JUDGMENT : (J.J. Munir, J.) 1. This is a claimants' appeal arising out of a judgment and award of Mr. S.C. Bose, District Judge of Allahabad, sitting as the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, dated 6th January, 2003 passed in Motor Accident Claims Petition No.410 of 1999. The claimants seek enhancement of the compensation awarded. 2. Smt. Gulshan Bano, the deceased, was travelling on board Jeep No. UP-70N-7479 on 13.04.1999. At about 7:30 p.m., near a certain Village Gansiari within the local limits of Police Station Mau Aima, District Allahabad (now Prayagraj), a Bus bearing registration No. UGH-471, owned by the Uttar Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation (for short, 'the UPSRTC'), that was proceeding from Allahabad to Ayodhya, hit the Jeep. In consequence of the accident, Smt. Gulshan Bano sustained injuries, leading to her death. The Jeep aforesaid, whereon Gulshan Bano was travelling, was owned by one Alok Pandey and insured with the Oriental Insurance Company, Allahabad. The claimants are three in number, to wit, Abdul Khaliq aged about 45 years, an uncle of the deceased, Smt. Hamidunnisha aged about 40 years, the deceased's mother and Shaista, the deceased's minor daughter, aged about 8 months. They shall hereinafter be called 'the claimants', unless the context otherwise requires. It appears that the deceased was a divorcee and there is no claim laid on behalf of her husband. 3. It is the claimants' case that the deceased was a woman, who stayed home and did productive work of stitching etc., that yielded her an income of Rs.5000/-per month. All the claimants were dependent upon the deceased's income. The claimants have, therefore, demanded a compensation in the sum of Rs.10,00,000/-. 4. A separate written statement each was filed on behalf of the UPSRTC, the owner of the ill-fated Jeep, Alok Pandey and on behalf of the Oriental Insurance Company, who are the Insurers of the ill-fated Jeep. The owner of the Jeep and the Insurers shall hereinafter referred to as 'the owner' and 'the Insurers'. 5. The UPSRTC broadly took a stand that the accident happened on account of the Jeep driver's negligence, whereas the owner took the stand that the accident occurred due to the rash and negligent driving by the Bus driver. It was also urged that on the date of accident, the ill-fated Jeep was validly insured with the Insurers. 5. The UPSRTC broadly took a stand that the accident happened on account of the Jeep driver's negligence, whereas the owner took the stand that the accident occurred due to the rash and negligent driving by the Bus driver. It was also urged that on the date of accident, the ill-fated Jeep was validly insured with the Insurers. The Insurers did a wholesome and inconsistent denial of everything that was urged to hold them liable. They denied insuring the ill-fated Jeep, the accident between the UPSRTC Bus and the ill-fated Jeep, and also the fact that the driver held a valid driving licence. In substance, the Insurers denied their liability to indemnify the owner of the Jeep regarding any liability, that might be apportioned to him. 6. On the pleadings of parties, the following issues were framed (translated into English from Hindi): “1. Whether on 13.04.1999, at about 7:30 in the evening hours, the alleged accident happened on account of rash and negligent driving of Jeep No. UP-70N-7479? 2. Whether the alleged accident, involving Jeep No. UP-70N-7479 and Bus No. UGH-471, happened due to the contributory negligence of both the vehicles? If yes, which vehicle is at fault and to what extent? 3. Whether Jeep No. UP-70N-7479 is owned by Alok Pandey and on the date of accident, it was insured with the Oriental Insurance Company? 4. Whether on the date of the accident, the driver had a valid driving licence? 5. Whether Jeep No. UP-70N-7479 was being operated in accordance with law, rules and its registration? 6. Whether the claimants are entitled to compensation? If yes, how much and from which of the parties? 7. To what relief are the claimants entitled?” 7. The Tribunal dealt with Issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and held that both the Bus and the ill-fated Jeep had an equal share of contributory negligence in the accident. Issue No.3 was answered in favour of the owner holding that the ill-fated Jeep was owned by him and validly insured with the Insurers. This issue was answered in this manner by the Tribunal on the Insurers’ admission. Issue No.5 was decided in the manner that the ill-fated Jeep was registered in the owner's name as a vehicle for personal use. There is a further finding that on the date of accident, the ill-fated Jeep was being used to carry passengers. This issue was answered in this manner by the Tribunal on the Insurers’ admission. Issue No.5 was decided in the manner that the ill-fated Jeep was registered in the owner's name as a vehicle for personal use. There is a further finding that on the date of accident, the ill-fated Jeep was being used to carry passengers. It was, therefore, held on this issue in conclusion that the ill-fated Jeep was not being operated in accordance with its registered use. In answering Issue No.4, the Tribunal held that according to the evidence on record, the driver of the ill-fated Jeep, Shiv Shankar had a valid driving licence with him, which was valid for driving a private vehicle alone. The licence was not endorsed for driving a commercial vehicle carrying passengers. Issues Nos.6 and 7 were taken up together. The claimants were held entitled to compensation on account of Gulshan Bano's death. 8. A finding was returned that her husband had not presented any claim and there was an affidavit to show that the deceased's husband had divorced her. The deceased's income, that was claimed from her exertions that she did privately doing stitching jobs etc., was not accepted by the Tribunal. There is a remark that the fact that the deceased's had an income of Rs.5000/-per month, has not been traversed on behalf of the owner, the UPSRTC and the Insurers. It has also been noticed that there is nothing on record to show the deceased's age. 9. It has been remarked that the deceased being a divorcee, it is believable that she would be working to earn a livelihood for herself. Despite these remarks, the deceased's income as claimed, or for that matter any substantial income has been discounted. The Tribunal has held for the deceased a minimum income of Rs.15,000/-a year. On that basis, the Tribunal has determined the compensation payable to the claimants. One-third of the deceased's income has been deducted towards her personal and living expenses. The deceased's age has been opined to be 22 years given the fact that it was claimed to be 22 years and in the autopsy report, it was determined as 21 years. The Tribunal has applied a multiplier of 17' to arrive at a substantive compensation of Rs.1,70,000/-. Nothing else has been awarded, except 10% simple interest from the date of institution of the claim petition until realization. 10. The Tribunal has applied a multiplier of 17' to arrive at a substantive compensation of Rs.1,70,000/-. Nothing else has been awarded, except 10% simple interest from the date of institution of the claim petition until realization. 10. Heard Mr. Sharve Singh, learned Counsel for the claimants, Mr. Siddharth Jaiswal, Advocate holding brief of Mr. Ashok Kumar Jaiswal, learned Counsel for the Insurers and Mr. Sunil Kumar Mishra, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the UPSRTC. No one appeared on behalf of the owner, though the name of Ms. Seema Misra, Advocate is printed in the cause list. 11. It is argued by the learned Counsel for the claimants that the principle of contributory negligence in this case is not applicable, because it is a case of composite negligence. The claimants are free to recover from either of the two vehicles notwithstanding the finding of contributory negligence apportioning a 50% liability. It is next submitted that breach of condition of the insurance policy that the Tribunal has found on account of the driving licence of the driver of the ill-fated Jeep not being endorsed for driving a commercial passenger vehicle, would not entitle the Insurers to an all out exoneration on the policy. Instead, it would give the Insurers a right to recover after paying of the claimants. The claimants have also criticized the Tribunal's finding about the deceased's annual income to be sum of Rs.15,000/-, rejecting evidence about her actual income. It is also said that the Tribunal has not taken into account future prospects of the deceased. The deduction towards personal expenses has been criticized as one much on the higher side. It is also urged that the Tribunal has failed to award anything towards loss of love and affection, besides funeral expenses. 12. The learned Counsel appearing for the UPSRTC says that they are not liable to pay anything to the claimants towards the enhanced compensation, inasmuch as the claimants have accepted a sum of Rs.60,000/-on 04.03.2001 before the Lok Adalat in complete settlement of their claim against the UPSRTC. 13. The learned Counsel for the Insurers, on the other hand, has argued that the Jeep driver's licence being one for a private vehicle alone, without any endorsement for driving a commercial vehicle, there is a fundamental breach of the policy, entitling the Insurers to complete exoneration, as ordered by the Tribunal. 14. 13. The learned Counsel for the Insurers, on the other hand, has argued that the Jeep driver's licence being one for a private vehicle alone, without any endorsement for driving a commercial vehicle, there is a fundamental breach of the policy, entitling the Insurers to complete exoneration, as ordered by the Tribunal. 14. This Court has considered the submissions advanced on behalf of both sides. It is to be noticed that there is no appeal, either by the owner or the Insurers. It is true that so far as the claimants are concerned, it is a case of composite negligence, because the deceased was on board one of the vehicles, that has been found to have contributed to the negligence leading to the accident. The claimants are free to recover from any of the parties found to be in contributory negligence. The issue of apportionment of negligence and a fortiori the liability to pay compensation is a matter inter se the owner and the Insurers on one hand and the UPSRTC on the other. It is not an issue in this appeal at all. 15. What is different in this case is that the rights of the claimants have nevertheless been split into two parts, to wit, one part against the owner and the Insurers and the other against the UPSRTC. There is on record a compromise inter se the claimants and the UPSRTC dated 04.03.2001 filed before the Lok Adalat, which has been accepted on the same day by the Lok Adalat. The terms of the settlement before the Lok Adalat show that the claimants have compromised their claim against the UPSRTC for a sum of Rs.60,000/- in all. The aforesaid compromise between the claimants and the UPSRTC is on record as paper No.14-Ga, on the reverse of which is the order passed by the Lok Adalat. The result is that the present appeal by the claimants for enhancement is confined to their claim against the owner and the Insurers. 16. The aforesaid compromise between the claimants and the UPSRTC is on record as paper No.14-Ga, on the reverse of which is the order passed by the Lok Adalat. The result is that the present appeal by the claimants for enhancement is confined to their claim against the owner and the Insurers. 16. This Court is of opinion that the Tribunal having returned a finding of contributory negligence to the extent of 50% each between the ill-fated Jeep and the UPSRTC Bus, it is difficult to disturb that finding in the absence of any positive evidence brought to the notice of this Court by the claimants to show that it was a different percentage of negligence on the part of the ill-fated Jeep's driver or it was cent per cent his fault. Even otherwise, it would now not be open to disturb that finding, because on the foot of it the claimants have settled the matter with the UPSRTC before the Lok Adalat. The claim, therefore, that now proceeds is confined to the owner and the Insurers. 17. Whatever enhancement of compensation is granted by this Court, if at all, the same would be limited to 50% of the determination, the other 50% having been settled in terms of the compromise with the UPSRTC. 18. The next question, which arises, is whether the Insurers have been rightly discharged of their liability by the Tribunal, or it is a case where the Insurers ought to be saddled with the liability of making good the compensation awarded with a right to recover from the owner. It is true that the driving licence held by the driver of the ill-fated Jeep was a licence to drive a motorcycle and a light motor vehicle, which authorizes a person to drive a private vehicle. It was not endorsed by the Licensing Authority, authorizing the licensee to drive a commercial light vehicle carrying passengers. 19. The Tribunal has recorded a finding that the facts and evidence on record show that the ill-fated Jeep was carrying gratuitous passengers, though there is nothing expressly said in the affidavit of Hamidunnisha, that has been filed in lieu of her examination-in-chief, that the deceased boarded the vehicle after paying some kind of a fare. This Court is inclined to agree with the Tribunal on this issue. This Court is inclined to agree with the Tribunal on this issue. The reason is that apparently the owner has not raised a specific plea in the written statement that he was carrying passengers, non-gratuitously or introducing circumstances to show some kind of a personal relationship between the deceased or her family and the owner. The Jeep was full of passengers unrelated to the owner from which a presumption about gratuitous carriage of passengers must be raised. There is nothing on record to rebut the presumption that the passengers on board the ill-fated Jeep, none of whom appear to be related to the owner, or his acquaintances or friends, were gratuitous. The Jeep was clearly being plied as a passenger vehicle for hire. 20. The Court's inference in this regard must also rest on judicial notice of the reputed fact that vehicles of this type are invariably used as passenger vehicles for hire, though registered as private ones. The Court, therefore, finds that while the driver of the Jeep may not be holding a valid licence, authorizing him to drive passenger vehicles used for commercial purposes, the ill-fated Jeep was nevertheless insured by the Insurers. At the same time, the driving licence not being one which was endorsed to drive a commercial or passenger vehicle, there is a breach of the insurance policy entitling the Insurers to exoneration from their liability to substantively indemnify in terms of the policy. But, they ought to be directed to pay the claimants and recover from the owner. 21. In Shamanna and another v. Divisional Manager, Oriental Insurance Company Limited and others, (2018) 9 SCC 650 , the relevant facts were that the deceased was travelling by a Jeep, negligently driven by its driver. The door of the vehicle suddenly opened and the deceased was thrown out of the vehicle leading to his death. The deceased was a young man and his parents claimed compensation. The Tribunal awarded compensation with a direction to pay and recover since the Jeep driver had no valid driving licence, when the accident happened. On an appeal by the Insurance Company and by the claimants as well, the High Court enhanced the compensation, but set aside the direction to pay and recover. It was in those circumstances that on the claimants' appeal by special leave, the Supreme Court after referring to the decision in National Insurance Co. On an appeal by the Insurance Company and by the claimants as well, the High Court enhanced the compensation, but set aside the direction to pay and recover. It was in those circumstances that on the claimants' appeal by special leave, the Supreme Court after referring to the decision in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Swaran Singh, (2004) 3 SCC 297 held in Shamanna (supra): “11. In the present case, to deny the benefit of “pay and recover”, what seems to have substantially weighed with the High Court is the reference to larger Bench made by the two-Judge Bench in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Parvathneni [National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Parvathneni, (2009) 8 SCC 785 : (2009) 3 SCC (Civ) 568 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 943] which doubted the correctness of the decisions which in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India directing insurance company to pay the compensation amount even though insurance company has no liability to pay. In Parvathneni case [National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Parvathneni, (2009) 8 SCC 785 : (2009) 3 SCC (Civ) 568 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 943] , the Supreme Court pointed out that Article 142 of the Constitution of India does not cover such type of cases and that : (SCC p. 786, para 5) “5. If the insurance company has no liability to pay at all, then, it cannot be compelled by order of the court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India to pay the compensation amount and later on recover it from the owner of the vehicle.” 12. The above reference in Parvathneni case [National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Parvathneni, (2009) 8 SCC 785 : (2009) 3 SCC (Civ) 568 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 943] has been disposed of on 17-9-2013 [National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Parvathneni, (2018) 9 SCC 657 ] by the three-Judge Bench keeping the questions of law open to be decided in an appropriate case. 13. Since the reference to the larger Bench in Parvathneni case [National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Parvathneni, (2009) 8 SCC 785 : (2009) 3 SCC (Civ) 568 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 943] has been disposed of by keeping the questions of law open to be decided in an appropriate case, presently the decision in Swaran Singh case [National Insurance Co. Since the reference to the larger Bench in Parvathneni case [National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Parvathneni, (2009) 8 SCC 785 : (2009) 3 SCC (Civ) 568 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 943] has been disposed of by keeping the questions of law open to be decided in an appropriate case, presently the decision in Swaran Singh case [National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Swaran Singh, (2004) 3 SCC 297 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 733] followed in Laxmi Narain Dhut [National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Laxmi Narain Dhut, (2007) 3 SCC 700 : (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 142] and other cases hold the field. The award passed by the Tribunal directing the insurance company to pay the compensation amount awarded to the claimants and thereafter, recover the same from the owner of the vehicle in question, is in accordance with the judgment passed by this Court in Swaran Singh [National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Swaran Singh, (2004) 3 SCC 297 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 733] and Laxmi Narain Dhut [National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Laxmi Narain Dhut, (2007) 3 SCC 700 : (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 142] cases. While so, in our view, the High Court ought not to have interfered with the award passed by the Tribunal directing the first respondent to pay and recover from the owner of the vehicle. The impugned judgment [Shamanna v. Laxman, 2016 SCC OnLine Kar 6928] of the High Court exonerating the insurance company from its liability and directing the claimants to recover the compensation from the owner of the vehicle is set aside and the award passed by the Tribunal is restored. 14. So far as the recovery of the amount from the owner of the vehicle, the insurance company shall recover as held in the decision in Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Nanjappan [Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Nanjappan, (2004) 13 SCC 224 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 148] wherein this Court held that : (SCC p. 226, para 8) “8. … For the purpose of recovering the same from the insured, the insurer shall not be required to file a suit. It may initiate a proceeding before the executing court concerned as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject-matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer.” 22. It may initiate a proceeding before the executing court concerned as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject-matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer.” 22. Therefore, this Court is of opinion that whatever liability is found for the owner, the Insurers would be liable to make good the compensation awarded and recover the same from the owner through an application made to the Tribunal. 23. This spares for the Court the question whether compensation has been validly determined by the Tribunal. The claimants have sought enhancement and say that the compensation as assessed is far on the lower side. They say, it is against the settled principles. 24. The first determinant in order to work out the compensation is the monthly income of the deceased; or for that matter, her annual income. The Tribunal has considered the deceased to be a productive person earning something for herself, but has not believed the testimony of Hamidunnisha on affidavit, where she has claimed in Paragraph No.6 of the affidavit that the deceased would work as a tailor and earn Rs.5000/-a month. It is important to notice that Hamidunnisha has put in her affidavit dated 19.07.2002 in lieu of her oral testimony, but she has not been cross-examined either by the owner or the Insurers; not even by the UPSRTC. Her testimony, therefore, remains unrebutted on record. Normally, unrebutted testimony is to be accepted, but it is not to be accepted blindly. It is to be put in the scale of fair judgment, based on other facts, circumstances and contemporary human experience to believe the whole of it or so much of it as can be accepted. 25. The Tribunal has opined that the deceased was a divorced woman and, therefore, the likelihood of her engaging in some kind of productive work is there. It is on the said basis that the Tribunal has done a guesswork and determined the deceased's income at a figure of Rs.15,000/-per annum. 26. Regarding the income of a woman, mostly a housewife or a homemaker, principles have been laid down in Arun Kumar Agrawal and another v. National Insurance Company Limited and others, (2010) 9 SCC 218 . After review of earlier authority on the issue in Arun Kumar Agrawal (supra), it has been held: “26. 26. Regarding the income of a woman, mostly a housewife or a homemaker, principles have been laid down in Arun Kumar Agrawal and another v. National Insurance Company Limited and others, (2010) 9 SCC 218 . After review of earlier authority on the issue in Arun Kumar Agrawal (supra), it has been held: “26. In India the courts have recognised that the contribution made by the wife to the house is invaluable and cannot be computed in terms of money. The gratuitous services rendered by the wife with true love and affection to the children and her husband and managing the household affairs cannot be equated with the services rendered by others. A wife/mother does not work by the clock. She is in the constant attendance of the family throughout the day and night unless she is employed and is required to attend the employer's work for particular hours. She takes care of all the requirements of the husband and children including cooking of food, washing of clothes, etc. She teaches small children and provides invaluable guidance to them for their future life. A housekeeper or maidservant can do the household work, such as cooking food, washing clothes and utensils, keeping the house clean, etc., but she can never be a substitute for a wife/mother who renders selfless service to her husband and children. 27. It is not possible to quantify any amount in lieu of the services rendered by the wife/mother to the family i.e. the husband and children. However, for the purpose of award of compensation to the dependants, some pecuniary estimate has to be made of the services of the housewife/mother. In that context, the term “services” is required to be given a broad meaning and must be construed by taking into account the loss of personal care and attention given by the deceased to her children as a mother and to her husband as a wife. They are entitled to adequate compensation in lieu of the loss of gratuitous services rendered by the deceased. The amount payable to the dependants cannot be diminished on the ground that some close relation like a grandmother may volunteer to render some of the services to the family which the deceased was giving earlier. 28. They are entitled to adequate compensation in lieu of the loss of gratuitous services rendered by the deceased. The amount payable to the dependants cannot be diminished on the ground that some close relation like a grandmother may volunteer to render some of the services to the family which the deceased was giving earlier. 28. In Lata Wadhwa v. State of Bihar [ (2001) 8 SCC 197 ] this Court considered the various issues raised in the writ petitions filed by the petitioners including the one relating to payment of compensation to the victims of the fire accident which occurred on 3-3-1989 resulting in the death of 60 persons and injuries to 113. By an interim order dated 15-12-1993, this Court requested the former Chief Justice of India, Shri Justice Y.V. Chandrachud to look into various issues including the amount of compensation payable to the victims. Although the petitioners filed objection to the report submitted by Shri Justice Y.V. Chandrachud, the Court overruled the same and accepted the report. On the issue of payment of compensation to the housewife, the Court observed: (SCC pp. 209-10, para 10) “10. So far as the deceased housewives are concerned, in the absence of any data and as the housewives were not earning any income, attempt has been made to determine the compensation on the basis of services rendered by them to the house. On the basis of the age group of the housewives, appropriate multiplier has been applied, but the estimation of the value of services rendered to the house by the housewives, which has been arrived at Rs. 12,000 per annum in cases of some and Rs. 10,000 for others, appears to us to be grossly low. It is true that the claimants, who ought to have given data for determination of compensation, did not assist in any manner by providing the data for estimating the value of services rendered by such housewives. But even in the absence of such data and taking into consideration the multifarious services rendered by the housewives for managing the entire family, even on a modest estimation, should be Rs. 3000 per month and Rs. 36,000 per annum. This would apply to all those housewives between the age group of 34 to 59 and as such who were active in life. 3000 per month and Rs. 36,000 per annum. This would apply to all those housewives between the age group of 34 to 59 and as such who were active in life. The compensation awarded, therefore, should be recalculated, taking the value of services rendered per annum to be Rs. 36,000 and thereafter, applying the multiplier, as has been applied already, and so far as the conventional amount is concerned, the same should be Rs. 50,000 instead of Rs. 25,000 given under the Report. So far as the elderly ladies are concerned, in the age group of 62 to 72, the value of services rendered has been taken at Rs. 10,000 per annum and the multiplier applied is eight. Though, the multiplier applied is correct, but the values of services rendered at Rs. 10,000 per annum, cannot be held to be just and, we, therefore, enhance the same to Rs. 20,000 per annum. In their case, therefore, the total amount of compensation should be redetermined, taking the value of services rendered at Rs. 20,000 per annum and then after applying the multiplier, as already applied and thereafter, adding Rs. 50,000 towards the conventional figure.” (emphasis supplied) 29. The judgment of Lata Wadhwa case [ (2001) 8 SCC 197 ] was referred to with approval in M.S. Grewal v. Deep Chand Sood [ (2001) 8 SCC 151 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 1426] for confirming the award of compensation of Rs. 5 lakhs in a case involving the death of school children by drowning due to negligence of teachers of the school. In Municipal Corpn. of Greater Bombay v. Laxman Iyer [ (2003) 8 SCC 731 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 252] a two-Judge Bench while deciding the issue of award of compensation under Sections 110-A and 110-B of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, referred to the judgments in Lata Wadhwa case [ (2001) 8 SCC 197 ] and M.S. Grewal case [ (2001) 8 SCC 151 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 1426]. 30. In A. Rajam v. M. Manikya Reddy [ 1989 ACJ 542 (AP)] , M. Jagannadha Rao, J. (as he then was) advocated giving of a wider meaning to the word “services” in cases relating to award of compensation to the dependants of a deceased wife/mother. 30. In A. Rajam v. M. Manikya Reddy [ 1989 ACJ 542 (AP)] , M. Jagannadha Rao, J. (as he then was) advocated giving of a wider meaning to the word “services” in cases relating to award of compensation to the dependants of a deceased wife/mother. Some of the observations made in that judgment are extracted below: “The loss to the husband and children consequent upon the death of the housewife or mother has to be computed by estimating the loss of ‘services’ to the family, if there was reasonable prospect of such services being rendered freely in the future, but for the death. It must be remembered that any substitute to be so employed is not likely to be as economical as the housewife. Apart from the value of obtaining substituted services, the expense of giving accommodation or food to the substitute must also be computed. From this total must be deducted the expense the family would have otherwise been spending for the deceased housewife. While estimating the ‘services’ of the housewife, a narrow meaning should not be given to the meaning of the word ‘services’ but it should be construed broadly and one has to take into account the loss of ‘personal care and attention’ by the deceased to her children, as a mother and to her husband, as a wife. The award is not diminished merely because some close relation like a grandmother is prepared to render voluntary services.” 33. In Chandra Singh v. Gurmeet Singh [(2003) 7 AD 222 (Del)] , Krishna Gupta v. Madan Lal [ (2002) 96 DLT 829 ] , Captan Singh v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. [ (2004) 112 DLT 417 ] and Amar Singh Thukral v. Sandeep Chhatwal [ (2004) 112 DLT 478 ] , the Single and Division Benches of the Delhi High Court declined to apply the judgment of this Court in Lata Wadhwa case [ (2001) 8 SCC 197 ] for the purpose of award of compensation under the Act. In Krishna Gupta v. Madan Lal [ (2002) 96 DLT 829 ] the Division Bench of the High Court observed as under: (DLT p. 834, para 24) “24. … The decision of the Apex Court in Lata Wadhwa [ (2001) 8 SCC 197 ] in our considered opinion, cannot be said to have any application in the instant case. In Krishna Gupta v. Madan Lal [ (2002) 96 DLT 829 ] the Division Bench of the High Court observed as under: (DLT p. 834, para 24) “24. … The decision of the Apex Court in Lata Wadhwa [ (2001) 8 SCC 197 ] in our considered opinion, cannot be said to have any application in the instant case. The Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 was the complete code by itself. It not only provides for the right of a victim and/or his legal heirs to obtain compensation in case of bodily injury or death arising out of use of motor vehicle, but the Forum therefor has been provided, as also the mode and manner in which the compensation to be awarded therefor. In such a situation, it would be inappropriate to rely upon a decision of the Apex Court, which had been rendered in an absolutely different fact situation and in relation whereto there did not exist any statutory compensation. Lata Wadhwa [ (2001) 8 SCC 197 ] was decided in a matter where a fire occurred during a celebration. The liability of Tata Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. was not disputed. Compensation was awarded having regard to the peculiar feature obtaining in that case which has got nothing to do with the statutory compensation payable under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act.” 34. In Amar Singh Thukral v. Sandeep Chhatwal [ (2004) 112 DLT 478 ] , the learned Single Judge of the Delhi High Court adopted the yardstick of minimum rates of wages for the purpose of award of compensation in the case of death of a housewife and then proceeded to observe: (DLT p. 487, para 35) “35. … Since there is no scientific method of assessing the contribution of a housewife to her household, in cases such as the present, resort should be had to the wages of a skilled worker as per the minimum rates of wages in Delhi. Although, this may sound uncharitable, if not demeaning to a housewife, there is hardly any other option available in the absence of any statutory guidelines.” 35. Although, this may sound uncharitable, if not demeaning to a housewife, there is hardly any other option available in the absence of any statutory guidelines.” 35. In our view, it is highly unfair, unjust and inappropriate to compute the compensation payable to the dependants of a deceased wife/mother, who does not have a regular income, by comparing her services with that of a housekeeper or a servant or an employee, who works for a fixed period. The gratuitous services rendered by the wife/mother to the husband and children cannot be equated with the services of an employee and no evidence or data can possibly be produced for estimating the value of such services. It is virtually impossible to measure in terms of money the loss of personal care and attention suffered by the husband and children on the demise of the housewife. In its wisdom, the legislature had, as early as in 1994, fixed the notional income of a non-earning person at Rs. 15,000 per annum and in case of a spouse, 1/3rd income of the earning/surviving spouse for the purpose of computing the compensation. 36. Though Section 163-A does not, in terms apply to the cases in which claim for compensation is filed under Section 166 of the Act, in the absence of any other definite criteria for determination of compensation payable to the dependants of a non-earning housewife/mother, it would be reasonable to rely upon the criteria specified in Clause 6 of the Second Schedule and then apply an appropriate multiplier keeping in view the judgments of this Court in Kerala SRTC v. Susamma Thomas [ (1994) 2 SCC 176 : 1994 SCC (Cri) 335] , U.P. SRTC v. Trilok Chandra [ (1996) 4 SCC 362 ] , Sarla Verma v. DTC [ (2009) 6 SCC 121 : (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 1002] and also take guidance from the judgment in Lata Wadhwa case [ (2001) 8 SCC 197 ] . The approach adopted by different Benches of the Delhi High Court to compute the compensation by relying upon the minimum wages payable to a skilled worker does not commend our approval because it is most unrealistic to compare the gratuitous services of the housewife/ mother with the work of a skilled worker.” 27. The approach adopted by different Benches of the Delhi High Court to compute the compensation by relying upon the minimum wages payable to a skilled worker does not commend our approval because it is most unrealistic to compare the gratuitous services of the housewife/ mother with the work of a skilled worker.” 27. The law regarding the income of a non-working housewife, who perished in a motor accident at the age of 22 years and was claimed by her family to be earning Rs.900/-per month from doing embroidery and knitting work was the subject matter of consideration by the Supreme Court in Jitendra Khimshankar Trivedi and others v. Kasam Daud Kumbhar and others, (2015) 4 SCC 237 . In Jitendra Khimshankar Trivedi (supra), it was held: “7. Admittedly, the claimants adduced only oral testimony of the witnesses to substantiate their claim that the deceased was self-employed and was earning Rs 900 per month. Smt Godavariben Khimshankar Trivedi, mother-in-law and Shri Khimshankar Raguram Trivedi, father-in-law have deposed to the effect that the deceased at the time of accident was doing tailoring, embroidery and knitting and was earning Rs 900 per month. They further deposed that their daughters were also doing the same work as the deceased Jayvantiben Jitendra Trivedi was then doing and that their daughters were earning Rs 3000 per month and had the deceased been alive, she would have also earned Rs 3000 per month. 8. The Tribunal observed that in the district of Kachchh embroidery work, stitching work and local traditional embroidery work is doing well and had the deceased been alive she would have earned Rs 1500 per month. Deducting 1/3rd for personal expenses and adopting multiplier of 18, the Tribunal has calculated the loss of dependency at Rs 2,16,000 (Rs 1000 × 12 × 18). Though in their cross-examination, Smt Godavariben Khimshankar Trivedi and Khimshankar Raguram Trivedi deposed that they did not keep voucher and account books, reasoning of the Tribunal that the embroidery and tailoring work is doing well in the district of Kachchh and that the deceased would have earned not less than Rs 1500 per month is well merited. It is to be pointed out that the respondents have not adduced any evidence to prove that the deceased was not doing any embroidery or tailoring work or the like. It is to be pointed out that the respondents have not adduced any evidence to prove that the deceased was not doing any embroidery or tailoring work or the like. While so, in the light of the factual findings recorded by the Tribunal, the High Court was not justified in reducing the income of the deceased to Rs 1350 per month from Rs 1500. 10. Even assuming Jayvantiben Jitendra Trivedi was not self-employed doing embroidery and tailoring work, the fact remains that she was a housewife and a homemaker. It is hard to monetise the domestic work done by a house-mother. The services of the mother/wife is available 24 hours and her duties are never fixed. Courts have recognised the contribution made by the wife to the house is invaluable and that it cannot be computed in terms of money. A housewife/homemaker does not work by the clock and she is in constant attendance of the family throughout and such services rendered by the homemaker has to be necessarily kept in view while calculating the loss of dependency. Thus even otherwise, taking deceased Jayvantiben Jitendra Trivedi as the homemaker, it is reasonable to fix her income at Rs 3000 per month. 11. Recognising the services of the homemaker and that domestic services have to be recognised in terms of money, in Arun Kumar Agrawal v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. [ (2010) 9 SCC 218 : (2010) 3 SCC (Civ) 664 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 1313] , this Court has held as under : (SCC p. 246, paras 62-63) “62. The alternative to imputing money values is to measure the time taken to produce these services and compare these with the time that is taken to produce goods and services which are commercially viable. One has to admit that in the long run, the services rendered by women in the household sustain a supply of labour to the economy and keep human societies going by weaving the social fabric and keeping it in good repair. If we take these services for granted and do not attach any value to this, this may escalate the unforeseen costs in terms of deterioration of both human capabilities and social fabric. 63. Household work performed by women throughout India is more than US $612.8 billion per year (Evangelical Social Action Forum and Health Bridge, p. 17). If we take these services for granted and do not attach any value to this, this may escalate the unforeseen costs in terms of deterioration of both human capabilities and social fabric. 63. Household work performed by women throughout India is more than US $612.8 billion per year (Evangelical Social Action Forum and Health Bridge, p. 17). We often forget that the time spent by women in doing household work as homemakers is the time which they can devote to paid work or to their education. This lack of sensitiveness and recognition of their work mainly contributes to women's high rate of poverty and their consequential oppression in society, as well as various physical, social and psychological problems. The courts and the Tribunals should do well to factor these considerations in assessing compensation for housewives who are victims of road accidents and quantifying the amount in the name of fixing ‘just compensation’.” 13. In order to award just and reasonable compensation income of the deceased is taken as Rs 3000 per month. Deducting 1/3rd for personal expenses contribution of the deceased to the family is calculated at Rs 2000 per month. At the time of her death deceased Jayvantiben was aged about 22 years, proper multiplier to be adopted is 18. Adopting multiplier of 18, total loss of dependency is calculated at Rs 4,32,000 (Rs 2000 × 12 × 18). With respect to the award of compensation under conventional heads, the Tribunal has awarded Rs 5000 towards loss of estate and Rs 3000 towards funeral expenses totalling Rs 8000. The High Court has awarded conventional damages of Rs 15,000 i.e. Rs 10,000 towards loss of estate and Rs 5000 towards funeral expenses. The courts below have not awarded any compensation towards loss of consortium and towards love and affection. In Rajesh v. Rajbir Singh [ (2013) 9 SCC 54 : (2013) 4 SCC (Civ) 179 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 817 : (2014) 1 SCC (L&S) 149] and Jiju Kuruvila v. Kunjujamma Mohan [ (2013) 9 SCC 166 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 849] , this Court has awarded substantial amount of Rs 1,00,000 towards loss of consortium and Rs 1,00,000 towards loss of love and affection. Following the same, in the case in hand, Rs 1,00,000 is awarded towards loss of consortium and Rs 1,00,000 towards loss of love and affection to the minor children. Following the same, in the case in hand, Rs 1,00,000 is awarded towards loss of consortium and Rs 1,00,000 towards loss of love and affection to the minor children. Towards loss of estate and funeral expenses, award of compensation of Rs 15,000 awarded by the High Court is maintained. Thus, the claimants are entitled to a total compensation of Rs 6,47,000.” 28. The deceased here was a young woman of 22 years, a fact that is not in dispute. Whether she was stitching clothes or doing something else is not decisive about her income. The deceased was in very productive phase of her life and a divorcee. She had a young daughter as her dependent and they were staying with her mother and uncle. The Tribunal has rightly held for what this Court has observed hereinbefore, that the deceased would be engaged in some gainful pursuit to earn a livelihood for herself and support her daughter and her mother, with whom she was staying. There is affirmative evidence in the form of an affidavit by the mother, which says that the deceased was working as a tailor. Possibly, what the mother means is that she was stitching at home clothes and apparels for gain or reward that she received from whomsoever were her customers. 29. Normally, the unrebutted affidavit of Hamidunnisha, the deceased's mother, should have been accepted, but as already remarked, an unrebutted statement in an affidavit has to be evaluated for the truth of it. There is no evidence aliunde, like some kind of proof of the receipt of labour charges for the deceased's exertions or any kind of receipts relating to the work done by her. Going by the practices in the unorganized labour sector, particularly, stitching and handcraft work done at home, formal evidence like books of account or ledgers showing receipts or balance-sheets are evidence never to be expected. But, that does not mean that whatever is asserted in the affidavit is to be accepted as true for every word of it. Testimony, whether oral or on affidavit about income on which claims are based, is known to be exaggerated and inflated. But, that does not mean that whatever is asserted in the affidavit is to be accepted as true for every word of it. Testimony, whether oral or on affidavit about income on which claims are based, is known to be exaggerated and inflated. At the same time, the work that the deceased was doing and the overall circumstances, an income of Rs.5000/-per month in the year 1999 does not seem to be believable, but given the wages obtaining during the relevant period of time, in the Court's opinion, a sum of Rs.3000/-per month can be safely accepted to be what the deceased would be earning per month. It is on the aforesaid basis that the claimants' dependency is to be assessed. 30. The claimants are three in number, one of whom is the deceased's minor child and the other her mother. There is no difficulty in accepting the child's claim. So far as the mother is concerned, her husband Insanul Haq was also a victim in the same accident on board the same vehicle. He was a power loom mechanic and had a power loom of his own that he employed in business to earn his livelihood. Hamidunnisha has filed Claim Petition No.411 of 1999 along with the other dependents of Insanul Haq to claim compensation for his death in the same accident. She is, therefore, clearly a dependent of Insanul Haq; not Gulshan Bano's. While Hamidunnisha is not entitled to claim any dependency upon Gulshan Bano, going by the settled principles, Gulshan Bano being her daughter, she would be entitled to some compensation on account of loss of filial consortium. The issue of filial consortium would be discussed with reference to authority relevant to the point later in this judgment. 31. The other claimant, Abdul Khaliq, the deceased's uncle, is her father's brother. He is a relatively young man of 45 years, still in the prime of his life. There is no reason why he should be regarded as a dependent of his divorced niece, who was staying with her parents' family after estrangement from her husband. 32. Therefore, this Court is of opinion that while the deceased's mother may be her heir, entitled to some compensation for the loss of filial consortium, the only dependent left behind by the deceased entitled to ask for compensation based on dependency, is the deceased's minor child, Shaista. 33. 32. Therefore, this Court is of opinion that while the deceased's mother may be her heir, entitled to some compensation for the loss of filial consortium, the only dependent left behind by the deceased entitled to ask for compensation based on dependency, is the deceased's minor child, Shaista. 33. With an income of Rs.3000/-per month, the deceased would have to be credited with an annual income of Rs.36,000/-. Now, falls for consideration, the deduction to be made towards the deceased's personal and living expenses. The locus classicus on the point is the decision of the Supreme Court Sarla Verma (Smt) v. Delhi Transport Corporation and another, (2009) 6 SCC 121 . The principles for deduction towards personal and living expenses have been set out in Paragraph No.30 of the report in Sarla Verma (supra). The difficulty in this case arises from the fact that the deduction towards personal expenses for a married person starts with the number of dependents being in the bracket of 2-3. The case of a solitary dependent is not dealt with in Sarla Verma. 34. What, therefore, would be the deduction where the deceased left behind a solitary dependent is the question to be answered. This issue fell for consideration before the Karnataka High Court in Manager, National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. T. Chandranaika and others, 2018 SCC OnLine Kar 2295. Referring to the guidance in Sarla Verma, the Karnataka High Court in T. Chandranaika (supra) has held: “9. As emphasized by the Learned Counsel for the appellant Smt. Manjula N. Tejaswi, it is seen that the Tribunal has not deducted any amount towards personal and living expenses of the deceased, out of her income of Rs. 7,000/-per month. Though the deceased was a married woman, she has left behind only a single dependant, namely her husband. Her both sons are majors aged above 35 years and are independently earning and looking after their families. Hence, since the deceased has left behind a sole dependant-her husband, the deduction to be adopted towards personal and living expenses ought to be taken at 1/2. This view is supported by the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Sarla Verma v. Delhi Transport Corporation [ (2009) 6 SCC 121 .] . The relevant paragraph of the said judgment reads as under: “30. This view is supported by the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Sarla Verma v. Delhi Transport Corporation [ (2009) 6 SCC 121 .] . The relevant paragraph of the said judgment reads as under: “30. Though in some cases the deduction to be made towards personal and living expenses is calculated on the basis of units indicated in Trilok Chandra, the general practice is to apply standardised deductions. Having considered several subsequent decisions of this court, we are of the view that where the deceased was married, the deduction towards personal and living expenses of the deceased should be one-third (?rd) where the number of dependent family members is 2 to 3. one fourth (¼th) where the number of dependent-family members is 4 to 6, and one- fifth (1/5th) where the number of dependent family members exceeds six.” (emphasis supplied) This implies that when there is only one dependant of the deceased, the deduction towards personal and living expenses of the deceased should be taken as ½. Applying the above view in Sarla Verma, the law has been succinctly laid down in the case of New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Sri. David T. [ILR 2012 KAR 2859.] wherein the relevant paragraph reads as under: “7. After going through the impugned judgment and award passed by Tribunal and after re- appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence available on file, I am of the considered view that the Tribunal has rightly assessed the monthly income of the deceased at Rs. 3,000/-, but erred in deducting ?rd towards the personal expenses of the deceased and taking the age of the deceased for adopting the multiplier instead of deducting 50% towards the personal expenses and adopting multiplier on the basis of the age of the husband of the deceased, as rightly pointed out by Learned Counsel for appellant- Insurer. In the light of the well settled law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court and this Court, in hosts of cases, whenever there is a sole claimant, 50% is to be deducted. Accordingly, I accept the monthly income of the deceased at Rs. 3,000/-and deduct 50% towards the personal expenses of the deceased. Accordingly, if 50% (i.e. Rs. 1,500/-) is deducted from Rs. 3,000/-towards her personal expenses, the net income would be Rs. 1,500/-per month. Accordingly, I accept the monthly income of the deceased at Rs. 3,000/-and deduct 50% towards the personal expenses of the deceased. Accordingly, if 50% (i.e. Rs. 1,500/-) is deducted from Rs. 3,000/-towards her personal expenses, the net income would be Rs. 1,500/-per month. Since the husband of the deceased was aged about 70 years, the proper multiplier applicable is ‘5’ as per the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court SARLA VERMA 'S CASE as against ‘10’ adopted by Tribunal. Thus, the compensation towards loss of dependency would work out to Rs. 90,000/- (i.e., Rs. 1,500/-× 12 × ‘5’) as against Rs. 2,40,000/- awarded by Tribunal.” 10. In view of the above decisions, I find that the judgment of the Tribunal requires to be revisited on the aspect of compensation awarded under the head ‘Loss of dependency’ and the deduction towards personal and living expenses shall be taken at 50%. Hence, the compensation payable towards ‘loss of dependency’ would come to Rs. 3,78,000/-(1/2 × 7000 × 9 × 12) as against Rs. 7,56,000/-awarded by the Tribunal. However, the compensation awarded by the tribunal under other conventional heads is just and proper and does not call for interference by this Court. Thus, the claimants- respondents are entitled to a total compensation of Rs. 4,18,000/-(Rupees four lakh eighteen thousand only) as against Rs. 7,96,000/-awarded by the Tribunal.” 35. There is similar reasoning adopted in a more recent decision of the Karanataka High Court in Geeta Hukumchand Bagewadi v. Sundarawwa Shivaray Naikhe and others, M.F.A. No. 20759 of 2020 (MV-D), decided on 15.04.2019, where B.M. Shyam Prasad, J. held: “8. The arguments as regards the deduction towards personal expenses in the case of a sole dependent is based on the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Sarla Verma and others v. Delhi Transport Corporation and another, reported in 2009 6 SCC 121 . The Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the deduction towards personal expenses should be 1/3rd when the dependents of the deceased are either two or three, 1/4th if the dependants are between 4 and 6 and 1/5th if the dependants are more than 6. A coordinate bench of this Court has considered this question of deduction toward spersonal expenses if the deceased is survived by a sole dependant in the light of the decision in Sarla Verma’s case referred supra and deducted 50% towards personal expenses. A coordinate bench of this Court has considered this question of deduction toward spersonal expenses if the deceased is survived by a sole dependant in the light of the decision in Sarla Verma’s case referred supra and deducted 50% towards personal expenses. This court can only agree with the submissions by the learned counsel for the Insurer that the deduction towards personal expenses in the case of a sole dependant should be 50% (or ½) of the Income as it stands to reason that if the permissible deduction in the case the number of dependants is either 2 or 3 should be 1/3rd, the deduction cannot be the same if the deceased is survived by a sole dependant. Of the two claimants, the Claimant No. 1 is the wife, and the other claimant is a major son. Therefore, only the wife would qualify as the dependant. As such the deduction towards personal expenses should be 50% (or ½) of the income. As such, the argument by the learned counsel for the Insurer in this regard is accepted.” 36. The decisions of the two learned Single Judges of the Karanataka High Court, with utmost respect, are not very eloquent in their reasoning why in case of a single dependent, deduction of 50% is to be made towards personal expenses. To the understanding of this Court, the reasoning would proceed on slightly different premise than that in the case of a bachelor, where 50% deduction is the rule in Sarla Verma. The reason for the rule in the case of bachelors is that they are predisposed to be spending more on themselves than married persons, who have to bear the responsibilities of a family. In case of a single dependent, the likelihood of the deceased sharing his income equally between himself and the dependent may serve as a valid basis to hold a 50% deduction towards personal and living expenses. Even otherwise, adopting the unit system for determining the deduction towards personal expenses, the deceased and the sole dependent can be regarded as two units, leading to the safe inference of 50% deduction towards the deceased's personal expenses. 37. The deceased's age being 22 years, where the applicable multiplier would again be governed by the Table in Paragraph No.40 of the report in Sarla Verma (supra). She would be placed in age bracket of 21-25 years, where the applicable multiplier is 18'. 37. The deceased's age being 22 years, where the applicable multiplier would again be governed by the Table in Paragraph No.40 of the report in Sarla Verma (supra). She would be placed in age bracket of 21-25 years, where the applicable multiplier is 18'. The Tribunal has, therefore, erred in adopting the multiplier of 17'. 38. Amongst the claimants, therefore, the deceased's daughter, who shall hereinafter be referred to as 'the minor claimant' is also entitled to addition of future prospects, which are no longer the preserve of the service class. These are also to be extended to the self-employed or those working on a fixed salary going by the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in National Insurance Company v. Pranay Sethi and others (2017) 16 SCC 680 . In Pranay Sethi (supra), it has been held: “56. The seminal issue is the fixation of future prospects in cases of deceased who are self- employed or on a fixed salary. Sarla Verma [Sarla Verma v. DTC, (2009) 6 SCC 121 : (2009) 2 SCC (Civ) 770 : (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 1002] has carved out an exception permitting the claimants to bring materials on record to get the benefit of addition of future prospects. It has not, per se, allowed any future prospects in respect of the said category. 57. Having bestowed our anxious consideration, we are disposed to think when we accept the principle of standardisation, there is really no rationale not to apply the said principle to the self- employed or a person who is on a fixed salary. To follow the doctrine of actual income at the time of death and not to add any amount with regard to future prospects to the income for the purpose of determination of multiplicand would be unjust. The determination of income while computing compensation has to include future prospects so that the method will come within the ambit and sweep of just compensation as postulated under Section 168 of the Act. In case of a deceased who had held a permanent job with inbuilt grant of annual increment, there is an acceptable certainty. But to state that the legal representatives of a deceased who was on a fixed salary would not be entitled to the benefit of future prospects for the purpose of computation of compensation would be inapposite. In case of a deceased who had held a permanent job with inbuilt grant of annual increment, there is an acceptable certainty. But to state that the legal representatives of a deceased who was on a fixed salary would not be entitled to the benefit of future prospects for the purpose of computation of compensation would be inapposite. It is because the criterion of distinction between the two in that event would be certainty on the one hand and staticness on the other. One may perceive that the comparative measure is certainty on the one hand and uncertainty on the other but such a perception is fallacious. It is because the price rise does affect a self-employed person; and that apart there is always an incessant effort to enhance one's income for sustenance. The purchasing capacity of a salaried person on permanent job when increases because of grant of increments and pay revision or for some other change in service conditions, there is always a competing attitude in the private sector to enhance the salary to get better efficiency from the employees. Similarly, a person who is self-employed is bound to garner his resources and raise his charges/fees so that he can live with same facilities. To have the perception that he is likely to remain static and his income to remain stagnant is contrary to the fundamental concept of human attitude which always intends to live with dynamism and move and change with the time. Though it may seem appropriate that there cannot be certainty in addition of future prospects to the existing income unlike in the case of a person having a permanent job, yet the said perception does not really deserve acceptance. We are inclined to think that there can be some degree of difference as regards the percentage that is meant for or applied to in respect of the legal representatives who claim on behalf of the deceased who had a permanent job than a person who is self-employed or on a fixed salary. But not to apply the principle of standardisation on the foundation of perceived lack of certainty would tantamount to remaining oblivious to the marrows of ground reality. And, therefore, degree-test is imperative. Unless the degree-test is applied and left to the parties to adduce evidence to establish, it would be unfair and inequitable. But not to apply the principle of standardisation on the foundation of perceived lack of certainty would tantamount to remaining oblivious to the marrows of ground reality. And, therefore, degree-test is imperative. Unless the degree-test is applied and left to the parties to adduce evidence to establish, it would be unfair and inequitable. The degree-test has to have the inbuilt concept of percentage. Taking into consideration the cumulative factors, namely, passage of time, the changing society, escalation of price, the change in price index, the human attitude to follow a particular pattern of life, etc., an addition of 40% of the established income of the deceased towards future prospects and where the deceased was below 40 years an addition of 25% where the deceased was between the age of 40 to 50 years would be reasonable. 58. The controversy does not end here. The question still remains whether there should be no addition where the age of the deceased is more than 50 years. Sarla Verma [Sarla Verma v. DTC, (2009) 6 SCC 121 : (2009) 2 SCC (Civ) 770 : (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 1002] thinks it appropriate not to add any amount and the same has been approved inReshma Kumari [Reshma Kumari v. Madan Mohan, (2013) 9 SCC 65 : (2013) 4 SCC (Civ) 191 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 826] . Judicial notice can be taken of the fact that salary does not remain the same. When a person is in a permanent job, there is always an enhancement due to one reason or the other. To lay down as a thumb rule that there will be no addition after 50 years will be an unacceptable concept. We are disposed to think, there should be an addition of 15% if the deceased is between the age of 50 to 60 years and there should be no addition thereafter. Similarly, in case of self-employed or person on fixed salary, the addition should be 10% between the age of 50 to 60 years. The aforesaid yardstick has been fixed so that there can be consistency in the approach by the tribunals and the courts.” 39. Similarly, in case of self-employed or person on fixed salary, the addition should be 10% between the age of 50 to 60 years. The aforesaid yardstick has been fixed so that there can be consistency in the approach by the tribunals and the courts.” 39. The next point to be considered is whether future prospects, to which the minor claimant is entitled, would be governed by the law laid down in Pranay Sethi or Rule 220-A (3) of the U.P. Motor Vehicles Rules, 1998 (for short, the Rules of 1998). This issue is no longer res integra in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in New India Assurance Co. Ltd v. Urmila Shukla and others, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 822, where it is observed: “9. It is to be noted that the validity of the Rules was not, in any way, questioned in the instant matter and thus the only question that we are called upon to consider is whether in its application, sub-Rule 3(iii) of Rule 220A of the Rules must be given restricted scope or it must be allowed to operate fully. 10. The discussion on the point in Pranay Sethi was from the standpoint of arriving at “just compensation” in terms of Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. 11. If an indicia is made available in the form of a statutory instrument which affords a favourable treatment, the decision in Pranay Sethi cannot be taken to have limited the operation of such statutory provision specially when the validity of the Rules was not put under any challenge. The prescription of 15% in cases where the deceased was in the age bracket of 50 60 years as stated in Pranay Sethi cannot be taken as maxima. In the absence of any governing principle available in the statutory regime, it was only in the form of an indication. If a statutory instrument has devised a formula which affords better or greater benefit, such statutory instrument must be allowed to operate unless the statutory instrument is otherwise found to be invalid. 12. We, therefore, reject the submission advanced on behalf of the appellant and affirm the view taken by the Tribunal as well as the High Court and dismiss this appeal without any order as to costs.” 40. 12. We, therefore, reject the submission advanced on behalf of the appellant and affirm the view taken by the Tribunal as well as the High Court and dismiss this appeal without any order as to costs.” 40. It still remains to be examined whether Rule 220-A(3) of the Rules of 1998, introduced by Notification No. 777/XXX-4-2011-4(3)-2010 dated 26th September, 2011 i.e. The Uttar Pradesh Motor Vehicles (Eleventh Amendment) Rules, 2011, would apply retrospectively to an accident that took place prior to the amendment. The issue was answered by a Division Bench of this Court in Sushil Kumar and others v. M/s. Sampark Lojastic Private Limited and others, 2017 (35) LCD 1311. In Sushil Kumar (supra), it was held: "31. Rule 220-A was inserted in the Uttar Pradesh Motor Vehicles Rules, 1998 in view of the various decisions of the law courts for providing benefit on account of future prospects of the injured/deceased. It provides for addition of certain percentage of the income of the injured/deceased in his actual income depending upon the age of the injured/deceased for the purposes of determination of the compensation. The aforesaid Rule came into effect on 26.09.2011 after the decision of the claim petition but before filing of the appeal though the accident took place on 08.05.2010 much before the enforcement of the above Rule. 32. It is in view of the above that an argument is being raised that Rule 220-A of the Rules which came into effect on 26.09.2011 would not apply to the accident which had taken place on 08.05.2010. 33. In Ram Sarup Vs. Munshi AIR 1963 SC 553 it was laid down that a change in law during the pendency of an appeal has to be taken into account and will cover the rights of the parties. 34. The view expressed above was followed by the Supreme Court in Mula Vs. Godhu AIR 1971 SC 89 . 35. In Dayawati Vs. Inderjit AIR 1966 SC 1423 the court had observed as under:-If the new law speaks in language, which expressly or by clear intendment, takes in even pending matters, the court of trial as well as the court of appeal must have regard to an intention so expressed, and the court of appeal may give effect to such a law even after the judgment of the court of first instance. 36. In Amarjit Kaur Vs. 36. In Amarjit Kaur Vs. Pritam Singh AIR 1974 SC 2068 effect was given to the change in law during the pendency of an appeal as the hearing of an appeal under the procedural law of this country is in the nature of rehearing of the suit by superior court. 37. It was in the light of the above decisions that in Lakshmi Narayan Guin and others Vs. Niranjan Modak AIR 1985 SC 111 it was held that a change in law during the pendency of an appeal has to be taken into account and will cover the right of the parties. 38. The aforesaid decision was followed by a Division Bench of this court in U.P. State Road Transport Corporation Vs. Smt. Madhu Sharma and others, 2003 (4) AWC 2620 which was a case in relation to the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act and it was observed that it is apparent that the change in law during the pendency of the original proceedings has to be taken into account so as to cover the rights of the parties. 39. In view of above decision the view expressed by the Division Bench of this court in ICICI Lombard (Supra) is not of good law as it does not takes into account the decisions referred to above in holding that the Rule 220-A of the Rules which came into effect on 26.09.2011 would not apply to the accident that took place prior to the said date only for the reason that the Rule was not specifically stated to be retrospective in nature." 41. The law laid down by the Division Bench in Sushil Kumar (supra) binds this Court and computation of future prospects is, therefore, to be made in accordance with the Rule 220-A(3) of Rules, 1998, even though the accident happened long before the amendment. Rule 220-A(3) stipulates that where the age of the deceased is less than 40 years, 50% is to be added to his/ her income towards future prospects. 42. There is an issue further raised about non-grant of any compensation by the Tribunal under the conventional heads. Here again, the law down in Pranay Sethi is eloquent, where it has been observed: “48. This aspect needs to be clarified and appositely stated. The conventional sum has been provided in the Second Schedule to the Act. 42. There is an issue further raised about non-grant of any compensation by the Tribunal under the conventional heads. Here again, the law down in Pranay Sethi is eloquent, where it has been observed: “48. This aspect needs to be clarified and appositely stated. The conventional sum has been provided in the Second Schedule to the Act. The said Schedule has been found to be defective as stated by the Court in Trilok Chandra [UP SRTC v. Trilok Chandra, (1996) 4 SCC 362 ]. Recently, in Puttamma v. K.L. Narayana Reddy [Puttamma v.K.L. Narayana Reddy, (2013) 15 SCC 45 : (2014) 4 SCC (Civ) 384 : (2014) 3 SCC (Cri) 574] it has been reiterated by stating : (SCC p. 80, para 54) “54. … we hold that the Second Schedule as was enacted in 1994 has now become redundant, irrational and unworkable due to changed scenario including the present cost of living and current rate of inflation and increased life expectancy.” 49. As far as multiplier or multiplicand is concerned, the same has been put to rest by the judgments of this Court. Para 3 of the Second Schedule also provides for general damages in case of death. It is as follows: “3. General damages (in case of death): The following general damages shall be payable in addition to compensation outlined above: (i) Funeral expenses Rs. 2000 (ii) Loss of consortium, if beneficiary is the spouse Rs. 5000 (iii) Loss of estate Rs. 2500 (iv) Medical expenses — actual expenses incurred before death supported by bills/vouchers but not exceeding Rs. 15,000” 50. On a perusal of various decisions of this Court, it is manifest that the Second Schedule has not been followed starting from the decision in Trilok Chandra [UP SRTC v.Trilok Chandra, (1996) 4 SCC 362 ] and there has been no amendment to the same. The conventional damage amount needs to be appositely determined. As we notice, in different cases different amounts have been granted. A sum of Rs 1,00,000 was granted towards consortium inRajesh [Rajesh v. Rajbir Singh, (2013) 9 SCC 54 : (2013) 4 SCC (Civ) 179 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 817 : (2014) 1 SCC (L&S) 149]. The conventional damage amount needs to be appositely determined. As we notice, in different cases different amounts have been granted. A sum of Rs 1,00,000 was granted towards consortium inRajesh [Rajesh v. Rajbir Singh, (2013) 9 SCC 54 : (2013) 4 SCC (Civ) 179 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 817 : (2014) 1 SCC (L&S) 149]. The justification for grant of consortium, as we find fromRajesh [Rajesh v. Rajbir Singh, (2013) 9 SCC 54 : (2013) 4 SCC (Civ) 179 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 817 : (2014) 1 SCC (L&S) 149] , is founded on the observation as we have reproduced hereinbefore. 51. On the aforesaid basis, the Court has revisited the practice of awarding compensation under conventional heads. 52. As far as the conventional heads are concerned, we find it difficult to agree with the view expressed in Rajesh[Rajesh v. Rajbir Singh, (2013) 9 SCC 54 : (2013) 4 SCC (Civ) 179 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 817 : (2014) 1 SCC (L&S) 149] . It has granted Rs 25,000 towards funeral expenses, Rs 1,00,000 towards loss of consortium and Rs 1,00,000 towards loss of care and guidance for minor children. The head relating to loss of care and minor children does not exist. ThoughRajesh [Rajesh v. Rajbir Singh, (2013) 9 SCC 54 : (2013) 4 SCC (Civ) 179 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 817 : (2014) 1 SCC (L&S) 149] refers to Santosh Devi [Santosh Devi v. National Insurance Co. Ltd., (2012) 6 SCC 421 : (2012) 3 SCC (Civ) 726 : (2012) 3 SCC (Cri) 160 : (2012) 2 SCC (L&S) 167] , it does not seem to follow the same. The conventional and traditional heads, needless to say, cannot be determined on percentage basis because that would not be an acceptable criterion. Unlike determination of income, the said heads have to be quantified. Any quantification must have a reasonable foundation. There can be no dispute over the fact that price index, fall in bank interest, escalation of rates in many a field have to be noticed. The court cannot remain oblivious to the same. There has been a thumb rule in this aspect. Any quantification must have a reasonable foundation. There can be no dispute over the fact that price index, fall in bank interest, escalation of rates in many a field have to be noticed. The court cannot remain oblivious to the same. There has been a thumb rule in this aspect. Otherwise, there will be extreme difficulty in determination of the same and unless the thumb rule is applied, there will be immense variation lacking any kind of consistency as a consequence of which, the orders passed by the tribunals and courts are likely to be unguided. Therefore, we think it seemly to fix reasonable sums. It seems to us that reasonable figures on conventional heads, namely, loss of estate, loss of consortium and funeral expenses should be Rs 15,000, Rs 40,000 and Rs 15,000 respectively. The principle of revisiting the said heads is an acceptable principle. But the revisit should not be fact- centric or quantum-centric. We think that it would be condign that the amount that we have quantified should be enhanced on percentage basis in every three years and the enhancement should be at the rate of 10% in a span of three years. We are disposed to hold so because that will bring in consistency in respect of those heads.” (emphasis by Court) 43. The next issue for consideration is compensation that is to be awarded for loss of consortium. This issue fell for consideration before their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Magma General Insurance Company Ltd. v. Nanu Ram alias Chuhru Ram and others, (2018) 18 SCC 130 . In Magma General Insurance Company Ltd. (supra), it has been held: “21. A Constitution Bench of this Court in Pranay Sethi [National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi, (2017) 16 SCC 680 : (2018) 3 SCC (Civ) 248 : (2018) 2 SCC (Cri) 205] dealt with the various heads under which compensation is to be awarded in a death case. One of these heads is loss of consortium. In legal parlance, “consortium” is a compendious term which encompasses “spousal consortium”, “parental consortium”, and “filial consortium”. The right to consortium would include the company, care, help, comfort, guidance, solace and affection of the deceased, which is a loss to his family. One of these heads is loss of consortium. In legal parlance, “consortium” is a compendious term which encompasses “spousal consortium”, “parental consortium”, and “filial consortium”. The right to consortium would include the company, care, help, comfort, guidance, solace and affection of the deceased, which is a loss to his family. With respect to a spouse, it would include sexual relations with the deceased spouse : [Rajesh v. Rajbir Singh, (2013) 9 SCC 54 : (2013) 4 SCC (Civ) 179 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 817 : (2014) 1 SCC (L&S) 149] 21.1. Spousal consortium is generally defined as rights pertaining to the relationship of a husband-wife which allows compensation to the surviving spouse for loss of “company, society, cooperation, affection, and aid of the other in every conjugal relation”. [Black's Law Dictionary(5th Edn., 1979).] 21.2. Parental consortium is granted to the child upon the premature death of a parent, for loss of “parental aid, protection, affection, society, discipline, guidance and training”. 21.3. Filial consortium is the right of the parents to compensation in the case of an accidental death of a child. An accident leading to the death of a child causes great shock and agony to the parents and family of the deceased. The greatest agony for a parent is to lose their child during their lifetime. Children are valued for their love, affection, companionship and their role in the family unit. (emphasis by Court) 44. In the opinion of this Court, so far as the consortium is concerned, though amongst the claimants, the claimant mother has not been held entitled to any dependency, she has lost her daughter and would, therefore, be entitled to filial consortium. So far as the minor claimant is concerned, she would, of course, be entitled to parental consortium. Amongst the claimants, the deceased's uncle (father's brother), who has not been considered any kind of a dependent of the deceased, is not entitled to anything towards consortium as well. He does not fall under any of the known categories, where compensation for the loss of consortium is to be awarded. 45. Amongst the claimants, the deceased's uncle (father's brother), who has not been considered any kind of a dependent of the deceased, is not entitled to anything towards consortium as well. He does not fall under any of the known categories, where compensation for the loss of consortium is to be awarded. 45. Since 50% of the liability for the compensation payable to the claimants was apportioned to the share of the UPSRTC, with whom the claimants have settled their claim fully and finally before the Lok Adalat, whatever compensation is found due on revision, would be payable by the owner and/ or the Insurers to the extent of 50% alone, most of it to the minor claimant, except the consortium, to which the claimant mother would also be entitled. The way this Court has held, whatever compensation towards the 50% of the dependency has been settled between the claimants and the UPSRTC, none of the claimants, except the minor claimant, would be entitled to the said sum of money. Nevertheless, since 50% of the claim apportioned to the UPSRTC has been settled by the claimants through a compromise before the Lok Adalat, accepting a total of Rs.60,000/-, it is very difficult to further safeguard the minor claimant's interest in regard to that part of the compensation. This Court would rest content to hope and trust that the claimant’s mother, who is the minor claimant's grandmother, would not tread upon the minor claimant's interest and work to safeguard it, being a higher mother. So much of the part of compensation in consequence of the settlement with the UPSRTC that the deceased's uncle has claimed and realized can also be best left to his own conscience. 46. Since it has been held that compensation is payable in the first instance by the Insurers, the Insurers are liable to satisfy the award to the extent payable by the owner with liberty to recover from the owner through a miscellaneous application to be made before the Tribunal, executing the award. 47. 46. Since it has been held that compensation is payable in the first instance by the Insurers, the Insurers are liable to satisfy the award to the extent payable by the owner with liberty to recover from the owner through a miscellaneous application to be made before the Tribunal, executing the award. 47. In view of the aforesaid conclusion, compensation payable to the claimants would have to be worked out in the following manner: (i) Monthly Income (of the deceased) = 3000 (ii) Monthly Income+Future Prospects (monthly income x 50%) 3000+1500 = 4500 (iii) Annual Income (of the deceased) 4500x12 54000 (iv) Annual Dependency = Annual Income – 50% deduction towards personal expenses of the deceased = 54000-27000 = 27000 (v) Total Dependency = Annual Dependency x Applied Multiplier = 27000x18 = 486000 (vi) Claimants’ entitlement towards conventional heads = Loss of Estate + Funeral Expenses + dependents’ Consortium =15000+15000+40000x2 = 110000 The total compensation would therefore, work out to a figure of Rs. 486000+ Rs. 110000 = 596000 Less 50% of the compensation apportioned to the share of the UPSRTC settled in the Lok Adalat = 596000/2 = 298000 48. In the result, this appeal is allowed in part. The impugned award passed by the Tribunal is modified and the compensation awarded and payable by the owner is enhanced to Rs. 2,98,000/-. The aforesaid sum of money shall be payable in the first instance by the Insurers with liberty to recover from the owner through a miscellaneous application to be made before the Tribunal. The said sum of money shall carry simple interest at the rate of 7% per annum from the date of institution of the claim petition, until realization. Any sum of money already deposited with the Tribunal by the owner, pursuant to the impugned award, shall be adjusted against the award. 49. The inter se apportionment of compensation ordered by the Tribunal is set aside and substituted by a direction that out of the total compensation, held payable to the claimants, the minor claimant shall be entitled to the whole of it, except a sum of Rs.20,000/-(50% of the filial consortium), which shall be payable to the claimant, Hamidunnisha. The sum of Rs.10,000/-directed to be paid to the claimant, Abdul Khaliq, if already paid, shall be refunded with interest @ 7% per annum to the minor claimant. The sum of Rs.10,000/-directed to be paid to the claimant, Abdul Khaliq, if already paid, shall be refunded with interest @ 7% per annum to the minor claimant. Likewise, the sum of Rs.25,000/-payable to the claimant, Smt. Hamidunnisha, if paid, shall be refunded to the minor claimant with interest at the same rate, subject to the condition that a sum of Rs.20,000/-, in the event of refund shall be adjusted in favour of the claimant, Smt. Hamidunnisha. 50. Costs easy.