JUDGMENT : VIVEK SINGH THAKUR, J. 1. These Revision Petitions, preferred by the tenant as well as the landlord against a common judgment passed by the Appellate Authority-(IV), Shimla, H.P. in two Rent Appeals, preferred by them against order of the Rent Controller in Rent Petition filed under H.P. Urban Rent Control Act (hereinafter referred to as ‘Rent Act’), are being decided together by this common order for involvement of appreciation of common questions of law and facts. 2. For convenience parties are being referred as ‘landlord’ and ‘tenant’ as per their status in the Rent Petition. Landlord is Young Men’s Christen Association, a Society registered under Societies Registration Act, on behalf of which Rent Petition has been preferred through its General Secretary. 3. Landlord preferred Rent Petition No. 66-2 of 2011, titled as Young Men’s Christen Association vs. Sukh Dev Singh Padam, for eviction of tenant from Room No. 13 of Young Men’s Christen Association (in short ‘YMCA’) Servant Quarter, Shimla, consisting of one room, on the grounds that 80 year old premises for having out lived its normal life span and having wide cracks in the walls, had become unfit and unsafe for human habitation and was required by the landlord for bona-fide requirement for reconstruction for augmenting its income as the premises was situated in the heart of the City having good potential for augmentation of income. 4. Tenant, admitting relationship between the parties, contested the petition by alleging that petition was filed on frivolous grounds with motive to evict the tenant from the premises, whereas, landlord had not sought any permission for reconstruction of the premises nor had discussed such proposal with the tenant and the premises was situated in the Core area of the City, where construction was completely banned and, therefore, prayer for dismissal of petition was made. 5. Petition was allowed and tenant was ordered to be evicted from the demised premises with a rider that eviction order shall not be executed unless landlord produces the building plan duly sanctioned/approved by the competent authority before the Executing Court. Further that, it shall be open for the tenant to apply for re-entry into the building in accordance with proviso (c) Section 14(3) of the Rent Act. 6. Tenant filed Rent Appeal No. 41-S/14 of 2015, titled as Sukh Dev Singh Padam vs. Young Men’s Christen Association, against the order of eviction. Further that, it shall be open for the tenant to apply for re-entry into the building in accordance with proviso (c) Section 14(3) of the Rent Act. 6. Tenant filed Rent Appeal No. 41-S/14 of 2015, titled as Sukh Dev Singh Padam vs. Young Men’s Christen Association, against the order of eviction. Whereas, landlord preferred Rent Appeal No. 10-S/14 of 2017/16, titled as Young Men’s Christen Association vs. Sukh Dev Singh Padam, assailing the condition of production of sanctioned/approved map before executing the order of eviction, imposed by the Rent Controller in the eviction order. 7. Vide common judgment dated 28.3.2017, Appellate Court dismissed appeal filed by the tenant. Whereas, appeal filed by the landlord was allowed my modifying order passed by the Rent Controller to the extent that tenant was directed to handover the vacant possession of the premises to the landlord within a period of three months, with a direction to the landlord that thereafter, landlord shall commence construction work within a period of six months and complete the same within further period of one year, after obtaining statutory permission. Further that, tenant shall be re-inducted after one month of construction of the building in the same place, location and area equivalent to the area which was in his occupation before passing of the order by the Rent Controller and terms and conditions of the tenancy shall be as per law laid down by the Supreme Court in Syed Jameel Abbas and Others vs. Mohd. Yamin alias Kallu Khan, 2004 (4) SCC 781 . 8. Tenant has approached this Court against the eviction order passed against him and dismissal of his appeal by the Appellate Authority. Whereas, landlord has approached this Court against time bound direction given by the Appellate Authority for re-building/re-construction of the premises as well as direction of re-induction of the tenant after construction of the building, claiming that such direction was unjust and oppressive against the right of the landlord. 9. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have also gone through the record. 10. 9. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have also gone through the record. 10. Supreme Court in Rukmini Amma Saradamma vs. Kallyani Sulochana and Others, (1993) 1 SCC 499 , referring its earlier pronouncement in Rai Chand Jain vs. Chandra Kanta Khosla, (1991) 1 SCC 422 , with respect to scope of revisional power under Section 20 of Kerala Rent Control Act, which is similar to H.P. Rent Act, has observed that notwithstanding the fact that Section 20 of the Act conferring revisional jurisdiction of the High Court is widely worded, such a jurisdiction cannot be converted into an appellate jurisdiction. 11. With respect to scope of jurisdiction and revisional jurisdiction and the extent of power which High Court can exercise in a Revision filed under Section 24(5) of the Rent Act, Five Judges’ Constitution Bench of Supreme Court in Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited vs. Dilbahar Singh, (2014) 9 SCC 78 , has observed as under: “28. Before we consider the matter further to find out the scope and extent of revisional jurisdiction under the above three Rent Control Acts, a quick observation about the ‘appellate jurisdiction’ and ‘revisional jurisdiction’ is necessary. Conceptually, revisional jurisdiction is a part of appellate jurisdiction but it is not vice-versa. Both, appellate jurisdiction and revisional jurisdiction are creatures of statutes. No party to the proceeding has an inherent right of appeal or revision. An appeal is continuation of suit or original proceeding, as the case may be. The power of the appellate court is co-extensive with that of the trial court. Ordinarily, appellate jurisdiction involves re-hearing on facts and law but such jurisdiction may be limited by the statute itself that provides for appellate jurisdiction. On the other hand, revisional jurisdiction, though, is a part of appellate jurisdiction but ordinarily it cannot be equated with that of a full-fledged appeal. In other words, revision is not continuation of suit or of original proceeding. When the aid of revisional court is invoked on the revisional side, it can interfere within the permissible parameters provided in the statute. It goes without saying that if a revision is provided against an order passed by the tribunal/appellate authority, the decision of the revisional court is the operative decision in law. When the aid of revisional court is invoked on the revisional side, it can interfere within the permissible parameters provided in the statute. It goes without saying that if a revision is provided against an order passed by the tribunal/appellate authority, the decision of the revisional court is the operative decision in law. In our view, as regards the extent of appellate or revisional jurisdiction, much would, however, depend on the language employed by the statute conferring appellate jurisdiction and revisional jurisdiction. 29. With the above general observations, we shall now endeavour to determine the extent, scope, ambit and meaning of the terms “legality or propriety” and “regularity, correctness, legality or propriety” and “legality, regularity or propriety” which are used in three Rent Control Acts under consideration. 29.1. The ordinary meaning of the word ‘legality’ is lawfulness. It refers to strict adherence to law, prescription, or doctrine; the quality of being legal. 29.2. The term ‘propriety’ means fitness; appropriateness, aptitude; suitability; appropriateness to the circumstances or condition conformity with requirement; rules or principle, rightness, correctness, justness, accuracy. 29.3. The terms ‘correctness’ and ‘propriety’ ordinarily convey the same meaning, that is, something which is legal and proper. In its ordinary meaning and substance, ‘correctness’ is compounded of ‘legality’ and ‘propriety’ and that which is legal and proper is ‘correct’. 29.4. The expression “regularity” with reference to an order ordinarily relates to the procedure being followed in accord with the principles of natural justice and fair play. 30. We have already noted in the earlier part of the judgment that although there is some difference in the language employed by the three Rent Control Acts under consideration which provide for revisional jurisdiction but, in our view, the revisional power of the High Court under these Acts is substantially similar and broadly such power has the same scope save and except the power to invoke revisional jurisdiction suo motu unless so provided expressly. None of these statutes confers on revisional authority the power as wide as that of appellate court or appellate authority despite such power being wider than that provided in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The provision under consideration does not permit the High Court to invoke the revisional jurisdiction as the cloak of an appeal in disguise. None of these statutes confers on revisional authority the power as wide as that of appellate court or appellate authority despite such power being wider than that provided in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The provision under consideration does not permit the High Court to invoke the revisional jurisdiction as the cloak of an appeal in disguise. Revision does not lie under these provisions to bring the orders of the Trial Court/Rent Controller and Appellate Court/Appellate Authority for rehearing of the issues raised in the original proceedings. 43. We hold, as we must, that none of the above Rent Control Acts entitles the High Court to interfere with the findings of fact recorded by the First Appellate Court/First Appellate Authority because on re- appreciation of the evidence, its view is different from the Court/Authority below. The consideration or examination of the evidence by the High Court in revisional jurisdiction under these Acts is confined to find out that finding of facts recorded by the Court/Authority below is according to law and does not suffer from any error of law. A finding of fact recorded by Court/Authority below, if perverse or has been arrived at without consideration of the material evidence or such finding is based on no evidence or misreading of the evidence or is grossly erroneous that, if allowed to stand, it would result in gross miscarriage of justice, is open to correction because it is not treated as a finding according to law. In that event, the High Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction under the above Rent Control Acts shall be entitled to set aside the impugned order as being not legal or proper. The High Court is entitled to satisfy itself the correctness or legality or propriety of any decision or order impugned before it as indicated above. However, to satisfy itself to the regularity, correctness, legality or propriety of the impugned decision or the order, the High Court shall not exercise its power as an appellate power to re-appreciate or reassess the evidence for coming to a different finding on facts. Revisional power is not and cannot be equated with the power of reconsideration of all questions of fact as a court of first appeal. Revisional power is not and cannot be equated with the power of reconsideration of all questions of fact as a court of first appeal. Where the High Court is required to be satisfied that the decision is according to law, it may examine whether the order impugned before it suffers from procedural illegality or irregularity.” 12. Present Revision Petition is to be decided keeping in view the aforesaid exposition of law with respect to scope of revisional jurisdiction of this Court. 13. Learned counsel for the tenant referring Sanjeev Sood (Bhagra) vs. Raj Kumar Sood and Others, 2018 (1) RCR (Rent) 30 and Pawan Kumar and Others vs. Rajesh Kumar, 2017 (2) RCR (Rent) 233, has contended that in view of these pronouncements, condition of sanctioned/approved map/plan was legal and valid and required to be imposed on the landlord before execution of eviction order and, therefore, it has been canvassed that Appellate Authority has committed a mistake of law by removing such condition. 14. To justify right of re-entry of the tenant and condition imposed by the Courts below on this count, learned counsel for the tenant has relied upon pronouncement of Division Bench of this High Court in Chaman Lal Bali vs. State of Himachal Pradesh and Another, 2017 (2) RCR (Rent) 236, wherein though remaining portion of proviso of Section 14(3) (c) of Rent Act providing reentry to the tenant was struck down and declared unconstitutional, however right of re-entry to the tenant has been upheld. 15. On behalf of the landlord, referring judgment dated 26.11.2018, passed by Coordinate Bench of this Court in Civil Revision No. 131 of 2018, titled as Rakesh vs. Raj Kumari, it has been contended that where eviction order has been passed on other grounds alongwith ground of re-construction/re-building, then condition of production of sanctioned/ approved map/plan for execution of eviction of the tenant is not warranted and it has been contended that in present case building has also been treated unfit and unsafe for human habitation and, therefore, to avoid any untoward incident, eviction order has to be implemented immediately without waiting for approval or sanction of the map/plan of the building. 16. Referring Kusum Devi vs. Mohan Lal (Dead) by LRs. 16. Referring Kusum Devi vs. Mohan Lal (Dead) by LRs. (2009) 11 SCC 594 , it has been contended on behalf of the landlord that where premises, having become unsafe and unfit for human habitation, is required bona-fide for re-building/reconstruction/ repairing, then eviction cannot be delayed as old, collapsed and dilapidated portion of the building may cause untoward incident. 17. Referring Jagat Pal Dhawan vs. Kahan Singh, (2003) 1 SCC 191 and Hari Dass Sharma vs. Vikas Sood and Others, (2013) 5 SCC 243 , it has been contended that for eviction under Section 14(3)(c) of the Rent Act, approval or sanction of plan is not a condition precedent for entitlement of landlord for eviction of the tenant and, therefore, it has been contended that Appellate Authority has rightly omitted the said condition. But, it has been contended that imposition of time bound re-construction and reentry ordered by the Appellate Court is not sustainable. 18. Referring Para-27 of Chaman Lal Bali’s case referred supra as well as Champeshwar Lall Sood vs. Gurpartap Singh and Others, 2017 (2) RCR (Rent) 293, it has been contended that tenant is also liable to use and occupation charges from the date of order of eviction passed by the Rent Controller till user and occupation of the premises in question. In this regard, reliance has also been placed on para-70 of order dated 03.08.2018, passed by this High Court in Civil Revision No. 125 of 2016, titled as Narinder Kumar vs. Rohit Madan and Others. 19. It has also been contended that tenant is occupying the room in the Servant Quarter and unless there is a relation of Master and Servant, the person is not entitled for occupying or continue to occupy the premises in Servant Quarters of the Society as Servant Quarters are meant for servants of the Society with respect to its affairs related to main building or otherwise of the Society and, therefore, right to re-entry, if any, shall be subject to such relation of the tenant with the landlord. 20. Landlord in his evidence has examined B.C. Sharma as PW-2 as an expert, who has proved on record his report Ex.PW-2/A alongwith photographs Ex.PW-2/D-1 to Ex.PW-2/D-4, to establish that building has been constructed with outdated material and has out lived its ordinary span of life and requires to be demolished in its entirety for new structure to be built. 20. Landlord in his evidence has examined B.C. Sharma as PW-2 as an expert, who has proved on record his report Ex.PW-2/A alongwith photographs Ex.PW-2/D-1 to Ex.PW-2/D-4, to establish that building has been constructed with outdated material and has out lived its ordinary span of life and requires to be demolished in its entirety for new structure to be built. The photographs, which were admittedly of the building wherein demised premises is situated depict its deplorable and deteriorated condition requiring re-construction/re-building. 21. In response, tenant has examined Des Raj Sharma as RW-1, who has proved on record his report Ex.RW.1/A, stating therein that demised premises was in good condition having cement concrete flooring, good quality wooden work with no cracks on floor and walls and roof, but he has not proved and placed on record any photographs of the demised premises. Rent Controller, after evaluating and assessing evidence on record, in absence of any cogent and reliable evidence in support of report Ex.RW.1/A, has relied upon report of PW-2 B.C. Sharma Ex.PW-2/A and photographs alongwith that and has arrived at a conclusion that building was unsafe for human habitation and requires re-construction and re-building which cannot be carried out unless premises is vacated by the tenant and in the light of evidence on record, I do not find any illegality or impropriety in the conclusion arrived by the Rent Controller and, therefore, it needs no interference. 22. With respect to condition of approval or sanction of map and plan, case law relied upon by the tenant is judgment passed by Coordinate Bench of this High Court. Whereas, in view of pronouncements of the Supreme Court in Jagat Pal Dhawan’s and Hari Dass Sharma’s cases, such permission is not condition precedent to the entitlement of landlord for eviction of the tenant and, therefore, I do not find any illegality in the order passed by the Appellate Authority removing such condition from the eviction order. Whereas, in view of pronouncements of the Supreme Court in Jagat Pal Dhawan’s and Hari Dass Sharma’s cases, such permission is not condition precedent to the entitlement of landlord for eviction of the tenant and, therefore, I do not find any illegality in the order passed by the Appellate Authority removing such condition from the eviction order. Otherwise also, for re-construction and rebuilding of building particularly when building has been found to be unsafe and unfit for human habitation, there may be other necessary steps required to be taken by the landlord even before such approval/sanction of plan/map for preventing any untoward incident on account of collapse of building and, where building has been found unsafe and unfit for human habitation and eviction has been ordered on that ground, a condition of production of approved or sanctioned plan before execution shall be an unwarranted absurd condition because for taking such steps, there may not be necessity of approved or sanctioned plan. Therefore, such condition of approval or sanction of plan for execution of order has rightly been omitted by the Appellate Court. 23. So far as, right of re-induction or re-entry of a person is concerned that shall be governed not only by the fact that he has been tenant of the premises/Servant Quarters of the landlord-Society, but also on the requirement of eligibility or entitlement for allotment of Servant Quarters of the Society in the premises in reference and also subject to all other provisions of law applicable for such re-entry/re-induction, including determination of fair rent or rent mutually agreed between the parties. 24. Entitling landlord for eviction of a tenant from a building which is unsafe and unfit for human habitation and is bona-fide required for re-construction/re-building, in a petition preferred under Section 14(3)(c) of the Rent Act, re-construction of the building in a time bound manner is also not a pre-condition and, therefore, such condition imposed by the Appellate Authority is unwarranted and, therefore such term deserves to be omitted from the eviction order. 25. Considering the case law referred by the landlord, I am of the opinion that tenant is also liable to pay and landlord is entitled to receive use and occupation charges for possession of the premises in question by the tenant after date of order of eviction i.e. 30.11.2015. 25. Considering the case law referred by the landlord, I am of the opinion that tenant is also liable to pay and landlord is entitled to receive use and occupation charges for possession of the premises in question by the tenant after date of order of eviction i.e. 30.11.2015. Admittedly, premises in question is situated in the heart of the City, in the Core area, where availability of premises is very costly. Landlord in his petition has pleaded that rent of the premises is Rs. 200/- per month plus electricity charges. Division Bench of this High Court in Chaman Lal Bali’s case, has observed as under: “27. In State of Maharashtra and Another vs. M/s Super Max International Pvt. Ltd. and Others, 2009 (2) RCR (Rent) 246 : AIR 2010 SC 722 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that while admitting the appeal after ejectment order, it is perfectly open to the appellate or the revisional court to direct the tenant to pay rent higher than the contractual rent, but the Court would not fix any excessive, fanciful or punitive amount. Since the mesne profits are not assessed by the appellate authority on the basis of the evidence led as per the Act, by production of evidence, on fact on issue or relevant facts, but is merely an assessment on the basis of prima-facie market rate is existing at the time of admission of the appeal after eviction order, a benefit has been bestowed on the landlord that he would be reasonably compensated for loss occasioned by delay in execution of decree by grant of stay order. The mesne profit or compensation payable to the landlord is generally determined on the basis of the cogent material placed on record by the parties in the shape of the registered lease deeds of the locality indicating the tentative amount of the rent which as the landlord would be entitled to in a case he had rented out the premises at the present market rate existing on the date of ejectment. However, there is no straight jacket formula. 28. However, there is no straight jacket formula. 28. It would be noticed ha the entire subject matter of mesne profits in the event of a decree of eviction and appeal there against being filed, is a judge-made law chiseled out by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in its various pronouncements (some of which have been cited above), the entire premise of the aforesaid judgments is that once a decree of eviction is passed, the tenant becomes unlawful occupant (subject to his right in appeal/revision), therefore, any contract between the parties also comes to an end. It is for this reason that the Courts have carved out this new principle of ensuring that the tenant in unlawful possession does not further prejudice the landlord, who is otherwise entitled to get possession of his property and for this purpose, have laid down that the tenant must pay a reasonable amount subject to outcome of the appeal/revision. 29. Even otherwise, the awarding of mesne profits does put a check on the diabolical plans of the tenant who has been ordered to be evicted to further delay the matter and squat on the premises by paying a nominal or meager rent. In the light of the aforesaid discussion it is evidently clear that the plea of the petitioner that there is no provision for claiming mesne profits after the order of eviction has been passed is clearly based on the misconception of the position of law.” 26. Keeping in view location of the premises concerned, it can be easily inferred that for such accommodation in the area concerned a person has to at least pay more than Rs. 2000/- per month. However, taking into consideration status of the tenant as well as the fact that no concrete material has been placed before me, thus for want of availability of material on record, I am of the opinion that it would be appropriate to direct the tenant to pay a sum of Rs. 1000/- per month as use and occupation charges from the date of eviction till handing over of the possession to the landlord. 1000/- per month as use and occupation charges from the date of eviction till handing over of the possession to the landlord. In case tenant vacates the premises in question on or before 30.04.2023, then he shall not be liable to pay any use and occupation charges, failing which he shall liable to pay use and occupation charges till his occupancy, in such eventuality, landlord shall be entitled to recover use and occupation charges as determined hereinabove. 27. Landlord shall be at liberty to file substantive petition for determining the mesne profit, wherein mesne profit shall be determined by the Court concerned on the basis of material placed before it and the amount directed to be paid as use and occupation charges shall not come in the way of parties to determine such fair amount of mesne profit. However, payment of such use and occupation charges shall be taken into consideration for the liability of tenant to pay the same. 28. Taking into consideration pronouncements of the Supreme Court as well this High Court and in view of discussion hereinabove, Revision Petition preferred by the tenant is dismissed and Revision Petition preferred by the landlord is partly allowed and condition of re-construction in time bound manner is removed. However, right of re-induction and re-entry of the tenant is upheld subject to the condition discussed supra as well as law as applicable to such re-entry and re-induction at relevant time. 29. Petitions stand disposed of, so also pending applications, if any.