JUDGMENT : (Ajai Kumar Srivastava-I, J.) 1. Heard Sri Salil Kumar Srivastava, learned counsel for the applicant, Sri Shiv Nath Tilhari, learned A.G.A. for the State and perused the entire record. 2. The instant application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. has been filed by the applicant for quashing the order dated 14.03.2023 passed by the learned Special Judge (NIA/ ATS)/ Additional Sessions Judge-V, Lucknow in S.T. No.13751 of 2021 titled as State vs. Salahuddin and others arising out of Case Crime No.09 of 2021, under Sections 417, 120-B, 153-A, 153-B, 295-A, 298, 121-A, 123 I.P.C. and Sections 3/5/8 of U.P. Prohibition of Unlawful Conversion of Religion Act, 2021, Police Station ATS, Gomti Nagar, pending in the court of learned Special Judge (ATS/ NIA Court)/ Additional Sessions Judge-V, Lucknow. 3. The brief facts giving rise to the instant application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. also is that the present applicant is standing trial for the offences under Sections 417, 120-B, 153-A, 153-B, 295-A, 298, 121-A, 123 I.P.C. and Sections 3/5/8 of U.P. Prohibition of Unlawful Conversion of Religion Act, 2021, which emanated from Case Crime No.09 of 2021. Vinod Kumar has been examined as prosecution witness-1 in the learned trial court. The learned trial court has passed the impugned order dated 14.03.2023 stating therein that examination-in-chief of P.W.-1, Vinod Kumar has been done and his cross-examination is yet to be completed. Due to his absence on 14.03.2023, the cross-examination of P.W.-1, Vinod Kumar was deferred. The learned trial court also observed in the impugned order dated 14.03.2023 that as there is a direction of this Court to get the trial expedited, therefore, the learned trial court directed that the examination in chief of all the prosecution witness would be recorded first. Admittedly, there are 73 witnesses listed in the charge sheet. Their cross-examination will stand deferred and once the examination-in-chief of all the prosecution witnesses has been done, they would be summoned for their cross-examination. 4. Aggrieved by the aforesaid impugned order dated 14.03.2023, the applicant has filed the instant application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. 5. Learned counsel for the applicant has submitted that the impugned order dated 14.03.2023 is patently illegal insofar as it is not reasoned and speaking order and the same does not disclose any reason for doing so. 6. 4. Aggrieved by the aforesaid impugned order dated 14.03.2023, the applicant has filed the instant application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. 5. Learned counsel for the applicant has submitted that the impugned order dated 14.03.2023 is patently illegal insofar as it is not reasoned and speaking order and the same does not disclose any reason for doing so. 6. His further submission is that the statutory scheme for examination of witnesses is contained in Sections 135 and 138 of Indian Evidence Act. The provisions contained in Section 231(1) Cr.P.C. is an exception to the general rule for examination and cross-examination of witnesses. Therefore, while passing such sweeping order in exercise of its discretionary power, the learned trial court ought to have acted with utmost circumspection and care, which is not reflected from the impugned order dated 14.03.2023. 7. In order to buttress his aforesaid submission, learned counsel for the applicant has placed reliance upon the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Orissa vs. Dhaniram Luhar, (2004) 5 SCC 568 and State of Kerala vs. Rasheed, (2019) 13 SCC 297 . 8. Learned counsel for the applicant has also submitted that the impugned order dated 14.03.2023 is also against the provisions contained in proviso to Section 309 Cr.P.C., therefore, the impugned order dated 14.03.2023 being patently illegal and an abuse of process of this Court, deserves to be quashed. 9. Per contra, learned A.G.A. for the State has vehemently opposed the prayer by submitting that the impugned order dated 14.03.2023 is a reasoned and speaking order, which has come to be passed in the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case where the prosecution has to examine as many as seventy three witnesses and the trial is to be concluded expeditiously, therefore, the same cannot be said to be arbitrary. 10. His further submission is that an application seeking recall of impugned order dated 14.03.2023 moved by the present applicant is pending disposal with the learned trial court. Therefore, also the present application is not maintainable and deserves to be dismissed. 11. In order to buttress his aforesaid submission, learned A.G.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of this Court in Lal Harsh Deo Narain Singh and another vs. State of U.P. and others, 2004 SCC OnLine All 2085. 12. Therefore, also the present application is not maintainable and deserves to be dismissed. 11. In order to buttress his aforesaid submission, learned A.G.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of this Court in Lal Harsh Deo Narain Singh and another vs. State of U.P. and others, 2004 SCC OnLine All 2085. 12. Having heard the learned counsel for the applicant, learned A.G.A. for the State and upon perusal of record, it transpires that the present applicant is standing trial for the offences under Sections 417, 120-B, 153-A, 153-B, 295-A, 298, 121-A, 123 I.P.C. and Sections 3/5/8 of U.P. Prohibition of Unlawful Conversion of Religion Act, 2021, which emanated from Case Crime No.09 of 2021. Vinod Kumar has been examined as prosecution witness-1 in the learned trial court. The learned trial court has observed in the impugned order dated 14.03.2023 that examination-in-chief of P.W.-1, Vinod Kumar has been recorded and his cross-examination is yet to be completed. Due to his absence on 14.03.2023, the cross-examination of P.W.-1, Vinod Kumar was deferred. The learned trial court also observed by means of impugned order dated 14.03.2023 that as there is a direction of this Court to get the trial expedited, therefore, the learned trial court directed that the examination in chief of all the prosecution witness would be recorded first. Their cross-examination will stand deferred and once the examinationin- chief of all the prosecution witnesses has been recorded, they would be summoned for their cross-examination. 13. Being germane to the present controversy, Sections 135 and 138 of Indian Evidence Act are quoted herein below:- "135. Order of production and examination of witnesses.—The order in which witnesses are produced and examined shall be regulated by the law and practice for the time being relating to civil and criminal procedure respectively, and, in the absence of any such law, by the discretion of the Court. 138. Order of examinations.—Witnesses shall be first examined-in chief then (if the adverse party so desires) cross-examined, then (if the party calling him so desires) re-examined. The examination and cross-examination must relate to relevant facts but the cross-examination need not be confined to the facts to which the witness testified on his examination-in-chief." 14. The ambit of provision contained in Section 231(2) Cr.P.C. came to be considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in a judgment rendered in Rasheed’s case (supra). The examination and cross-examination must relate to relevant facts but the cross-examination need not be confined to the facts to which the witness testified on his examination-in-chief." 14. The ambit of provision contained in Section 231(2) Cr.P.C. came to be considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in a judgment rendered in Rasheed’s case (supra). Paragraph Nos.15, 17, 18, 19 and 23 of Rasheed's case (supra), being relevant, are quoted herein below:- "15. Section 231 CrPC indicates that the Judge is given the discretion to defer cross-examination of a witness, until any other witness or witnesses have been examined. Section 231 is set out hereinbelow: “231. Evidence for prosecution.— (1) On the date so fixed, the Judge shall proceed to take all such evidence as may be produced in support of the prosecution. (2) The Judge may, in his discretion, permit the cross-examination of any witness to be deferred until any other witness or witnesses have been examined or recall any witness for further cross-examination.” (emphasis supplied) The phraseology of Section 231(2) mirrors Section 242(3) [“242. Evidence for prosecution.—(1)-(2)* * * (3) On the date so fixed, the Magistrate shall proceed to take all such evidence as may be produced in support of the prosecution: Provided that the Magistrate may permit the cross-examination of any witness to be deferred until any other witness or witnesses have been examined or recall any witness for further cross-examination.”] CrPC which provides for a similar discretion to a Magistrate in the trial of a warrant case under Chapter XIX CrPC." 17. The Karnataka High Court in Shamoon Ahmed Sayed v. Intelligence Officer [Shamoon Ahmed Sayed v. Intelligence Officer, 2008 SCC OnLine Kar 371 : 2009 Cri LJ 1215 : ILR 2008 KAR 4378] , delivered by Shantanagoudar, J. (as he then was), had observed that Section 231(2) as well as Section 242(3) CrPC must be interpreted in light of the legislative intent behind the enactment of Section 251-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. 18. What follows from the discussion is that the norm in any criminal trial is for the examination-in- chief of witnesses to be carried out first, followed by cross-examination, and re-examination if required, in accordance with Section 138 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. 18. What follows from the discussion is that the norm in any criminal trial is for the examination-in- chief of witnesses to be carried out first, followed by cross-examination, and re-examination if required, in accordance with Section 138 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. Section 231(2) CrPC, however, confers a discretion on the Judge to defer the cross-examination of any witness until any other witness or witnesses have been examined, or recall any witness for further cross-examination, in appropriate cases. Judicial discretion has to be exercised in consonance with the statutory framework and context while being aware of reasonably foreseeable consequences. [ A Constitution Bench of this Court in Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 565 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 465 had elucidated upon the nature and manner of exercise of judicial discretion in para 21. The relevant extract has been reproduced hereunder : (SCC p. 584, para 21) “21. … Every kind of judicial discretion, whatever may be the nature of the matter in regard to which it is required to be exercised, has to be used with due care and caution. In fact, an awareness of the context in which the discretion is required to be exercised and of the reasonably foreseeable consequences of its use, is the hallmark of a prudent exercise of judicial discretion.”(emphasis supplied)] The party seeking deferral under Section 231(2) CrPC must give sufficient reasons to invoke the exercise of discretion by the Judge, and deferral cannot be asserted as a matter of right. 19. Several High Courts have held that the discretion under Section 231(2) CrPC should be exercised only in “exceptional circumstances” [Sisir Debnath v. State of W.B., 2017 SCC OnLine Cal 21442; Shamoon Ahmed Sayed v. Intelligence Officer, 2008 SCC OnLine Kar 371 : 2009 Cri LJ 1215 : ILR 2008 KAR 4378], or when “a very strong case” [Amit Kumar Shaw v. State of W.B., 2010 SCC OnLine Cal 2632] has been made out. However, while it is for the parties to decide the order of production and examination of witnesses in accordance with the statutory scheme, a Judge has the latitude to exercise discretion under Section 231(2) CrPC if sufficient reasons are made out for deviating from the norm. 23. However, while it is for the parties to decide the order of production and examination of witnesses in accordance with the statutory scheme, a Judge has the latitude to exercise discretion under Section 231(2) CrPC if sufficient reasons are made out for deviating from the norm. 23. While deciding an application under Section 231(2) CrPC, a balance must be struck between the rights of the accused, and the prerogative of the prosecution to lead evidence. The following factors must be kept in consideration: (i) possibility of undue influence on witness(es); (ii) possibility of threats to witness(es); (iii) possibility that non-deferral would enable subsequent witnesses giving evidence on similar facts to tailor their testimony to circumvent the defence strategy; (iv) possibility of loss of memory of the witness(es) whose examination-in-chief has been completed; (v) occurrence of delay in the trial, and the non-availability of witnesses, if deferral is allowed, in view of Section 309(1) CrPC [“309. Power to postpone or adjourn proceedings.—(1) In every inquiry or trial the proceedings shall be continued from day to day until all the witnesses in attendance have been examined, unless the court finds the adjournment of the same beyond the following day to be necessary for reasons to be recorded:” See also Vinod Kumar v. State of Punjab, (2015) 3 SCC 220 : (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 226 : (2015) 1 SCC (L&S) 712; and S.J. Chaudhary v. State (UT of Delhi), (1984) 1 SCC 722 : 1984 SCC (Cri) 163.] . These factors are illustrative for guiding the exercise of discretion by a Judge under Section 231(2) CrPC. (emphasis supplied)” 15. It is also useful to refer to a judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Dhaniram Luhar’s case (supra). Paragraphs No.7 and 8, being relevant, are extracted herein below:- “7. Reason is the heartbeat of every conclusion, and without the same it becomes lifeless. (See Raj Kishore Jha v. State of Bihar [ (2003) 11 SCC 519 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 212 : (2003) 7 Supreme 152 ] .) 8. Even in respect of administrative orders Lord Denning, M.R. in Breen v. Amalgamated Engg. Reason is the heartbeat of every conclusion, and without the same it becomes lifeless. (See Raj Kishore Jha v. State of Bihar [ (2003) 11 SCC 519 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 212 : (2003) 7 Supreme 152 ] .) 8. Even in respect of administrative orders Lord Denning, M.R. in Breen v. Amalgamated Engg. Union [(1971) 1 All ER 1148 : (1971) 2 QB 175 : (1971) 2 WLR 742 (CA)] observed :“The giving of reasons is one of the fundamentals of good administration.” In Alexander Machinery (Dudley) Ltd. v. Crabtree [1974 ICR 120 (NIRC)] it was observed: “Failure to give reasons amounts to denial of justice.” “Reasons are live links between the mind of the decision-taker to the controversy in question and the decision or conclusion arrived at.” Reasons substitute subjectivity by objectivity. The emphasis on recording reasons is that if the decision reveals the “inscrutable face of the sphinx”, it can, by its silence, render it virtually impossible for the courts to perform their appellate function or exercise the power of judicial review in adjudging the validity of the decision. Right to reason is an indispensable part of a sound judicial system; reasons at least sufficient to indicate an application of mind to the matter before court. Another rationale is that the affected party can know why the decision has gone against him. One of the salutary requirements of natural justice is spelling out reasons for the order made; in other words, a speaking-out. The “inscrutable face of the sphinx” is ordinarily incongruous with a judicial or quasi-judicial performance.” 16. Thus examined in the light of aforesaid settled legal position, it transpires that the impugned order dated 14.03.2023 is cryptic, by means of which, cross-examination of 73 prosecution witnesses has been deferred in bulk without recording existence of any such tenable ground as has come to be recognized by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in paragraph No.23 of Rasheed's case (supra). 17. So far as the objection of learned A.G.A. for the State to the effect that the recall application is still pending with the learned trial court, therefore, the instant application cannot be maintained, is concerned, it is needless to mention that power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is an extra-ordinary power vested with the High Courts in order to prevent abuse of process of the Court or failure of justice. 18. 18. The ratio of a judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Adalat Prasad vs. Rooplal Jindal and Others, (2004) 7 SCC 338 , is that any criminal court does not have power to recall its own order, which is substantive in nature like order issuing summon. Therefore in the considered opinion of this Court, the law laid down by this Court in Lal Harsh Deo Narain Singh’s case (supra) is distinguishable insofar as in the instant case, it cannot be said that the remedy seeking recall of impugned order dated 14.03.2023 is available to the applicant in view of restriction contained in Section 362 Cr.P.C. 19. It is needless to mention that the power vested with the learned trial court under Section 231(2) Cr.P.C. is a discretionary power, which should be exercised judiciously. Therefore, the learned trial court will always be at liberty to pass appropriate order, in accordance with law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rasheed's case (supra). 20. The upshot of aforesaid discussion is that the instant application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. deserves to be allowed and is, accordingly, allowed. Consequently, the impugned order dated 14.03.2023 passed by the learned Special Judge (NIA/ATS)/Additional Sessions Judge-V, Lucknow in S.T. No.13751 of 2021 titled as State vs. Salahuddin and others arising out of Case Crime No.09 of 2021, under Sections 417, 120-B, 153-A, 153-B, 295-A, 298, 121-A, 123 I.P.C. and Sections 3/5/8 of U.P. Prohibition of Unlawful Conversion of Religion Act, 2021, Police Station ATS, Gomti Nagar, is, hereby, set aside. 21. The learned trial court concerned is also directed to proceed with the trial of S.T. No.13751 of 2021 titled as State vs. Salahuddin and others expeditiously having regard to the provisions contained in Section 309 Cr.P.C.