Rajeev Ranjan Prasad, J. – Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and learned counsel for the State. 2. Petitioner in the present case seeking the following reliefs: – “(i) For issuance of an appropriate writ in the nature of Certiorari for quashing the decision of State Remission Board dated 20.04.2023, so far it relates to the petitioner, whereby and where under the State Remission Board was pleased to reject the proposal of the petitioner for his premature release on the ground that there is no favourable report of the Presiding Officer of the learned convicting court. (ii) For issuance of an appropriate writ in the nature of Mandamus, commanding and directing the Respondent Authorities to grant premature release to the petitioner, who convicted for life vide judgment and order dated 11/12.08.2009 passed in Sessions Case No. 854 of 2005 arising out of Shikarpur P.S. Case No. 193 of 2005 by the learned 4th Additional District and sessions Judge, West Champaran, Bettiah on the ground that the petitioner had already completed 14 years of his physical incarceration on 10.10.2019 as also all the prescribed Authorities except the Presiding Officer of the Convicting Court had recommended for premature release of the petitioner. (iii) For issuance of any other appropriate writ / writs, order / orders direction / directions for which the writ petitioners would be entitled under the facts and circumstances of the case.” 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner was convicted for an offence under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code vide judgment and order dated 11/12.08.2009 passed by learned 4th Additional District and Sessions Judge, West Champaran, Bettiah in Sessions Trial No. 854 of 2005. It is submitted that the trial court judgment was affirmed by the Hon’ble High Court vide Cr. Appeal (DB) No. 905 of 2009. The trial court imposed a sentence of life imprisonment and a sum of Rs. 5000/- as fine upon the petitioner. 4. By virtue of Section 432 of the Code of Criminal Procedure petitioner would be entitled to be considered for permature release in terms of government’s policy upon the completion of 14 years of actual incarceration and 20 years period with remission. 5000/- as fine upon the petitioner. 4. By virtue of Section 432 of the Code of Criminal Procedure petitioner would be entitled to be considered for permature release in terms of government’s policy upon the completion of 14 years of actual incarceration and 20 years period with remission. In fact the case of the petitioner was considered by the State Remission Board (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Board’) for premature release in terms of statutory schemes but the proposal for premature release has been rejected by the Board on the solitary ground that the report of the learned Presiding Officer of the trial court was not favourable and the petitioner had been found guilty for murder of his wife. 5. Learned counsel submits with reference to the Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court in case of Ravi Pratap Mishra vs. State of Bihar and Ors. in Cr. WJC No. 272 of 2017 that despite an unfavourable report of the Presiding Officer, the Remission Board was obliged to apply it’s own mind and even in terms of the Bihar Prison Manual the said report alone would not have been a reason to refuse the premature release of the petitioner. 6. Learned counsel has further relied upon a judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Ram Chander vs. The State of Chhattisgarh & Anr. in Writ Petition (Crl) No. 49 of 2022 wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court has discussed in detail the statutory scheme under Sections 432 (2) and 433-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure with reference to the various judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court. He has further relied upon a recent judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Rajo @ Rajwa @ Rajendra Mandal vs. the State of Bihar & Ors. reported in 2023 SCC Online SC 1068 [: 2023 (6) BLJ 13 (SC)] (Writ Petition (Criminal) No(s).252/2023). It is submitted that in this case the Board has not followed the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court and has rejected the proposal for premature release of the petitioner in a routine and mechanical manner. 7. reported in 2023 SCC Online SC 1068 [: 2023 (6) BLJ 13 (SC)] (Writ Petition (Criminal) No(s).252/2023). It is submitted that in this case the Board has not followed the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court and has rejected the proposal for premature release of the petitioner in a routine and mechanical manner. 7. Learned counsel for the State has opposed the Writ Application but at the same time he is unable to controvert the submission that the Board has not at all applied its independent mind keeping in view the judgments of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the matter of grant of premature release and consideration of a report of the Presiding Judge. 8. Having heard learned counsel for the petitioner and the State as also on perusal of the records, this Court finds that the impugned order by which the proposal for premature release of the petitioner has been rejected reads as under: – dzekad canh@firk dk uke@meaz FkkukdkaM l= okn la[;k@ltk dh frfFk vijk/k @ okn dh /kkjk OkkLrfod lalheu vof/k 14 o"kZ@ ifjgkj lfgr 20 o"kZiw.kZ djus dh frfFk x.kuk frfFk okLrfod lalheu vo/kh ifjgkj lfgr lalheu vof/k vkosnu izkfIr dh frfFk izksos'ku inkf/kdkjh dk izfrosnu i=kad fnukd iqfyl v/kh{kd dk izfrosnu i=kad@fnukad 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 65 dUgS;k iVsy is0& dey egrks mez& 40 o”kZ eqDr dkjkxkj] cDlj f'kdkjiqj Fkkuk dkaM la0& 193@05 ST 854@ 2005 ltk dh frfFk 12-08- 2009 Qkalh dh ltk /kkjk 302 vkbihlh 03-08-2019 10-10-2019 x.kuk frfFk 07-10-2022 17 o"kZ 02 ekg 06 fnu 22 o"kZ 11 ekg 27 fnu 27-09-2022 687 29-09-2022 canh ds ifjokj ,oa lekt mldh Lohdk;Zrk dks n`f"ViFk j[krs gq, canh ds le;iwoZ fjgkbZ ds fcUnq ij fopkj fd;k tk ldrk gSA 4888 01-10-2022 i q0fu0&l g& Fkkuk/;{k }kjk lefiZr tkap izfrosnu ds vkyksd us canh ds vle; dkjkeqfDr gsrq vuq'kalk fd;k tkrk gSA ihBklhu U;k;/kh'k dk earO;@i=kad fnukad dkjk/kh{kd dk izfrosnu i=kad@fnukad dqy vfHk;qDr ,oa lg% vfHk;qDr ls lacaf/kr lwpuk foxr cSBd esa i"kZn dh vuq'kalk Ldzhfuax lfefr@egkfujh{kd dh vuq'kalk Ik"kZn dh vuq'kalk 10 11 12 13 14 15 555 29.09-2022 The facts and circumstances of the case do not make out a case for any leniency. It also appears that the convict Kanhiya Patel was convicted and sentenced for committing murder of his own wife and that too before her children, which seems to be could blooded murder by the victim’s husband who is guardian of his wife. Thus from perusal of the judgement it appears to this court, that there is no ground to make any recommendation for lenient and considerate view of the State for premature release of the above named convict 2678 08-10-2022 budk vkpj.k larks"kizn gSA foeqfDr gsrq vuq'kaflr Lkg vfHk;qDr ugha gSA fn0 27-08-2021 dh cSBd esa iqfyl v/kh{kd ds izfrdqy izfrosnu ds vkyksd esa vLohd`r 1- ihBklhu U;k;k/kh'k dk izfrosnu The facts and circumstance of the case do not make out a case for any leniency. It also appears that the convict Kanhiya Patel was convicted and sentenced for committing murder of his own wife and that too before her children, which seems to be cold blood ed murder by the victim’s husband who is guardian of his wife. Thus from perusal of the judgement it appears to this court, that there is no ground to make any recommendation for lenient and considerate view of the State for premature release of the above named convict. 2- iRuh dh gR;k ,oa ihBklhu U;k;k/kh'k ds izfrdwy izfrosnu ds vkyksd esa vle; dkjkeqfDr dk izLrko vLohd`r fd;k tk ldrk gSA 1- ihBklhu U;k;k/kh'k dk izfrosnu The facts and circumstance of the case do not make out a case for any leniency. It also appear s that the convict Kanhiya Patel was convicted and sentenced for committing murder of his own wife and that too before her children, which seems to be cold blood ed murder by the victim ’s husband who is guardian of his wife. Thus from perusal of the judgement it appear s to this court, that there is no ground to make any recommendation for lenient and considerate view of the State for premature release of the above named convict. 2- iRuh dh gR;k ,oa ihBklhu U;k;k/kh'k ds izfrdwy izfrosnu ds vkyksd esa vle; dkjkeqfDr dk izLrko vLohd`r fd;k tk ldrk gSA 9. Thus from perusal of the judgement it appear s to this court, that there is no ground to make any recommendation for lenient and considerate view of the State for premature release of the above named convict. 2- iRuh dh gR;k ,oa ihBklhu U;k;k/kh'k ds izfrdwy izfrosnu ds vkyksd esa vle; dkjkeqfDr dk izLrko vLohd`r fd;k tk ldrk gSA 9. As regards the importance of the opinion of the learned Presiding Judge of the sentencing court, Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Sangeet vs. State of Haryana reported in (2013) 2 SCC 452 clearly held that the opinion of the Presiding Judge of the sentencing court must be accompanied by reasons and in the case of State of Haryana vs. Mohinder Singh reported in (2000) 3 SCC 394 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the power of remission cannot be exercised arbitrarily. The decision to grant remission should be informed, fair and reasonable. 10. The Hon’ble Apex Court has while looking into this aspect of the matter in the case Rajo @ Rajwa @ Rajendra Mandal (supra) observed in paragraph ‘24’ and ‘27’ as under: – 24. Apart from the other considerations (on the nature of the crime, whether it affected the society at large, the chance of its recurrence, etc.), the appropriate government should while considering the potential of the convict to commit crimes in the future, whether there remains any fruitful purpose of continued incarceration, and the socio-economic conditions, review : the convict's age, state of heath, familial relationships and possibility of reintegration, extent of earned remission, and the post-conviction conduct including, but not limited to - whether the convict has attained any educational qualification whilst in custody, volunteer services offered, job/work done, jail conduct, whether they were engaged in any socially aimed or productive activity, and the overall development as a human being. The Board thus should not entirely rely either on the presiding judge, or the report prepared by the police. In this court's considered view, it would also serve the ends of justice if the appropriate government had the benefit of a report contemporaneously prepared by a qualified psychologist after interacting/interviewing the convict that has applied for premature release. The Bihar Prison Manual, 2012 enables a convict to earn remissions, which are limited to one third of the total sentence imposed. Special remission for good conduct, in addition, is granted by the rules. The Bihar Prison Manual, 2012 enables a convict to earn remissions, which are limited to one third of the total sentence imposed. Special remission for good conduct, in addition, is granted by the rules. If a stereotypical approach in denying the benefit of remission, which ultimately results in premature release, is repeatedly adopted, the entire idea of limiting incarceration for long periods (sometimes spanning a third or more of a convict's lifetime and in others, result in an indefinite sentence), would be defeated. This could result in a sense of despair and frustration among inmates, who might consider themselves reformed-but continue to be condemned in prison. 27. This court, on earlier occasion, had grappled with the situation of different remission policies/rules prevailing at different points of the convict’s sentence – i.e., when the policy on the date of conviction, and on the date of consideration for premature release, are different. It has been held that the policy prevailing on the date of the conviction [see State of Haryana vs. Raj Kumar, (2021) 9 SCC 292 (para 16], would be applicable. However, in Jagdish (supra) it was also recognised that if a more liberal policy exists on the date of consideration, the benefit should be provided: “43. [...] The State authority is under an obligation to at least exercise its discretion in relation to an honest expectation perceived by the convict, at the time of his conviction that his case for premature release would be considered after serving the sentence, prescribed in the short-sentencing policy existing on that date. The State has to exercise its power of remission also keeping in view any such benefit to be construed liberally in favour of a convict which may depend upon case to case and for that purpose, in our opinion, it should relate to a policy which, in the instant case, was in favour of the respondent. In case a liberal policy prevails on the date of consideration of the case of a “lifer” for premature release, he should be given benefit thereof.” 11. This Court has further noticed that the Hon’ble Division Bench in the case of Ravi Pratap Mishra (supra) has expressed its opinion as regards the consideration of the report of the Presiding Judge in the following manner in paragraphs ‘6’, ‘7’ and ‘8’ of the said judgment which read as under: – “6. This Court has further noticed that the Hon’ble Division Bench in the case of Ravi Pratap Mishra (supra) has expressed its opinion as regards the consideration of the report of the Presiding Judge in the following manner in paragraphs ‘6’, ‘7’ and ‘8’ of the said judgment which read as under: – “6. Thus, the learned Sessions Judge was clearly wrong in his opinion. We may also add that paragraphs 2 and 3 of his communication also show his ignorance. Section 432 of Cr P C does not talk of any guidelines to be laid out by the High Court. The desirability of guideline was merely indicated by the Apex Court in the judgment referred to therein but that does not mean that in absence of guideline laid by the High Court, the learned Additional Sessions Judge is precluded from applying his mind. He is a Judicial Officer trained for such eventuality. It was expected of him to apply himself to the law and the legal requirements. Thus clearly, this is not an opinion which could be taken to be adverse to the petitioner sufficient to deny him the statutory relief under Section 432, Cr P C. 7. Now we may come to the function of the Board. From what has been noted above, it appears that the Board felt bound by the opinion of the Judicial Officer, however irrelevant it may be. Is this stand of the Board correct? In our view, it is not. Board consists of very high level officials. It consists of the Law Secretary, the Home Secretary, the Inspector General of Prison, the District and Sessions Judge, Patna amongst other officials. It is an independent statutory body which has to exercise its independent wisdom in accordance with law. It is not bound by the opinion of any other person. The opinions of the Jail Superintendent, the Superintendent of Police, the Probationary Officer, the trial Judge are guiding factors to enable the Board to come to an independent opinion. It is not bound by what is said in any one or all of the opinions. It is not bound by the opinion of any other person. The opinions of the Jail Superintendent, the Superintendent of Police, the Probationary Officer, the trial Judge are guiding factors to enable the Board to come to an independent opinion. It is not bound by what is said in any one or all of the opinions. We will not try and illustrate this inasmuch as the Board having been constituted by senior responsible officers, they would exercise the power keeping in view the legislative policy as enacted in Section 432 of Cr P C in respect of a convict of a heinous offence and who has served the sentence substantially. It is only such person who are to be considered for release. The object of the Section is not to condemn such persons but to ensure that having spent a substantial period of their sentence, they be permitted to come back into society. It is only when there is serious apprehension about their future conduct, serious and inevitable apprehension about their future conduct upon their release which is bona fide born out from the records that the Board would be legitimately justified in refusing to release the convict otherwise it is not bound by the opinion of the authorities though, as noted above, they are guiding factors to be taken into account. From this meeting itself, we would note that in Item 32, one of the trial Judges made an absurd recommendation. The absurdity is writ large which is quoted hereunder: “… … …There is no such type of provision in criminal law after passing the judgment and sentence and the said judgment was confirmed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. This Court has no right to give any finding regarding the release of said accused. You do as per law i e in accordance with law.” 8. The learned trial Judge, who is an officer of the Superior Judicial Service of the rank of Additional Sessions Judge, did not even bother to look for the provision under which his opinion has been sought but notwithstanding this, the Board did recommend the release of the person concerned probably because of the last line written by the trial Judge, that is, you do as per law i e in accordance with law conferring the discretion on the Board. This discretion is always on the Board whether there is a favourable report or not. Board is not bound by the reports for justifiable grounds. It can take a different view of the matter notwithstanding favourable recommendations by all authorities. The Board may still disallow the same which may be valid subject to judicial review. On the other hand, notwithstanding adverse recommendations, the Board may, for justifiable reason, as in this case noted just above, take a different view of the matter and release. Board is constituted of higher officials with a heavy responsibility in this matter. It has to exercise its discretion in a manner compatible to the facts of this case and the law in these regards and the objects with which the Section has been enacted.” 12. When this Court examines the reasons provided by the Board in the impugned order, this Court comes to a conclusion that in fact the Board has not at all applied its independent mind and the report of the Presiding Officer as disclosed in the impugned order would not inspire confidence of this Court. Such a kind of report consisting of only ornamental language cannot sustain the test of law and it can only lead to an arbitrary decision on the part of the Board. 13. In result, the impugned order is set aside. The Board is directed to consider the case of the petitioner for premature release in the light of the government’s policy and the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court. Such consideration shall be given within a period of two months from the date of receipt/production of a copy of this order and the same will be communicated to the petitioner. 14. This Writ Application stands allowed to the extent indicated hereinabove.