ORDER: The National Insurance Company Limited has invoked Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as Arbitration Act), to challenge award dated 11/2/2020, passed by an arbitral tribunal consisting of three Members. The majority award of two Members of the tribunal has allowed the claim of the respondent Reliance Industries Ltd. and held that the respondent is entitled to an amount of Rs.435.82 Crores, which was wrongly deducted by the petitioner while paying amount for loss suffered by the respondent, as per the insurance policy issued by the petitioner. The minority award of one Member of the arbitral tribunal held that the proceeding initiated by the respondent suffered from non-joinder of necessary parties, as the insurance policy was issued by other insurance companies also, although the petitioner was indeed the lead insurer. 2. The brief facts leading up to filing of the present petition are that on 2/10/2012, the petitioner issued an insurance policy called a Mega Package Policy (2012-2013) to the respondent for insurance cover for the period between 2/10/2012 to 1/10/2013. The said policy covered risk in two parts i.e. Part A pertaining to property damage and Part B pertaining to business interruption, described as gross profits and increased cost of working due to reduction in turnover. The respondent, inter alia, is into the business of petrochemicals and it owns and operates a manufacturing unit at Dahej in Gujarat, which is an integrated complex. One of the primary raw materials utilized in the manufacturing unit at Dahej is Semi Rich Gas from which Ethane and Propane are extracted and used for the manufacturing of petrochemicals. As per the respondent, 80% of the demand of Semi Rich Gas is met by gas extracted from Panna Mukta Tapti field (PMT gas), which is transported by Gas Authority of India Ltd. (GAIL) to the manufacturing unit of the respondent at Dahej. The PMT gas is transported to the manufacturing unit at Dahej via Hazira – Dahej pipeline, which consists of 26” diam pipeline. A 24” diam pipeline also exists, used for return of lean gas i.e. the gas from which Ethane and Propane has been extracted, which is sent to the establishment of GAIL at Hazira. 3. The PMT gas is transported to the manufacturing unit at Dahej via Hazira – Dahej pipeline, which consists of 26” diam pipeline. A 24” diam pipeline also exists, used for return of lean gas i.e. the gas from which Ethane and Propane has been extracted, which is sent to the establishment of GAIL at Hazira. 3. The network of pipelines forming part of the Hazira – Dahej pipeline network included pipeline laid under the Narmada river at a depth of 20 meters below the river bed. It is stated that such network of pipelines is also laid by Gujarat State Petroleum Ltd. (GSPL), Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. (ONGC) and Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. (IOCL). In August 2013, due to heavy rain fall in the catchment area of Narmada river, about 14.5 Lakh cusec of water was discharged into Narmada river in one day, resulting in a deluge, as a consequence of which, it was found that the pressure of the Semi Rich gas had dropped in the 26” diam pipeline indicating possibility of rupture in the network of pipelines. Due to the unfavourable weather conditions, the personnel of the respondent could not approach the Narmada river during the night and when they visited the spot on 26/8/2013, it was found that the pipelines were exposed. On 27/8/2013, the respondent carried out aerial survey and it was found that the network of pipelines was extensively damaged due to the heavy deluge of water. Thereafter, on 30/8/2013, the personnel of the respondent could visit the affected spot to ascertain the extent of damage to both 26” and 24” diam pipelines. The repair and restoration was undertaken, which could be completed only by the end of December 2013 and beginning of January 2014. During this period, the supply of PMT gas to the manufacturing unit of the respondent at Dahej was interrupted for 154 days, between 25/8/2013 to 25/1/2014. 4. The respondent intimated the petitioner on 27/8/2013 about the said incident and stated that the extent of loss would be known only after the water receded. Subsequent email communications were sent and eventually on 4/4/2014, the respondent sent an email to the petitioner quantifying its claim under the insurance policy, at Rs.55.57 Crores for damage to the property at the manufacturing unit at Dahej and Rs.1137 Crores towards business interruption at the said unit. 5. Subsequent email communications were sent and eventually on 4/4/2014, the respondent sent an email to the petitioner quantifying its claim under the insurance policy, at Rs.55.57 Crores for damage to the property at the manufacturing unit at Dahej and Rs.1137 Crores towards business interruption at the said unit. 5. In the meanwhile, the petitioner had appointed two surveyors in the context of the said incident and on 21/4/2014, the first joint interim survey report was submitted by the joint surveyors. The report concluded that the claim of the respondent was tenable under the policy. No breach of policy conditions and exclusions were observed in the said report. It recommended to maintain a loss reserve of Rs.950 Crores. There were number of communications exchanged between the parties. On 6/2/2015, the second interim survey report was submitted by the joint surveyors, quantifying the assessed loss at Rs. 925.10 Crores, but the said figure was reduced by Rs.435.82 Crores for adjustment towards benefit obtained by the respondent at its manufacturing unit at Hazira. The report recorded that during the period of interruption due to damage to the pipeline, there was increased supply of PMT gas from GAIL to the manufacturing unit of the respondent at Hazira, as a consequence of which, the said unit could reduce its consumption of more expensive gas, indicating that the respondent had benefited at the said manufacturing unit at Hazira during the interruption period. This was the basis of the said reduction of the assessment of loss. 6. On 27/10/2015, the joint surveyors submitted the final survey report, reiterating the finding given in the second interim report, recommending adjustment of Rs.435.81 Crores from the gross assessed loss of Rs.925.10 Crores suffered by the respondent. Since the petitioner had made certain payments to the respondent in the interregnum, the balance admitted amount was paid to the respondent, although an amount of Rs.435.82 Crores was deducted from the total amount assessed towards loss. This led to a dispute between the parties, in the backdrop of which on 13/5/2016, the respondent issued notice to the petitioner invoking arbitration as per Condition No.7.1.1 of the insurance policy. This led to constitution of the three Member arbitral tribunal before which the proceedings stood initiated in June 2017. Eventually, the impugned arbitral award was passed on 11/2/2020 by the arbitral tribunal. The said award is subject matter of challenge in the present petition. 7. This led to constitution of the three Member arbitral tribunal before which the proceedings stood initiated in June 2017. Eventually, the impugned arbitral award was passed on 11/2/2020 by the arbitral tribunal. The said award is subject matter of challenge in the present petition. 7. It is relevant that during the period when the tribunal had reserved its award, the petitioner filed Commercial Suit No.166/2020, before this Court against four insurance companies, which were co-insurers in the said insurance policy called Mega Package Policy dated 2/10/2012. The petitioner stated in the plaint about the aforementioned arbitral proceedings and prayed for a declaration that the award of the arbitral tribunal be held as binding on the said co-insurers i.e. defendants in the said suit. This was the principal claim in the said suit, apart from a further declaration that deduction of the aforementioned amount of total loss assessed by the petitioner was illegal and unsustainable. 8. According to the petitioner, filing of the aforementioned suit and suppressing the said fact from the arbitral tribunal, disentitled the respondent from seeking any relief in the context of the impugned award, as the said award could be said to be obtained by fraud and suppression on the part of the respondent. A specific ground of challenge in that regard is raised before this Court, claiming that the conduct of the respondent was such that, only on the ground of suppression and misleading the arbitral tribunal, the impugned award ought to be set aside. Much emphasis was placed on the fact that one of the issues raised on the part of petitioner before the arbitral tribunal was non-joinder of the said co-insurers being fatal to the claim raised on behalf of the respondent before the arbitral tribunal. The present petition was filed challenging the said arbitral award in which the respondent entered appearance through counsel and the pleadings were completed. The petition was taken up for final hearing. 9. Mr. Seervai, learned Senior counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that in the first place, the impugned award ought to be set aside only on the ground that the respondent filed the aforementioned suit before this Court claiming reliefs identical to the claims raised before the arbitral tribunal and then suppressed the very filing of the said suit from the tribunal. Seervai, learned Senior counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that in the first place, the impugned award ought to be set aside only on the ground that the respondent filed the aforementioned suit before this Court claiming reliefs identical to the claims raised before the arbitral tribunal and then suppressed the very filing of the said suit from the tribunal. It was submitted that the petitioner had raised a specific ground of non-joinder of necessary parties as being fatal to the claim raised on behalf of the respondent and this aspect was seriously contested before the tribunal. In fact, the minority award held that non-joinder of the co-insurers was fatal to the claim of the respondent. According to the learned Senior counsel appearing for the petitioner, if the fact regarding the filing of the suit was placed before the arbitral tribunal, the majority award would also have turned in favour of the petitioner. In any case, it was submitted that the suppression of the said fact amounted to practicing fraud on the arbitral tribunal and that on this sole ground, the impugned award deserved to be set aside. 10. Reliance was placed on judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu Vs. Jagannath and Ors., (1994) 1 SCC 1 . It was submitted that the Supreme Court had held in the said judgment that a person whose case is based on falsehood, has no right to approach the Court of Law and such a person can be summarily thrown out at any stage of the litigation. 11. Reliance was also placed on judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of K. Jayaram and Ors. Vs. Bangalore Development Authority and Ors., 2021 SCC Online SC 1194, wherein it was held that the parties had to disclose the details of all legal proceedings and litigations either past or present, concerning the subject matter of dispute, and that a litigant can be non-suited on the ground of suppression of material facts. Reliance was also placed on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Yashoda (Alias Sodhan) Vs. Sukhwinder Singh and Ors., 2022 SCC Online SC 1208, on the aspect of effect of suppression of relevant facts from the Court. 12. Reliance was also placed on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Yashoda (Alias Sodhan) Vs. Sukhwinder Singh and Ors., 2022 SCC Online SC 1208, on the aspect of effect of suppression of relevant facts from the Court. 12. The learned Senior counsel appearing for the petitioner then attacked the impugned award on merits, by stating that the tribunal failed to appreciate the universal principle of insurance law that a party cannot be paid an amount beyond the amount for which it is indemnified under an insurance policy. It is the settled law that while assessing loss suffered by a party due to an unforeseen incident, any advantage gained by the party relatable to the very same incident has to be considered and adjusted while arriving at the final figure to assess the loss. The learned Senior counsel for the petitioner relied upon various judgments in support of the said proposition, including judgment of the Court of Appeal of England in the case of Castellain Vs. Preston and Ors., (1883) 11 QBD 380. It was emphasized that the Court in the said judgment laid down the principle that in a contract of insurance, the policyholder shall be fully indemnified, but shall never be more than fully indemnified. In this context, while assessing loss suffered by the insured, factors pertaining to the loss being diminished are necessarily be taken into consideration i.e. anything which reduces or diminishes the loss suffered by the insured must necessarily be taken into account while calculating the amount payable to such an insured. The principle of equity was invoked in the said judgment while laying down the said proposition. 13. It was pointed out that the Supreme Court of India also relied upon the said principle laid down in Castellain Vs. Preston and Ors. (supra), while deciding the case of United India Insurance Company Limited Vs. Levis Strauss (India) Private Limited, (2022) 6 SCC 1 , thereby indicating that the said principle was now part of Indian jurisprudence also. The Supreme Court observed that a contract of insurance is and always continues to be one for indemnity of the defined loss, no more no less. Reference was also made to few other judgments in support of the said proposition. 14. The Supreme Court observed that a contract of insurance is and always continues to be one for indemnity of the defined loss, no more no less. Reference was also made to few other judgments in support of the said proposition. 14. According to the learned Senior counsel appearing for the petitioner, exactly for the period of 154 days during which the manufacturing unit of the respondent at Dahej suffered business interruption and consequent loss, there was a corresponding increase in the profit at the manufacturing unit of the respondent at Hazira. On this basis, it was submitted that benefit accruing to the respondent at its manufacturing unit at Hazira, which had a direct nexus with the incident in question affecting the unit at Dahej, ought to be taken into consideration and therefore, the adjustment made by the petitioner while assessing the final amount towards loss, was justified. On this basis, it was submitted that the deduction made to the total loss suffered towards business interruption was in consonance with the aforesaid universal principle of indemnity, which the arbitral tribunal failed to appreciate. It was further submitted that the insured in the present case was Reliance Industries Limited and hence, its manufacturing unit at Hazira and other places could also be taken into consideration while assessing the business interruption loss suffered at the manufacturing unit at Dahej due to the incident in question. The approach of the arbitral tribunal in treating the manufacturing unit at Dahej in an isolated manner was attacked on the ground that such an approach may be justified while calculating the loss to property caused by heavy rainfall, but the loss suffered for business interruption could not have been assessed in such a manner. 15. According to the learned Senior counsel appearing for the petitioner, the final joint survey report of the surveyors had correctly recommended the deduction of the spurt in business enjoyed by the respondent at its manufacturing unit at Hazira while determining the amount payable to the respondent for loss due to business interruption. According to the learned Senior counsel appearing for the petitioner, not only were the terms of the insurance policy misinterpreted, but the aforementioned universal principle of indemnity was completely ignored by the arbitral tribunal while passing the impugned award. According to the learned Senior counsel appearing for the petitioner, not only were the terms of the insurance policy misinterpreted, but the aforementioned universal principle of indemnity was completely ignored by the arbitral tribunal while passing the impugned award. It was specifically submitted that the terms of the insurance policy were rewritten by the arbitral tribunal, thereby indicating that sufficient ground existed under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act for setting aside the impugned arbitral award. The learned Senior counsel placed reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Ssangyong Engineering and Construction Co. Ltd. Vs. National Highway authority of India, (2019) 15 SCC 131 , Associate Builders Vs. Delhi Development Authority, (2015) 3 SCC 49 and PSA SICAL Terminals Pvt. Ltd. Vs. The Board of Trustees of V. O. Chidambaranar Port Trust Tuticorin and Ors., 2021 SCC Online SC 508. Reliance was also placed on judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in Chenab Bridge Project Undertaking Vs. Kokan Railway Corporation Ltd., 2022 SCC Online Bom. 3148. 16. The learned Senior counsel appearing for the petitioner further submitted that vital documents were ignored by the arbitral tribunal while rendering its findings. Specific reliance was placed on two charts placed before the tribunal, which according to the petitioner indicated the facts and figures showing the spurt in business and manufacturing enjoyed at the manufacturing unit at Hazira, at the very time when the manufacturing unit at Dahej suffered losses due to business interruption. It was submitted that because of business interruption at the manufacturing unit at Dahej, the cheap PMT gas became available at Hazira and the respondent was not required to purchase expensive gas leading to net gain at the unit at Hazira relatable to the very incident, which had led the respondent to raising its claim under the insurance policy. Ignoring vital documents and relevant facts is a clear ground available under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, for interference with an arbitral award. It was submitted that the view adopted by the arbitral tribunal could not be said to be even a possible view on the interpretation of the terms of the insurance policy in the light of documents placed on record and hence, the present petition ought to be allowed. 17. It was submitted that the view adopted by the arbitral tribunal could not be said to be even a possible view on the interpretation of the terms of the insurance policy in the light of documents placed on record and hence, the present petition ought to be allowed. 17. The learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner further submitted that the arbitral tribunal erred in taking into consideration the contents of gas sale and transmission contacts executed by GAIL with the respondent in the context of its various manufacturing units, including the units at Dahej and Hazira. It was submitted that the said contracts were wholly irrelevant to the dispute between the parties in the present case. Accordingly, it was submitted that the impugned award stood vitiated on this ground also. 18. On the other hand, Mr. Milind Sathe, learned Senior counsel appearing for the respondent submitted that there could be no quarrel with the universal principle of indemnity relied upon by the learned Senior counsel appearing for the petitioner. Hence, it was not necessary to join issue and comment upon the judgments relied upon by the petitioner in support of the said universal principle. The endeavour on the part of the learned Senior counsel appearing for the respondent was on demonstrating that within the four corners of the insurance policy taken by the respondent, it was entitled to the entire loss assessed towards business interruption, without any deduction for the alleged spurt in the manufacturing activities and business at the manufacturing unit at Hazira. According to the respondent, the petitioner had referred to and relied upon certain clauses of the insurance policy before the arbitral tribunal, but while raising challenge to the arbitral award before this Court, no such reference was made, precisely for the reason such reference was not convenient for the petitioner. In that light, the learned Senior counsel for the respondent referred to various clauses of the insurance policy, particularly clauses 5.2 and 5.4 thereof. It was submitted that the terms “insured” and “insurer” used in the insurance policy indicated that the policy was an independent policy for each location where the manufacturing unit of the respondent was located. In that light, the learned Senior counsel for the respondent referred to various clauses of the insurance policy, particularly clauses 5.2 and 5.4 thereof. It was submitted that the terms “insured” and “insurer” used in the insurance policy indicated that the policy was an independent policy for each location where the manufacturing unit of the respondent was located. It was brought to the notice of this Court that for the manufacturing unit at Hazira, there was a separate insurance policy taken by the respondent and that therefore, reference to the manufacturing unit at Hazira, while assessing the loss of business interruption suffered by the respondent at its manufacturing unit at Dahej, was wholly misplaced and unsustainable. 19. It was submitted that since an insurance policy is nothing but a contract executed between the parties, it was necessary for the Court to appreciate the terms and various clauses of the policy before arriving at any finding. It was submitted that the arbitral tribunal had taken into consideration all the relevant clauses of the policy to come to a considered conclusion that the manufacturing unit at Hazira could never be covered under the expression “alternative premises” under the insurance policy, to the manufacturing unit at Dahej. Once this was established, the alleged spurt in business and manufacturing at the unit at Hazira was wholly irrelevant for assessing the loss towards business interruption suffered by the respondent at its manufacturing unit at Dahej. The learned Senior counsel for the respondent then referred to various paragraphs of the majority award to contend that all the relevant aspects were taken into consideration and that the tribunal arrived at the only possible view in the matter. Reliance was also placed on judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Ssangyong Engineering and Construction Co. Ltd. Vs. National Highway authority of India supra and Union of India Vs. Recon, Mumbai, 2020(6) Mh.L.J. 509, to contend that post amendment of the Arbitration Act in the year 2015, the scope of interference in an arbitral award was considerably reduced and that the petitioner in the present case had failed to make out any ground under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, be it the aspect of conflict with public policy of India or patent illegality, to claim interference with the arbitral award. 20. 20. On the aspect of non-joinder of necessary parties, the learned Senior counsel for the respondent submitted that the insurance policy was executed only by the petitioner with the respondent. Reference to the co-insurers was only in the schedule and it was an internal arrangement between the petitioner and the co-insurers. It was further submitted that there was an arbitration clause in the agreement between the petitioner and the co-insurers, thereby indicating that if there was a dispute between them, it would be an independent dispute to be resolved by arbitration. The terms clearly indicated that it was only the petitioner who was supposed to make good the loss suffered by the respondent and therefore, the findings rendered on the aspect of non-joinder of the necessary parties, in the majority award, were clearly sustainable. As regards the minority award holding that the claim of the respondent suffered due to non-joinder of necessary parties, it was submitted that the findings rendered in the majority award were a complete answer to the same. 21. On the aspect of suppression of facts on the part of the respondent in failing to place before the arbitral tribunal, the facts pertaining to the filing of the aforementioned suit, it was submitted that a perusal of the pleadings in the suit itself would show that no such ground was available to the petitioner in the present case. By referring to the pleadings in the plaint, it was submitted that the foremost prayer in the suit was for a declaration that the co-insurers would be bound by the award to be rendered by the arbitral tribunal. It was submitted that since the co-insurers were admittedly not signatories and parties to the insurance policy, there was no question of invocation of arbitration against them and hence, the only way in which the respond could ensure that it enjoyed the fruits of the arbitral award, was to file such a suit. It had no bearing on the question of non-joinder of necessary parties as there was no conflict in the stated stand of the respondent before the arbitral tribunal and the contents of the said suit. It was emphasized that the facts of the present case are distinguishable from the facts pertaining to the judgments on which reliance was placed on behalf of the petitioner. Accordingly, it was submitted that the present petition deserved to be dismissed. 22. It was emphasized that the facts of the present case are distinguishable from the facts pertaining to the judgments on which reliance was placed on behalf of the petitioner. Accordingly, it was submitted that the present petition deserved to be dismissed. 22. Having heard the learned Senior counsel appearing for the rival parties, in the backdrop of the material placed on record, it would be appropriate to first deal with the allegation of suppression of facts levelled against the respondent. According to the petitioner, by suppressing the fact of filing of the aforementioned suit before this Court against the co-insurers, the respondent had misled the tribunal, thereby vitiating the entire arbitral proceedings and hence, the award itself. According to the petitioner, this aspect goes to the root of the matter and the arbitral award deserves to be set aside only on this ground. It is recorded herein above, that the petitioner relies upon judgments of the Supreme Court in the case of S. P. Chengalvaraya Naidu Vs. Jagannath and Ors. (supra), K. Jayaram and Ors. Vs. Bangalore Development Authority and Ors. (supra), and Yashoda (Alias Sodhan) Vs. Sukhwinder Singh and Ors. (supra), in support of the said proposition. In the case of S. P. Chengalvaraya Naidu Vs. Jagannath and Ors. (supra), the Supreme Court held that the High Court in the said case was not justified in holding that there was no legal duty cast upon the plaintiff to come to the Court with a true case and prove it by true evidence. In the facts of the said case, the Supreme Court found that the plaintiff therein had failed to disclose all the facts in the suit and non-mentioning and non-production of certain documents amounted to playing fraud on the Court. It is in the backdrop of such facts that the Supreme Court found that the case of the plaintiff therein was based on falsehood, thereby holding that such a plaintiff can be thrown out at any stage of the litigation. 23. In the case of K. Jayaram and Ors. Vs. Bangalore Development Authority and Ors. (supra), the Supreme Court found that the menace of litigants approaching various judicial fora by suppressing material facts resulting in inconsistent orders, ought to be stopped. 23. In the case of K. Jayaram and Ors. Vs. Bangalore Development Authority and Ors. (supra), the Supreme Court found that the menace of litigants approaching various judicial fora by suppressing material facts resulting in inconsistent orders, ought to be stopped. In that context, it was observed that the parties ought to disclose details of all legal proceedings and litigations, either past or present, concerning any part of the subject matter of dispute, which is within their knowledge. 24. In the case of Yashoda (Alias Sodhan) Vs. Sukhwinder Singh and Ors. (supra), the Supreme Court found that the plaintiff had suppressed filing of an earlier suit and its withdrawal, in the subsequent suit filed for the very same cause of action. In this context, the Supreme Court observed, by placing reliance on the judgment of this Court in the case of S. P. Chengalvaraya Naidu Vs. Jagannath and Ors. (supra), that the plaintiff is under a duty to disclose all material facts. 25. In the present case, a perusal of the plaint in the suit filed on behalf of the respondent before this Court would show that the primary relief sought is for a declaration that the insured would be bound by the award of the arbitral tribunal. The respondent not only disclosed the arbitration proceedings initiated against the petitioner, but also copiously referred to the said proceedings in the plaint itself. In fact, the respondent quoted points for determination framed by the arbitral tribunal in the said proceedings. Thereupon, the respondent stated that since the co-insurers were not parties to the policy and to the arbitration agreement executed between the petitioner and the respondent, it was constrained to file the said suit. Thus, it cannot be alleged that the respondent suppressed any facts pertaining to the arbitration proceedings from this Court in the aforesaid suit. In so far as suppression before the tribunal is concerned, the stated stand of the respondent throughout the proceedings before the tribunal was that the co-insurers were not made parties to the arbitration proceedings, simply for the reason that they were not parties to the arbitration agreement. It was only the petitioner and the respondent who were parties to the agreement and all the aspects of the dispute pertained to the petitioner alone. It was not as if by filing the suit, the respondent had taken an inconsistent stand. 26. It was only the petitioner and the respondent who were parties to the agreement and all the aspects of the dispute pertained to the petitioner alone. It was not as if by filing the suit, the respondent had taken an inconsistent stand. 26. There was no question of the respondent in the present case failing to place a true case before the arbitral tribunal and it was also not a situation of suppressing material facts from the tribunal. Therefore, it cannot be said that the respondent approached the tribunal with unclean hands to surreptitiously seek certain reliefs, by indulging in suppression and fraud. This Court is not in agreement with the petitioner that the position of law on which it placed reliance indicates that the arbitral award deserves to be set aside, as having been obtained by practicing fraud and suppression. The aspect of the co-insurers being necessary parties, was in fact, the first issue determined by the tribunal, which was contested on merits and the majority award held in favour of the respondent. Thus, this Court finds no merits in the aforesaid ground raised on behalf of the petitioner. 27. While discussing the other grounds of challenge raised on behalf of the petitioner in the present petition, it would be appropriate to refer to the position of law that has been recognized by the Supreme Court and this Court, post amendment of the Arbitration Act in the year 2015. Prior to the amendment, in the light of earlier judgments of the Supreme Court, the scope of interference in an arbitral award had considerably widened, as a consequence of which, the amendment to the Arbitration Act was introduced in the year 2015. 28. In fact, the 246th report of the Law Commission of India, which eventually led to the amendment of the Arbitration Act in the year 2015, recorded that judgments of the Supreme Court, including the judgment in the case of Oil & Natural Gas Corporation Ltd vs Saw Pipes Ltd, (2003) 5 SCC 705 , had resulted in frequent interference in arbitral awards and such unintended consequences of the judgments of the Supreme Court were required to be addressed. Thereupon, substantial amendments were made in Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, which provides for grounds for setting aside an arbitral award. 29. In the case of Ssangyong Engineering and Construction Co. Ltd. Vs. Thereupon, substantial amendments were made in Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, which provides for grounds for setting aside an arbitral award. 29. In the case of Ssangyong Engineering and Construction Co. Ltd. Vs. National Highway authority of India (supra), the Supreme Court took note of the said developments leading to amendment of the Arbitration Act in the year 2015. The Supreme Court analyzed the effect of such amendments on the judgments rendered prior thereto and the width of jurisdiction now available to the Court under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, while considering challenge to an arbitral award. The Supreme Court in the case of Ssangyong Engineering and Construction Co. Ltd. Vs. National Highway authority of India (supra), held as follows : 34. What is clear, therefore, is that the expression “public policy of India”, whether contained in Section 34 or in Section 48, would now mean the “fundamental policy of Indian law” as explained in paragraphs 18 and 27 of Associate Builders, i.e., the fundamental policy of Indian law would be relegated to the “Renusagar” understanding of this expression. This would necessarily mean that the Western Geco expansion has been done away with. In short, Western Geco, as explained in paragraphs 28 and 29 of Associate Builders, would no longer obtain, as under the guise of interfering with an award on the ground that the arbitrator has not adopted a judicial approach, the Court’s intervention would be on the merits of the award, which cannot be permitted post amendment. However, insofar as principles of natural justice are concerned, as contained in Sections 18 and 34(2)(a) (iii) of the 1996 Act, these continue to be grounds of challenge of an award, as is contained in paragraph 30 of Associate Builders. 35. It is important to notice that the ground for interference insofar as it concerns “interest of India” has since been deleted, and therefore, no longer obtains. Equally, the ground for interference on the basis that the award is in conflict with justice or morality is now to be understood as a conflict with the “most basic notions of morality or justice”. This again would be in line with paragraphs 36 to 39 of Associate Builders (supra), as it is only such arbitral awards that shock the conscience of the court that can be set aside on this ground. 36. This again would be in line with paragraphs 36 to 39 of Associate Builders (supra), as it is only such arbitral awards that shock the conscience of the court that can be set aside on this ground. 36. Thus, it is clear that public policy of India is now constricted to mean firstly, that a domestic award is contrary to the fundamental policy of Indian law, as understood in paragraphs 18 and 27 of Associate Builders, or secondly, that such award is against basic notions of justice or morality as understood in paragraphs 36 to 39 of Associate Builders. Explanation 2 to Section 34(2)(b)(ii) and Explanation 2 to Section 48(2)(b)(ii) was added by the Amendment Act only so that Western Geco, as understood in Associate Builders and paragraphs 28 and 29 in particular, is now done away with. 37. Insofar as domestic awards made in India are concerned, an additional ground is now available under sub-section (2A), added by the Amendment Act, 2015, to Section 34. Here, there must be patent illegality appearing on the face of the award, which refers to such illegality as goes to the root of the matter but which does not amount to mere erroneous application of the law. In short, what is not subsumed within “the fundamental policy of Indian law”, namely, the contravention of a statute not linked to public policy or public interest, cannot be brought in by the backdoor when it comes to setting aside an award on the ground of patent illegality. 38. Secondly, it is also made clear that re-appreciation of evidence, which is what an appellate court is permitted to do, cannot be permitted under the ground of patent illegality appearing on the face of the award. 39. To elucidate, paragraph 42.1 of Associate Builders, namely, a mere contravention of the substantive law of India, by itself, is no longer a ground available to set aside an arbitral award. Paragraph 42.2 of Associate Builders, however, would remain, for if an arbitrator gives no reasons for an award and contravenes Section 31(3) of the 1996 Act, that would certainly amount to a patent illegality on the face of the award. 40. Paragraph 42.2 of Associate Builders, however, would remain, for if an arbitrator gives no reasons for an award and contravenes Section 31(3) of the 1996 Act, that would certainly amount to a patent illegality on the face of the award. 40. The change made in Section 28(3) by the Amendment Act really follows what is stated in paragraphs 42.3 to 45 in Associate Builders, namely, that the construction of the terms of a contract is primarily for an arbitrator to decide, unless the arbitrator construes the contract in a manner that no fair-minded or reasonable person would; in short, that the arbitrator’s view is not even a possible view to take. Also, if the arbitrator wanders outside the contract and deals with matters not allotted to him, he commits an error of jurisdiction. This ground of challenge will now fall within the new ground added under Section 34(2A). 41. What is important to note is that a decision which is perverse, as understood in paragraphs 31 and 32 of Associate Builders, while no longer being a ground for challenge under “public policy of India”, would certainly amount to a patent illegality appearing on the face of the award. Thus, a finding based on no evidence at all or an award which ignores vital evidence in arriving at its decision would be perverse and liable to be set aside on the ground of patent illegality. Additionally, a finding based on documents taken behind the back of the parties by the arbitrator would also qualify as a decision based on no evidence inasmuch as such decision is not based on evidence led by the parties, and therefore, would also have to be characterised as perverse. 30. Subsequently, this Court in the case of Union of India Vs. Recon (supra), further considered the position of law post amendment of the Arbitration Act, in the year 2015, as also the law clarified by the Supreme Court in the aforementioned judgment in the case of Ssangyong Engineering and Construction Co. Ltd. Vs. National Highway authority of India (supra). Upon analysis of the said position, this Court in the said judgment held as follows: 17.4 This yields the following result: (i) A lack of a 'judicial approach', being the Western Geco expansion, is not available per se as a ground of challenge. Ltd. Vs. National Highway authority of India (supra). Upon analysis of the said position, this Court in the said judgment held as follows: 17.4 This yields the following result: (i) A lack of a 'judicial approach', being the Western Geco expansion, is not available per se as a ground of challenge. (ii) A violation of the principles of natural justice is a ground for challenge as one under Section 18 read with Section 34(2)(a)(iii) -- that is to say, not under the 'fundamental policy' head nor the 'patent illegality' head, but distinctly under this sub-section30 30. 34(2)(a)(iii): the party making the application was not given proper notice of the appointment of an arbitrator or of the arbitral proceedings or was otherwise unable to present his case. (iii) A lack of reasons is a patent illegality under Section 34(2-A). (iv) In interpreting the contract, the arbitral view must be fair-minded and reasonable. If the view is one that is not even possible, or if the arbitrator wanders beyond the contract, that would amount to a 'patent illegality'. (v) 'Perversity' as understood in Associate Builders, is now dishoused from 'fundamental policy' (where Western Geco put it), and now has a home under 'patent illegality'. This includes: (A) a finding based on no evidence at all; (B) an award that ignores vital evidence; and (C) a finding based on documents taken behind the back of the parties. I believe this is not an exhaustive listing. Combining (iv) and (v) above, therefore, while the explicit recognition or adoption of the Wednesbury unreasonableness standard (introduced in Western Geco) is probably done away with, there is even yet a requirement of reasonableness and plausibility in matters of contractual interpretation. If the interpretation of the contract is utterly unreasonable and totally implausible -- the view taken is not even possible -- a challenge lies. Therefore: an award that was impossible either in its making (by ignoring vital evidence, or being based on no evidence, etc) or in its result (returning a finding that is not even possible), then a challenge on the ground of 'perversity' lies under Section 34(2-A) as a dimension of 'patent illegality'. 31. This Court is of the opinion that the above quoted position of law clearly indicates the limited scope now available to the Court under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act to interfere with an arbitral award. 31. This Court is of the opinion that the above quoted position of law clearly indicates the limited scope now available to the Court under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act to interfere with an arbitral award. It is in the backdrop of the said position of law that the contentions of the rival parties in the present case need to be considered. 32. It has been vehemently submitted on behalf of the petitioner that the claim of the respondent ought to have been thrown out by the arbitral tribunal on the ground of non-joinder of co-insurers, who were necessary parties. Much emphasis was placed on the minority award, wherein the said plea was accepted. The majority award rejected the same. It needs to be examined as to whether the findings rendered by the majority award are open to interference within the narrow scope now available under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act. In order to examine the said aspect of the matter, it would be appropriate to refer to the relevant portion of the impugned award which considers the said issue. In fact, the same was framed as issue no.1 before the arbitral tribunal. In paragraph 139 of the impugned award, the tribunal recorded certain admitted facts, as follows: 139. According to Claimant, following aspects are admitted position in the present proceedings; a) The Policy was issued by and in the name of NICL alone b) The premium was paid to NICL alone c) Surveyors were appointed by NICL alone d) The decision to partially repudiate the claim was taken by NICL alone (By the Competent Authority of NICL, as admitted by Rwl) e) All payments under the Policy were made by NICL alone, following which it issued cash calls to the coinsurers to remit their shares. f) Under the Co-insurance Agreement only lead Insurer is supposed to take decision about the insured event, loss assent, appointment of surveyors, making payments etc., which decisions are binding upon the co-insurers, NICL in this case is indisputably the lead insurer. 33. The tribunal found that reference to the co-insurer was only in Schedule H of the policy and that it was nowhere stated that the co-insurers were parties to the arbitration agreement between the petitioner and the respondent. 33. The tribunal found that reference to the co-insurer was only in Schedule H of the policy and that it was nowhere stated that the co-insurers were parties to the arbitration agreement between the petitioner and the respondent. It was also noted that there was co-insurance agreement between the petitioner on the one hand and co-insurers on the other, to which the respondent was admittedly not a party. Such agreement had an independent arbitration clause for resolving disputes between the petitioner as a lead insurer and the co-insurers. Such dispute was obviously limited to the extent of liability inter-se between the insurers. 34. After referring to all such relevant material, the arbitral tribunal in paragraphs 154 to 164 of the impugned award, undertook a detailed analysis of the terms of the insurance policy, as also the oral and documentary evidence on record including the statements of witnesses in cross examination, to conclude that the claim of the respondent could not fail for non-joinder of the co-insurers as parties to the claim. This Court does not find any ground available under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, as amended in the year 2015 and in the light of the position of law clarified by the Supreme Court, to interfere with the impugned award on the said aspect of the matter. The minority award, cannot be come to the aid of the petitioner and this Court finds that the ground of non-joinder of necessary parties cannot lead to interference with the impugned arbitral award. 35. In so far as findings on the merits of the matter are concerned, as regards reduction of Rs.435.82 Crores, it would be appropriate to refer to the relevant clauses of the insurance policy and the analysis of the same in the impugned award. Since the dispute pertains to loss caused due to business interruption, part B of the policy, becomes relevant. Clause 5 and its various sub clauses deal with the said aspect of the matter. Clause 5 is the insuring clause whereby the petitioner as an insurer is liable to make good amount of actual loss sustained by the respondent. Clause 5.2.1, pertains to turnover which is defined as the money payable to the insured for the goods sold and delivered and for services rendered in the course of the business. Clause 5 is the insuring clause whereby the petitioner as an insurer is liable to make good amount of actual loss sustained by the respondent. Clause 5.2.1, pertains to turnover which is defined as the money payable to the insured for the goods sold and delivered and for services rendered in the course of the business. Clause 5.2.8 refers to shortage in turnover, defining the same as amount by which the turnover during the indemnity period falls short of the standard turnover relating to that period, due to damage suffered by the respondent. Clause 5.4.1 defines alternative premises as being the premises where the insured rendered its services for the benefit of the business during the indemnity period, if such services were rendered elsewhere. It is significant that all these clauses have to be considered in the backdrop of fact that the respondent took insurance policies for each location separately, where it was conducting manufacturing activities or business. The insurance policy in the present case concerned the manufacturing unit of the respondent at Dahej alone and alternative premises would have been one where the activities of the said unit would have been shifted, due to any untoward incident. 36. All these aspects were appreciated by the arbitral tribunal while holding that the business activities of the respondent at any other place could not be taken into consideration for adjustment of amount payable to the respondent due to business interruption at the manufacturing unit at Dahej, as a consequence of the untoward incident of destruction of pipeline network due to heavy rains. The petitioner is not justified in contending that the tribunal wrongly proceeded on the aspect of location specific nature of the insurance policy by relying upon only the damage to property suffered by the respondent. This Court is convinced that the approach adopted by the arbitral tribunal in paragraphs 258 to 266 was a correct approach, while holding in favour of the respondent. In fact, the scope of jurisdiction under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, is now narrowed down to the extent that even if the tribunal had erroneously interpreted the clauses of the insurance policy, this Court would not sit in appeal over the same to interfere with the arbitral award. In fact, the scope of jurisdiction under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, is now narrowed down to the extent that even if the tribunal had erroneously interpreted the clauses of the insurance policy, this Court would not sit in appeal over the same to interfere with the arbitral award. It was only if the view adopted by the tribunal was not even a possible view that the ground under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act would have arisen. In the present case, the approach of the tribunal is found to be reasonable and the findings rendered on the said aspect of the matter certainly constitute a possible view in the matter, in which this Court cannot interfere while exercising jurisdiction under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act. 37. The petitioner is not justified in contending that since the insurer in the present case is “Reliance Industries Ltd.” all the entities or units covered under Reliance Industries Ltd would have to be taken into consideration to arrive at a final figure of loss sustained by the respondent due to business interruption at its manufacturing unit at Dahej. It would lead to an absurd situation and therefore, the learned Senior counsel appearing for the petitioner fairly submitted that the entire business of Reliance Industries Ltd could certainly not be taken into consideration while assessing the said aspect of the matter. 38. In fact, the material on record clearly shows that for the manufacturing unit at Hazira, the respondent had taken a separate and independent insurance policy. It is an admitted position that the loss the manufacturing unit at Hazira may suffer, as a result of an untoward incident is not covered under the subject policy. As noted herein above, the manufacturing unit at Hazira is certainly not covered under the expression “alternative premises” specified in clause 5.4.1 of the subject policy in the present case, thereby indicating the fallacy in the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioner. 39. This makes it clear that findings rendered by the arbitral tribunal, to the effect that the business activities at the manufacturing unit at Hazira were wholly irrelevant for assessing the loss suffered due to business interruption at the manufacturing unit at Dahej, was based on a reasonable and correct interpretation of the terms of the subject insurance policy. 39. This makes it clear that findings rendered by the arbitral tribunal, to the effect that the business activities at the manufacturing unit at Hazira were wholly irrelevant for assessing the loss suffered due to business interruption at the manufacturing unit at Dahej, was based on a reasonable and correct interpretation of the terms of the subject insurance policy. For the same reason the ground raised on behalf of the petitioner that vital documents in the form of the two charts were ignored by the tribunal, is also found to be unsustainable, as the charts contained figures showing the alleged spurt in manufacturing and business activity at the unit of the respondent at Hazira during the period of business interruption at the unit at Dahej. Therefore, no ground is made out on behalf of the petitioner under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act in that regard. 40. This Court is also of the opinion that the respondent was justified in placing on record details of gas sale and transmission contracts executed by GAIL with the respondent in respect of its various manufacturing units, including the units at Hazira and Dahej. The said details were placed on record to buttress its stand that the supply of PMT gas to the manufacturing unit at Hazira was within the scope of the said gas sale and transmission contact and that it had no connection with the untoward incident, as a consequence of which supply to the manufacturing unit at Dahej had suffered from lack of supply of PMT gas. It was only to indicate that the supply of the said PMT gas to the unit at Hazira was well within the quota available to the said unit of the respondent. There was nothing wrong on the part of tribunal in having taken into consideration the said aspect of the matter, while holding in favour of the respondent, for the reason that analysis of the said aspect of the matter was an extension of consideration of the principal contention raised on behalf of the respondent that the manufacturing activities at the unit at Hazira could not be taken into consideration while assessing the amount payable for loss of business interruption in the manufacturing unit at Dahej under the subject insurance policy. The petitioner is not justified in attacking the findings of the arbitral tribunal on that aspect of the matter. 41. The petitioner is not justified in attacking the findings of the arbitral tribunal on that aspect of the matter. 41. As regards applicability of the universal principle of indemnity and reliance placed on behalf of the petitioner on the judgments in the case of Castellain Vs. Preston and Ors. (supra) and other judgments, suffice it to say that there can be no quarrel with the said universal principle but, the entitlement of the respondent for being paid under the insurance policy for the loss suffered at the manufacturing unit at Dahej, was strictly governed by the terms of the insurance policy. The terms can lead only to one conclusion that the manufacturing unit at Hazira can never be a relevant consideration for adjustment of loss actually suffered by the respondent in the manufacturing unit at Dahej. It could not be said that the respondent in the present case stood indemnified beyond what it was entitled. In fact, in the facts of the present case, it cannot be said that the respondent as an insured had enjoyed any profit. In the facts of the present case, in terms of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of United India Insurance Company Limited Vs. Levis Strauss (India) Private Limited supra, the contract of insurance continued to be one for indemnity of the defined loss, no more no less. Therefore, the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioner on the universal principle recognized in insurance law, can also not be accepted. 42. In the light of the above, this Court finds that no ground is made out for interference with the impugned arbitral award and that the petition deserves to be dismissed. 43. Accordingly, the petition is dismissed with no order as to costs. All pending applications also stand disposed of.