Amit Kumar Ghosh v. State of Jharkhand through the Secretary, Department of Home, Jail and Disaster Management
2023-09-21
S.N.PATHAK
body2023
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT : Heard the parties. 2. In instant writ petition petitioner has prayed for quashing the order of dismissal passed by the Superintendent of Police, Sahibganj vide order No. 945 dated 25.06.2011 whereby the petitioner has been removed from the post of police constable. Petitioner has further prayed for quashing the order dated 19.01.2016, passed by the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Dumka whereby the appeal preferred by the petitioner against the order of dismissal has been rejected. Petitioner has also prayed for direction upon the respondents to reinstate him in services as for the same set of charges he has been acquitted in criminal trial. 3. The case of the petitioner lies in a narrow compass. Petitioner was initially appointed to the post of Police Constable against Advt. No. 01/2004 in the district of Dhaband and his brass number was 934. The petitioner gave his joining before the respondent-authorities on 04.11.2008. the petitioner was sent for initial training at Deoghar and thereafter posted at Dumka. It is the case of the petitioner that soon after his posting at the district of Dumka, his parents became sick and for looking after them, the petitioner tendered his resignation from the above post vide letter dated 30.09.2009, which was forwarded to the Superintendent of Police, Dhanbad. Few months thereafter, when the health of his parents improved, the petitioner again applied for the post of Police Constable at Sahibganj and selected for the said post. Upon his selection, the petitioner given his joining to the post of Constable at Sahibganj and his brass number was 384. Thereafter, the petitioner was discharging his duties diligently and sincerely. However, to his utter shock and surprise, on an omnibus complaint by some unknown person, a letter dated 10.01.2010 was issued by the Superintendent of Police, Dhanbad to the Superintendent of Police, Sahibganj seeking information with respect to appointment of petitioner to the post of Police Constable at Sahibganj. Subsequently, an FIR being Borio P.S. Case No. 19 of 2010 was also lodged against the petitioner under Sections 467/467/471/420 of IPC. 4.
Subsequently, an FIR being Borio P.S. Case No. 19 of 2010 was also lodged against the petitioner under Sections 467/467/471/420 of IPC. 4. On the basis of aforesaid FIR, a departmental proceeding bearing No. 15/2010 was initiated against the petitioner and vide memo No. 464 dated 27.02.2010, the petitioner was served with a charge-memo alleging therein that the petitioner, while working in the Dhanbad Zila Bal, has got appointed in the Sahebganj Zila Bal without any notice and permission and has withdrawn salary from two districts simultaneously by committing fraud and cheating. The petitioner was asked to submit his explanation to the charges levelled against him within a week. Upon receipt of the said show-cause, the petitioner submitted his reply on 17.05.2010 before the Superintendent of Police, Sahebganj denying each and every charges levelled again him and pleaded himself to be innocent and not guilty. The petitioner against submitted his written statement on 25.10.2010 before the Presiding Officer and reiterated the defence earlier taken by him before the Superintendent of Police, Sahebganj. The Presiding Officer perused the charge-sheet, written statements submitted by the petitioner, the depositions made by the witnesses and the other documents in detailed and observed that on 30.09.2009, the petitioner sent his resignation letter to the Superintendent of Police, Dhanbad through Registered Police. In his resignation letter, petitioner submitted that due to being only son of his old aged parents, it is not possible for him to serve the respondent-Department at Dhanbad. The Presiding Officer further observed that the Superintendent of Police, Dhanbad has already ordered for recovery of the two months’ salary which the petitioner has withdrawn believing to be arrears of his salary. 5. The Presiding Officer, upon perusal of the charge-sheet, written statements of the petitioner, the depositions made by the witnesses and other documents on record, vide his enquiry report dated 27.10.2010 found and concluded that the petitioner is not guilty of the charges levelled against him. Thereafter, the Superintendent of Police, Sahebganj vide memo No. 2026 dated 15.11.2010 issued 2nd show-cause notice to the petitioner to which the petitioner submitted his reply pleading himself to be innocent and not guilty.
Thereafter, the Superintendent of Police, Sahebganj vide memo No. 2026 dated 15.11.2010 issued 2nd show-cause notice to the petitioner to which the petitioner submitted his reply pleading himself to be innocent and not guilty. It is the further case of the petitioner that after submission of enquiry report dated 27.10.2010, a fresh/ de-novo enquiry was initiated against the petitioner for the same set of charges without any rhyme and reason wherein the Presiding Officer found the petitioner guilty of the charges levelled against him and submitted his report dated 02.06.2011. 6. However, to his utter shock and surprise, based on the 2nd enquiry report dated 02.06.2011, the Superintendent of Police, Sahebganj passed order dated 25.06.2011, whereby the services of the petitioner has been terminated. Being aggrieved by the order passed by the Disciplinary Authority, the petitioner preferred an appeal before the Appellate Authority i.e. the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Dumka. However, the said appeal also stood dismissed vide order dated 31.12.2015. 7. It is the further case of the petitioner for the same set of charges an FIR being Borio P.S. Case No. 19/2010 was lodged against the petitioner and this Hon’ble Court vide its order dated 23.10.2018 passed in Cr. Rev. No. 699 of 2017 set aside the judgment dated 23.06.2014, passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge-I, Sahebganj in Cr. App. No. 95/2013 and the judgment of conviction dated 02.08.2013, passed by the learned Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Sahibganj in connection to Borio (Jirwabari) P.S. Case No. 19/2010, corresponding to G.R. Case No. 38/2010 (T.R. No. 81/2013). 8. In view of the above order, the petitioner filed a representation dated 07.02.2019 before the respondent-authorities for reinstatement along with back wages but the same has not been considered by the respondents and hence, the petitioner has been constrained to knock the door of this Court. 9. Mr. Shresth Gautam, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner vociferously argues that the basis of termination of the petitioner is false and suffers from bias as the petitioner has sincerely been discharging his duties without any complaint whatsoever.
9. Mr. Shresth Gautam, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner vociferously argues that the basis of termination of the petitioner is false and suffers from bias as the petitioner has sincerely been discharging his duties without any complaint whatsoever. The disciplinary authority and the appellate authority had failed to note the fact that the Hon’ble High Court in its order had appreciated that petitioner had already tendered his resignation from the post of Police Constable Dhanbad prior to joining his new assignment as Police Constable Sahebganj and the resignation was sent under certificate of posting. The Hon’ble High Court had also appreciated the fact that not a single penny has been withdrawn by the petitioner from Dhanbad therefore, it was never the intention of the petitioner to accept the salary from two places. Thus, there is no dereliction of duty on the part of the petitioner and he had acted bonafidely in tendering his resignation at Dhanbad and thereafter joining his new assignment at Sahibganj. Learned counsel further argues that petitioner was not given proper opportunity of hearing as he was in judicial custody and as such, impugned orders are not tenable in the eyes of law. Learned counsel further argues that the Disciplinary Authority without assigning any reason for differing with the 1st enquiry report, had ordered for a fresh/ de-novo enquiry for the same set of charges, which is not permissible in the eyes of law. 10. Per contra, counter-affidavit has been filed. Learned counsel appearing for the respondents vehemently opposes the contention of learned counsel for the petitioner and submits that initially the petitioner was appointed as Police Constable at Zila Bal Dhanbad and thereafter, again he was appointed as Constable at Zila Bal Sahebganj without submitted his resignation from the post of Constable at Zila Bal Dhanbad and after proper enquiry it was found that he has cheated the Police Department and withdrawn salary from two places. Such action of the petitioner amounts to indiscipline and dereliction of duties which is not acceptable from a Police Personnel. The petitioner was found guilty of charges in the departmental proceeding and upon being satisfied with the enquiry report, the Disciplinary Authority passed the order of dismissal which was later on affirmed by the Appellate Authority also. Hence, the writ petition is not maintainable in the eyes of law as well as on facts and circumstances of the case.
The petitioner was found guilty of charges in the departmental proceeding and upon being satisfied with the enquiry report, the Disciplinary Authority passed the order of dismissal which was later on affirmed by the Appellate Authority also. Hence, the writ petition is not maintainable in the eyes of law as well as on facts and circumstances of the case. In reply to the arguments advanced by learned counsel for the petitioner that without assigning any reason a fresh/ de-novo enquiry was conducted, learned counsel further respondents submits that as some query has been left by the Conducting Officer, hence, the respondents have enquired the matter by appointing new Conducting Officer, who after proper enquiry submitted his report holding the petitioner guilty of the charges. 11. Be that as it may, on a consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case as also the submissions made across the bar, this Court is of the considered view that the case of the petitioner needs consideration. The impugned orders are not tenable in the eyes of law and are fit to be quashed and set for the following facts and reasons: (I) The disciplinary authority has differed from the findings of the 1st Enquiry Officer without issuance of any show-cause notice to the petitioner and without assigning any reasons (II) The appellate authority passed the impugned order in mechanical manner without applying his own mind and without assigning reasons for affirming the order of the disciplinary authority. (III) There was no occasion for conducting a de-novo/ fresh enquiry without assigning any reason for differing with the 1st enquiry report, the disciplinary authority had ordered for 2nd enquiry, which is impermissible in the eyes of law, as after differing with enquiry report and following the principle of natural justice, a further enquiry could have been initiated and not a fresh enquiry. (IV) In view of the specific observations made by this Court in Cr. Rev. No. 699 of 2017, it is crystal clear that there was no loss to the State Exchequer as before joining his new assignment at Sahebganj, the petitioner has already tendered his resignation from his initial place of appointment at Dhanbad district and had not taken any salary from there after tendering his resignation. (V) There has been complete violation of the principle of audi alteram partem. (VI) Even in the criminal case Cr. Rev.
(V) There has been complete violation of the principle of audi alteram partem. (VI) Even in the criminal case Cr. Rev. No. 699 of 2017, this Court has been pleased to acquit the petitioner from the charges levelled which are identical to the charges levelled in the departmental proceeding. Though different yardsticks are there but since on identical charges, the petitioner has been acquitted in criminal case, the same carries weight and in that view of the matter also the punishment of dismissal is not warranted. 12. Law is well settled and the Hon'ble Apex Court in case of Managing Director, ECIL v. B. Karunakar, reported in (1993) 4 SCC 727 has held as under: “26. The reason why the right to receive the report of the enquiry officer is considered an essential part of the reasonable opportunity at the first stage and also a principle of natural justice is that the findings recorded by the enquiry officer form an important material before the disciplinary authority which along with the evidence is taken into consideration by it to come to its conclusions. It is difficult to say in advance, to what extent the said findings including the punishment, if any, recommended in the report would influence the disciplinary authority while drawing its conclusions. The findings further might have been recorded without considering the relevant evidence on record, or by misconstruing it or unsupported by it. If such a finding is to be one of the documents to be considered by the disciplinary authority, the principles of natural justice require that the employee should have a fair opportunity to meet, explain and controvert it before he is condemned. It is negation of the tenets of justice and a denial of fair opportunity to the employee to consider the findings recorded by a third party like the enquiry officer without giving the employee an opportunity to reply to it. Although it is true that the disciplinary authority is supposed to arrive at its own findings on the basis of the evidence recorded in the inquiry, it is also equally true that the disciplinary authority takes into consideration the findings recorded by the enquiry officer along with the evidence on record. In the circumstances, the findings of the enquiry officer do constitute an important material before the disciplinary authority which is likely to influence its conclusions.
In the circumstances, the findings of the enquiry officer do constitute an important material before the disciplinary authority which is likely to influence its conclusions. If the enquiry officer were only to record the evidence and forward the same to the disciplinary authority, that would not constitute any additional material before the disciplinary authority of which the delinquent employee has no knowledge. However, when the enquiry officer goes further and records his findings, as stated above, which may or may not be based on the evidence on record or are contrary to the same or in ignorance of it, such findings are an additional material unknown to the employee but are taken into consideration by the disciplinary authority while arriving at its conclusions. Both the dictates of the reasonable opportunity as well as the principles of natural justice, therefore, require that before the disciplinary authority comes to its own conclusions, the delinquent employee should have an opportunity to reply to the enquiry officer's findings. The disciplinary authority is then required to consider the evidence, the report of the enquiry officer and the representation of the employee against it.” Further, the Hon'ble Apex Court in case of K.R. Dev v. The Controller of Central Excise, Shillong, reported in (1971) 2 SCC 102 , has held that: “In case of some defect in the enquiry conducted by the Enquiry Officer, the disciplinary authority can direct the Enquiry Officer to conduct further enquiry in respect of the matter, but it cannot direct a fresh enquiry to be conducted by some other officer.” The Hon'ble Apex Court in case of Punjab National Bank v. Kunj Behari Misra, reported in (1998) 7 SCC 84 , has held that:— “Whenever the disciplinary authority disagrees with the enquiring authority on any article of charge then before it records its findings on such charge, it must record its tentative reasons for such disagreement and give to the delinquent officer an opportunity to represent before it records its findings. The report of the enquiry office containing its findings will have to be conveyed and the delinquent office will have an opportunity to persuade the disciplinary authority to accept the favourable conclusion of the enquiry officer.
The report of the enquiry office containing its findings will have to be conveyed and the delinquent office will have an opportunity to persuade the disciplinary authority to accept the favourable conclusion of the enquiry officer. The principles of natural justice require the authority which has to take a final decision and can impose a penalty, to give an opportunity to the officer charged of misconduct to file a representation before the disciplinary authority records its findings on the charges framed against the officer.” Further in paras-17 & 19 of the judgment passed in case Punjab National Bank v. Kunj Behari Misra (supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that:— “17. These observations are clearly in tune with the observations in Bimal Kumar Pandit case quoted earlier and would be applicable at the first stage itself. The aforesaid passages clearly bring out the necessity of the authority which is to finally record an adverse finding to give a hearing to the delinquent officer. If the enquiry officer had given an adverse finding, as per Karunakar case the first stage required an opportunity to be given to the employee to represent to the disciplinary authority, even when an earlier opportunity had been granted to them by the enquiry officer. It will not stand to reason that when the finding in favour of the delinquent officers is proposed to be overturned by the disciplinary authority then no opportunity should be granted. The first stage of the enquiry is not completed till the disciplinary authority has recorded its findings. The principles of natural justice would demand that the authority which proposes to decide against the delinquent officer must give him a hearing. When the enquiring officer holds the charges to be proved, then that report has to be given to the delinquent officer who can make a representation before the disciplinary authority takes further action which may be prejudicial to the delinquent officer. When, like in the present case, the enquiry report is in favour of the delinquent officer but the disciplinary authority proposes to differ with such conclusions, then that authority which is deciding against the delinquent officer must give him an opportunity of being heard for otherwise he would be condemned unheard. In departmental proceedings, what is of ultimate importance is the finding of the disciplinary authority. ………….. 19.
In departmental proceedings, what is of ultimate importance is the finding of the disciplinary authority. ………….. 19. The result of the aforesaid discussion would be that the principles of natural justice have to be read into Regulation 7(2). As a result thereof, whenever the disciplinary authority disagrees with the enquiry authority on any article of charge, then before it records its own findings on such charge, it must record its tentative reasons for such disagreement and give to the delinquent officer an opportunity to represent before it records its findings. The report of the enquiry officer containing its findings will have to be conveyed and the delinquent officer will have an opportunity to persuade the disciplinary authority to accept the favourable conclusion of the enquiry officer. The principles of natural justice, as we have already observed, require the authority which has to take a final decision and can impose a penalty, to give an opportunity to the officer charged of misconduct to file a representation before the disciplinary authority records its findings on the charges framed against the officer.” 13. The same view as reiterated by this Court in case of Birju Prasad Vs. State of Jharkhand & Ors., reported in 2020 SCC Online Jhar. 1676 and in case of Madhurendra Kumar Singh Vs. State of Jharkhand & Ors., reported in 2019 SCC Online Jhar. 2964. 14. In the case in hand, the Enquiry Officer was changed without assigning any reason and a fresh enquiry was held, holding the petitioner guilty of the charges. 15. As a cumulative effect of the aforesaid rules, guidelines, judicial pronouncements and legal propositions, this Court is of the view that the impugned of punishment dated 25.06.2011 and appellate order dated 19.01.2016 are not tenable in the eyes of law and as such, the same are hereby quashed and set aside. The respondents are directed to reinstate the petitioner with all consequential benefits from the date the petitioner was legally entitled for the same, within a period of four weeks from the date of receipt/production of a copy of this order. As nothing has been brought on record to show that petitioner was gainfully employed or not, in absence of said averments, petitioner is entitled for 25% back wages only. 16. Resultantly, the writ petition stands allowed.