018 and remand the case back to the High Court for its reconsideration in accordance with law.” (Emphasis supplied) The Apex Court observes that the High Court had committed a jurisdictional error by not entertaining the revision petition on merits and overlooking the effect that discharge is an available right provided to the accused. The Apex Court further observes that the trial Court while considering the discharge application cannot act as a ‘mere post office’. The Court has to sift through the evidence in order to find out whether there are sufficient grounds to try the suspect. The Court has to consider broad probabilities, total effect of evidence and if the trial Court fails, the High Court should consider it. 13. In the light of the judgments of the Apex Court in KANCHAN KUMAR and SANJAY KUMAR RAI (supra) what becomes unmistakably clear is that the trial Court has a duty cast upon it to consider the discharge application on its merits by looking into the entire records till that stage. I would deem it appropriate to add the fact that rejection of discharge leads to framing of charge under Section 226 of the CrPC. I would deem it appropriate to add the fact that rejection of discharge leads to framing of charge under Section 226 of the CrPC. Therefore, it becomes all the more pivotal for the trial Court to consider the application for discharge, consider whether there are sufficient grounds to frame the charge, against the accused and not act as a ‘mere post office’. 14. If the facts obtaining in the case at hand, as narrated hereinabove, are considered on the bedrock of the principles considered by the Apex Court, the petitioner ought to have been discharged from the array of accused, as the records would speak for themselves. All together would lead to unmistakable conclusion that the petitioner cannot be held guilty of any offence. 15. The issue whether this Court should consider these documents at the stage of revision is no longer res integra as the Apex Court in the case of RUKMINI NARVEKAR v. VIJAYA SATARDEKAR AND OTHERS, (2008) 14 SCC 1 has held as follows: “27. There shall be no order as to costs. ALTAMAS KABIR, J. (concurring)— I have carefully gone through the draft judgment prepared by my learned Brother and though I agree with his interpretation of the provisions of Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as “CrPC”), and wish to express my own views in the matter. 29. Section 227 CrPC, which is in Chapter XVIII of the Code, which deals with trials before a Court of Session, relates to the opening stages of a trial at the time of framing of charge against the accused which is done under Section 228. Section 227 which is relevant for our purpose provides as follows: “227. Discharge.—If, upon consideration of the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith, and after hearing the submissions of the accused and the prosecution in this behalf, the Judge considers that there is not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge the accused and record his reasons for so doing.” 30. The aforesaid provision has fallen for consideration of this Court in several cases on the question as to whether at the stage of framing of charge, the court in seisin of the matter is required to consider any material, other than that indicated in the section. 31. The aforesaid provision has fallen for consideration of this Court in several cases on the question as to whether at the stage of framing of charge, the court in seisin of the matter is required to consider any material, other than that indicated in the section. 31. In the three-Judge Bench decision of this Court in State of Orissa v. Debendra Nath Padhi [ (2005) 1 SCC 568 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 415] to which my learned Brother has also referred, it has been mentioned as to how the matter came to be referred to the larger Bench. Till 1996, the consistent view which had been taken by this Court is that at the time of framing of charge the trial court can consider only such materials as are placed by the investigating agency having regard to the very language of Section 227. At that stage, the defence could only be heard but could not be given an opportunity to produce evidence for the consideration of the court. However, a different view was expressed by a two-Judge Bench of this Court in Satish Mehra v. Delhi Admn. [ (1996) 9 SCC 766 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 1104] The learned Judges observed that if the accused were able to produce any reliable material at the stage of taking cognizance or framing of charge which might fatally affect the very sustainability of the case, it is unjust to suggest that no such material should be looked into by the court at that stage. It was, therefore, held that the trial court would be within its power to consider even material which the accused may produce at the stage contemplated in Section 227 of the Code. It was because of a discordant note being struck to an otherwise established principle in Satish Mehra case [ (1996) 9 SCC 766 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 1104] that in Debendra Nath Padhi case [ (2005) 1 SCC 568 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 415] an order was passed referring the said question to a larger Bench and the same was taken up for consideration in the said case itself by a three-Judge Bench. 32. 32. While referring to Sections 227 and 228 CrPC relating to sessions triable cases, the three-Judge Bench (in Debendra Nath Padhi case [ (2005) 1 SCC 568 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 415] ) also considered the provisions of Sections 239 and 240 CrPC relating to trial of warrant cases by Magistrates, which are almost identical to Sections 227 and 228 CrPC. The decision rendered in Debendra Nath Padhi case [ (2005) 1 SCC 568 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 415] makes it very clear that the dominant issue being dealt with in the case was with regard to the right enjoyed by an accused to produce evidence for the consideration of the court at the stage of framing of charge. 33. Interpreting the expression “the record of the case” and the word “case” used in Section 227 of the Code, the learned Judges held that the said expressions clearly meant the records and the documents or articles produced with it, as indicated in Section 227 CrPC. It was observed that no provision in the Code gives the accused the right to file any material or document at the stage of framing of charge. The right is only granted at the stage of the trial. 34. The learned Judges then went on to examine the earlier cases where the common view taken was that at the stage of Sections 227 and 228 of the Code all that the court is required to see is whether there is sufficient ground for conviction of the accused or whether the trial is sure to end in his conviction. The learned Judge while considering the other decision also referred to the decision of this Court in State Anti-Corruption Bureau v. P. Suryaprakasam [1999 SCC (Cri) 373 : subsequently reported at (2008) 14 SCC 1 3] , wherein it was explained that at the time of framing of charge, the trial court is required to and can only consider the police report referred to in Section 173 of the Code and the documents sent with it. It was emphasised that the only right available to the accused at that stage was that of being heard and nothing beyond that. 35. It was emphasised that the only right available to the accused at that stage was that of being heard and nothing beyond that. 35. In order to identify the parameters of the questions referred to it, the larger Bench observed that in the case before it the question involved was not about the jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code where along with the petition the accused may file unimpeachable evidence of sterling quality and on that basis seek quashing, but it is about the right claimed by the accused to produce material at the stage of framing charge. The larger Bench was, therefore, fully conscious of the limits within which it was required to confine its views and the judgment was rendered in that context. The same will be evident from the opening paragraph of the judgment. 36. While deciding the questions referred to it, the larger Bench made a conscious distinction between a proceeding under Section 227 CrPC before the trial court and a proceeding under Section 482 CrPC and made a reference to the court's power to consider material other than those produced by the prosecution in a proceeding under Section 482 CrPC. It is in that context that while holding that the decision rendered in Satish Mehra case [ (1996) 9 SCC 766 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 1104] was erroneous, the larger Bench held that if the submission that the accused would be entitled to produce materials and documents in proof of his innocence at the stage of framing of charge, was to be accepted, it would be unsettling a law well settled over a hundred years. It is in that light that the provisions of Section 227 CrPC would have to be understood and that it only means hearing the submissions of the accused on the records of the case filed by the prosecution and documents submitted therewith and nothing more. The larger Bench arrived at a definite conclusion that the expression “hearing the submissions of the accused” cannot mean an opportunity to file material to be granted to the accused and thereby changing the settled law. At the stage of framing of charge, hearing the submissions of the accused has to be confined to the material produced by the police. 37. The larger Bench did not leave any scope for a different interpretation of the provisions of Section 227 as is now being made. At the stage of framing of charge, hearing the submissions of the accused has to be confined to the material produced by the police. 37. The larger Bench did not leave any scope for a different interpretation of the provisions of Section 227 as is now being made. Incidentally, the very same arguments which have been advanced by Mr Lalit before us on behalf of the accused, were also advanced by learned counsel before the larger Bench and the same were negated as far as Section 227 CrPC is concerned. However, in paras 21 and 29 of the judgment the larger Bench did indicate that the width of the powers of the High Court under Section 482 CrPC and Article 226 of the Constitution is unlimited whereunder in the interest of justice the High Court could make such order as may be required to secure the ends of justice and to prevent abuse of the process of any court. 38. In my view, therefore, there is no scope for the accused to produce any evidence in support of the submissions made on his behalf at the stage of framing of charge and only such materials as are indicated in Section 227 CrPC can be taken into consideration by the learned Magistrate at that stage. However, in a proceeding taken therefrom under Section 482 CrPC the court is free to consider material that may be produced on behalf of the accused to arrive at a decision whether the charge as framed could be maintained. This, in my view, appears to be the intention of the legislature in wording Sections 227 and 228 the way in which they have been worded and as explained in Debendra Nath Padhi case [ (2005) 1 SCC 568 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 415] by the larger Bench therein to which the very same question had been referred.” (Emphasis supplied) The Court was considering the duty of the trial Court under Section 227 of the CrPC and the documents produced herein could be taken note of by the High Court when it is brought before the High Court as a challenge. Therefore, I have no hesitation to look into the evidence let in, the opinion of the brain mapping test or the polygraph test to hold that there is no material against the petitioner. 16. Therefore, I have no hesitation to look into the evidence let in, the opinion of the brain mapping test or the polygraph test to hold that there is no material against the petitioner. 16. A caveat, a brain mapping test by itself cannot lead to an acquittal of an accused. It is a material that would go against the prosecution and in favour of the accused which has to be corroborated with other evidence. The Apex Court in the case of CAPTAIN MANJITH SINGH VIRDI (supra) was considering the purport, importance and consequences of psychological evaluation test or brain mapping test as the case would be. The Apex Court though set aside the order passed by the High Court in discharging the accused on the ground of brain mapping test, the reason for setting aside was that the High Court had not recorded reasons for any corroborative material. 17. The corroborative material is the evidence of the prosecution witnesses themselves Mr. Anil Kumar and Dr. Hanumantha Prasad, but no where it indicates the role of the petitioner. The petitioner and other accused have been dragged into the web of crime on the score that average student just prior to writing of the entrance examination has become a brilliant student. In fact it is that fact that triggered the entire episode of crime. The petitioner has produced several documents to demonstrate that she has been a good student throughout, secured above average marks and has been a recipient of several encomiums from the Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists of United Kingdom. 18. For all the aforesaid reasons, I deem it appropriate to discharge the petitioner from the array of accused, failing which would result in patent injustice. Hence, I pass the following: ORDER (i) Criminal Revision Petition is allowed. (ii) The order of the XLVII Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge and Special Judge for CBI Cases, Bengaluru rejecting the application under Section 227 of the CrPC in terms of his order dated 27-01-2020 in Special C.C. No.106 of 2008 is quashed insofar as it concerns the petitioner. (iii) The petitioner shall stand discharged from the array of accused in the charge sheet so filed by the CBI in Special C.C.No.106 of 2008.