JUDGMENT : This is a claimants appeal arising out of a judgment and award passed by the learned District Judge/ Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Kanpur Nagar dated 29.08.2005 passed in M.A.C.P. No. 103 of 2005, seeking enhancement of the compensation awarded. 2. The claimants-appellants are the claimant-petitioners of M.A.C.P. No. 103 of 2005 instituted before the Tribunal seeking compensation on account of the death of their son in a motor accident. The claimants-appellants are the father and mother of the deceased and shall hereinafter be referred to as the “claimants.” 3. The claimants’ case briefly put is this: Mohit Dwivedi was a student of Class XI at Woodbine Gardenia School, situate at G.T. Road, Kalyanpur, Kanpur Nagar. On November, the 9th, 2004, after attending school, he was proceeding to attend his coaching classes near Gurudev Palace, Kakadev by a Scooter, bearing Registration No. UP-78AM-9142. The aforesaid scooter was owned by the deceased’s father, Arun Kumar Dwivedi, one of the claimants. At about 01:45 in the afternoon as Mohit reached a place facing Dalhan Anusandhan Railway Crossing, a truck bearing Registration No. UP-70L-9527 moving from the opposite direction, swerved to the wrong side of the road and hit Mohit’s scooter. As a result of the impact, Mohit was thrown down from the scooter and sustained grievous injuries. The scooter was also damaged. A multitude of persons gathered at the site of the accident and the offending truck was apprehended on the spot. Some of those men conveyed Mohit to the hospital but he passed away in transit. He was the claimants’ elder son and very intelligent. He was reading to write his competitive test for admission to the Bachelor of Engineering course. He would attend coaching class after school hours for the said purpose. Besides studies, Mohit would take part in extracurricular activities. The deceased would have gone on to become an Engineer and earn an approximate sum of Rs.50,000/- per month but for his untimely demise. The claimants say that they have been deprived of his services and financial help in their old days. They have suffered physical and mental agony, which cannot be compensated in monetary terms. At the time of his demise, the deceased was aged about 19 years. His monthly income was Rs.25,000/-. The claimants say that they have been deprived of his services and financial help in their old days. They have suffered physical and mental agony, which cannot be compensated in monetary terms. At the time of his demise, the deceased was aged about 19 years. His monthly income was Rs.25,000/-. An FIR about the incident was lodged at P.S. Kalyanpur, leading to registration of Crime No. 692 of 2004, under Sections 279, 304-A and 302 IPC against Ram Magan, the truck driver on 09.11.2004 at 04:00 p.m. 4. The claimants prayed that a sum of Rs.32,76,000/- along with interest @ 18% per annum be awarded to them in compensation. 5. One Bharat Bhushan Khanna is the owner of the offending vehicle. He was impleaded as opposite party no. 1 to the claim petition. Before us he is impleaded as respondent no. 1 to the appeal. The truck owner shall hereinafter be called as the ‘owner”. The New India Assurance Company Limited through its Regional Officer, Kanpur Nagar are the insurers of the offending truck. They were impleaded as opposite party no. 2 to the claim petition and respondent no. 2 to this appeal. The aforesaid Insurance Company shall hereinafter be called as the ‘Insurers’. 6. A written statement was filed on behalf of the owner. He has admitted being the registered owner of the offending truck. He has pleaded that the offending truck was insured with the Insurers from 04.04.2004 to 03.04.2005. According to the owner, the accident did not take place on account of rash and negligent driving by the truck driver. The driver of the truck held a valid driving license. He was an experienced driver. The accident was caused due to the negligence of the deceased. A plea has been raised that the registered owner of the scooter and its Insurer have not been impleaded as parties to the claim petition, rendering it bad for non-joinder of the necessary parties. The compensation claimed is excessive. It is pleaded that if the owner be found liable, the burden would go to the Insurers. The Insurers have filed a separate written statement and generally denied the claimants’ case. According to the Insurers, the factum of the accident and the involvement of the offending truck therein is denied. They have pleaded that no accident was caused by the offending truck in the manner alleged by the claimants. The Insurers have filed a separate written statement and generally denied the claimants’ case. According to the Insurers, the factum of the accident and the involvement of the offending truck therein is denied. They have pleaded that no accident was caused by the offending truck in the manner alleged by the claimants. There is in the alternative a plea to the effect that the accident, if any, was caused due to the deceased’s negligence. The driver of the offending truck was not holding a valid and effective license on the date of the accident. 7. There is a plea on behalf of the Insurers that Mohit Dwivedi was a minor and did not hold a driving license on the date of the accident. The accident took place involving the offending truck and the ill-fated scooter but the Owner and the Insurer of the scooter have not been impleaded as opposite-parties to the claim-petition. The Insurers also pleaded that they do not admit the insurance policy claimed by the owner due to want of particulars. The amount of compensation claimed is castigated as excessive. The Insurers say that the claim petition deserved to be rejected. 8. On the pleadings of parties, the Tribunal framed the following issues : “1. Whether the accident took place on 9.11.04 at about 1.45 AM (sic PM) on the G.T.Road, infront of DALHAN ANUSANDHAN Railway Crossing, within the local limits of P.S. Kalyanpur, Kanpur-Nagar, due to rash and negligent driving of Truck No. UP-70L-9527 by its driver, as alleged in the petition? If so, whether the death of Sri Mohit Dwivedi has been caused, as a result of the said accident? 2. Whether the accident in question took place due to rash and negligent driving of Scooter No. UP-78AM-9142 by the deceased himself? 3. Whether the driver of the truck in question was not holding a valid and effective driving licence on the date of accident? 4. Whether the petitioners are entitled to get any compensation? If so, from whom and to what extent? 5. To what relief, if any, is the petitioners entitled?” 9. The claimants examined in support of their case, Arun Kumar Dwivedi as PW-1 and Ritesh Kumar as PW-2. Documentary evidence was also produced which will be discussed during the course of judgment as much as is relevant to the issue involved in this appeal. 5. To what relief, if any, is the petitioners entitled?” 9. The claimants examined in support of their case, Arun Kumar Dwivedi as PW-1 and Ritesh Kumar as PW-2. Documentary evidence was also produced which will be discussed during the course of judgment as much as is relevant to the issue involved in this appeal. The Insurers did not produce any evidence and against the owner, the claim proceeded ex parte before the Tribunal. 10. Issues nos. 1 and 2 that pertain to negligence and contributory negligence were taken up together by the Tribunal holding that the accident was caused due to rash and negligent driving of the truck driver and Mohit’s death was caused on account of injuries sustained in consequence of the said accident. It was further held that the accident did not happen due to rash and negligent driving by the deceased. Thus, the case of contributory negligence was negatived by the Tribunal. 11. Issue no. 3 was answered in the affirmative holding that the driver of the offending truck held a valid and effective driving license on the date of accident. Issue nos. 4 and 5 which are overlapping were decided holding that claimants are entitled to compensation in the sum of Rs.1,54,500/-, which the Insurers are liable to indemnify. The claim petition was, accordingly, allowed with 7% interest per annum on the compensation awarded, reckoned from the date of institution of the claim petition, until realization. There is a further direction in the award impugned made by the Tribunal, directing apportionment of compensation payable to the extent of 50% each between the two claimants. 12. Heard Mr. Vidya Kant Shukla, learned Counsel for the claimants and Mr. Saurabh Srivastava, learned counsel for the Insurers. No one appeared for the owner. 13. It must be noticed at the outset that no cross appeal or cross objection has been preferred, either on behalf of the Insurers or the owner. As such, there is no cause or occasion for this Court to examine the findings of the Tribunal recorded on Issues Nos. 1, 2 and 3. Those must be held to have attained finality inter partes. 14. This appeal has been pressed on behalf of the claimants, seeking enhancement of the compensation awarded. As such, there is no cause or occasion for this Court to examine the findings of the Tribunal recorded on Issues Nos. 1, 2 and 3. Those must be held to have attained finality inter partes. 14. This appeal has been pressed on behalf of the claimants, seeking enhancement of the compensation awarded. While returning findings on Issue No. 4, the Tribunal has taken note of the fact that the deceased was a promising student, reading in Class XI at Woodbine Gardenia School, Kalyanpur at the time of his untimely demise. He was also preparing to write his entrance examination for admission to the undergraduate engineering course. The Tribunal has remarked that the life and career of a person is fraught with uncertainties. According to the Tribunal in due course after earning his degrees, the deceased may have established himself in life and gone on to help the claimants in the future. The Tribunal has then said that since the deceased had no income, his notional income shall be deemed to be 15000/- per annum. To this a multiplier of 15 has been applied and a deduction of 1/3rd made towards personal and living expenses. It is on the foot of the aforesaid parameters that a substantive dependency of Rs.1,50000/- has been determined by the Tribunal. In addition, a sum of Rs.2000/- has been awarded towards funeral expenses, Rs.2000/- towards loss of estate and general damages. It is in this manner that a total of sum of Rs.1,54,000/- has been assessed to be the compensation payable by the owner and Insurers, with obligation on the Insurers to satisfy the award. 15. Learned Counsel for the claimants has criticized the Tribunal’s approach in assessing the compensation based on a very conservative notional income for the deceased. It is also argued that the Tribunal ought to have awarded future prospects which ought to be awarded even in those cases that proceed on the foot of a notional income. Learned counsel for the claimants has placed reliance in support of his contention upon a Bench decision of this Court in Saroj Devi and others v. Royal Sundaram Alliance Insurance Co. Ltd. and Another, 2016 (2) TAC (281)(All.). In Saroj Devi (supra), it was held that the notional income could not be less than Rs.3000/- per month and future prospects would have to be added to the extent of 50%. 16. Ltd. and Another, 2016 (2) TAC (281)(All.). In Saroj Devi (supra), it was held that the notional income could not be less than Rs.3000/- per month and future prospects would have to be added to the extent of 50%. 16. Learned Counsel for the Insurers has supported the impugned judgment and submitted that in the absence of an income in presenti, there cannot be an award of future prospects based on conjecture about a student’s prospective income. It must be remarked here that students in the middle class Indian society are looked upon with suspicion about their future productivity, even if it be almost certain from their current progression that they would have a rewarding career. Also, there is distinct concept in middle class Indian society about being a ‘mere student’. A student is not a class by itself and a man could be productive at any stage of his life. The new world has opened up vistas of opportunity for the youngsters to actually earn, while they study, doing both serious work and entertainment business, equally rewarding. Sadly, the pedantic outlook about being a student and then a productive man at a certain age of the human life with the certain and dependable productivity being inferred for Government servants alone paid out of the State exchequer is a lingering legacy of a colonial past and a different world. Keeping aside the idea of a new world of opportunities and the actually productive young men, who earn while they study, because there is no evidence about that in this case, we think that the notional income of Rs. 15,000/- a year for a student of Class XI, aged about 19 years, is a very pessimistic assessment about the young man’s income-even notional. 17. In V. Mekala v. M. Malathi and another, (2014) 11 SCC 178 , which was a case about a claim for compensation in an injury case of a 16 years old girl, who was a promising student of Class XI and left 70% permanently disabled by the accident, it was held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court, thus : “17. Further, having regard to the undisputed fact that there has been inflation of money in the country since the occurrence of the accident, the same has to be taken into account by the Tribunal and appellate court while awarding compensation to the appellant claimant as per the principle laid down by this Court in Govind Yadav [Govind Yadav v. New India Insurance Co. Ltd., (2011) 10 SCC 683 : (2012) 3 SCC (Civ) 1082 : (2012) 1 SCC (Cri) 82 : (2012) 1 SCC (L&S) 422] which has reiterated the position of Reshma Kumari v. Madan Mohan, (2009) 13 SCC 422 : (2009) 5 SCC (Civ) 143 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 1044], the relevant paragraph of which reads as under: (Reshma Kumari case [Reshma Kumari v. Madan Mohan, (2009) 13 SCC 422 : (2009) 5 SCC (Civ) 143 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 1044], SCC pp. 440-41, para 46) “46. In the Indian context several other factors should be taken into consideration including education of the dependants and the nature of job. In the wake of changed societal conditions and global scenario, future prospects may have to be taken into consideration not only having regard to the status of the employee, his educational qualification; his past performance but also other relevant factors, namely, the higher salaries and perks which are being offered by the private companies these days. In fact while determining the multiplicand this Court in Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Jashuben [ (2008) 4 SCC 162 : (2008) 2 SCC (Cri) 752] held that even dearness allowance and perks with regard thereto from which the family would have derived monthly benefit, must be taken into consideration.” 18. The fact that the appellant was a brilliant student at the time of the accident should also be taken into consideration while awarding compensation to her. Therefore, taking Rs.6000 as monthly notional income by the Tribunal for the purpose of awarding compensation under this head is too meagre an amount. The learned counsel appearing for Respondent 2 contended that the appellant can still finish her education and find employment and therefore, there is no necessity to enhance the amount of compensation under the head of “loss of income” and “future prospects”. The learned counsel appearing for Respondent 2 contended that the appellant can still finish her education and find employment and therefore, there is no necessity to enhance the amount of compensation under the head of “loss of income” and “future prospects”. It is pertinent to reiterate here that the appellant claimant has undergone and is still undergoing substantial pain and suffering due to the accident which has rendered both her legs dysfunctional. This has reduced the scope of her future prospects including her marriage substantially. Moreover, a tortfeasor is not entitled to dictate the terms of the appellant claimant's career as has been held by the Karnataka High Court in K. Narasimha Murthy v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. [ILR 2004 KAR 2471], the relevant paragraph of which reads as under: (ILR pp. 2490-91, para 41) “41. … Further, it needs to be emphasised that it is not the right of the tortfeasor or a person who has taken over the liability of the tortfeasor in terms of and under the Act to dictate that the injured person should do some other work, manual or otherwise, it does not matter, may be with pain and discomfort, in order to minimise his or its liability. Such insistence is untenable in law and if such is the case, it would violate basic human rights of the injured person. In this case, the appellant is reduced to such a state that he is unable to do any work, manual or otherwise, without subjecting himself to pain and suffering, agony and discomfort. In an accident, if a man is disabled for a work which he was doing before the accident, that he has no talents, skill, experience or training for anything else and he is unable to find any work, manual or clerical, such a man for all practical purposes has lost all earning capacity he possessed before and he is required to be compensated on the basis of total loss. In reaching this conclusion we may derive support from the judgments in Daniels v. Sir Robert McAlpine and Sons Ltd. [(1971) 11 KIR 141] and Blair v. FJC Lilley (Marine) Ltd. [1981 SLT 90] Secondly, the physical incapacity to earn income sustained by the appellant is not temporary, but permanent and complete as per Ext. P-43. In reaching this conclusion we may derive support from the judgments in Daniels v. Sir Robert McAlpine and Sons Ltd. [(1971) 11 KIR 141] and Blair v. FJC Lilley (Marine) Ltd. [1981 SLT 90] Secondly, the physical incapacity to earn income sustained by the appellant is not temporary, but permanent and complete as per Ext. P-43. Thirdly, it cannot be said that since the appellant has sustained only 54% permanent physical disability in respect of the whole body as per PW 3, the court should take into account functional disability also at 54% only while assessing the loss of earning capacity. Such hypothesis does not stand to reason nor can it be accepted as valid in terms of law. An injured person is compensated for the loss which he incurs as a result of physical injury and not for physical injury itself. In other words, compensation is given only for what is lost due to accident in terms of an equivalent in money insofar as the nature of money admits for the loss sustained. In an accident, if a person loses a limb or eye or sustains an injury, the court while computing damages for the loss of organs or physical injury, does not value a limb or eye in isolation, but only values totality of the harm which the loss has entailed the loss of amenities of life and infliction of pain and suffering: the loss of the good things of life, joys of life and the positive infliction of pain and distress.” 19. Further, it has been held in Reshma Kumari [Reshma Kumari v. Madan Mohan, (2009) 13 SCC 422 : (2009) 5 SCC (Civ) 143 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 1044] that certain relevant factors should be taken into consideration while awarding compensation under the head of future prospect of income. The relevant paragraph reads as under: (SCC pp. 431-32, para 27) “27. The question as to the methodology required to be applied for determination of compensation as regards prospective loss of future earnings, however, as far as possible should be based on certain principles. The relevant paragraph reads as under: (SCC pp. 431-32, para 27) “27. The question as to the methodology required to be applied for determination of compensation as regards prospective loss of future earnings, however, as far as possible should be based on certain principles. A person may have a bright future prospect; he might have become eligible to promotion immediately; there might have been chances of an immediate pay revision, whereas in another (sic situation) the nature of employment was such that he might not have continued in service; his chance of promotion, having regard to the nature of employment may be distant or remote. It is, therefore, difficult for any court to lay down rigid tests which should be applied in all situations. There are divergent views. In some cases it has been suggested that some sort of hypotheses or guesswork may be inevitable. That may be so.” 20. Therefore, in the light of the principles laid down in the aforesaid case, it would be just and proper for this Court, and keeping in mind her past results we take Rs.10,000 as her monthly notional income for computation of just and reasonable compensation under the head of loss of income. Further, the High Court has failed to take into consideration the future prospects of income based on the principles laid down by this Court in the catena of cases referred to supra. Therefore, the appellant is justified in seeking for re-enhancement under this head as well and we hold that the appellant claimant is entitled to 50% increase under this head as per the principle laid down by this Court in Santosh Devi [Santosh Devi v. National Insurance Co. Ltd., (2012) 6 SCC 421 : (2012) 3 SCC (Civ) 726 : (2012) 3 SCC (Cri) 160 : (2012) 2 SCC (L&S) 167]. The relevant paragraph reads as under: (SCC pp. 426-27, para 13) “13. In Sarla Verma case [Sarla Verma v. DTC, (2009) 6 SCC 121 : (2009) 2 SCC (Civ) 770 : (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 1002], another two-Judge Bench considered various factors relevant for determining the compensation payable in cases involving motor accidents, noticed apparent divergence in the views expressed by this Court in different cases, referred to large number of precedents including the judgments in U.P. SRTC v. Trilok Chandra [ (1996) 4 SCC 362 ], Nance v. British Columbia Electric Railway Co. Ltd. [1951 AC 601 : (1951) 2 All ER 448 (PC)], Davies v. Powell Duffryn Associated Collieries Ltd. (No. 2) [1942 AC 601 : (1942) 1 All ER 657 (HL)] and made an attempt to limit the exercise of discretion by the Tribunals and the High Courts in the matter of award of compensation by laying down a straitjacket formula under different headings, some of which are enumerated below: (Sarla Verma case [Sarla Verma v. DTC, (2009) 6 SCC 121 : (2009) 2 SCC (Civ) 770 : (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 1002], SCC pp. 133-34, para 24) ‘Question (i)—Addition to income for future prospects *** 24. In Susamma Thomas [Kerala SRTC v. Susamma Thomas, (1994) 2 SCC 176 : 1994 SCC (Cri) 335] this Court increased the income by nearly 100%, in Sarla Dixit [Sarla Dixit v. Balwant Yadav, (1996) 3 SCC 179 ] the income was increased only by 50% and in Abati Bezbaruah [Abati Bezbaruah v. Geological Survey of India, (2003) 3 SCC 148 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 746] the income was increased by a mere 7%. In view of the imponderables and uncertainties, we are in favour of adopting as a rule of thumb, an addition of 50% of actual salary to the actual salary income of the deceased towards future prospects, where the deceased had a permanent job and was below 40 years. (Where the annual income is in the taxable range, the words “actual salary” should be read as “actual salary less tax”.) The addition should be only 30% if the age of the deceased was 40 to 50 years. There should be no addition, where the age of the deceased is more than 50 years. Though the evidence may indicate a different percentage of increase, it is necessary to standardise the addition to avoid different yardsticks being applied or different methods of calculation being adopted. Where the deceased was self-employed or was on a fixed salary (without provision for annual increments, etc.), the courts will usually take only the actual income at the time of death. A departure therefrom should be made only in rare and exceptional cases involving special circumstances.’” Therefore, taking both the aspects into account, the total amount of compensation under this head is calculated as Rs.22,68,000 [(Rs.10,000 × 70/100 + Rs.10,000 × 70/100 × 50/100) × 12 × 18]” 18. A departure therefrom should be made only in rare and exceptional cases involving special circumstances.’” Therefore, taking both the aspects into account, the total amount of compensation under this head is calculated as Rs.22,68,000 [(Rs.10,000 × 70/100 + Rs.10,000 × 70/100 × 50/100) × 12 × 18]” 18. The principles regarding assessment of compensation in case of persons, who do not have an income in presenti, but are students, was considered by the Supreme Court in M.R. Krishna Murthi v. New India Assurance Company Limited and others, (2020) 15 SCC 493 , where it was held : “24. From the conjoint reading of the aforesaid judgments, inter alia, the following principles can be culled out which would be relevant for deciding the instant appeal: 24.1. In those cases where the victim of the accident is not an earning person but a student, while assessing the compensation for loss of future earning, the focus of the examination would be the career prospect and the likely earning of such a person in future. For example, where the claimant is pursuing a particular professional course, the poser would be: what would have been his income had he joined a service commensurating with the said course. That can be the future earning. 24.2. There may be cases where the victim is not, at that stage, doing any such course to get a particular job. He or she may be studying in a school. In such a case, future career would depend upon multiple factors like the family background, choice/interest of the complainant to pursue a particular career, facilities available to him/her for adopting such a career, the favourable surrounding circumstances to see which would have enabled the claimant to successfully pick up the said career, etc. If the chosen field is employment, then the future earning can be taken on the basis of salary and allowances which are payable for such calling. In case, career is a particular profession, the future earning would depend on host of other factors on the basis of which chances to achieve success in such a profession can be ascertained. 24.3. There may be cases like Deo Patodi [Oriental Insurance Co. In case, career is a particular profession, the future earning would depend on host of other factors on the basis of which chances to achieve success in such a profession can be ascertained. 24.3. There may be cases like Deo Patodi [Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Deo Patodi, (2009) 13 SCC 123 : (2009) 5 SCC (Civ) 29 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 963] where even a student, the claimant would have made earnings on part-time basis or would have received offer for a particular job. In such cases, these factors would also assume relevance. 24.4. After ascertaining the likely earning of the victim in the aforesaid manner, the nature of injuries and disability suffered as a result thereof would be kept in mind while determining as to how much earning has been affected thereby. Here, impact of injuries on functional disability is to be seen. In case of death of victim, it would result in total loss of earning. In the case of injuries, the nature of disability becomes important. Such an exercise was undertaken in N. Manjegowda case [N. Manjegowda v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd., (2014) 3 SCC 584 : (2014) 2 SCC (Civ) 297 : (2014) 4 SCC (Cri) 634].” 19. In Gopalpuri Jai Prakash and others v. The Managing Director, APSRTC and others, MACMA. No. 694 of 2011, decided on 08.09.2022, the Telangana High Court considered the income of a student studying in the intermediate course for the purpose of award of compensation to his legal representatives. The student in that case had died in a motor accident on 21.10.2006. While considering the question of income of student in Gupalpuri Jai Prakash (supra), it was observed : “9. The petitioners stated that by the date of the accident Prakash/deceased was aged 18 years and was brilliant student studying intermediate. Further by giving tuitions, he used to earn Rs. 6,000/- per month. 10. Out of the documents filed by the petitioners, the driving licence/Ex. A-5, S.S.C. certificate/Ex. A-7 and passport/Ex. A-10 are reflecting that the date of birth of Prakash/deceased is 09.10.1989. Thus, the age of Prakash/deceased by the date of the accident is 18 years. With regard to income though the petitioners placed the evidence of PW-2 to support the claim that the deceased was giving tuitions, the material particulars as to how many students and the fees per student were missing. Thus, the age of Prakash/deceased by the date of the accident is 18 years. With regard to income though the petitioners placed the evidence of PW-2 to support the claim that the deceased was giving tuitions, the material particulars as to how many students and the fees per student were missing. However, having regard to the pleaded academic record in Ex. A-7, A-8 and A-9 a monthly income of Rs. 5,000/- can safely be taken on notional basis.” 20. Though Gupalpuri Jai Prakash was a case where it was asserted that the deceased had an actual income earned out of providing private tuitions, but the Court assessed his income on a notional basis at a figure of Rs.5000/- considering his academic record. Here, the deceased was a student of Class XI. This Court finds on a perusal of his mark-sheets for the High School Examination, 2004 conducted by the Central Board of Secondary Education dated 28.05.2004 that the deceased had averaged between C and D Grade, also earning a B, but nevertheless was a student of a good school, affiliated to the Central Board of Secondary Education. He had interest in extracurricular activities and there are certificates on record of his participation in these activities. 21. PW-1, the deceased's father Arun Kumar Dwivedi has said in his examination-in-chief that his son was reading in Class-XI in the Woodbine Gardenia School, Kanpur and was taking a foundation course to upgrade his skills in writing his Engineering Entrance Examination. In his examination-in-chief, it is further said that his son had read from Nursery to Class X in the Sir Padampat Singhania Education Centre, Kanpur, U.P., affiliated to the CBSE. The witness has also stated that after passing his Engineering Examination, his son wanted to join the NDA. Considering the totality of evidence, it must be remarked that the deceased was a student, reading in a good institution at the intermediate level. Going by the guidelines in Paragraph No.24.2 of the report in M.R. Krishna Murthi (supra), it must be remarked that the deceased had an inclination to seek admission to an Engineering Course and aspired to join the NDA. Going by the guidelines in Paragraph No.24.2 of the report in M.R. Krishna Murthi (supra), it must be remarked that the deceased had an inclination to seek admission to an Engineering Course and aspired to join the NDA. The fact that he had passed his High School from a good institution and was pursuing his studies to earn his Intermediate Examination Certificate also from a good institution, both affiliated to the Central Board of Secondary Education, besides the fact that his family were spending money, providing him auxiliary coaching to upgrade his skills for the purpose of writing his competitive examination for selection to the Engineering Course, all go to show that he had good prospects of being selected in an Engineering Course and securing a rewarding job for himself. The mere fact that the deceased's High School Certificate does not carry very high grades is not an index about his future performance. The schools where he was studying and the fact that his family were funding his education in a good school, are dependable factors to infer a good future for the deceased in terms of his productivity. 22. In the opinion of this Court, bearing in mind the guidance on high authority regarding assessment to be made about the income of students on a notional basis and the circumstances of the deceased, the time when the accident happened, that is to say, the year 2004, when an unskilled daily-wagers would be earning about Rs.3000/- per month, it would be fair to find for the deceased a notional income of Rs.5000/- per month. 23. The monthly income of the deceased being Rs.5000/-, the annual income would work out to a figure of Rs.60,000/-. The deceased was bachelor and the claimants are his parents. Going by the principle with regard to deductions for personal and living expenses relating to bachelors laid down in Sarla Verma (Smt) v. Delhi Transport Corporation and another, (2009) 6 SCC 121 , a 50% deduction is to be made from the deceased's income. The deceased was aged 19 years and going by the Table in Paragraph No.40 of the report in Sarla Verma (supra), the applicable multiplier would be that set out for the age bracket of 15-20 years. It is 18'. 24. The deceased was aged 19 years and going by the Table in Paragraph No.40 of the report in Sarla Verma (supra), the applicable multiplier would be that set out for the age bracket of 15-20 years. It is 18'. 24. The Tribunal has directed a deduction of one-third towards personal and living expenses and adopted a multiplier of 15', going by the age of the parents, that was 44 years for the father and 43 for the mother. The settled principles in Sarla Verma and subsequent authorities would indicate that the Tribunal was in error on both counts. The appropriate deduction to be made towards personal and living expenses, has already been indicated and so also the multiplier, which has to be 18'; not 15'. 25. Nothing has been awarded by the Tribunal towards the future prospects of the deceased. In view of the decision of the Supreme Court in National Insurance Company v. Pranay Sethi and others (2017) 16 SCC 680 , the benefit of future prospects have been extended to the self-employed and those working on a fixed salary, but here the deceased was neither self-employed nor a person working on a fixed salary. He was a young boy with a future to look to and, therefore, his income has been assessed notionally. The question is whether in the case of notional income, future prospects are to be granted as well. This question fell for consideration of the Supreme Court in Meena Pawaia and others v. Ashraf Ali and Others, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 1083. The question and the holding figure in Paragraph Nos.11 and 13 of the report of their Lordships' decision in Meena Pawaia (supra), where it has been observed : “11. The next question which is posed for the consideration before this court is whether anything further is required to be added towards the future rise in income? It is submitted that on behalf of the Union of India that as the deceased was not serving and earning at the time of accident/death nothing further is to be added towards the future prospect/future rise in income. The aforesaid cannot be accepted. 13. It is submitted that on behalf of the Union of India that as the deceased was not serving and earning at the time of accident/death nothing further is to be added towards the future prospect/future rise in income. The aforesaid cannot be accepted. 13. We see no reason why the aforesaid principle may not be applied, which apply to the salaried person and/or deceased self employed and/or a fixed salaried deceased, to the deceased who was not serving and/or was not having any income at the time of accident/death. In case of a deceased, who was not earning and/or not doing any job and/or self employed at the time of accident/death, as observed herein above his income is to be determined on the guesswork looking to the circumstances narrated hereinabove. Once such an amount is arrived at he shall be entitled to the addition over the future prospect/future rise in income. It cannot be disputed that the rise in cost of living would also affect such a person. As observed by this court in the case of Pranay Sethi (Supra), the determination of income while computing compensation has to include future prospects so that the method will come within the ambit and sweep of just compensation as postulated under Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act. In case of a deceased who had held a permanent job with inbuilt grant of annual increment and/or in case of a deceased who was on a fixed salary and/or self employed would only get the benefit of future prospects and the legal representatives of the deceased who was not serving at the relevant time as he died at a young age and was studying, could not be entitled to the benefit of the future prospects for the purpose of computation of compensation would be inapposite. Because the price rise does affect them also and there is always an incessant effort to enhance one's income for sustenance. It is not expected that the deceased who was not serving at all, his income is likely to remain static and his income would remain stagnant. As observed in Pranay Sethi (Supra) to have the perception that he is likely to remain static and his income to remain stagnant is contrary to the fundamental concept of human attitude which always intends to live with dynamism and move and change with the time. As observed in Pranay Sethi (Supra) to have the perception that he is likely to remain static and his income to remain stagnant is contrary to the fundamental concept of human attitude which always intends to live with dynamism and move and change with the time. Therefore we are of the opinion that even in case of a deceased who was not serving at the time of death and had no income at the time of death, their legal heirs shall also be entitled to future prospects by adding future rise in income as held by this court in the case of Pranay Sethi (supra) i.e. addition of 40% of the income determined on guesswork considering the educational qualification, family background etc., where the deceased was below the age of 40 years.” (emphasis by Court) 26. Given the principle that future prospects are to be added to the deceased's income even in a case where it is notional on account of the deceased being a non-earning member at the time of his demise. The question that still falls for consideration is if in the State of Uttar Pradesh, the future prospects ought to be governed by the principle in Pranay Sethi or Rule 220-A(3) of the U.P. Motor Vehicles Rules, 1998 (for short the ‘Rules of 1998’). The issue was answered by the Supreme Court in the context of future prospects, generally to be awarded in the State of Uttar Pradesh, in New India Assurance Co. Ltd v. Urmila Shukla and others, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 822, where it has been held : "9. It is to be noted that the validity of the Rules was not, in any way, questioned in the instant matter and thus the only question that we are called upon to consider is whether in its application, sub-Rule 3(iii) of Rule 220A of the Rules must be given restricted scope or it must be allowed to operate fully. 10. The discussion on the point in Pranay Sethi was from the standpoint of arriving at "just compensation" in terms of Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. 11. 10. The discussion on the point in Pranay Sethi was from the standpoint of arriving at "just compensation" in terms of Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. 11. If an indicia is made available in the form of a statutory instrument which affords a favourable treatment, the decision in Pranay Sethi cannot be taken to have limited the operation of such statutory provision specially when the validity of the Rules was not put under any challenge. The prescription of 15% in cases where the deceased was in the age bracket of 50-60 years as stated in Pranay Sethi cannot be taken as maxima. In the absence of any governing principle available in the statutory regime, it was only in the form of an indication. If a statutory instrument has devised a formula which affords better or greater benefit, such statutory instrument must be allowed to operate unless the statutory instrument is otherwise found to be invalid. 12. We, therefore, reject the submission advanced on behalf of the appellant and affirm the view taken by the Tribunal as well as the High Court and dismiss this appeal without any order as to costs." 27. To the understanding of this Court, there is no reason to limit the rule in Urmila Shukla (supra) to cases where future prospects are awarded in case of salaried persons, those self-employed, or still more, the ones working on a fixed salary, once future prospects have been held payable in case of those credited with a notional income. There is no rational cause or reason not to extend the principle in Urmila Shukla to such cases. In this Court's opinion, therefore, future prospects in the State of Uttar Pradesh have to be calculated according to Rule 220-A(3) of the Rules of 1998 in a case where the income has been assessed notionally for a non-earning deceased, who is a student. 28. The next issue which arises for consideration is whether the Rules of 1998, that were enforced in the year 2011 vide Notification No. 777/XXX4-2011-4(3)-2010 dated 26 September, 2011 i.e. The Uttar Pradesh Motor Vehicles (Eleventh Amendment) Rules, 2011, would apply retrospectively to an accident that took place before the amendment. 28. The next issue which arises for consideration is whether the Rules of 1998, that were enforced in the year 2011 vide Notification No. 777/XXX4-2011-4(3)-2010 dated 26 September, 2011 i.e. The Uttar Pradesh Motor Vehicles (Eleventh Amendment) Rules, 2011, would apply retrospectively to an accident that took place before the amendment. This question was answered by a Division Bench of this Court in Sushil Kumar and others v. M/s. Sampark Lojastic Private Limited and others, 2017 (35) LCD 1311, where it has been held : "31. Rule 220-A was inserted in the Uttar Pradesh Motor Vehicles Rules, 1998 in view of the various decisions of the law courts for providing benefit on account of future prospects of the injured/deceased. It provides for addition of certain percentage of the income of the injured/deceased in his actual income depending upon the age of the injured/deceased for the purposes of determination of the compensation. The aforesaid Rule came into effect on 26.09.2011 after the decision of the claim petition but before filing of the appeal though the accident took place on 08.05.2010 much before the enforcement of the above Rule. 32. It is in view of the above that an argument is being raised that Rule 220-A of the Rules which came into effect on 26.09.2011 would not apply to the accident which had taken place on 08.05.2010. 33. In Ram Sarup Vs. Munshi AIR 1963 SC 553 it was laid down that a change in law during the pendency of an appeal has to be taken into account and will cover the rights of the parties. 34. The view expressed above was followed by the Supreme Court in Mula Vs. Godhu AIR 1971 SC 89 . 35. In Dayawati Vs. Inderjit AIR 1966 SC 1423 the court had observed as under:-If the new law speaks in language, which expressly or by clear intendment, takes in even pending matters, the court of trial as well as the court of appeal must have regard to an intention so expressed, and the court of appeal may give effect to such a law even after the judgment of the court of first instance. 36. In Amarjit Kaur Vs. 36. In Amarjit Kaur Vs. Pritam Singh AIR 1974 SC 2068 effect was given to the change in law during the pendency of an appeal as the hearing of an appeal under the procedural law of this country is in the nature of rehearing of the suit by superior court. 37. It was in the light of the above decisions that in Lakshmi Narayan Guin and others Vs. Niranjan Modak AIR 1985 SC 111 it was held that a change in law during the pendency of an appeal has to be taken into account and will cover the right of the parties. 38. The aforesaid decision was followed by a Division Bench of this court in U.P. State Road Transport Corporation Vs. Smt. Madhu Sharma and others, 2003 (4) AWC 2620 which was a case in relation to the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act and it was observed that it is apparent that the change in law during the pendency of the original proceedings has to be taken into account so as to cover the rights of the parties. 39. In view of above decision the view expressed by the Division Bench of this court in ICICI Lombard (Supra) is not of good law as it does not takes into account the decisions referred to above in holding that the Rule 220-A of the Rules which came into effect on 26.09.2011 would not apply to the accident that took place prior to the said date only for the reason that the Rule was not specifically stated to be retrospective in nature." 29. Nothing has been pointed out to this Court that the law laid down by the Division Bench in Sushil Kumar (supra), which is otherwise binding on this Court, has been overruled by a Larger Bench or the Supreme Court. The deceased was aged 19 years and, therefore, much less than 40 years. The future prospects, which the claimants are entitled to add to the deceased's notional income, going by Rule 220-A(3) of Rules, would be 50%. It is held, accordingly. 30. The next issue that arises for consideration is the entitlement of the deceased under the conventional heads. This question was again the subject matter of the consideration in Pranay Sethi, where it has been held : “48. This aspect needs to be clarified and appositely stated. It is held, accordingly. 30. The next issue that arises for consideration is the entitlement of the deceased under the conventional heads. This question was again the subject matter of the consideration in Pranay Sethi, where it has been held : “48. This aspect needs to be clarified and appositely stated. The conventional sum has been provided in the Second Schedule to the Act. The said Schedule has been found to be defective as stated by the Court in Trilok Chandra [UP SRTC v. Trilok Chandra, (1996) 4 SCC 362 ]. Recently, in Puttamma v. K.L. Narayana Reddy, (2013) 15 SCC 45 : (2014) 4 SCC (Civ) 384 : (2014) 3 SCC (Cri) 574 it has been reiterated by stating : (SCC p. 80, para 54) “54. … we hold that the Second Schedule as was enacted in 1994 has now become redundant, irrational and unworkable due to changed scenario including the present cost of living and current rate of inflation and increased life expectancy.” 49. As far as multiplier or multiplicand is concerned, the same has been put to rest by the judgments of this Court. Para 3 of the Second Schedule also provides for general damages in case of death. It is as follows: “3. General damages (in case of death): The following general damages shall be payable in addition to compensation outlined above : (i) Funeral expenses Rs.2000 (ii) Loss of consortium, if beneficiary is the spouse Rs.5000 (iii) Loss of estate Rs.2500 (iv) Medical expenses — actual expenses incurred before death supported by bills/vouchers but not exceeding Rs.15,000” 50. On a perusal of various decisions of this Court, it is manifest that the Second Schedule has not been followed starting from the decision in Trilok Chandra [UP SRTC v. Trilok Chandra, (1996) 4 SCC 362 ] and there has been no amendment to the same. The conventional damage amount needs to be appositely determined. As we notice, in different cases different amounts have been granted. A sum of Rs.1,00,000 was granted towards consortium in Rajesh [Rajesh v. Rajbir Singh, (2013) 9 SCC 54 : (2013) 4 SCC (Civ) 179 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 817 : (2014) 1 SCC (L&S) 149]. The conventional damage amount needs to be appositely determined. As we notice, in different cases different amounts have been granted. A sum of Rs.1,00,000 was granted towards consortium in Rajesh [Rajesh v. Rajbir Singh, (2013) 9 SCC 54 : (2013) 4 SCC (Civ) 179 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 817 : (2014) 1 SCC (L&S) 149]. The justification for grant of consortium, as we find from Rajesh [Rajesh v. Rajbir Singh, (2013) 9 SCC 54 : (2013) 4 SCC (Civ) 179 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 817 : (2014) 1 SCC (L&S) 149], is founded on the observation as we have reproduced hereinbefore. 51. On the aforesaid basis, the Court has revisited the practice of awarding compensation under conventional heads. 52. As far as the conventional heads are concerned, we find it difficult to agree with the view expressed in Rajesh [Rajesh v. Rajbir Singh, (2013) 9 SCC 54 : (2013) 4 SCC (Civ) 179 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 817 : (2014) 1 SCC (L&S) 149]. It has granted Rs.25,000 towards funeral expenses, Rs.1,00,000 towards loss of consortium and Rs.1,00,000 towards loss of care and guidance for minor children. The head relating to loss of care and minor children does not exist. Though Rajesh [Rajesh v. Rajbir Singh, (2013) 9 SCC 54 : (2013) 4 SCC (Civ) 179 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 817 : (2014) 1 SCC (L&S) 149] refers to Santosh Devi [Santosh Devi v. National Insurance Co. Ltd., (2012) 6 SCC 421 : (2012) 3 SCC (Civ) 726 : (2012) 3 SCC (Cri) 160 : (2012) 2 SCC (L&S) 167], it does not seem to follow the same. The conventional and traditional heads, needless to say, cannot be determined on percentage basis because that would not be an acceptable criterion. Unlike determination of income, the said heads have to be quantified. Any quantification must have a reasonable foundation. There can be no dispute over the fact that price index, fall in bank interest, escalation of rates in many a field have to be noticed. The court cannot remain oblivious to the same. There has been a thumb rule in this aspect. Any quantification must have a reasonable foundation. There can be no dispute over the fact that price index, fall in bank interest, escalation of rates in many a field have to be noticed. The court cannot remain oblivious to the same. There has been a thumb rule in this aspect. Otherwise, there will be extreme difficulty in determination of the same and unless the thumb rule is applied, there will be immense variation lacking any kind of consistency as a consequence of which, the orders passed by the tribunals and courts are likely to be unguided. Therefore, we think it seemly to fix reasonable sums. It seems to us that reasonable figures on conventional heads, namely, loss of estate, loss of consortium and funeral expenses should be Rs.15,000, Rs.40,000 and Rs.15,000 respectively. The principle of revisiting the said heads is an acceptable principle. But the revisit should not be fact-centric or quantum-centric. We think that it would be condign that the amount that we have quantified should be enhanced on percentage basis in every three years and the enhancement should be at the rate of 10% in a span of three years. We are disposed to hold so because that will bring in consistency in respect of those heads.” (emphasis by Court) 31. The issue of award of compensation for the loss of consortium came up before the Supreme Court in Magma General Insurance Company Ltd. v. Nanu Ram alias Chuhru Ram and others, (2018) 18 SCC 130 , where it was observed : “21. A Constitution Bench of this Court in Pranay Sethi [National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi, (2017) 16 SCC 680 : (2018) 3 SCC (Civ) 248 : (2018) 2 SCC (Cri) 205] dealt with the various heads under which compensation is to be awarded in a death case. One of these heads is loss of consortium. In legal parlance, “consortium” is a compendious term which encompasses “spousal consortium”, “parental consortium”, and “filial consortium”. The right to consortium would include the company, care, help, comfort, guidance, solace and affection of the deceased, which is a loss to his family. With respect to a spouse, it would include sexual relations with the deceased spouse : [Rajesh v. Rajbir Singh, (2013) 9 SCC 54 : (2013) 4 SCC (Civ) 179 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 817 : (2014) 1 SCC (L&S) 149] 21.1. With respect to a spouse, it would include sexual relations with the deceased spouse : [Rajesh v. Rajbir Singh, (2013) 9 SCC 54 : (2013) 4 SCC (Civ) 179 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 817 : (2014) 1 SCC (L&S) 149] 21.1. Spousal consortium is generally defined as rights pertaining to the relationship of a husband-wife which allows compensation to the surviving spouse for loss of “company, society, cooperation, affection, and aid of the other in every conjugal relation”. [Black's Law Dictionary(5th Edn., 1979).] 21.2. Parental consortium is granted to the child upon the premature death of a parent, for loss of “parental aid, protection, affection, society, discipline, guidance and training”. 21.3. Filial consortium is the right of the parents to compensation in the case of an accidental death of a child. An accident leading to the death of a child causes great shock and agony to the parents and family of the deceased. The greatest agony for a parent is to lose their child during their lifetime. Children are valued for their love, affection, companionship and their role in the family unit. (emphasis by Court) 32. In view of the aforesaid conclusion, the compensation payable to the claimants in this appeal are revised and would have to be determined in the following manner : (i) Monthly Income (of the deceased) Rs.5000 (ii) Annual Income (of the deceased) = 5000x12 Rs.60000 (iii) Annual Income+Future Prospects (annual income x 50%) = 60000+30000 Rs.90000 (iv) Annual Dependency = Annual Income – 50% deduction towards personal expenses of the deceased = 90000-45000 Rs.45000 (v) Total Dependency = Annual Dependency x Applied Multiplier = 45000 x 18 Rs.810000 (vi) Claimant’s entitlement towards conventional heads = Loss of Estate + Funeral Expenses + dependents’ Consortium =15000+15000+40000x2 Rs.110000 The total compensation would therefore, work out to a figure of Rs.810000+ Rs.110000 Rs.920000 33. In the result, this appeal is allowed in part. The impugned award passed by the Tribunal is modified and the compensation awarded enhanced to Rs.9,20,000/-. The aforesaid sum of money shall carry simple interest at the rate of 7% per annum from the date of institution of the claim petition, until realization. Any sum of money already deposited with the Tribunal by the Insurers, pursuant to the impugned award or the interim orders passed by this Court, shall be adjusted. The aforesaid sum of money shall carry simple interest at the rate of 7% per annum from the date of institution of the claim petition, until realization. Any sum of money already deposited with the Tribunal by the Insurers, pursuant to the impugned award or the interim orders passed by this Court, shall be adjusted. The other directions of the Tribunal carried in the impugned award shall remain intact. Costs easy.