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2023 DIGILAW 1190 (PAT)

S. M. Zafar Imam v. State of Bihar

2023-10-19

MOHIT KUMAR SHAH

body2023
Mohit Kumar Shah, J. – The present writ petition has been filed for quashing the notice, issued by the Circle Officer, Benipur, Darbhanga, under the provisions of the Bihar Public Land Encroachment Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as the “Act, 1956”), dt. 02.8.2021, in connection with Encroachment Case No. 23 of 2011-12, by which the petitioner has been directed to remove the encroachment by 10.08.2021. The petitioner has also sought quashing of memo dated 28.12.2022, issued by the Circle Officer, Benipur, whereby and whereunder the petitioner has been asked to submit evidence within three days regarding his right, title and interest over the land in question, in view of the fact that the copy of khatiyan, submitted by the petitioner, upon being verified from the District Record Room, Darbhanga, has not been found to have been issued from the District Record Room, Darbhanga and the same is forged. 2. At the outset, it would be apt to point out that several interlocutory applications have been filed in the present case, out of which, while I.A. No. 2 of 2023, I.A. No. 3 of 2023 and I.A. No. 4 of 2023 have been filed by the petitioner, I.A. No. 1 of 2023 has been filed by the brother of the petitioner namely Sri. S. M. Naiyer Imam, seeking to intervene in the present case for being impleaded as Respondent No. 7. In fact, the order dated 03.04.2023, passed in the present case, would show that a copy of I.A. No. 1 of 2023, filed by the proposed intervenor respondent, has already been handed over to the learned counsel for the petitioner. The learned Senior Counsel / counsels for the parties hold a unanimous view to the effect that technicalities should not come in the way of imparting justice, hence, all the interlocutory applications may be allowed. Accordingly, I.A. No. 1 of 2023, I.A. No. 2 of 2023, I.A. No. 3 of 2023 and I.A. No. 4 of 2023 are allowed. The registry shall add the additional prayers made in I.A. No. 2 of 2023, I.A. No. 3 of 2023 and I.A. No. 4 of 2023 to the prayer portion of the main writ petition as well as depict proposed intervenor of I.A. No. 1 of 2023 as Respondent No. 7 to the present writ petition. 3. The registry shall add the additional prayers made in I.A. No. 2 of 2023, I.A. No. 3 of 2023 and I.A. No. 4 of 2023 to the prayer portion of the main writ petition as well as depict proposed intervenor of I.A. No. 1 of 2023 as Respondent No. 7 to the present writ petition. 3. The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner had also submitted that the pleadings are complete in the present case and the petitioner does not wish to file any reply to I.A. No. 1 of 2023, inasmuch as the same is formal in nature and the averments already pleaded by the petitioner in the writ petition, interlocutory applications and the supplementary affidavits etc., filed in the present case, are more than sufficient. In fact, the learned counsel for the Respondent-State had also submitted that the counter affidavit, filed by the District Magistrate, Darbhanga, is sufficient to deal with all the interlocutory applications. Similarly, no inclination has been shown by the learned counsel for the intervenor respondent to file any further affidavit. It had been unanimously submitted at bar by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner and the learned counsels for the Respondents including that of the intervenor Respondent that the present case be heard on merits and it be decided finally. Thus the learned Senior counsel for the petitioner/learned counsels for the Respondents were heard at length on 17.4.2023 and the judgment was reserved. 4. Thus, in nutshell, the petitioner has prayed for quashing the notice dated 2.8.2021, issued by the Circle Officer, Benipur, the memo dated 28.12.2022, issued by the Circle Officer, Benipur, the letter dated 28.2.2023, issued by the Circle Officer, Benipur to the Collector cum District Consolidation/Settlement Officer, Darbhanga, to cancel Case No. 316 of 2006, the order dated 02.03.2023, passed by the Circle Officer, Benipur under Section 6(1) of the Act, 1956, declaring the land in question to be a public land and the joint inspection report dated 28.3.2023. Facts of the Case: 5. The brief facts of the case, according to the petitioner, are that earlier notice was issued to the petitioner regarding the land in question bearing Khesra No. 100, 101, 102 and 103, situated at Mauza-Basuham, Circle-Benipur, stating therein that the said land is registered in the Government records as “Anabad Bihar Sarkar”. Facts of the Case: 5. The brief facts of the case, according to the petitioner, are that earlier notice was issued to the petitioner regarding the land in question bearing Khesra No. 100, 101, 102 and 103, situated at Mauza-Basuham, Circle-Benipur, stating therein that the said land is registered in the Government records as “Anabad Bihar Sarkar”. It is stated that the mother of the petitioner, namely, Smt. Bibi Nabiul Fatima, wife of late Md. Zareef, had filed a case, under Section 106 of the Bihar Tenancy Act, 1885 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act, 1885”), bearing Case No. 316 of 2006, which was finally decided in her favor, vide judgment dated 30.4.2009 and it was directed to register the name of the mother of the petitioner in the Government records. It is also submitted that earlier also, notice was issued for removal of the encroachment in question, which was challenged by the brother of the petitioner, namely, Dr. S. M. Naqui Imam, by filing a writ petition bearing CWJC No. 9495 of 2012, which was disposed off by a coordinate Bench of this Court, vide order dated 12.4.2013, granting liberty to him to file representation within three weeks, stating therein the relevant details of his case as also annexing relevant documents in support of his claim and the same was directed to be considered and disposed off, in accordance with law, by passing of the final order by the Circle Officer, Benipur and till then, it was directed that no coercive steps shall be taken against the petitioner of that writ petition. 6. The Ld. Senior Counsel for the petitioner has next stated that though the controversy in question had died down, but in the meantime, one Bhuneshwar Jha was posted as Circle Officer, Benipur, who, in connivance with the rivals of the petitioner and with the intention of exhorting money, had again initiated encroachment proceedings and had issued a notice dated 18.01.2021 to the petitioner, in connection with Encroachment Case No. 23 of 2011-12, whereby the petitioner was directed to appear before the Circle Officer, Benipur and file his show cause as to why action be not taken to remove the encroachment in question. The petitioner is stated to have filed his reply on 01.02.2021, explaining therein the entire history, pertaining to the land in question. The petitioner is stated to have filed his reply on 01.02.2021, explaining therein the entire history, pertaining to the land in question. The Circle Officer, Benipur, had then written a letter dated 04.02.2021, for the purposes of verifying the actual facts, to the Assistant Consolidation / Settlement Officer, Darbhanga, by which he had requested him to confirm as to whether Khesra No. 100 and 101 are recorded in the name of Smt. Bibi Nabiul Fatima, to which the Assistant Consolidation/Settlement Officer, Darbhanga, had replied, vide letter dated 29.06.2021, stating therein that the documents have been verified and found to be correct, nonetheless, the Circle Officer, Benipur, had again issued a notice dated 02.08.2021, in connection with Encro. Case No. 23 of 2011-12, directing the petitioner to remove the encroachment in question, which was replied to by the petitioner, vide letter dt. 07.08.2021, however, the Circle Officer, Benipur, had then written a letter dt. 6.5.2021 to the Senior Officer, District Record Room, Darbhanga, to verify & confirm about the khatiyan, produced by the petitioner, which was replied to, vide letter dated 10.11.2022, wherein it was stated that the Khatiyan of Khesra No. 100 and 101 has not been issued by the said Office. Thereafter, the Circle Officer, Benipur, had issued another notice dated 28.12.2022, wherein he had directed the petitioner to submit his reply within three days, adducing proper evidence regarding his right, title and interest in the land in question. The petitioner had then submitted his reply, however, in the meantime, the Circle Officer, Benipur, had written a letter dated 28.2.2023 to the Collector cum District Consolidation / Settlement Officer, Darbhanga, for cancelling the order, passed in Case No. 316/2006, inasmuch as the same has been obtained/ passed by committing deceit and fraud. It is next contended that the Circle Officer, Benipur, had then passed the final order dt. 02.3.2023, under Section 6(1) of the Act, 1956, in connection with Encro. Case No. 23 of 2011-12, holding the land in question to be a public land & further declaring the petitioner to be an encroacher. 7. The further case of the petitioner is that the old Khesra No. 86 was having a total area of 7 bigha, 2 katha and 2 dhur, situated at Mauza- Basuham, which also includes village rasta and the same was bifurcated and renumbered as Khesra No. 98, 101 and 102. 7. The further case of the petitioner is that the old Khesra No. 86 was having a total area of 7 bigha, 2 katha and 2 dhur, situated at Mauza- Basuham, which also includes village rasta and the same was bifurcated and renumbered as Khesra No. 98, 101 and 102. It is submitted that at the time of vesting of the old Khesra No. 86, the same was registered as Gairmajarua Malik, which was also mentioned in the return, filed by the ex-landlord and the petitioner came in possession of the land by virtue of parcha, issued in favor of mother of the petitioner and on the basis of the same, the mother of the petitioner had filed a suit bearing Case No. 316 of 2006, under Section 106 of the Act, 1885, before the Assistant Settlement Officer, Darbhanga, who, upon enquiry, had passed an order dated 30.4.2009 and had ordered to omit the name of the State Respondent from the Khatiyan parcha, pertaining to Khata No. 1435, Khesra No. 100 and 101, situated at Mauza-Basuham, Circle-Benipur, P.S. No. 134, District-Darbhanga and record the name of Bibi Nabiul Fatima. Thus, it is submitted that the Respondents have incorrectly stated in the counter affidavit that the land in question is Anabad Sarve Sadharan, type-Rasta or Gairmajurua Aam land. It is also submitted that the averment of the private Respondent No. 7 to the effect that the mother of the petitioner had died on 01.10.2005, is also incorrect, inasmuch as she had actually died on 2.10.2007, as would be apparent from the death certificate dt. 07.4.2021, issued by the Nagar Parishad, Benipur. The Ld. Senior Counsel for the petitioner has contended that the private Respondent No. 7 has been litigating with the petitioner since several years, several cases are pending in between them & family dispute is existing in between them since about twenty years, thus, all the averments made by the private Respondent No. 7 are motivated, incorrect and intentional with a view to harass the petitioner and disturb his peaceful life. Thus, it is submitted that the joint inspection report dated 28.03.2023 is non est in the eyes of law. At this juncture, the Ld. Thus, it is submitted that the joint inspection report dated 28.03.2023 is non est in the eyes of law. At this juncture, the Ld. Senior Counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the contention of the private Respondent No. 7 and for that matter that of the Respondent-State, to the effect that the mother of the petitioner had died on 01.10.2007 and the case, under Section 106 of the Act, 1885, was fraudulently instituted at the instance of the petitioner only on 04.07.2006, is also incorrect, inasmuch as the mother of the petitioner had died on 2.10.2007, whereafter the petitioner had filed an application for substitution on 19.11.2007, inasmuch as the land in question along with the building standing thereon was orally gifted to the petitioner by his mother. Contentions of the Ld. Senior Counsel for the petitioner: 8. As far as the legal aspect of the matter is concerned, the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner has submitted that in an encroachment proceeding, the issue of title cannot be decided and possession cannot be disturbed and in case, there is bonafide / serious dispute regarding the right, title and interest of a person / the Government, to any property, the Respondent-State should, in such a situation, resort to the regular proceedings of suit and then get a decree for eviction of a person from unauthorized occupation. The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner has stated that summary proceedings can be resorted to only where unauthorized occupation of Government property is not in dispute, however, if the occupant raises bonafide claim about his right/title over the premises in question, proper remedy would be institution of a suit for adjudication of dispute regarding ownership right over the land in question and to get the right declared by the competent Civil Court. In this regard, the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner has referred to various judgments, rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court as also by this Court, which are being enumerated herein below: – “(I) (1982) 2 SCC 134 (Government of Andhra Pradesh vs. Thummala Krishna Rao & Another) (II) (2019) 20 SCC 705 (Kaikhosrou (Chick) Kavasji Framji vs. Union of India & Another) (III) 1992 (2) PLJR 854 (Smt. Rekha Singh & Others vs. State of Bihar & Others) (IV) 2016 (4) PLJR 122 [: 2016 (3) BLJ 6 (PHC)] (Sri 108 Shyamajee vs. The State of Bihar & Ors.). (V) 2001 (2) PLJR 587 (Smt. Uma Devi Sinha vs. State of Bihar & Ors.) (VI) 2014 (3) PLJR 798 [: 2014 (4) BLJ 73 (PHC)] (Tapeshwar Prasad Singh vs. The State of Bihar vs. Ors.) (VII) 2017 (1) PLJR 818 [: 2017 (4) BLJ 163 (PHC)] (Vijay Kumar Prasad vs. The State of Bihar & Ors.)” Contentions of the Ld. Counsel for the State : 9. Per contra, the learned counsel for the Respondent-State has submitted, by referring to the counter affidavit, filed in the present case by the Collector cum District Magistrate, Darbhanga that considering the directions of this Court, an enquiry committee, under the Chairmanship of the Additional Collector, Darbhanga, was constituted, vide memo dated 23.03.2023 and in the meantime, an order was passed to maintain status quo at the spot in question. The enquiry committee under the chairmanship of the Additional Collector, Darbhanga, through the Circle Officer, Benipur, had given proper information to the petitioner vide memo no. 615 dated 23.03.2023, so that the inquiry can be conducted in the presence of the petitioner and others. Accordingly, on the date and time, as fixed by the committee, the inquiry committee along with its officials had visited the spot and the land in question, appertaining to Khata No. 1434 (N), Khesra No.-100 (N) and 101 (N), situated at Mauza- Basuham, Thana No. 134, Anchal- Benipur, Darbhanga and had then properly measured and verified the land in question, in the presence of the petitioner, local representatives & other villagers, whereafter, proceedings thereof was drawn on the spot. It is pertinent to mention here that the petitioner refused to put his signature upon the proceeding order dt. 27.03.2023. Thereafter, the Additional Collector, Darbhanga, had submitted the joint inquiry report dated 27.03.2023, vide Memo No.933/R, dated 28.03.2023, relevant portion whereof are reproduced herein below: – "In this view of the matter, in case such representation is filed within a period of three weeks stating the relevant details of his case as also annexing the copy of the relevant documents in support of his claim, the representation be considered in accordance with law expeditiously and upon consideration final order be passed and communicated to the petitioner. Till passing of the final order, let no coercive step be taken against the petitioner pursuant to Annexures- 1 & 2. Till passing of the final order, let no coercive step be taken against the petitioner pursuant to Annexures- 1 & 2. The writ application stands disposed of with the above observationsèdirections." Øe lañ vfrØe.kdkjh dk uke vkjñ ,lñ [kkrk lañ vkjñ ,lñ [kkrk lañ jdok vfrØe.kk dk fdLe 1. Jh ,lñ,eñ tiQj beke] MkWñ ,lñ ,eñ udh beke] Jh ,lñ ,eñ uS;j beke] ,lñ ,eñ ljoj beke ,oa Jh ,lñ ,eñ vyh beke firk&Loñ ,lñ ,eñ tjhiQ 1434 101 02 dV~Bk bZaV iDdk edku 2. Jh jktk reUuk firk&eksñ lxhj vgen ejgwe 1434 100 9 èkwj (2 fMñ) bZaV edku 3. Jh vuoj vkye firk&;kdcw jgekuh 1434 101 1 èkwj (0-22 fMñ) vkaf'kd fnoky 10. The learned counsel for the Respondent-State has further submitted that it would be apparent from the aforesaid report dated 27/28.03.2023 that the new Kheshra No. 100 and 101 have been carved out from the old Kheshra No. 86 and the nature of the land in both i.e. cadastral survey and revisional survey is Rasta, recorded as Gairmajurua Aam and Anavad Serve Sadharan respectively. The report also signifies the fact that the petitioner’s mother, namely Nabiul Fatima, died on 01.10.2005, which is evident from photograph of the grave stone of the mother of the petitioner, whereas it has been erroneously claimed that the mother of the petitioner had filed a Title Suit bearing Title Suit No. 316/2006, under section 106 of the Act, 1885 on 04.07.2206 and had obtained a decree, which is apparently fraudulent. The report also states that the In-charge Officer, Record Room, Darbhanga, vide letter no. 77 dated 21.03.2023, has clearly stated that no Tarmim/Rectification has been made in the R.S Khatiyan, which stands corroborated from the affidavit submitted by the brother of the petitioner namely Dr. S.M Naqui Imam and Shri S.M Nair Imam, vide Oath No. 68 dated 20.03.2023, wherein, it has been stated that their mother had been died on 01.10.2005 and the decree obtained in connection with Title Suit no. 316 of 2006, under section 106 of the Act, 1885, is forged. Thus, considering the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case, the committee, headed by the Additional Collector, Darbhanga, has casted serious doubts upon the said decree, passed in Title Suit no. 316 of 2016, under section 106 of the Act, 1885. 11. 316 of 2006, under section 106 of the Act, 1885, is forged. Thus, considering the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case, the committee, headed by the Additional Collector, Darbhanga, has casted serious doubts upon the said decree, passed in Title Suit no. 316 of 2016, under section 106 of the Act, 1885. 11. It is next contended that the aforesaid report would also show that the land in question has been measured in the presence of the petitioner, local representatives and villagers, whereupon it has been found that the land in question has been encroached by the encroachers including the petitioner. It is also contended that one more encroacher, namely Shri Anwar Alam, has been identified and accordingly, the aforesaid committee has granted approval to initiate encroachment proceeding as against him. 12. Thus, it is submitted by the learned counsel for the Respondent-State that apparently the land in question is a public land, which has been encroached by the encroachers including the petitioner and for its removal, as also in compliance of the order of this Hon'ble Court dated 27.07.2011, passed in C.W.J.C No. 17282 of 2010, an Encroachment Case No. 23/2011-12 was initiated and after issuing notice to the encroachers, providing reasonable opportunity to the encroachers including the petitioner, to put forth their defence and in accordance with the provisions contained in the Act, 1956, the Circle officer, Benipur, has passed the final order dated 02.03.2023, under Section 6(1) of the Act, 1956, declaring the land in question to be a public land. Contentions of the Ld. Counsel for the intervenor-private Respondent No. 7: 13. The learned counsel for the private Respondent No. 7 has submitted that the mother of the petitioner had died on 01.10.2005, hence, the aforesaid case, purportedly filed, under Section 106 of the Act, 1885, bearing Case No. 316 of 2006, which is stated to have been filed on 04.07.2006, could not have actually been filed, hence, the entire premise, on which the petitioner has based his case, is founded on deceit, manufactured documents and fraud. In fact, the In-charge Officer, District Record Room, Darbhanga, has also certified that no amendment / revision has been made in the Khatiyan panji as far as Khata No. 1434, Khesra No. 100 and 101, situated at Mauza-Basuham, P.S. No. 134, Circle-Benipur, District-Darbhanga, is concerned and the revised khatiyan, produced by the petitioner, has not been issued by the said office. It is further submitted that the petitioner has created yet another forged document i.e. the death certificate of the mother of the petitioner dated 07.04.2021, wherein the date of death has been mentioned as 02.10.2007, as is apparent from a bare perusal of the entire records of the said Case No. 316 of 2006 along with its order-sheet (at running page no. 184 onwards of the brief), which would demonstrate that the mother of the petitioner has been shown to be present on various dates, fixed by the Presiding Officer, i.e. on 31.12.2008, 13.2.2009 and 27.2.2009, in connection with Case No. 316 of 2006, hence, if the mother of the petitioner had died on 2.10.2007, her appearance could not have been recorded on the aforesaid dates. It is also submitted that the bar code, affixed on the death certificate, is forged and fabricated, inasmuch as, upon scanning the same, no record could be found. DETERMINATION: 14. Having heard the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner and the learned counsel for the Respondents, this Court finds that the premises of the defence put forth by the petitioner rests on the order dated 30.4.2009, passed by the Presiding Officer, Darbhanga, in Case No. 316 of 2006, under Section 106 of the Act, 1885, whereby and whereunder the Presiding Officer, Darbhanga, has directed to omit the name of the Respondent-State in the khatiyan panji qua Khata No. 1435 (which in fact is non-existant inasmuch as the actual khata No. is 1434), Khesra No. 100 and 101, situated at Mauza-Basuham, Circle-Benipur, P.S. No. 134 and instead, record the name of the mother of the petitioner, namely, Bibi Nabiul Fatima, although the entire pleadings made in the present case would demonstrate that not a single chit of paper has been produced by the petitioner to show his bonafide regarding him possessing right, title and interest over the land in question. At this juncture, it would be relevant to quote Section 106 of the Act, 1885 herein below: – “106. At this juncture, it would be relevant to quote Section 106 of the Act, 1885 herein below: – “106. Institution of suit before a Revenue Officer. – In proceedings under this Part, a suit may be instituted before a Revenue Officer at any time within three months from the date of the certificate of the final publication of the record-of-rights under sub-section (2) of Section 103- A of this Act, by presenting a plaint on stamped paper, for the decision of any dispute regarding any entry which a Revenue Officer has made in, or any omission which the said officer has made from the record; whether such dispute be between landlord and tenant, or between landlord of the same or of neighbouring estates, or between tenant and tenant, or as to whether the relationship of landlord and tenant exists, or as to whether land held rent free is properly so held, or as to any other matter: and the Revenue Officer shall hear and decide the dispute: [Omitted by Act 2 of 1965.] Provided [Omitted by Act 2 of 1965.] that in any suit under this Section the Revenue Officer shall not try any issue which has been, or is already, directly, and substantially in issue between the same parties, or between parties under whom they or any of them claim, in proceedings for the settlement of rents under this Part, where such issue has been tried and decided, or is already tried, by a Revenue Officer under Section 105-A.” 15. At this juncture, it would be relevant to reproduce herein below, the statements made in the written statement, filed on behalf of the State of Bihar before the Presiding Officer / Assistant Settlement Officer, Darbhanga, in Case No. 316 of 2006: – “(1) That the suit as framed and filed is not maintainable either in law on fact. (2) That the plaintiff has no cause of action or right to sue. (3) That the suit is barred by the law of limitation. (4) That the suit is barred by the principle of estoppel, waiver and acquiescence. (5) That the statements made in support of the plaint is neither admitted nor denied. (6) That the plaintiff has claimed the issue in question on the basis of Kewala. It is submitted that the plaintiff has not filed any chit of paper in support of his claim. (5) That the statements made in support of the plaint is neither admitted nor denied. (6) That the plaintiff has claimed the issue in question on the basis of Kewala. It is submitted that the plaintiff has not filed any chit of paper in support of his claim. It is further submitted that the plaintiff has also not filed the C.S. Khatiyan. It is further submitted that the claim of the plaintiff is totally imaginary or / and vexatious. (7) That so far possession is concerned, it is submitted that the plaintiff has never been in possession of the suit land. In fact, that the land in question is concerned, is in possession of the State and the same is under the control of Sadar Anchal. (8) That the land in question was and is the Government land and as such the plaintiff has no manner of concern with the land in question. (9) That so far the rent receipt is concerned, it is submitted that the alleged rent receipt is not at variance with the land. (10) That the nature of the land…. Illegible…. (11) That the survey panji has rightly recorded in the name of State and as such there is no question to delete the name of the State from the khata in question. (12) That in view of the fact as stated above, it is necessary that the case of the plaintiff is fit to be dismissed.” 16. A bare perusal of the written statement, filed on behalf of the State of Bihar, would show that a specific plea regarding the suit being barred by the law of limitation, was raised, apart from it being categorically averred that the plaintiff has neither filed any chit of paper in support of his claim nor has filed CS khatiyan and the entire claim is based on imaginary and vexatious grounds. In fact, the possession of the plaintiff on the suit land was also disputed. A bare perusal of Section 106 of the Act, 1885 would show that suit is required to be filed at any time within three months from the date of the certificate of the final publication of the record of rights under sub-section (2) of Section 103-A of the Act, 1885, by presenting a plaint on stamp paper. A bare perusal of Section 106 of the Act, 1885 would show that suit is required to be filed at any time within three months from the date of the certificate of the final publication of the record of rights under sub-section (2) of Section 103-A of the Act, 1885, by presenting a plaint on stamp paper. However, it is an undisputed fact that the records of right, after revisional survey, was prepared and published on 3.3.1984, however, the suit has been filed by the mother of the petitioner only on 04.07.2006, hence, the same is clearly barred by the law of limitation. Nonetheless, the Presiding Officer / Assistant Settlement Officer, Darbhanga, failed to adjudicate the said issue regarding the suit itself being barred by limitation, despite such objection having been raised by the Respondent-State in its written statement, filed in the said Case No. 316 of 2006. It is a trite law that a case, filed under Section 106 of the Act, 1885, is a suit and is covered by the provisions of the limitation act and there is no power vested in the authority to condone the delay in filing the suit, filed beyond the time prescribed, hence, any suit, filed beyond the period of limitation, cannot be entertained, inasmuch as the same is impermissible in law. Reference, in this regard, be had to a judgment, rendered by the learned Division Bench of this Court in the case of Tilkeshwar Singh @ Tilkeshwar Prasad Singh vs. State of Bihar & Others, reported in 2004 (3) PLJR 114 . Reference be also had to the judgment, rendered by this Court, in the case of Kunti Kumari @ Manju Singh vs. State of Bihar & Ors., reported in 1998 (3) PLJR 490 . 17. Another aspect of the matter is regarding the actual date of death of the mother of the petitioner, namely, Bibi Nabiul Fatima, who is stated to have filed the aforesaid petition under Section 106 of the Act, 1885, before the Presiding Officer/ Assistant Settlement Officer, Darbhanga, i.e. the case bearing Case No. 316 of 2006. 17. Another aspect of the matter is regarding the actual date of death of the mother of the petitioner, namely, Bibi Nabiul Fatima, who is stated to have filed the aforesaid petition under Section 106 of the Act, 1885, before the Presiding Officer/ Assistant Settlement Officer, Darbhanga, i.e. the case bearing Case No. 316 of 2006. In this regard, it is the categorical averment of the Respondent No. 7 that the mother of the petitioner as also his mother, namely, Bibi Nabiul Fatima, had died on 01.10.2005 and in proof thereof, the Respondent No. 7 has annexed an affidavit, sworn by him and his brother, stating therein that their mother died on 01.10.2005 and the head stone kept on top of the grave of their mother also bear the date of death as 01.10.2005. In fact the parties have also mentioned the date of death of the deceased Bibi Nabiul Fatima as 01.10.2005 in collateral proceedings, as can be culled out from Page No. 148 of the brief. 18. In reference to the death certificate of the mother of the petitioner dated 07.04.2021, purportedly issued by the Nagar Parishad, Benipur, showing her date of death to be 02.10.2007, it would be first relevant to refer to Rule 8 and 9 of the Registration of Birth and Death Rules, 1999, which postulates that the information regarding birth and death is to be given within a maximum period of 30 days, however, the same can also be given after expiry of 30 days, but within one year of its occurrence, however, in such cases, the same shall be registered only with the permission of the officer, prescribed in that behalf and on payment of late fee. In case of any birth and death, which has not been registered within one year of its occurrence, the same can be registered only on an order of a Magistrate of the 1st Class or a presidency Magistrate, however, this Court finds that the said procedure has not been adhered to in the present case and a death certificate of the mother of the petitioner dated 07.04.2021, purportedly certifying that the death of the mother of the petitioner had taken place on 2.10.2007 i.e about 14 years back, has been issued by Nagar Parishad, Benipur, which is annexed as Annexure-20 to the present writ petition, thus the same itself is apparently a manufactured document. Apart from the aforesaid issue regarding the aforesaid Case No. 316 of 2006, having been filed under Section 106 of the Act, 1885 on 04.07.2006, purportedly by the deceased mother of the petitioner, who had already died on 01.10.2005, this Court finds that even if her date of death is taken to be 02.10.2007, she had continued to appear before the Presiding Officer/Assistant Settlement Officer in the aforesaid case No. 316 of 2006 on various dates i.e. 31.12.2008, 13.2.2009 & 27.2.2009 (as can be culled out from the appearance slips of the said deceased Bibi Nabiul Fatima, tendered in the aforesaid Case No. 316 of 2006, which can be found at running page no. 198 to 202 of the brief), which is inconceivable, thus, the entire proceedings of the said case is attended with fraud and deceit. 19. Yet another aspect of the matter is that the petitioner has stated in paragraph no. 7 of the supplementary affidavit, filed in the present case, that he had filed an application for substitution on 19.11.2007 in the aforesaid Case No. 316 of 2006, after a portion of the land and building in question was orally given to the petitioner by his mother, however, this Court finds that firstly, after the death of the mother of the petitioner, if at all, she was having any property, the same is obviously required to be divided amongst all the five sons, nonetheless, this Court finds that neither any order has been passed on the substitution petition, filed by the petitioner showing himself to be the sole legal heir of the deceased Nabiul Fatima nor the petitioner has been substituted in the aforesaid Case No. 316 of 2006. In fact no proof has been brought on record to show that the Presiding Officer had ever acknowledged filing of the said substitution petition, as is also apparent from the order-sheet of the said case, annexed by the private Respondent No. 7, in the second supplementary affidavit filed by him, which can be found at page no. 184 and 185 of the brief. Thus, the entire proceedings of the aforesaid Case No. 316 of 2006 is attended with malafide, deceit and fraud. 184 and 185 of the brief. Thus, the entire proceedings of the aforesaid Case No. 316 of 2006 is attended with malafide, deceit and fraud. It is a well-settled principle of law that a judgment or decree obtained by playing fraud on the Court is a nullity and non-est in the eyes of law, thus, this Court would desist from giving any credence to the aforesaid order dated 30.4.2009 and the decree in question, passed in Case No. 316 of 2006, by the Presiding Officer / Assistant Settlement Officer, Darbhanga. Reference in this regard be had to a judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu vs. Jagannath, reported in (1994) 1 SCC 1 , paragraph No. 5 whereof is being reproduced herein below: – “5. The High Court, in our view, fell into patent error. The short question before the High Court was whether in the facts and circumstances of this case, Jagannath obtained the preliminary decree by playing fraud on the court. The High Court, however, went haywire and made observations which are wholly perverse. We do not agree with the High Court that “there is no legal duty cast upon the plaintiff to come to court with a true case and prove it by true evidence”. The principle of “finality of litigation” cannot be pressed to the extent of such an absurdity that it becomes an engine of fraud in the hands of dishonest litigants. The courts of law are meant for imparting justice between the parties. One who comes to the court, must come with clean hands. We are constrained to say that more often than not, process of the court is being abused. Property-grabbers, tax-evaders, bank-loan-dodgers and other unscrupulous persons from all walks of life find the court-process a convenient lever to retain the illegal gains indefinitely. We have no hesitation to say that a person, who's case is based on falsehood, has no right to approach the court. He can be summarily thrown out at any stage of the litigation.” 20. It is equally a well settled law that a judgment/decree passed in favor of a dead person is a nullity in the eyes of law. We have no hesitation to say that a person, who's case is based on falsehood, has no right to approach the court. He can be summarily thrown out at any stage of the litigation.” 20. It is equally a well settled law that a judgment/decree passed in favor of a dead person is a nullity in the eyes of law. Admittedly in the present case, the aforesaid judgment/ decree dated 30.4.2009, has been passed by the Presiding Officer / Assistant Settlement Officer, Darbhanga in Case No. 316 of 2006, in favor of the deceased Bibi Nabiul Fatima, hence the same is nullity in the eyes of law and is of no help to the petitioner, thus his case solely based upon the same is bound to fail and is bereft of any merit. Reference in this regard be had to the judgments rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Gurnam Singh vs. Gurbachan Kaur, reported in (2017) 13 SCC 414 , the one rendered in the case of T. Gnanavel vs. T.S. Kanagaraj, reported in (2009) 14 SCC 294 and the one rendered in the case of Amba Bai vs. Gopal, reported in (2001) 5 SCC 570 . It would be relevant to reproduce paragraph Nos. 13 to 15, 17, 19 to 23 of the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Gurnam Singh vs. Gurbachan Kaur (supra) herein below: – “13. The short question which arises for consideration in this appeal is whether the impugned order allowing the plaintiff's second appeal is legally sustainable in law? In other words, the question is whether the High Court had the jurisdiction to decide the second appeal when the appellant and the 2 respondents had expired during the pendency of appeal and their legal representatives were not brought on record? 14. In a leading case of this Court in Kiran Singh vs. Chaman Paswan [Kiran Singh vs. Chaman Paswan, AIR 1954 SC 340 ] , the learned Judge Venkatarama Ayyar, J. speaking for the Bench in his distinctive style of writing laid down the following principle of law being fundamental in nature: (AIR p. 342, para 6) “6. 14. In a leading case of this Court in Kiran Singh vs. Chaman Paswan [Kiran Singh vs. Chaman Paswan, AIR 1954 SC 340 ] , the learned Judge Venkatarama Ayyar, J. speaking for the Bench in his distinctive style of writing laid down the following principle of law being fundamental in nature: (AIR p. 342, para 6) “6. … It is a fundamental principle well established that a decree passed by a court without jurisdiction is a nullity, and that its invalidity could be set up whenever and wherever it is sought to be enforced or relied upon, even at the stage of execution and even in collateral proceedings. A defect of jurisdiction, whether it is pecuniary or territorial, or whether it is in respect of the subject-matter of the action, strikes at the very authority of the court to pass any decree, and such a defect cannot be cured even by consent of parties.” 15. The question, therefore, is whether the impugned judgment/order is a nullity because it was passed by the High Court in favour of and also against the dead persons? In our considered opinion, it is a nullity. The reasons are not far to seek. 17. The law on the point is well settled. On the death of a party to the appeal, if no application is made by the party concerned to the appeal or by the legal representatives of the deceased on whom the right to sue has devolved for substitution of their names in place of the deceased party within 90 days from the date of death of the party, such appeal abates automatically on expiry of 90 days from the date of death of the party. In other words, on 91st day, there is no appeal pending before the Court. It is “dismissed as abated”. 19. In the case at hand, both the aforementioned provisions came in operation because the appellant and the two respondents expired during the pendency of the second appeal and no application was filed to bring their legal representatives on record. As held above, the legal effect of the non-compliance with Rules 3(2) and 4(3) of Order 22 of the Code, therefore, came into operation resulting in dismissal of second appeal as abated on the expiry of 90 days from 10.5.1994 i.e. on 10.8.1994. As held above, the legal effect of the non-compliance with Rules 3(2) and 4(3) of Order 22 of the Code, therefore, came into operation resulting in dismissal of second appeal as abated on the expiry of 90 days from 10.5.1994 i.e. on 10.8.1994. The High Court, therefore, ceased to have jurisdiction to decide the second appeal which stood already dismissed on 10-8-1994. Indeed, there was no pending appeal on and after 10.8.1994. 20. In our considered view, the appeal could be revived for hearing only when firstly, the proposed legal representatives of the deceased persons had filed an application for substitution of their names and secondly, they had applied for setting aside of the abatement under Order 22 Rule 9 of the Code and making out therein a sufficient cause for setting aside of an abatement and lastly, had filed an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act seeking condonation of delay in filing the substitution application under Order 22 Rules 3 and 4 of the Code beyond the statutory period of 90 days. If these applications had been allowed by the High Court, the second appeal could have been revived for final hearing but not otherwise. Such was not the case here because no such applications had been filed. 21. It is a fundamental principle of law laid down by this Court in Kiran Singh case [Kiran Singh vs. Chaman Paswan, AIR 1954 SC 340 ] that a decree passed by the court, if it is a nullity, its validity can be questioned in any proceeding including in execution proceedings or even in collateral proceedings whenever such decree is sought to be enforced by the decree-holder. The reason is that the defect of this nature affects the very authority of the court in passing such decree and goes to the root of the case. This principle, in our considered opinion, squarely applies to this case because it is a settled principle of law that the decree passed by a court for or against a dead person is a “nullity” (see N. Jayaram Reddy vs. LAO [N. Jayaram Reddy vs. LAO, (1979) 3 SCC 578], Ashok Transport Agency vs. Awadhesh Kumar [Ashok Transport Agency vs. Awadhesh Kumar, (1998) 5 SCC 567 ] and Amba Bai vs. Gopal [Amba Bai vs. Gopal, (2001) 5 SCC 570 ] ). 22. 22. The appellants are the legal representatives of Defendants 2 and 4 on whom the right to sue has devolved. They had, therefore, right to question the legality of the impugned order inter alia on the ground of it being a nullity. Such objection, in our opinion, could be raised in appeal or even in execution proceedings arising out of such decree. In our view, the objection, therefore, deserves to be upheld. It is, accordingly, upheld. 23. In the light of the foregoing discussion, we allow the appeal and set aside the impugned judgment/decree.” 21. Now coming back to the present case, this Court, having gone through the joint inspection report dated 27/28.3.2023, submitted by the Assistant Settlement Officer, Darbhanga, the Incharge Officer, District Record Room, Darbhanga, the Sub- Divisional Officer, Benipur and the Additional Collector, Darbhanga, finds that the following findings can be culled out from the same: – (i) In pursuance to the order dated 27.07.2011, passed by the Hon’ble Patna High Court in CWJC No. 17282 of 2010 (Ram Lakhan Singh @ Ramu vs. The State of Bihar & Ors.), the Sub-Divisional Officer, Benipur, had written a letter dated 09.09.2011 to the Circle Officer, Benipur, whereupon the Circle Officer, Benipur, had initiated encroachment proceedings, under the provisions of the Act, 1956, bearing Encroachment Case No. 23 of 2011-12 and 39 people were identified to have encroached the Government Land, leading to issuance of notices dated 25.10.2011 to all the encroachers by the Circle Officer, Benipur, separately and at serial no. 1, the name of Dr. Naqui Imam was mentioned. The said Dr. S. M. Naqui Imam had challenged the said notice before this Hon’ble Court, by filing a writ petition bearing CWJC No. 9495 of 2012, wherein a coordinate Bench of this Hon’ble Court, by an order dated 12.04.2013, had disposed off the said writ petition with liberty to the said Sri Dr. S. M. Naqui Imam to file a written representation, annexing the relevant documents in support of his claim, which in turn was directed to be considered by the authorities whereafter, the final order was required to be passed and till then, it was directed that no coercive action shall be taken against the petitioner of the said case. (ii) Since the aforesaid order dated 12.4.2013, passed by this Hon’ble Court was not being complied with, the aforesaid Sri Dr. (ii) Since the aforesaid order dated 12.4.2013, passed by this Hon’ble Court was not being complied with, the aforesaid Sri Dr. S. M. Nayer Imam had filed a complaint before the Sub-Divisional Public Grievance Redressal Officer, Benipur and then had also filed first and second appeal, leading to the presiding Officer cum District Officer, Darbhanga, passing an order dated 29.07.2021, in the second appeal filed by the petitioner, directing the Circle Officer, Benipur, to conclude the ongoing encroachment proceedings and ensure removal of the encroachment in question. (iii) It appears that the Circle Officer, Benipur, had got the measurement conducted by the Circle Amin, Benipur and it was found that one Md. Naseem Ahmed, the petitioner herein and one Raja Imam Tamanna had encroached the Government land, situated at Mauza- Basuham, P.S. No. 134, revised survey Khesra No. 99, 100 and 101, by constructing boundary wall on 96 sq. ft. land, constructing two storied concrete house over 2 Katha land and by constructing brick concrete house over 8 dhur of land respectively, hence, notices were issued to them in Form I of the Act, 1956, whereafter the petitioner had submitted an order, passed under Section 106 of the Act, 1885 in favor of the mother of the petitioner, namely, Bibi Nabiul Fatima, in Case No. 316 of 2006, pertaining to cadestral survey no. 100, revised survey no. 101, whereby and whereunder the said land had been declared to be raiyati land, which was sent for verification to the Assistant Settlement Officer, Darbhanga, hence keeping aside the matter of the petitioner, notices in Form II were issued to the remaining encroachers. (iv) The Circle Officer, Benipur, had also sent the alleged revised khatiyan, submitted by the petitioner, to the Incharge Senior Officer, District Record Room, Darbhanga, vide letter dated 04.02.2021 for verification, followed by a reminder dated 04.09.2022, in reply whereof, the Senior In-charge Officer, District Record Room, Darbhanga, vide letter dated 10.11.2022 had replied, stating therein that the khatiyan, submitted by the petitioner, has not been issued from the said office. Thus, it is apparent that the petitioner had submitted a forged revised khatiyan. Thus, it is apparent that the petitioner had submitted a forged revised khatiyan. (v) The Circle Officer, Benipur, has also informed the joint inspection team that the revised khatiyan and the order, passed under Section 106 of the Act, 1885, in case No. 316 of 2006, are obtained/manufactured/forged/ fabricated, inasmuch as though it has been stated by the petitioner that Smt. Nabiul Fatima had filed an application U/s. 106 of the Act, 1885 on 04.07.2006, however, she was no longer alive on the said date, inasmuch as she had died much before i.e. on 01.10.2005. (vi) The In-charge Officer, District Record Room, Darbhanga, vide letter dated 21.3.2023, has reported that no record is present in the Khatiyan panji, pertaining to Mauza-Basuham, P.S. No. 134, Khata No. 1435 and the land in question, pertaining to Khesra No. 100 and 101 are situated in Khata No. 1434, which is an Anabad Sarvsadharan, Type-Rasta (Road) and therein, no remarks have been mentioned regarding any amendment/revision. (vii) On 27.3.2023, the inspection / measurement of the land, appertaining to survey Khata No. 1434, Khesra No. 100 and 101 was carried out. In fact, revised Khesra No. 100 and 101 has been carved out of the cadastral survey Khesra No. 86. The Circle Amin had showed the old as well as new survey map to the joint inspection team, from a bare perusal whereof, it has been found that in the old survey map, Khesra No. 86 and in the new survey map, revised survey Khesra No. 100 and 101 have been recorded as Aam sarak (public road). The In-charge Officer, District Record Room, Darbhanga, has also annexed the true copy of the khatiyan along with his letter dated 21.03.2023, wherein it has been mentioned that the aforesaid khesra/revised khesra has been recorded in the survey khatiyan as Anabad Sarvsadharan, Type- Rasta (Road) and no revised / amended khatiyan has been prepared with regard to the revised survey Khesra No. 100 & 101 in favor of any raiyat (private person/native). (viii) Upon measurement, it was found that over Mauza- Basuham, Tola-Kajiyana, P.S. No. 134, Anchal-Benipur, not only the petitioner and one Sri Raja Tamanna have made encroachment, but also one Anwar Alam has also partly encroached the said land. The encroachment made by the petitioner and others have already been depicted in the chart reproduced hereinabove in the preceding paragraphs. (viii) Upon measurement, it was found that over Mauza- Basuham, Tola-Kajiyana, P.S. No. 134, Anchal-Benipur, not only the petitioner and one Sri Raja Tamanna have made encroachment, but also one Anwar Alam has also partly encroached the said land. The encroachment made by the petitioner and others have already been depicted in the chart reproduced hereinabove in the preceding paragraphs. (ix) The order dated 30.04.2009, passed under Section 106 of the Act, 1885 in Case No. 316 of 2006, which has been submitted by the petitioner, is suspicious, inasmuch as firstly, on the basis of the decree prepared in pursuance of the order dated 30.04.2009, no amended khatiyan has been prepared and secondly, the own brother of the petitioner, Sri S.M. Naiyer Imam had intervened in the aforesaid Encroachment Case No. 23 of 2011-12 and produced the Shilapath (stone slab/head stone) kept at the grave of the mother of the petitioner, which shows that the mother of the petitioner, namely, Nabiul Fatima, had died on 01.10.2005, whereas the petition, under Section 106 of the Act, 1885, was filed only on 04.07.2006. (x) Two brothers of the petitioner, namely, Dr. S. N. Naqui Imam and S. M. Naiyer Imam have submitted photocopy of the joint affidavit on oath dated 20.03.2023, wherein they have stated that the order / decree passed in Case No. 316 of 2006 and khatiyan are forged and fabricated and they do not have any knowledge about the same as also in case, any order has been passed in favor of the mother of the petitioner, the benefit of the said order shall emanate to all the sons of late Nabiul Fatima. (xi) Therefore, the committee has concluded that it is apparent that the Circle Amin has measured the land in question on 27.03.2023 and has identified/marked three encroachers, who have encroached the Government land/road (Anabad Sarvsadharan) and the documents submitted by the petitioner in his support are suspicious, which have been created/fabricated/forged with the help of the then Assistant Settlement Officer, Sri Ramanand Chaudhary, thus, the order, passed by the Circle Officer, Benipur, in Encroachment Case No. 23 of 2011-12, regarding removal of encroachment from the Government land, is absolutely correct. 22. 22. Thus, it is clear from a bare perusal of the records of the present case as also from the aforesaid joint inspection report dated 27/28.3.2023 that the In-charge Officer, District Record Room, Darbhanga, has found no record in the khatiyan panji regarding Khata No. 1435, Khesra No. 100 and 101 and on the contrary, the records show that the actual description of the land in question is Khata No. 1434, Khesra No. 100 and 101, situated at Mauza-Basuham, P.S. No. 134, which has been recorded as Anabad Sarvsadharan, Type-Sarak (Road) and therein, no remark has been mentioned regarding any revision/amendment of the same. Therefore, the contention of the petitioner that revised khatiyan has been issued in favor of his mother with regard to Khata No. 1434, Khesra No. 100 and 101, situated at Mauza-Basuham, is incorrect and a false statement. In fact, the aforesaid order dated 30.04.2009, passed in Case No. 316 of 2006 and the decree prepared thereafter, is in the name of dead person i.e. late Bibi Nabiul Fatima, which, in any case, is nullity in the eyes of law, thus, has got no value. In fact, a bare perusal of the record of rights, published by the Revenue and Land Reforms Department, Government of Bihar, annexed at running page no. 209 and 210 of the brief, would show that Khata No. 1434, Khesra No. 100 and 101 has been recorded as Anabad Sarvsadharan, Type-Rasta (road), hence, there is no dispute that the land in question is a public land meant for rasta (road). Therefore, this Court finds that in case there is no dispute with regard to unauthorized occupation of Government property by encroachers, the Respondent-State is well within its right to initiate summary proceedings under the provisions of the Act, 1956 for removal of the encroachment in question, thus, the judgments, referred to by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner, are clearly distinguishable in the facts and circumstances of the present case. In such view of the matter, this Court finds that firstly, the encroachment case in question i.e. Encroachment Case no. In such view of the matter, this Court finds that firstly, the encroachment case in question i.e. Encroachment Case no. 23 of 2011-12 was initiated in obedience and compliance of the order of this Hon’ble Court dated 27.07.2011, passed in CWJC No. 17282 of 2010, whereby and whereunder the Circle Officer / Sub-Divisional Officer, Benipur, Darbhanga, was directed to visit the spot and carry out a survey and in case of detection / revelation of any encroachment, he was directed to proceed to remove the encroachment made by the Mukhiya or any other person of the village- Basuham, by resorting to the provisions, contained in the Act, 1956 as well as by taking recourse to the provisions contained under Section 133 Cr.P.C. and the process was directed to be completed within a period of three months, failing which the Sub-Divisional Magistrate was made liable to be proceeded under the contempt jurisdiction of the Court. Thereafter, notice was issued to the petitioner, which was duly replied to by the petitioner and only after complying with the provisions, contained in the Act, 1956, as also complying with the principles of natural justice, the final order dated 02.3.2023, has been passed by the Circle Officer, Benipur, under Section 6(1) of the Act, 1956, which is annexed as Annexure-17 to the present writ petition, holding the land in question to be a public land and the petitioner to be an encroacher, thus, no fault can be found either with the aforesaid joint inspection report dated 28.03.2023 or with the final order dated 02.03.2023, passed by the Circle Officer, Benipur, under Section 6(1) of the Act, 1956. 23. This Court also finds that the petitioner has neither produced any Bandobasti receipts, issued by the ex-landlord in favor of the mother of the petitioner nor has produced the revised khatiyan, qua the land in question, thus, apparently, he is not having any bonafide claim over the land in question. 23. This Court also finds that the petitioner has neither produced any Bandobasti receipts, issued by the ex-landlord in favor of the mother of the petitioner nor has produced the revised khatiyan, qua the land in question, thus, apparently, he is not having any bonafide claim over the land in question. It may not be out of place to mention here that it is a trite law that it is not the duration, short or long, of encroachment that is conclusive of the question whether the summary remedy prescribed by the Act can be put into operation for evicting a person, but what is relevant for the decision of that question is more the nature of the property on which the encroachment is alleged to have been committed and the consideration whether the claim of the occupant is bonafide and in case, there is no dispute, the Government would be free to take recourse to the summary remedy of eviction, provided for under the Act, 1956, which has been resorted to in the present case, thus, this Court does not find any fault with the action of the State-Respondents. 24. Before parting, it would be relevant to reproduce Section 9 of the Act, 1956 hereinbelow: – “9. Burden of proof. – Where any public land was acquired under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894), for the purpose of the Government, any local authority, {public undertaking], any educational institution or a railway company, or where the land is recorded in any public or other official book, register or record or surveyed under Bengal Survey Act, 1875 (Ben. Act V of 1875), or other local or special law as belonging to the Government, local authority. Act V of 1875), or other local or special law as belonging to the Government, local authority. [public undertaking], educational institution or railway company, or where the land is recorded as public land within the meaning of this Act, the burden of proving that the land is not public land or has ceased to be public and shall lie on the person who raises such a defence.” A bare reading of Section 9 of the Act, 1956 would show that the position of a person, proceeded against in a proceeding under the Act, 1956, is that of a defendant, hence once the respondent-State has been able to show, even prima facie, that the subject-matter of the proceeding is recorded in any public or other official record as belonging to the Government etc. or is recorded as a public land/road, it will be for the defendant i.e the encroacher to discharge the burden of proving that the land is not a public land/road or has ceased to be public land/road. However, in the wake of conspicuous facts and circumstances of the present case, detailed hereinabove in the preceding paragraphs, it is apparent that the petitioner has miserably failed to discharge the burden of proving that the land in question is not a public land or has ceased to be a public land. Reference, in this connection, be had to a judgment, rendered by this Hon’ble Court in the case of Uday Kumar vs. the State, reported in AIR 1976 Patna 233. 25. This Court would also delve into one another aspect of the matter i.e., in case, the petitioner is sanguine that disputed question of right, title and interest qua the land in question exists, although this Court has already held herein above that there is no dispute that the land in question is a public land meant for rasta (road), the petitioner can either bring the same to the notice of the authorities i.e. may be by filing an appeal under Section 11 of the Act, 1956, against the final order dated 02.03.2023, passed by the Circle Officer, Benipur, under Section 6(1) of the Act, 1956 or avail such other alternative remedies as are otherwise available under the law including that of filing a civil suit before the competent Court of civil jurisdiction. Reference, in this connection, be had to a judgment, rendered by the learned Division Bench of this Court in the case of Card Board Products (Gomia) & Others vs. State of Bihar & Others, reported in 1994 (1) PLJR 99 , paragraph nos. 11 and 13 whereof are reproduced herein below: – “11. It is true that in a case where exists a disputed question of title, the summary proceeding under the Act may not be suitable remedy. However, in our opinion, this jurisdictional fact can also be brought to the notice of the Deputy Commissioner, Bokaro, who shall determine the same at the first instance. In Management of Express Newspapers (Private) Ltd. Madras vs. The Workers (AIR 1963 Supreme Court 569), it was held as follows: “The High Court undoubtedly has jurisdiction to ask the Industrial Tribunal to stay its hands and to embark upon the preliminary inquiry itself. The jurisdiction of the High Court to adopt this course cannot be, and is indeed not disputed. But would it be proper for the High Court to adopt such a course unless the ends of justice seem to make it necessary to do so? Normally, the questions of fact, though they may be jurisdictional facts, the decision of which depends upon the appreciation of evidence, should be left to be tried by the Special Tribunals constituted for that purpose. If and after the Special Tribunals try the preliminary issue in respect of the such jurisdictional facts, it would be open to the aggrieved party to take that matter before the High Court by a writ petition and ask for an appropriate writ. Speaking generally, it would not be proper or appropriate that the initial jurisdiction of the Special Tribunal to deal with these jurisdictional facts should be circumvented and the decision of such a preliminary issue brought before a High court in its writ jurisdiction. We wish to point out that in making these observations, we do not propose to lay down any fix or inflexible rule; whether or not even the preliminary facts would be tried by High Court in a writ petition, must naturally depend upon the circumstances of each case and upon the nature of the preliminary issue raised between the parties. We wish to point out that in making these observations, we do not propose to lay down any fix or inflexible rule; whether or not even the preliminary facts would be tried by High Court in a writ petition, must naturally depend upon the circumstances of each case and upon the nature of the preliminary issue raised between the parties. Having regard to the circumstances of the present dispute, we think the Court of Appeal was right in taking the view that the preliminary issue should more appropriately be dealt with by the Tribunal. The Appeal Court has made it clear that any party who feels aggrieved by the finding of the Tribunal on this preliminary issue may move the High Court in accordance with law. Therefore, we are not prepared to accept Mr. Sastri's argument that Appeal Court was wrong in reversing the conclusion of the trial Judge in so far as the Trial Judge proceeded to deal with the question as to whether the action of the appellant was a closure or a lock out.” 13. We have no doubt in our mind that the Deputy Commissioner, Bokaro, shall consider all aspects of the matter and shall pass appropriate order in accordance with law.” Reference on the aforesaid issue be also had to the judgments rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the following cases: – (i) In the case of Shri Sohan Lal vs. Union of India & Another, reported in AIR 1957 SC 529 ; (ii) In the case of Punjab National Bank & Others vs. Atmanand Singh & Others, reported in 2020 SCC Online SC 433 [: 2020 (4) BLJ 214 (SC)]; (iii) In the case of Thansingh Nathmal and Ors. vs. Superintendent of Taxes, Dhubri and Ors., reported in AIR 1964 SC 1419 ; (iv) In the case of Babubhai Muljibhai Patel vs. Nandlal Khodidas Barot, reported in (1974) 2 SCC 706 ; (v) In the case of Government of Andhra Pradesh vs. Thummala Krishna Rao & Anr., reported in (1982) 2 SCC 134 . Reference be also had to a judgment rendered by this Court in the case of Ripusudan Singh vs. State of Bihar & Ors., reported in 2023 (5) BLJ 372 and other judgments, rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court, as mentioned therein. 26. Reference be also had to a judgment rendered by this Court in the case of Ripusudan Singh vs. State of Bihar & Ors., reported in 2023 (5) BLJ 372 and other judgments, rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court, as mentioned therein. 26. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case and for the reasons mentioned hereinabove, I do not find any merit in the present writ petition, hence, the present writ petition stands dismissed, however status quo existing as on today qua the land/house of the petitioner in question shall be maintained for a period of two weeks from today in order to enable the petitioner to avail such remedies as are otherwise available under the law.