JUDGMENT 1. Criminal Petition No.7731 of 2014 is filed by the Petitioners/A.1 and A.2, under Sec. 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short "Cr.P.C") praying to quash the proceedings against them in C.C.No.314 of 2014 on the file of the Court of Special Mobile Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Guntur, for the offences under Ss. 447 and 427 IPC. 2. Since both the criminal petitions are arising out of C.C.No.314 of 2014 and raising common questions of law, they have been heard together and are being decided by this common Order. 3. For the sake of convenience, the parties are hereinafter referred to as they are arrayed before the trial Court in C.C.No.314 of 2014. 4. A private complaint was filed by the de facto complainant on the file of Special Mobile Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Guntur against A.1 to A.4. The learned Magistrate recorded the sworn statement of the de facto complainant and one of the witnesses, namely, G.V.Subrahmanyam and eventually having found prima facie case against all the accused regarding their complicity in the commission of the said offence, took cognizance of the offence under Ss. 447 and 427 IPC and issued process of summons to A.1 to A.4 in C.C.No.314 of 2014. The said case is now pending trial before the trial Court. Challenging the said cognizance, the petitioners/A.1 to A.4 filed the above-referred Criminal Petitions seeking to quash the proceedings against them arising out of C.C.No.314 of 2014. 5. The marshaling of facts, upon perusal of the complaint and other material available on record, is that thirty years ago, the de facto complainant took lease of the land of an extent of Ac.5.09 cents in D.Nos.190/1A, 109/1B and 403 of Budampadu Village from Jameela Begum (Mymunnisa Begum), who is the owner of the property. Thereafter, the said property came into the hands of A.1. The de facto complainant and A.1 entered into an agreement of lease on 29/4/2009. A.1 tried to forcibly evict the de facto complainant from the leased land which was in his possession and protesting the same, the de facto complainant filed A.T.C.No.4 of 2013 before the Tenancy Special officer-cum-Principal Junior Civil Judge, Guntur and got a temporary ad-interim injunction. Without his knowledge and consent, A.1 sold Ac.3.09 cents covered in D.Nos.190/1A, 190/1B to one T.Vaishnavi Reddy by violating the above said Court Orders. Without his knowledge and consent, A.1 sold Ac.3.09 cents covered in D.Nos.190/1A, 190/1B to one T.Vaishnavi Reddy by violating the above said Court Orders. On 14/2/2014, A.1 and his clerk came to the said land and threatened the de facto complainant to vacate the premises and on 16/2/2014 at 6.00 a.m., all the accused came to the fields and damaged the entire crop which was raised in Ac.2.00 cents of land. Immediately, the de facto complainant rushed to Nallapadu Police Station and gave a report. The Police did not take any action. Then, the de facto complainant approached the superior Police Officials and they also did not respond. As such, the present complaint is filed. 6. Sri O.Manohara Reddy, Learned Senior Counsel appeared on behalf of the petitioners/A.1 to A.4 in both the criminal petitions and submitted that A.1 sold Ac.3.09 cents of land to the said T.Vaishnavi Reddy. A.1 is the owner of the rest of the land to an extent of Ac.2.00 cents. On 29/4/2009 A.1 and the de facto complainant entered into an agreement of lease in terms and conditions agreed upon lease for 5 years through which the de facto complainant has become cultivating tenant of the said land. He would further submit that when A.1 requested the de facto complainant to vacate the said land for his own use, the de facto complainant filed I.A.1440 of 2013 in ATC 4/2013 before the Tenancy Special Officer-cum-Principal Junior Civil Judge, Guntur, seeking an ad-interim injunction against A.1 and one Thummuru Vyshanavi Reddy and the same was dismissed on 20/10/2014. Against the said Order, an appeal was preferred by the de facto complainant in A.T.A.No.4 of 2014 on the file of Tenancy Appellate Tribunal (Principal District Judge), Guntur and the said appeal was allowed. Aggrieved by the same, the 2nd respondent in A.T.C.No.4 of 2013 i.e., T.Vaishnavi Reddy filed a C.R.P. on the file of this Court and the same was allowed, setting aside the orders of the learned Special Judge, Tenancy Appellate Tribunal-cum-Principal District Judge, Guntur, in A.T.A.No.4 of 2014 and restored the Order passed in I.A.1440 of 2013 in ATC 4/2013 dtd. 20/10/2014. He would further submit that the de facto complainant was not in possession of the property, the question of trespassing into the said property by the petitioners/A.1 to A.4 does not arise. Therefore, taking cognizance of the offence under Ss. 20/10/2014. He would further submit that the de facto complainant was not in possession of the property, the question of trespassing into the said property by the petitioners/A.1 to A.4 does not arise. Therefore, taking cognizance of the offence under Ss. 447 and 427 IPC against A.1 to A.4, by the learned Magistrate would be illegal. He would further submit that once a Civil Court has given a finding stating that the 2nd respondent/de facto complainant was not in possession of the property, the question of invoking Ss. 447 and 427 IPC does not arise. Further, he would submit that there is no material on record to show that the de facto complainant is the cultivating tenant of the property. Therefore, continuation of criminal proceedings against A.1 to A.4 is a clear abuse of the process of law. Therefore, he would pray to quash the proceedings in C.C.No.314 of 2014 against the petitioners/A.1 to A.4. 7. Sri Mangana Sree Ramarao, learned counsel for the 2nd respondent/de facto complainant would submit that, after the incident took place, the de facto complainant gave a complaint to the Police. But, they have not responded to take any action saying that the nature of the dispute involved was civil in nature. He would further submit that the de facto complainant filed a complaint before the Special Mobile Judicial Magistrate for First Class, Guntur and the learned Magistrate recorded the sworn statement of the 2nd respondent/de facto complainant and another witness. After scrutinizing the material and the contents in the sworn statement, the learned Magistrate was of the view that there was evidence/material which forms sufficient ground, and has taken cognizance and proceeded to issue summons to A.1 to A.4. Therefore, A.1 to A.4 have committed the alleged offence. Further, he would submit that the cognizance was taken by the Magistrate having found that there was a prima facie case, upon collection of evidence and came to a conclusion that the petitioners have committed the alleged offence. He would further submit that this Court does not have the power to decide the disputed fact involved in the case as it is the complete domain of the trial Court. Therefore, he would pray for dismissal of both criminal petitions. 8. Sri P.M.Mithileswara Reddy, learned Assistant Public Prosecutor conceded to the arguments of the learned counsel for the 2nd respondent/de facto complainant. 9. Therefore, he would pray for dismissal of both criminal petitions. 8. Sri P.M.Mithileswara Reddy, learned Assistant Public Prosecutor conceded to the arguments of the learned counsel for the 2nd respondent/de facto complainant. 9. Now the point for consideration is: Whether there are any merits in the criminal petitions to allow? 10. It should be noted that in State of Haryana and Others Vs. Ch.Bhajanlal and Others ( AIR 1992 SC 604 ), the Hon'ble Apex Court considered in detail the powers of the High Court under Sec. 482 Cr.P.C to quash the criminal proceedings/FIR. The Hon'ble Apex Court summarized the legal position by laying down the following guidelines to be followed by the High Courts in the exercise of their inherent powers to quash the criminal complaint. The Hon'ble Apex Court summarized the legal position by laying down the following guidelines to be followed by the High Courts in the exercise of their inherent powers to quash the criminal complaint. (1) where the allegations made in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused; (2) where the allegations in the First Information Report and other materials, if any, accompanying the F.I.R. do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Sec. 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Sec. 155(2) of the Code; (3) where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or 'complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused; (4) where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Sec. 155(2) of the Code; (5) where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused; (6) where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party; (7) where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge. 11. As can be seen, the 1st guideline is to the effect that even if the complaint allegations are accepted to be true on their face value, if they do not constitute an offence, then the complaint taken on file by the learned Magistrate can be quashed. 11. As can be seen, the 1st guideline is to the effect that even if the complaint allegations are accepted to be true on their face value, if they do not constitute an offence, then the complaint taken on file by the learned Magistrate can be quashed. On this touchstone, when the complaint allegations are perused, the entire allegation is that the petitioners/A.1 to A.4 trespassed into the fields and damaged the crop with a tractor and caused loss of Rs.10,000.00 to the 2nd respondent/de facto complainant but in the complaint, he did not mention about the filing of ATC No.4 of 2013 and pending litigation in between them. Admittedly, the disputed land belongs to the 1st petitioner/A.1. Item No.1 of the disputed land was sold to T.Vaishnavi Reddy for a sale consideration of Rs.75.00 lakhs under a sale deed dtd. 3/3/2014 by the 1st petitioner/A.1. The 2nd respondent/de facto complainant filed I.A.No.1440 of 2013 in A.T.C.4 of 2013 before the Tenancy Special officer-cum-Principal Junior Civil Judge, Guntur against petitioner/A.1 and one T.Vaishnavi Reddy. The learned Tribunal dismissed the said I.A.No.1440 of 2013, with a finding that "there is no document to show the prima facie possession of the petitioner over the petition schedule property. Hence, in the absence of any kind of evidence, I declined to consider the contention of the petitioner that the petitioner is in possession and enjoyment of the petition schedule property and I have no hesitation to hold that the petitioner failed to show his prima facie possession over the petition schedule property. As the petitioner failed to show his prima facie possession over the petition schedule property, the petitioner is not entitled for interim injunction restraining the respondents from interfering with the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the petitioner as prayed for." 12. Aggrieved by the said Order, the 2nd respondent/de facto complainant preferred A.T.A.4 of 2014 and the learned Tenancy Appellate Tribunal-cum-Principal District Judge, Guntur, allowed the appeal setting aside the impugned Order dtd. 20/10/2014 passed in I.A.No.1440 of 2013 in A.T.C.4 of 2013 by the learned Special Officer-cum-Principal Junior Civil Judge, Guntur. Aggrieved by the said Order, the 2nd respondent/de facto complainant preferred A.T.A.4 of 2014 and the learned Tenancy Appellate Tribunal-cum-Principal District Judge, Guntur, allowed the appeal setting aside the impugned Order dtd. 20/10/2014 passed in I.A.No.1440 of 2013 in A.T.C.4 of 2013 by the learned Special Officer-cum-Principal Junior Civil Judge, Guntur. Aggrieved by the said Order, Civil Revision Petition No.7833 of 2018 was filed by the 2nd respondent (Thummuru Vaishnavi Reddy) in A.T.A.No.4 of 2014, before this Court and the said Civil Revision Petition was allowed and the operative portion of the Order is as follows: "In the result, this Civil Revision petition is allowed. Consequently, Order of learned Special Judge, Tenancy Appellate tribunal-cum-Principal District Judge, Guntur in A.T.A.No.4 of 2014 dtd. 17/9/2018 is set aside. Order of learned Tenancy Special Officer-cum-Principal Junior Civil Judge, Guntur in I.A.No.1440 of 2013 in A.T.C.No.4 of 2013 dtd. 20/10/2014 is restored......" 13. It is pertinent to mention here that the civil disputes are adjudicated by the Tenancy Tribunals and by this Court wherein it was found that the 2nd respondent/de facto complainant was not in possession of the subject property. At this stage, even if the complaint allegations are taken into consideration, one cannot conclude prima facie that the petitioners/A.1 to A.4 have committed the said offence. It is a cardinal principle that when the complaint allegations do not disclose the civil disputes between them in the complaint and the material produced by the petitioners' counsel disclose that civil disputes are adjudicated by the Tenancy Tribunals and this Court holding that the 2nd respondent/de facto complainant has failed to prove his continuous possession and enjoyment of the land in dispute, therefore it is not a criminal offence, continuation of criminal proceedings against the petitioners/A.1 to A.4 would amount to the abuse of process of Court. 14. In the instant case, the offences alleged against the petitioners/A.1 to A.4 are under Ss. 447 and 427 IPC. The learned Magistrate has taken cognizance on the main allegations against the petitioners/A.1 to A.4 that they have trespassed into the subject land, damaged the crop and caused loss of Rs.10,000.00 to the 2nd respondent/de facto complainant, which does not belong to him. Admittedly, the disputed land belongs to the 1st petitioner/A.1 sold to said T.Vaishnavi Reddy under the sale deed dtd. Admittedly, the disputed land belongs to the 1st petitioner/A.1 sold to said T.Vaishnavi Reddy under the sale deed dtd. 3/2/2014 in respect of the property which does not belong to the 2nd respondent/de facto complainant, under which he is claiming tenancy rights, which falsifies in view of the Orders in C.R.P.No.7833 of 2018, dtd. 4/11/2019. 15. It is relevant to refer to Ss. 447 and 427 IPC which read as under: 447. Punishment for criminal trespass.--Whoever commits criminal trespass shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three months, or with fine which may extend to five hundred rupees, or with both. 427. Mischief causing damage to the amount of fifty rupees.-- Whoever commits mischief and thereby causes loss or damage to the amount of fifty rupees or upwards, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both. 16. The essential ingredients in both the above offences are trespassing into the subject property and causing loss/damage. The question then is whether the 2nd respondent/de facto complainant was in possession of the property? But, factually he was not in the possession of the property, as held by the Tenancy Tribunal in I.A.No.1440 of 2013 in A.T.C.4 of 2013, which was confirmed by this Court. 17. The learned counsel for the petitioners/A.1 to A.4 relied upon a decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Paramjeet Batra Vs. State of Uttarakhand and others (2013) 11 SCC 673 ), wherein, at Para No.12 it was held as follows: "12. While exercising its jurisdiction under Sec. 482 of the Code the High Court has to be cautious. This power is to be used sparingly and only for the purpose of preventing abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure ends of justice. Whether a complaint discloses a criminal offence or not depends upon the nature of facts alleged therein. Whether essential ingredients of criminal offence are present or not has to be judged by the High Court. A complaint disclosing civil transactions may also have a criminal texture. But the High Court must see whether a dispute which is essentially of a civil nature is given a cloak of criminal offence. Whether essential ingredients of criminal offence are present or not has to be judged by the High Court. A complaint disclosing civil transactions may also have a criminal texture. But the High Court must see whether a dispute which is essentially of a civil nature is given a cloak of criminal offence. In such a situation, if a civil remedy is available and is, in fact, adopted as has happened in this case, the High Court should not hesitate to quash the criminal proceedings to prevent abuse of process of the court." 18. In a decision reported in Chandran Ratnaswamy Vs. K.C.Palani Swamy and others (2013) 6 SCC 740 ) the Hon'ble Apex Court at Para 60 held as follows: "60. We are of the definite opinion that the complainant has manipulated and misused the process of court so as to deprive the appellants from their basic right to move freely anywhere inside or outside the country. Moreover, it would be unfair if the appellants are to be tried in such criminal proceedings arising out of the alleged breach of a joint venture agreement specially when such disputes have been finally resolved by the court of competent jurisdiction. Hence, allowing the criminal proceedings arising out of FIR No. 7 of 2007 to continue would be an abuse of the process of the court and, therefore, for the ends of justice such proceedings ought to be quashed. Since the High Court failed to look into this aspect of the matter while passing the impugned order, in our opinion, the same could not be sustained in law." 19. In Mohammed Ibrahim and others Vs. State of Bihar and another (2009) 8 SCC 751 ), the Hon'ble Apex Court at Para No.8 held as follows: "8. This Court has time and again drawn attention to the growing tendency of the complainants attempting to give the cloak of a criminal offence to matters which are essentially and purely civil in nature, obviously either to apply pressure on the accused, or out of enmity towards the accused, or to subject the accused to harassment. Criminal courts should ensure that proceedings before it are not used for settling scores or to pressurise parties to settle civil disputes............." 20. In V.Y.Jose and another Vs. State of Gujarat (2009) 3 SCC 78 ), the Hon'ble Apex Court, at Para Nos.27 and 28 held as follows: "27. Criminal courts should ensure that proceedings before it are not used for settling scores or to pressurise parties to settle civil disputes............." 20. In V.Y.Jose and another Vs. State of Gujarat (2009) 3 SCC 78 ), the Hon'ble Apex Court, at Para Nos.27 and 28 held as follows: "27. The said principle has been reiterated in All Cargo Movers (I) (P) Ltd. v. Dhanesh Badarmal Jain [ (2007) 14 SCC 776 : (2007) 12 Scale 391 ] stating: (SCC p. 781, para 16) "16. For the said purpose, allegations in the complaint petition must disclose the necessary ingredients therefor. Where a civil suit is pending and the complaint petition has been filed one year after filing of the civil suit, we may for the purpose of finding out as to whether the said allegations are prima facie correct, take into consideration the correspondences exchanged by the parties and other admitted documents. It is one thing to say that the Court at this juncture would not consider the defence of the accused but it is another thing to say that for exercising the inherent jurisdiction of this Court, it is impermissible also to look to the admitted documents. Criminal proceedings should not be encouraged, when it is found to be mala fide or otherwise an abuse of the process of the court. Superior courts while exercising this power should also strive to serve the ends of justice." 28. A matter which essentially involves dispute of a civil nature should not be allowed to be the subject-matter of a criminal offence, the latter being not a short cut of executing a decree which is non-existent. The superior courts, with a view to maintain purity in the administration of justice, should not allow abuse of the process of court. It has a duty in terms of Sec. 483 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to supervise the functionings of the trial courts." 21. In view of the decisions supra, this Court is of the view that the civil dispute was given the colour of a criminal case. In fact, the present complaint was filed by the 2nd respondent/de facto complainant before the learned Magistrate on 24/2/2014. In view of the decisions supra, this Court is of the view that the civil dispute was given the colour of a criminal case. In fact, the present complaint was filed by the 2nd respondent/de facto complainant before the learned Magistrate on 24/2/2014. By that time, the 2nd respondent/de facto complainant filed A.T.C.No.4 of 2013 on the file of the Tenancy Special Officer-cum-Principal Junior Civil Judge, Guntur, and also filed I.A.No.1440 of 2013 in the said ATC seeking ad-interim injunction restraining the respondents therein from dispossessing the 2nd respondent/de facto complainant from the subject property. Having knowledge about the pendency of said ATC, the 2nd respondent/de facto complainant did not disclose the fact of the pendency of the civil dispute between them, in the complaint filed by him. 22. Therefore, this Court is of the opinion that the matter appears to be purely civil in nature, and there appears that the 2nd respondent/de facto complainant was not in possession of the subject property. Subsequent to the filing of A.T.C.No.4 of 2013, the present complaint was filed on 24/2/2014 and in the said ATC the learned Tenancy Tribunal held that the 2ndrespondent/de facto complainant failed to show his prim facie possession over the subject property. Therefore, the question of criminal trespass into the subject property by the petitioners/A.1 to A.4 and causing loss does not arise. Therefore, the present complaint is an abuse of the process of law. The purely civil dispute is sought to be given a colour of a criminal offence to wreak vengeance against the petitioners/A.1 to A.4. It does not meet the strict standard of proof required to sustain criminal accusation against the petitioners/A.1 to A.4. 23. Learned counsel for the 2nd respondent relied upon a decision in Iqbal Singh Marwah and another Vs. Meenakshi Marwah and another (2005) 4 SCC 370 ) wherein, at Para Nos.31 and 32 the Hon'ble Apex Court held as follows: "31. That apart, the Sec. which we are required to interpret is not a penal provision but is part of a procedural law, namely, the Code of Criminal Procedure which elaborately gives the procedure for trial of criminal cases. The provision only creates a bar against taking cognizance of an offence in certain specified situations except upon complaint by court. That apart, the Sec. which we are required to interpret is not a penal provision but is part of a procedural law, namely, the Code of Criminal Procedure which elaborately gives the procedure for trial of criminal cases. The provision only creates a bar against taking cognizance of an offence in certain specified situations except upon complaint by court. A penal statute is one upon which an action for penalties can be brought by a public officer or by a person aggrieved and a penal Act in its wider sense includes every statute creating an offence against the State, whatever is the character of the penalty for the offence. The principle that a penal statute should be strictly construed, as projected by the learned counsel for the appellants can, therefore, have no application here. 32. Coming to the last contention that an effort should be made to avoid conflict of findings between the civil and criminal courts, it is necessary to point out that the standard of proof required in the two proceedings are entirely different. Civil cases are decided on the basis of preponderance of evidence while in a criminal case the entire burden lies on the prosecution and proof beyond reasonable doubt has to be given. There is neither any statutory provision nor any legal principle that the findings recorded in one proceeding may be treated as final or binding in the other, as both the cases have to be decided on the basis of the evidence adduced therein.........." 24. He further relied on the decision in Jagdish Ram Vs. State of Rajasthan and another (2004) 4 SCC 432 ), wherein, at Para No.10, the Hon'ble Apex Court held as follows: "10. ............ The taking of cognizance of the offence is an area exclusively within the domain of a Magistrate. At this stage, the Magistrate has to be satisfied whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding and not whether there is sufficient ground for conviction. Whether the evidence is adequate for supporting the conviction, can be determined only at the trial and not at the stage of inquiry. At the stage of issuing the process to the accused, the Magistrate is not required to record reasons." 25. Whether the evidence is adequate for supporting the conviction, can be determined only at the trial and not at the stage of inquiry. At the stage of issuing the process to the accused, the Magistrate is not required to record reasons." 25. In the light of the above decisions, no doubt, the learned Magistrate is empowered to take cognizance after satisfying with the averments in the complaint and the sworn statement of the complainant and the Magistrate has to be satisfied whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding or not and whether there is sufficient ground for conviction. Whether the evidence is adequate for supporting the conviction can be determined only at the time of trial, but not at the stage of enquiry. If there is sufficient ground for proceeding, then the learned Magistrate is empowered to issuance of process to the accused. The Magistrate is not required to record the reasons. But, in the present case of nature, the 2nd respondent/de facto complainant suppressed in the complaint about the filing of ATC 4 of 2013 and also I.A.No.1440 of 2013 in the said ATC seeking ad-interim injunction against the 1st petitioner/A.1 and dismissal of the same, which was upheld by this Court in Civil Revision Petition No.7833 of 2018 on 4/11/2019 holding that the 2nd respondent/de facto complainant failed to make out prima facie case in his favour. Therefore, this Court is of the opinion that the judgments relied on by the learned counsel for the 2nd respondent/de facto complainant, are not helpful to the case of the 2nd respondent/de facto complainant. 26. In a decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Karnataka Vs. L.Muniswamy ( 1977 (2) SCC 699 ), it was observed as under: "...the wholesome power under Sec. 482 Cr.P.C, entitles the High Court to quash a proceeding when it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceeding to continue would be an abuse of process of the Court or that the ends of justice require that the proceeding ought to be quashed. The High Court have been invested with inherent powers, both in civil and criminal matters, to achieve a salutary public purpose. A Court proceeding ought not to be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment or prosecution................" 27. A meticulous perusal of the contents of the complaint reveals force in submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioners/A.1 to A.4. A Court proceeding ought not to be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment or prosecution................" 27. A meticulous perusal of the contents of the complaint reveals force in submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioners/A.1 to A.4. There are absolutely valid legal grounds emanating from the record warranting interference of this Court under Sec. 482 Cr.P.C to quash the proceedings against the petitioners/A.1 to A.4 arising out of C.C.No.314 of 2014. 28. In view of the guidelines in Bhajanlal's case (supra) where the allegations made in the complaintand the material furnished by the petitioners/A.1 to A.4 in support of their case do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the petitioners/A.1 to A.4. 29. A given set of facts may make out a civil wrong. Considering the facts and circumstances of the present case, number of litigations pending between the parties and the civil dispute adjudicated by this Court in a Civil Revision Petition No.7833 of 2018 between the parties, in my considered view, continuation of criminal proceedings against the petitioners/A.1 to A.4 would be an abuse of process of the Court. The Order of the Magistrate dtd. 10/6/2014 in taking cognizance of the offence and issuance of summons to the petitioners/A.1 to A.4 and the criminal proceedings thereon in C.C.No.314 of 2014, are liable to be quashed, the complaint may also be quashed where it is a clear abuse of the process of the Court, as when the criminal proceedings found to have been initiated with a mala fides / malice of wreaking vengeance or to cause harm or where the allegations are absurd and inherently improbable. 30. On an overall consideration of the entire material placed on record and the decisions referred to above, and the law declared by the Hon'ble Apex Court, the judgments referred to supra, it is suffice to conclude that the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners/A.1 to A.4 and the material produced before this Court directly indicate the malafides in prosecution of criminal proceedings against the petitioners/A.1 to A.4 so also by abuse of process of the Court, as an arm-twisting method to bring the petitioners/A.1 to A.4 to the terms of the 2nd respondent/de facto complainant and to cloak a civil dispute with criminal nature, has resorted to criminal litigation. Hence, allowing the criminal proceedings arising out of C.C.No.314 of 2014 on the file of the Court of Special Mobile Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Guntur to continue would be an abuse of process of the Court. Therefore, for the ends of justice, such proceedings ought to be quashed. 31. In view of the foregoing discussion, I find that it is a fit case to exercise the inherent jurisdiction of this Court under Sec. 482 Cr.P.C against the petitioners/A.1 to A.4 to quash the proceedings arising out of C.C.No.314 of 2014 pending on the file of Special Mobile Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Guntur for the offence punishable under Ss. 447 and 427 IPC. 32. Resultantly, the Criminal Petition No.7731 of 2014 filed by petitioners/A.1 and A.2 and Criminal Petition No.10087 of 2014 filed by petitioners/A.3 and A.4 are allowed, and the proceedings against the petitioners/A.1 to A.4 arising out of C.C.No.314 of 2014 pending on the file of Special Mobile Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Guntur are hereby quashed. As a sequel, the miscellaneous petitions, pending if any, shall stand disposed of.