JUDGMENT Jaspreet Singh, J. This is the plaintiff's second appeal being aggrieved against the judgment and decree of reversal dated 06th November, 1985 passed by the First Additional District Judge, Bahraich in Civil Appeal No. 7 of 1982 (Sri Ram Gopal v. Budhai and Another) whereby the defendant's first appeal was allowed and the judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court dated 30th November 1981 in Suit No. 222 of 1981 (Budhai v. Bhupendra Vikram Singh and Another) was set aside as a consequence the suit which was allowed by the Trial Court was dismissed by the Lower Appellate Court. 2. The instant second appeal was admitted by this Court on 07.12.1985, however, the substantial questions of law was not formulated. Later, this Court on 23.03.2023 had framed the following two questions of law arising in the instant second appeal. "(i) Whether the Lower Appellate Court was justified in reversing the findings in respect of the issue No.2 to hold that the appellant before the Lower Appellate Court was a bonafide purchaser for valuable consideration without notice. (ii) Whether it was incumbent upon the Lower Appellate Court to have considered the pleadings as well as the evidence of the parties and without meeting the aforesaid reasons was it justified in reversing the findings." 3. That during the pendency of the instant second appeal, the plaintiff-appellant and the defendant-respondent no. 1 expired and their legal heirs have been brought on record. For the sake of convenience, the Court shall be referring to the parties, as they were originally impleaded in the appeal. 4. To put to controversy in a perspective, certain brief facts giving rise to the instant second appeal are being noticed hereinafter. 5. The plaintiff-appellant Budhai had instituted a suit for specific performance of contract before Munsif, Kaisarganj, District Bahraich registered as R.S. No. 222 of 1981 wherein the original vendor namely Bhupendra Vikram Singh was impleaded as the defendant no. 1 while the subsequent purchaser was impleaded as defendant no. 2. 6. It was the case of the plaintiff-appellant that the father-in-law of the defendant no. 1 Bhupendra Vikram Singh remained unwell and for his treatment, the defendant no. 1 required money. For the aforesaid need, the defendant no. 1 agreed to sell the disputed property in question to the plaintiff for a total sale consideration of Rs. 2,100/- out of which a sum of Rs. 1 Bhupendra Vikram Singh remained unwell and for his treatment, the defendant no. 1 required money. For the aforesaid need, the defendant no. 1 agreed to sell the disputed property in question to the plaintiff for a total sale consideration of Rs. 2,100/- out of which a sum of Rs. 1,600/- was paid on 19.04.1974 as earnest money and the remaining was to be paid at the time of the execution of the sale deed. 7. Since the father-in-law of the defendant no. 1 was not well, hence, he did not execute the sale deed at the moment and it was agreed that the sale deed can be executed between 5 to 6 years. Since the defendant no. 1 was repeatedly asked to execute the sale deed and he evaded to perform his obligations, later, it revealed that on 26.08.1981 the defendant no. 1 sold the property in question to the defendant no. 2, hence, the plaintiff instituted a suit on 28.08.1981 seeking a decree of specific performance of contract requiring the defendant no. 1 and the defendant no. 2 to join in executing the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff in terms of the agreement dated 19.04.1974 for which the plaintiff-appellant was always ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. 8. The defendant no. 1 and the defendant no. 2 filed their separate written statements. The defendant no. 1 the original vendor admitted that he had executed an agreement to sell, however, in his additional pleas he had raised a plea that the plaintiff had agreed to sell the property bearing No. 326 Aa which was sold in favour of the plaintiff and there was no other property for which the agreement was executed and that even the sale consideration was suppressed and for all the reasons, the plaintiff was not entitled to get the agreement enforced as the defendant no. 1 had already executed a sale deed in favour of the defendant no. 2 relating to plot bearing no. 326 Ba for which the plaintiff had no concern. 9. The defendant no. 2 being the subsequent purchaser also filed his separate written statement and took a plea that the alleged agreement dated 19.04.1974 was ante-dated. The defendant no. 1 had agreed to sell plot no. 2 relating to plot bearing no. 326 Ba for which the plaintiff had no concern. 9. The defendant no. 2 being the subsequent purchaser also filed his separate written statement and took a plea that the alleged agreement dated 19.04.1974 was ante-dated. The defendant no. 1 had agreed to sell plot no. 326 Aa and a sale deed to the aforesaid effect was already executed and there was no agreement for plot no. 326 Ba. The defendant no. 2 had purchased plot no. 326 Ba from the defendant no. 1 for which the plaintiff had no concern. In the aforesaid circumstances, coupled with the fact that the defendant was a bonafide purchaser for valuable consideration without notice was entitled to protect his sale deed and the suit could not be decreed against the defendant no. 2. 10. Upon the exchange of pleadings, the Trial Court framed five issues out of which the important issues were:- (i) Whether there is any agreement to sell dated 19.04.1974 between the plaintiff and the defendant no. 1 as alleged and if so its effect? (ii) Whether the defendant no. 2 is a bonafide purchaser for a valuable consideration in good faith without notice of the so called disputed property? (iii) Whether the defendant no. 1 had already performed his obligations in respect of the agreement regarding sale of the property as alleged in paragraph 13 of the written statement of the defendant no. 1. 11. The plaintiff examined himself as P.W. 1 and Sri Ram Phal as P.W. 2. Sri Bhupendra Vikram Singh examined himself as D.W. 1 and one Sri Guru Prasad was examined as D.W. 2. 12. The Trial Court while dealing with the issue regarding agreement returned a finding in favour of the plaintiff and also held that the defendant no. 2 was not a bonafide purchaser for valuable consideration and that the plaintiff was entitled to a decree of specific performance of contract and the suit was decreed by means of judgment and decree dated 30.11.1981 passed by the 3rd Additional Munsif, Bahraich. 13. Significantly, it is Ram Gopal, the defendant no. 2 was not a bonafide purchaser for valuable consideration and that the plaintiff was entitled to a decree of specific performance of contract and the suit was decreed by means of judgment and decree dated 30.11.1981 passed by the 3rd Additional Munsif, Bahraich. 13. Significantly, it is Ram Gopal, the defendant no. 2 who had preferred a Regular Civil Appeal under Section 96 C.P.C. The original vendor Bhupendra Vikram Singh did not prefer any appeal, thus, it would be seen that the appeal under Section 96 C.P.C. was contested by the subsequent purchaser and in his appeal, the Lower Appellate Court entered a finding that the agreement to sale dated 19.04.1984 was forged and fictitious document. It also found that the property in question was not identifiable and the defendant no. 2 (the appellant before the Lower Appellate Court) did not have the notice of the agreement and as such he was a bonafide purchaser for valuable consideration without notice and with the aforesaid findings, the Appeal came to be allowed by means of judgment and decree dated 06.11.1985 passed by 1st Additional District Judge, Bahraich which is under challenge before this Court in the present second appeal. 14. Sri Mohammad Ali, learned counsel holding brief of Sri Prabhakar Tewari, learned counsel for the appellant submits that first and foremost, the Lower Appellate Court had grossly erred in returning a finding that the agreement to sell dated 19.04.1974 was a forged and fictitious document especially when such a plea was never raised by the defendant no. 1. 15. It is further submitted that while the suit was decreed by the Trial Court, the defendant no. 1 did not prefer any appeal. The appeal which was preferred by the defendant no. 2 who claimed to be the bonafide purchaser for valuable consideration without notice and as such his plea was confined only to that limited extent and he could have assailed the findings only in respect of issue no. 2 which was framed by the Trial Court and as such he could not have raised the plea which was never raised by the original vendor namely Bhupendra Vikram Singh, hence, the Lower Appellate Court exceeded its jurisdiction in entertaining the appeal of defendant no. 2 and on such grounds which were not available to the defendant no. 2 and even otherwise the findings which have been reversed regarding issue no. 2 and on such grounds which were not available to the defendant no. 2 and even otherwise the findings which have been reversed regarding issue no. (ii) is based on unsound reasoning and contrary to the material available on record. 16. The learned counsel for the appellant further submits that the Trial Court while dealing with the respective issues had considered the oral evidence of the parties thread-bare and thereafter had returned a finding. In case if the Lower Appellate Court was not satisfied with the said finding, then it was incumbent upon the Lower Appellate Court to have first dealt with the evidence, met with the reasons recorded by the Trial Court and thereafter could have reversed the findings by recording its own reasons but that has not been done. Thus, the manner in which the Lower Appellate Court has exercised its power while dealing with a first appeal is not in consonance with the settled legal principles which has vitiated the judgment. 17. It is also urged that in pursuance of the judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court dated 30.11.1981, the sale deed has already been executed in favour of the appellant by the Executing Court and this has not been challenged by the respondents, accordingly, in the totality of the circumstances, the appeal deserves to be allowed. 18. Per contra, Sri Mohan Singh, learned counsel for the respondent no. 2 has vehemently urged that the Lower Appellate Court was justified in setting aside the judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court for the reason that the property itself was not identifiable. It is also urged that the agreement to sell was in respect of property bearing No. 326 Aa for which a sale deed had already been executed by the defendant no. 1 in favour of the plaintiff, however, later with greed in mind, the alleged agreement dated 19.04.1974 was prepared in respect of plot no. 326 Ba for which neither the defendant no. 1 had agreed nor received any consideration and thus on the basis of such an agreement the decree passed by the Trial Court could not be sustained and has rightly been set aside by the Lower Appellate Court. 19. The learned counsel for the respondent no. 326 Ba for which neither the defendant no. 1 had agreed nor received any consideration and thus on the basis of such an agreement the decree passed by the Trial Court could not be sustained and has rightly been set aside by the Lower Appellate Court. 19. The learned counsel for the respondent no. 2 further submits that even otherwise from the perusal of the alleged agreement to sell dated 19.04.1974, it will indicate that the said agreement was inadmissible in law, inasmuch as, the property in question was agricultural in nature and as per the recitals contained in the agreement to sell, it is alleged that the possession was handed over to the plaintiff. This in terms of Section 164 of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act it would amount to a sale and as such if the agreement, if tested, either as an agreement or a sale deed in terms of Section 164, it would be grossly under stamped, consequently, by virtue of Section 33 and section 35 of the Indian Stamp Act, the document was not admissible, hence, the suit could not be decreed on the basis of the alleged agreement. 20. It is also submitted that the alleged sale deed which is said to be executed in favour of the plaintiff by the Executing Court is nothing but in pursuance of the judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court which was set aside by the Lower Appellate Court and the Executing Court is required to put the parties to the same position and status as it is a consequential act done in pursuance of a decree which did not subsist and was set aside by the Lower Appellate Court. Hence, it would necessarily imply that the sale deed executed during the execution would necessarily have to be set aside being a consequential act, hence, merely because, a sale deed has been executed in favour of the plaintiff will not give any strength to the plaintiff-appellant and the appeal deserves to be dismissed. 21. Hence, it would necessarily imply that the sale deed executed during the execution would necessarily have to be set aside being a consequential act, hence, merely because, a sale deed has been executed in favour of the plaintiff will not give any strength to the plaintiff-appellant and the appeal deserves to be dismissed. 21. The learned counsel for the respondent has relied upon the decision of the Apex Court in Omprakash v. Laxmi Narayan and Others (2014) 1 SCC 618 , Avinash Kumar Chauhan v. Vjay Krishna Mishra (2009) 2 SCC 532 , R.K. Mohammed Ubaidullah and Others v. Hajee C. Abdul Wahab and Others, (2000) 6 SCC 402 , Seethakathi Trust Madras v. Krishnaveni (2022) 3 SCC 150 and U.N. Krishnamurthy v. A.M. Krishnamurthy (2022) SCC Online 840. 22. The Court has heard the learned counsel for the parties and also perused the material on record. 23. The first question as to whether the Lower Appellate Court was justified in reversing the finding in respect of issue no. (ii), if examined in light of the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties and from the perusal of the material on record, would reveal that at the time of institution of the suit, the defendant no. 2, Ram Gopal was a minor. The sale deed executed by the defendant no. 1 in favour of the defendant no. 2 dated 26.08.1981 was in favour of Ram Gopal and the sale deed was executed through his father Hari Ram. 24. The record would further go on to indicate that the plaintiff in paragraph 3 had clearly set-up its case on the basis of the agreement to sale dated 19.04.1974. This paragraph 3 of the plaint so admitted by the Bhupendra Vikram Singh while he filed his written statement Ka-22 dated 20.10.1981, thus, in so far as the execution of the agreement by the defendant no. 1 in favour of the plaintiff is concerned, the same was admitted and it was also admitted that the parties had agreed to sell the property in question for a sum of Rs. 2,100/- against which a sum of Rs. 1,600/- had been received by the defendant no. 1 as earnest money. 25. The record would further indicate that the property in question was sold by the defendant no. 1 in favour of Ram Gopal, the defendant no. 2,100/- against which a sum of Rs. 1,600/- had been received by the defendant no. 1 as earnest money. 25. The record would further indicate that the property in question was sold by the defendant no. 1 in favour of Ram Gopal, the defendant no. 2 through his guardian and father Sri Hari Ram. While Sri Hari Ram took a plea of being a bonafide purchaser for valuable consideration without notice but in order to prove the same, the only witness that appeared was Gur Prasad. Sri Gur Prasad was the witness of the sale deed executed by the defendant no. 1 in favour of the defendant no. 2. 26. Though, the defendant no. 1 took a wavering plea that he had agreed to sell property bearing Plot No. 326 Aa and a sale deed had already been executed in respect thereto in favour of the plaintiff and there was no agreement for 326 Ba which the defendant no. 1 sold to defendant no. 2 was also considered by the Courts and a finding was returned against the defendant no. 1. At this stage, a bare perusal of the evidence led by the defendant no. 1 Bhupendra Vikram Singh, if perused, would indicate that he gave a conflicting statement and could not even stick firmly on the stand whether he had executed any agreement in respect of plot No. 326 Ba especially when the said agreement was confronted to him and the agreement clearly reflected and related to Plot No. 326 Ba. It is in the aforesaid context that the Trial Court noticed that the version as well as the evidence of the defendant no. 1 did not support the plea taken by him. In so far as the defendant no. 2 is concerned, neither the father of the defendant no. 2 namely Hari Ram entered into the witness box to make a positive statement that the defendant no. 2 was a bonafide purchaser for valuable consideration without notice but only examined Gur Prasad who was merely a witness of the said sale deed executed in favour of Ram Gopal. 27. At this juncture, the learned counsel for the respondents submits that the Trial Court returned a negative finding on the said point against the respondent no. 2 alleging that the defendant no. 27. At this juncture, the learned counsel for the respondents submits that the Trial Court returned a negative finding on the said point against the respondent no. 2 alleging that the defendant no. 2-witness made an statement in his statement that he had the knowledge of the agreement but it is submitted that the this is a case of misreading and misquoting the statement of the witness Gur Prasad and from perusal of his statement, it would indicate that he had stated that he had no notice and thus the Lower Appellate Court was justified in reversing the finding. 28. In order to ascertain the veracity of the contentions made by the respective parties, the Court had perused the statements of the defendant-witness no. 2 Gur Prasad and though it is correct to state that he stated that he did not have the notice of the agreement in favour of the appellant but even then it will be relevant to notice that Gur Prasad was neither the party to the proceedings nor he was appearing as a power of attorney holder on behalf of the defendant no. 2. 29. The property was purchased by Sri Ram Gopal who was a minor at the relevant time and his natural father and guardian Hari Ram must have made inquiries, however, he did not enter into the witness box to give any statement. The solitary statement which is available on record is on behalf of Gur Prasad who has merely proved the sale deed which was executed by the defendant no. 1 in favour of the defendant no. 2. His statement regarding the defendant no. 2 being a bonafide purchaser for valuable sale consideration without notice is not of much substance as the said plea was available to the defendant no. 2 and had to be proved by him and as he was a minor, the best person who could have established the said plea was his father Hari Ram. As already noticed above, Hari Ram did not appear in the witness box and thus the one line statement regarding bonafide purchaser for valuable consideration without notice made by Gur Prasad was not very relevant to establish the aforesaid plea which goes to the root of the defence as raised by the respondent no. 2. 30. As already noticed above, Hari Ram did not appear in the witness box and thus the one line statement regarding bonafide purchaser for valuable consideration without notice made by Gur Prasad was not very relevant to establish the aforesaid plea which goes to the root of the defence as raised by the respondent no. 2. 30. There is another way to look at the entire issue and i.e. to say that the said plea which was part of the defence of the defendant no. 2 was personal to the defendant no.2. The burden to prove the said plea squarely rested on the shoulders of the defendant no. 2, as noticed above, none appeared on behalf of the defendant no. 2 to substantiate the plea as the best person would have been the father of the defendant no. 2 as he being in charge of the affairs of the defendant no. 2 who was procuring and purchasing the property for the defendant no. 2 must have or ought to have made bonafide inquiries and what was the extent of such inquiries, there is no material to substantiate the same. 31. The defendant no. 2 did not have the right to take the plea regarding the agreement to sell dated 19.04.1974 being bad since it was a plea which was specific to the defendant no. 1 and he had not raised the plea in his written statement. The record would also substantiate that the defendant no. 1 had earlier executed a sale deed in favour of the plaintiff relating to the property bearing No. 326 Aa. The agreement dated 19.04.1974 related to plot no. 326 Ba and the record would also substantiate that the property bearing No. 326 Aa and 326 Ba both were recorded in the names of defendant no. 1 and the agreement to sell which is admitted by the defendant no. 1 in paragraph 3 of his written statement related to Plot No. 326 Ba. The parties have gone to trial in respect of Plot No. 326 Ba and therefore after the evidence, the feeble defence sought to be raised by the defendant no. 1 in respect of plots no. 326 Aa and 326 Ba also paled into insignificance and positive finding was returned by the Trial Court in favour of the plaintiff-appellant. 32. In the aforesaid backdrop where the defendant no. 1 in respect of plots no. 326 Aa and 326 Ba also paled into insignificance and positive finding was returned by the Trial Court in favour of the plaintiff-appellant. 32. In the aforesaid backdrop where the defendant no. 1 did not file an appeal under Section 96 C.P.C., thus, the finding recorded by the Trial Court regarding the agreement to sell in favour of the plaintiff dated 19.04.1974 in respect of Plot No. 326 Ba was not open to be challenged at the behest of the defendant no. 2. It will also be relevant to notice that not only did the defendant no. 1 did not file any appeal but he also did not join hands with the defendant no. 2 and the effect would be that the defendant no. 2 could have only contested the appeal on the solitary plea of bonafide purchaser for valuable consideration without notice and in this regard, as already noticed above that there is no sufficient evidence on behalf of the defendant no. 2 to substantiate the aforesaid plea, thus, the Lower Appellate Court was not justified in reversing the aforesaid finding. 33. It will be worth while to notice that the Lower Appellate Court has tried to carve out a new case that the said agreement dated 19.04.1974 was an outcome of fraud and was a fictitious document. No such plea of fraud regarding the agreement dated 19.04.1974 was raised by the defendant no. 1 who was the executant of the said document rather he admitted the same in paragraph 3 of his written statement, thus, the observations made by the Lower Appellate Court and returning a finding that the agreement dated 19.04.1974 was a fraudulent document is absolutely perverse as there is no material either in the pleading in support of the said plea nor any issue was framed and no evidence was led by any of the parties and in absence of the aforesaid basic ingredients, the Lower Appellate Court has completely transgressed its jurisdiction in returning a finding that the agreement dated 19.04.1974 was fraudulent is purely based on surmises and is clearly unsustainable. 34. The ground upon which the finding on issue no. (ii) regarding the defendant no. 34. The ground upon which the finding on issue no. (ii) regarding the defendant no. 2 being a bonafide purchaser for valuable consideration without notice which has been reversed is based taking into account the inference drawn by the Lower Appellate Court that the agreement in favour of the plaintiff dated 19.04.1974 was fictitious. The reasons as indicated by the Lower Appellate Court to arrive at such findings are extraneous to the evidence available on record, inasmuch as, none of the parties led the evidence and the inference drawn by the Lower Appellate Court again is perverse as it is not sustainable on the basis of the evidence. 35. It is in this view of the matter, this Court has no hesitation to hold that the manner in which the Lower Appellate Court has entered into the issue regarding the agreement in favour of the plaintiff being fictitious is per-se erroneous and extending the same to reverse the finding that the defendant no. 2 was a bonafide purchaser for valuable consideration without notice is also unsustainable. Thus, this Court holds that the findings returned by the Lower Appellate Court on the issue as to whether the defendant no. 2 was a bonafide purchaser for valuable consideration without notice is perverse and is accordingly set aside. 36. Having said that and examining the plea of the counsel for the respondent no. 2 that the agreement dated 19.04.1974 was inadmissible in evidence as it was inadequately stamped on the two counts (i) that since possession was handed over thus in terms of Section 164 of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act, it amounted to a sale and the stamp duty was not affixed as required on a sale deed; (ii) that even in terms of the agreement, the appropriate stamp duty was not affixed, hence, the agreement was hit by section 35 of the Stamp Act. For the aforesaid reasons, the agreement could not have been entered or considered in evidence and the suit ought to have failed. 37. The aforesaid submission of the learned counsel for the respondent no. 2 is being noticed to be rejected for the reason that no such plea was taken by the respondent no. 2 in the written statement. For the aforesaid reasons, the agreement could not have been entered or considered in evidence and the suit ought to have failed. 37. The aforesaid submission of the learned counsel for the respondent no. 2 is being noticed to be rejected for the reason that no such plea was taken by the respondent no. 2 in the written statement. Even while filing the appeal before the Lower Appellate Court, no such plea was raised and it is only during the course of the arguments before this Court that the said plea is sought to be raised. Even otherwise, the complete answer to the aforesaid question is contained in section 36 of the Indian Stamp Act which reads as under:- "36. Admission of instrument where not to be questioned.-Where an instrument has been admitted in evidence, such admission shall not, except as provided in section 61, be called in question at any stage of the same suit or proceeding on the ground that the instrument has not duly stamped." 38. From the perusal of the aforesaid provision, it would be clear that if at all any objection regarding the admissibility of a document is to be raised then it should be done at the time of admission of the document in evidence. Once, the said document has been admitted in evidence and the parties have led the evidence, it is no more open for the defendant to raise such a plea. As already noticed above, the plea was never raised either at the time of tendering the document in evidence nor during trial at any stage and not even before the Lower Appellate Court and thus for the aforesaid reasons, the plea cannot be entertained by this Court during the course of arguments. 39. The decisions cited by the learned counsel for the respondent on the aforesaid point in Omprakash (supra), it would be seen that in a suit for specific performance of contract, the plea regarding inadmissibility of the agreement was raised before the Trial Court who found favour with the contention, however, the same was set aside by the High Court which later came to be restored by the Apex Court. 40. 40. The decisions cited by the learned counsel for the respondent on the aforesaid point in Avinash Kumar Chauhan (supra) is not applicable as in the said case, the issue regarding applicability of stamp duty was raised before the Court of first instance at the inception and the document had been impounded. 41. Thus, from the aforesaid two decisions, it would be clear that the party had raised the said plea before the Trial Court which has not been done in the instant case and for the said reason, it will also indicate that in both the cases i.e. Omprakash (Supra) and Avinash Kumar Chauhan (supra), there was no consideration of the effect of section 36 of the Indian Stamp Act and i.e. for the reason that the plea had been raised at the first instance, however, in the instant case, it would be found and as noticed above that it was never raised, accordingly, at this stage, in terms of the section 36 of the Indian Stamp Act it does not permit the defendant no. 2 to raise such a plea and thus the said plea is accordingly rejected. 42. This Court is fortified in its view in light of the decision of the Apex Court in Barium Chemicals Ltd. v. Vishwa Bharati Mining Corporation; (2009) 16 SCC 262 wherein the Apex Court in paragraph 3 held as under:- "3. The order of the High Court does not conform to the requirements of sections 35 and 36 of the Stamp Act. A document which is not duly stamped and is also not registered though required to be registered can be admitted in evidence for collateral purposes under proviso to section 49 of the Registration Act but so far as the stamp duty is concerned, if the document is not duly stamped it has to be dealt with under section 35 of the Stamp Act before it is admitted in evidence failing which, by virtue of Section 36, admission of document in evidence cannot be questioned at any later stage. " 43. " 43. Similarly, the Apex Court in N.N. Global Mercantile Private Limited v. Indo Unique Flame Ltd. and Others; 2023 SCC Online SC 495 in paragraph 54 has held as under:- "We draw the following conclusions, as to what has been laid down by a Bench of three learned Judges in Hindustan Steel (supra): i. The Stamp Act is a fiscal measure intended to raise revenue; ii. The stringent provisions of the Act are meant to protect the interest of the Revenue; iii. It is not intended to be used as a weapon by a litigant to defeat the cause of the opponent; iv. Upon the endorsement being made under section 42(2) of the Stamp Act, the document would be admissible in evidence and can be acted upon." 44. In so far as the issue regarding readiness and willingness which has been raised by the defendant no. 2 during course of argument is concerned, it will be relevant to notice that the aforesaid plea may not be relevant at the behest of the defendant no. 2 as the defendant no. 1 had never raised the plea in his written statement. Even otherwise it is incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove his readiness and willingness, if it is seen, it would be found that in paragraph 7, the plaintiff had clearly pleaded his readiness and willingness and performed his part of contract, coupled with the fact that the same was never denied by either of the defendants and there has been no serious challenge to the fact that the plaintiff did not have the requisite means to pay and thus this Court is not inclined to entertain the aforesaid plea at this stage, especially, once having examined that the plaintiff did plea his readiness and willingness and also substantiated the same through the evidence which was not contradicted by the defendants in the evidence, accordingly, for the aforesaid reasons, neither the plea is sustainable especially when it was never raised before any of the courts below, consequently, the decisions which have been cited by the learned counsel for the respondents in R.K. Mohammad (supra), V.K. Mishra (Supra) and U.N. Krishnamurthy (Supra) and Seetakathi Trust (Supra) have no applicability in the facts and circumstances, though, the proposition of law is now well settled to be disputed. 45. 45. Now, coming to the other question regarding the Lower Appellate Court having reversed the findings of the Trial Court, it would be seen that this issue cannot be answered in favour of the respondent no. 2 for the reason that the Trial Court had considered the evidence led by the parties and by ascribing reasons has recorded his inferences and findings. The Lower Appellate Court ought to have considered the said reasons and only then it could have reversed the findings by recording its fresh reasons which has not been done rather as already noticed above, the Lower Appellate Court moved on a tangent and considered a plea that the agreement dated 19.04.1974 was fictitious even though no such plea was raised nor issue framed and no evidence was led by the parties. Such a finding being perverse cannot be sustained as already noticed above. It is now well settled regarding that the manner in which the Lower Appellate Court must exercise its power under Section 96 C.P.C. and it has been considered in a plethora of cases and the Apex Court having summarized the same in Sudarsan Puhan v. Jayanta Ku. Mohanty and Others reported in 2018 (10) SCC Online 552 has reiterated the scope and manner of exercise of jurisdiction by the Lower Appellate Court while dealing with an appeal under Section 96 C.P.C and the relevant paragraphs read as under:- ".....21. The powers of the first appellate court while deciding the first appeal are indeed well defined by various judicial pronouncements of this Court and are, therefore, no more res integra. 22. As far back in 1969, the learned Judge-V.R. Krishna Iyer, J. (as his Lordship then was the Judge of the Kerala High Court) while deciding the first appeal under section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as "the Code") in Kurian Chacko v. Varkey Ouseph [Kurian Chacko v. Varkey Ouseph, 1968 SCC Online Ker 101 : AIR 1969 Kerala 316], reminded the first appellate court of its duty to decide the first appeal. In his distinctive style of writing with subtle power of expression, the learned Judge held as under: (SCC OnLine Ker paras 1-3) "1. The plaintiff, unsuccessful in two courts, has come up here aggrieved by the dismissal of his suit which was one for declaration of title and recovery of possession. In his distinctive style of writing with subtle power of expression, the learned Judge held as under: (SCC OnLine Ker paras 1-3) "1. The plaintiff, unsuccessful in two courts, has come up here aggrieved by the dismissal of his suit which was one for declaration of title and recovery of possession. The defendant disputed the plaintiffs title to the property as also his possession and claimed both in himself. The learned Munsif, who tried the suit, recorded findings against the plaintiff both on title and possession. But, in appeal, the learned Subordinate Judge disposed of the whole matter glibly and briefly, in a few sentences. 2. An appellate court is the final court of fact ordinarily and therefore a litigant is entitled to a full and fair and independent consideration of the evidence at the appellate stage. Anything less than this is unjust to him and I have no doubt that in the present case the learned Subordinate Judge has fallen far short of what is expected of him as an appellate court. 3. Although there is furious contest between the counsel for the appellant and for the respondent, they appear to agree with me in this observation." (emphasis supplied) 23. This Court also in various cases reiterated the aforesaid principle and laid down the powers of the appellate court under Section 96 of the Code while deciding the first appeal. 24. We consider it apposite to refer to some of the decisions. 25. In Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari [Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari, (2001) 3 SCC 179 ], this Court held as under: (SCC pp. 188-89, para 15) "15. ... The appellate court has jurisdiction to reverse or affirm the findings of the trial court. First appeal is a valuable right of the parties and unless restricted by law, the whole case is therein open for rehearing both on questions of fact and law. The judgment of the appellate court must, therefore, reflect its conscious application of mind and record findings supported by reasons, on all the issues arising along with the contentions put forth and pressed by the parties for decision of the appellate court. ... while reversing a finding of%fact the appellate court must come into close quarters with the reasoning assigned by the trial court and then assign its own reasons for arriving at a different finding. ... while reversing a finding of%fact the appellate court must come into close quarters with the reasoning assigned by the trial court and then assign its own reasons for arriving at a different finding. This would satisfy the court hearing a further appeal that the first appellate court had discharged the duty expected of it. " 26. The above view was followed by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in Madhukar v. Sangram [Madhukar v. Sangram, (2001) 4 SCC 756 ], wherein it was reiterated that sitting as a court of% first appeal, it is the duty of the High Court to deal with all the issues and the evidence led by the parties before recording its findings." 46. It will also be seen that for the reasons recorded above, the judgment of the Lower Appellate Court cannot be sustained and the Executing Court had already got the sale deed executed and registered in execution of the judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court dated 31.11.1981 as shall be evident from the copy of the sale deed placed on record which is dated 01.03.1983 executed by the Munsif, Kaiserganj, Bahraich on behalf of defendant nos. 1 and 2 and the said sale deed relates to the said property which is the subject matter of the agreement and in favour of the plaintiffs-appellants. 47. Thus, for the detailed discussions, the second appeal stands allowed. The judgment and decree dated 06th November, 1985 passed by the 1st Additional District Judge, Bahraich in Civil Appeal No. 7 of 1982 (Sri Ram Gopal v. Budhai and Another) is set aside and judgment and decree dated 30.11.1981 passed in Suit No. 222 of 1981 (Budhai v. Bhupendra Vikram Singh and Another) is restored. In the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order as to costs. The records of the Trial Court shall be returned expeditiously.