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2023 DIGILAW 1202 (ALL)

Hasima Begum v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd.

2023-05-01

J.J.MUNIR

body2023
JUDGMENT : This is a claimants' appeal arising out of a judgment and award dated 26.04.2000 passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Bareilly, seeking enhancement of compensation. 2. Motor Accident Claims Petition No.305 of 1999 was instituted before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal/ the District Judge, Bareilly on 21.04.1999 on behalf of the five dependents of the late Shakeel Ahmad – two adults and three minors – claiming compensation for his death in a motor accident from the owner and the insurers of Truck No. UP-22-6933. According to the claimants, on 2nd of April, 1999, Shakeel Ahmad was on board Jeep No. UP-25-5646. He was deboarding passengers on one side of the road, at about half past five in the evening, parking the jeep there. In the meantime, Truck No. UP-22-6933, driven negligently and at a high speed, came on from the Kicha end and hit Shakeel Ahmad. He was grievously injured. Shakeel was conveyed to the Primary Health Centre, Baheri for medical aid and thence to the District Hospital, Bareilly for treatment. During treatment, he succumbed to the injuries. 3. According to the five claimant-appellants (for short, 'the claimants'), Shakeel Ahmad was a healthy and hard working young man. His sudden death brought ruin to the family. The claimants sought compensation in the sum of Rs.4,00,000/- together with 18% annual interest. It is the claimants' case that Shakeel Ahmad was aged 30 years and would work on the jeep as an assistant and a partner to the owner. The offending truck was insured with the United India Insurance Co. Ltd. through its Divisional Manager, Rampur Garden, Bareilly (for short, 'the Insurers') vide Cover Note No. 706310, valid from 08.01.1999 to 07.01.2000. The Insurers were impleaded as opposite party No.1 to the claim petition and respondent No.1 to this appeal. The offending truck was owned by one Khalil Ahmad, who was arrayed as opposite party No.2 to the claim petition and respondent No.2 to this appeal. He is the registered owner of the truck and shall hereinafter be called 'the owner'. 4. The owner filed a written statement, where he has acknowledged the fact that he is the registered owner of the offending truck. He has admitted the fact that on 02.04.1999, the truck was proceedings from Kicha to Bareilly. It was driven at a regulated speed, with due care by its driver. 4. The owner filed a written statement, where he has acknowledged the fact that he is the registered owner of the offending truck. He has admitted the fact that on 02.04.1999, the truck was proceedings from Kicha to Bareilly. It was driven at a regulated speed, with due care by its driver. The jeep driver was operating the vehicle negligently. The offending truck was insured with the Insurers under a cover note valid from 08.01.1999 to 07.01.2000. The driver of the offending truck was Rajesh Kumar, who held a driving licence valid upto 16.04.2000. He had not been negligent in any way in driving the truck. It was urged that since the offending truck was insured, if any liability be found for the owner, it has to be made good by the Insurers. 5. The Insurers filed a separate written statement and denied the factum of accident. They have denied the deceased's age, avocation and income. It has also been denied that the claimants were dependent upon the deceased. It is also pleaded that all the legal representatives of the deceased have not been made parties and, therefore, the claim petition is bad for non-joinder. A plea has further been raised to the effect that the driver of the offending truck was not made a party, again leading to non-joinder. The accident did not happen on account of negligence of the driver of the offending truck and, therefore, the Insurers are not liable. The owner was operating the offending truck without registration, a fitness certificate and contrary to the terms of the insurance policy. The driver of the truck did not have a valid driving licence. The claimants have come up with an inflated claim. According to the Insurers, the claim petition deserved to be rejected. 6. On the pleadings of parties, the Tribunal struck the following issues (translated into English from Hindi) : “1. Whether on 02.04.1999, at about 5:30 in the evening, at the Baheri Bypass, Truck No. UP-22-6933, driven negligently, recklessly and at a high speed by its driver, proceeding from the Kicha end of the road, hit Shakeel, on account of which he died? 2. Whether at the time of the accident, the driver of the vehicle in question did not have a valid driving licence? 3. 2. Whether at the time of the accident, the driver of the vehicle in question did not have a valid driving licence? 3. Whether at the time of the accident, the vehicle in question was validly insured with opposite party No.1, United India Insurance Co. Ltd.? 4. Whether the claim petition is bad for non-joinder of necessary party, on account of non-impleadment of the driver of Vehicle No. UP-22-6933? 5. Whether the claimants are entitled to compensation? If yes, how much and from which opposite party?” 7. The claimants examined in support of the claim petition PW-1 Hasima Begum, Mohd. Islam PW-2 and Salim PW-3. The claimants produced in documentary evidence vide a list of document, bearing paper No. 17-Ga, six documents, which include a photostat copy of the cover note of the offending truck, a photostat copy of the truck driver's driving licence, a photostat copy of the tax paid for the offending truck and a fitness certificate of the truck. In addition, through another list, bearing paper No. 24-Ga, nine other documents were filed, that include a certified copy of the FIR, a certified copy of the charge sheet and a certified copy of the postmortem report. The Insurers filed a true copy of the insurance policy, but did not lead any oral evidence. 8. Issue No.1 was answered for the claimants, holding that on the date and time of the accident, the deceased died on account of rash and negligent driving by the driver of the offending truck. Issue No.2 was answered against the Insurers, holding that on the date of the accident, Rajesh Kumar, the driver of the offending truck had a valid driving licence. Likewise, Issue No.3 was decided against the Insurers, holding that on the date of the accident, the offending truck was insured with the Insurers. Issue No.4 was also decided in favour of the claimants and against the Insurers, holding that it was not bad for non-joinder of a necessary party on account of non-impleadment of the offending truck's driver. 9. While answering Issue No.5, the Tribunal held the deceased's income to be a sum of Rs.2000/- per month, and deducting a sum of Rs.800/- towards personal and living expenses, a monthly dependency of Rs.1200/- was determined. The Tribunal applied a multiplier of 15' to find a total substantive dependency of Rs.2,16,000/-. 9. While answering Issue No.5, the Tribunal held the deceased's income to be a sum of Rs.2000/- per month, and deducting a sum of Rs.800/- towards personal and living expenses, a monthly dependency of Rs.1200/- was determined. The Tribunal applied a multiplier of 15' to find a total substantive dependency of Rs.2,16,000/-. A consolidated sum of Rs.10,000/- was awarded to the widow for the loss of consortium, funeral expenses and loss of estate. Accordingly, a compensation in the sum of Rs.2,26,000/- was awarded to the claimants with an apportionment of Rs.1,10,000/- to the widow, Rs.26,000/- to the deceased's mother and Rs.30,000/- each to the three minor children. The said sum of money was ordered to carry interest @ 10% per annum from the date of institution of the claim petition until realization. The compensation awarded to the minors was directed to be placed in a fixed deposit with a Nationalized Bank, to be held there until the minors attained majority. 10. Heard Mr. Ram Singh, learned Counsel for the claimants. No one has appeared on behalf of the owner or the Insurers, though service was held sufficient vide order dated 18.10.2022. 11. The only issue that has been canvassed in this appeal before this Court is the inadequacy of compensation awarded. 12. The Tribunal has reasoned that the deceased was a helper on the jeep. He was a partner too, in the enterprise of ferrying passengers for hire on the jeep with the registered owner. According to the claimants, he would earn Rs.3500/- per month. The Tribunal has looked into the testimony of PW-1, the deceased's wife, who has said that her husband would garner an income of Rs.3500/- by operating the jeep. 13. The Tribunal has also looked into the evidence of PW-2, Mohd. Islam, the registered owner of the jeep. Mohd. Islam has said in his testimony that the deceased would look after the jeep and was a partner by verbal agreement. After deducting expenses involved in the vehicle's operation, according to the registered owner, the deceased would share profits with him equally. The deceased would save for himself a sum of Rs.4000-4500/- per month. In the cross-examination, the Tribunal has noted that Mohd. Islam, PW-2 has said that in the month of March, 1999, for the last time, Shakeel had paid him a sum of Rs.3500/-. The deceased would save for himself a sum of Rs.4000-4500/- per month. In the cross-examination, the Tribunal has noted that Mohd. Islam, PW-2 has said that in the month of March, 1999, for the last time, Shakeel had paid him a sum of Rs.3500/-. The Tribunal has also noted that this witness has said that he had a register recording the monthly income, but did not produce it in evidence. 14. The Tribunal has concluded that all this evidence proves that the deceased would work on Jeep No. UP-25-5646 and on the date of accident too, he was deboarding passengers. It has also been held that according to the autopsy report, the deceased's age was 32 years. In the absence of any documentary evidence, the Tribunal has opined that the deceased's income ought to be determined at a sum of Rs.2000/- per month, out of which Rs.800/- he would spend on himself. As already noted about the reckoning of compensation, the Tribunal ultimately held the claimants entitled to a sum of Rs.2,26,000/-. 15. Upon hearing learned Counsel for the claimants and perusing the record, this Court finds that there is an unchallenged assertion about the deceased's income being Rs.3500/-. The said income is half of the profits earned by operating the jeep, of which Mohd. Islam was the owner. Mohd. Islam has said that the deceased would earn Rs.4000-4500/- per month. The widow has said that he would earn Rs.3500/-. Therefore, for the Tribunal to say that the deceased would earn Rs.2000/- per month is no more than an ipse dixit of the Judge in the Tribunal. 16. The deceased's wife, in the cross-examination done at the instance of the Insurers, has stood by the position that her husband would earn a sum of Rs.3500/- per month, which she has described as salary. The witness being apparently not an educated woman, she would not understand that the deceased was sharing profits with the registered owner earned out of the operating jeep for hire, carrying passengers. What is important is that in the cross-examination, there is nothing said to discredit the assertion about the deceased's income being Rs.3500/- per month. Mohd. Islam, PW-2, in his testimony has pegged the deceased's monthly income at a figure of Rs.4000-4500/-. What is important is that in the cross-examination, there is nothing said to discredit the assertion about the deceased's income being Rs.3500/- per month. Mohd. Islam, PW-2, in his testimony has pegged the deceased's monthly income at a figure of Rs.4000-4500/-. In his cross-examination, he has come out with the fact that in the month of March, 1999, the deceased had paid him a sum of Rs.3500/-. There being an equal sharing between the registered owner of the jeep, PW-2 and the deceased, the deceased too would have earned the same sum of money, during the month of March, 1999. 17. This Court is of opinion that in the nature of the work that the deceased and the registered owner of the ill-fated jeep did together, one can hardly expect maintenance of ledgers, books of account, balance-sheets or tax returns. The Court cannot turn away its face from the hard reality that much economic activity, particularly, in the days gone by, happened outside the formal regime of recorded transactions, but it does not mean that these activities to earn ones livelihood were not there. Howsoever illegal, vehicles registered as private ones, particularly jeeps, have always dotted the highways, at least in this State, to ferry passengers for hire or reward. They have afforded means of transport to some and to others an occupation. We do not know whether the ill-fated jeep was registered as a commercial vehicle or not. We assume it was not. Even then, it cannot be said that the jeep was not exploited for commercial gain by ferrying passengers that yielded a definitive income, both to the registered owner and the deceased. Going by the contemporary standards of the time at the turn of the century, an unskilled labourer would earn about Rs.100/- a day. That was the figure accepted for an unskilled labourer in the earlier years of the last decade of the 20th century. 18. The deceased was not a casual labourer, but a person engaged in providing a service to passengers for hire or reward, using a motor vehicle, sharing profits with the registered owner. In the circumstances, on the most conservative estimate, this Court is of opinion that the deceased can safely be credited with a monthly income of Rs.3000/- per month at the time of his demise in the fatal motor accident. We hold accordingly. 19. In the circumstances, on the most conservative estimate, this Court is of opinion that the deceased can safely be credited with a monthly income of Rs.3000/- per month at the time of his demise in the fatal motor accident. We hold accordingly. 19. It is on the foot of this monthly income that this Court proceeds to determine the claimants' dependency and the compensation. A monthly income of Rs.3000/- would work to an annual income of Rs.36,000/-. 20. The deceased left behind five dependents, about whom, there is no doubt that they were his dependents. The two adults were his widow and the mother, and the three minors, his children. Going by Rule 220-A (2)(iii) of the U.P. Motor Vehicles Rules, 1998 (for short the ‘Rules of 1998’), reckoning the minor dependents as half a unit, the total number of dependents would be three and a half. It would be rounded off or rationalized to 'four'. According to the holding in Sarla Verma (Smt) v. Delhi Transport Corporation and another, (2009) 6 SCC 121 , for a married man, leaving behind dependents in the bracket of 4-6, a deduction of one-fourth has to be directed towards personal and living expenses of the deceased. The Tribunal has directed a quantified deduction of Rs.800/-, that is about two-fifth of the deceased's income, determined by the Tribunal, that is to say, Rs.2000/-. This Court, therefore, holds that the Tribunal has ordered an excessive deduction towards personal expenses, which should be substituted by a deduction of one-fourth. 21. The Tribunal has applied a multiplier of 15'. The deceased was held 32 years old. Going by the table in Paragraph No.40 of the decision in Sarla Verma (supra) for a victim in the age group of 31-35 years, the appropriate multiplier to be adopted is 16'. The Tribunal, therefore, erred in applying the multiplier of 15'. 22. The next issue that has been raised by the learned Counsel for the claimants is the non-award of anything towards future prospects. In view of the holding of the Supreme Court in National Insurance Company v. Pranay Sethi and others (2017) 16 SCC 680 , future prospects are to be awarded in cases of victims of fatal motor accidents, who are self-employed or worked on a fixed salary too. In view of the holding of the Supreme Court in National Insurance Company v. Pranay Sethi and others (2017) 16 SCC 680 , future prospects are to be awarded in cases of victims of fatal motor accidents, who are self-employed or worked on a fixed salary too. The question would certainly arise whether future prospects, to which the claimants are entitled, would be governed by the law laid down in Pranay Sethi (supra) or Rule 220-A(3) of the Rules of 1998. This issue is no longer res integra in view of the holding in New India Assurance Co. Ltd v. Urmila Shukla and others, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 822, where it has been observed : "9. It is to be noted that the validity of the Rules was not, in any way, questioned in the instant matter and thus the only question that we are called upon to consider is whether in its application, sub-Rule 3(iii) of Rule 220A of the Rules must be given restricted scope or it must be allowed to operate fully. 10. The discussion on the point in Pranay Sethi was from the standpoint of arriving at "just compensation" in terms of Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. 11. If an indicia is made available in the form of a statutory instrument which affords a favourable treatment, the decision in Pranay Sethi cannot be taken to have limited the operation of such statutory provision specially when the validity of the Rules was not put under any challenge. The prescription of 15% in cases where the deceased was in the age bracket of 50-60 years as stated in Pranay Sethi cannot be taken as maxima. In the absence of any governing principle available in the statutory regime, it was only in the form of an indication. If a statutory instrument has devised a formula which affords better or greater benefit, such statutory instrument must be allowed to operate unless the statutory instrument is otherwise found to be invalid. 12. We, therefore, reject the submission advanced on behalf of the appellant and affirm the view taken by the Tribunal as well as the High Court and dismiss this appeal without any order as to costs." 23. 12. We, therefore, reject the submission advanced on behalf of the appellant and affirm the view taken by the Tribunal as well as the High Court and dismiss this appeal without any order as to costs." 23. There is no cavil, therefore, that future prospects in the State of Uttar Pradesh have to be quantified in accordance with Rule 220-A(3) of the Rules of 1998, and not the principles in Pranay Sethi. 24. The next issue which arises is whether Rule 220-A(3) of the Rules of 1998, which came into force by virtue of Notification No. 777/XXX4-2011-4(3)-2010 dated 26th September, 2011 i.e. The Uttar Pradesh Motor Vehicles (Eleventh Amendment) Rules, 2011, would apply retrospectively to an accident which happened much before the amendment. This issue fell for consideration of a Division Bench of this Court in Sushil Kumar and others v. M/s. Sampark Lojastic Private Limited and others, 2017 (35) LCD 1311. In Sushil Kumar (supra), it has been held : "31. Rule 220-A was inserted in the Uttar Pradesh Motor Vehicles Rules, 1998 in view of the various decisions of the law courts for providing benefit on account of future prospects of the injured/deceased. It provides for addition of certain percentage of the income of the injured/deceased in his actual income depending upon the age of the injured/deceased for the purposes of determination of the compensation. The aforesaid Rule came into effect on 26.09.2011 after the decision of the claim petition but before filing of the appeal though the accident took place on 08.05.2010 much before the enforcement of the above Rule. 32. It is in view of the above that an argument is being raised that Rule 220-A of the Rules which came into effect on 26.09.2011 would not apply to the accident which had taken place on 08.05.2010. 33. In Ram Sarup Vs. Munshi AIR 1963 SC 553 it was laid down that a change in law during the pendency of an appeal has to be taken into account and will cover the rights of the parties. 34. The view expressed above was followed by the Supreme Court in Mula Vs. Godhu AIR 1971 SC 89 . 35. In Dayawati Vs. Munshi AIR 1963 SC 553 it was laid down that a change in law during the pendency of an appeal has to be taken into account and will cover the rights of the parties. 34. The view expressed above was followed by the Supreme Court in Mula Vs. Godhu AIR 1971 SC 89 . 35. In Dayawati Vs. Inderjit AIR 1966 SC 1423 the court had observed as under:-If the new law speaks in language, which expressly or by clear intendment, takes in even pending matters, the court of trial as well as the court of appeal must have regard to an intention so expressed, and the court of appeal may give effect to such a law even after the judgment of the court of first instance. 36. In Amarjit Kaur Vs. Pritam Singh AIR 1974 SC 2068 effect was given to the change in law during the pendency of an appeal as the hearing of an appeal under the procedural law of this country is in the nature of rehearing of the suit by superior court. 37. It was in the light of the above decisions that in Lakshmi Narayan Guin and others Vs. Niranjan Modak AIR 1985 SC 111 it was held that a change in law during the pendency of an appeal has to be taken into account and will cover the right of the parties. 38. The aforesaid decision was followed by a Division Bench of this court in U.P. State Road Transport Corporation Vs. Smt. Madhu Sharma and others, 2003 (4) AWC 2620 which was a case in relation to the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act and it was observed that it is apparent that the change in law during the pendency of the original proceedings has to be taken into account so as to cover the rights of the parties. 39. In view of above decision the view expressed by the Division Bench of this court in ICICI Lombard (Supra) is not of good law as it does not takes into account the decisions referred to above in holding that the Rule 220-A of the Rules which came into effect on 26.09.2011 would not apply to the accident that took place prior to the said date only for the reason that the Rule was not specifically stated to be retrospective in nature." 25. According to the law laid down by the Division Bench in Sushil Kumar (supra), which apparently binds this Court, the award of future prospects is to be made in accordance Rule 220-A(3) of Rules, 1998, notwithstanding the fact that accident happened prior to the amendment. Here, the deceased was aged less than 40 years and going by Rule 220-A(3), there has to be an addition of 50% to his income towards future prospects. 26. The next question that arises for consideration is the claimants' entitlement under the conventional heads. In Pranay Sethi, it has been held : “48. This aspect needs to be clarified and appositely stated. The conventional sum has been provided in the Second Schedule to the Act. The said Schedule has been found to be defective as stated by the Court in Trilok Chandra [UP SRTC v. Trilok Chandra, (1996) 4 SCC 362 ]. Recently, in Puttamma v. K.L. Narayana Reddy, (2013) 15 SCC 45 : (2014) 4 SCC (Civ) 384 : (2014) 3 SCC (Cri) 574 it has been reiterated by stating : (SCC p. 80, para 54) “54. … we hold that the Second Schedule as was enacted in 1994 has now become redundant, irrational and unworkable due to changed scenario including the present cost of living and current rate of inflation and increased life expectancy.” 49. As far as multiplier or multiplicand is concerned, the same has been put to rest by the judgments of this Court. Para 3 of the Second Schedule also provides for general damages in case of death. It is as follows: “3. General damages (in case of death): The following general damages shall be payable in addition to compensation outlined above: (i) Funeral expenses Rs.2000 (ii) Loss of consortium, if beneficiary is the spouse Rs.5000 (iii) Loss of estate Rs.2500 (iv) Medical expenses — actual expenses incurred before death supported by bills/vouchers but not exceeding Rs.15,000” 50. On a perusal of various decisions of this Court, it is manifest that the Second Schedule has not been followed starting from the decision in Trilok Chandra [UP SRTC v. Trilok Chandra, (1996) 4 SCC 362 ] and there has been no amendment to the same. The conventional damage amount needs to be appositely determined. As we notice, in different cases different amounts have been granted. The conventional damage amount needs to be appositely determined. As we notice, in different cases different amounts have been granted. A sum of Rs.1,00,000 was granted towards consortium in Rajesh [Rajesh v. Rajbir Singh, (2013) 9 SCC 54 : (2013) 4 SCC (Civ) 179 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 817 : (2014) 1 SCC (L&S) 149]. The justification for grant of consortium, as we find from Rajesh [Rajesh v. Rajbir Singh, (2013) 9 SCC 54 : (2013) 4 SCC (Civ) 179 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 817 : (2014) 1 SCC (L&S) 149], is founded on the observation as we have reproduced hereinbefore. 51. On the aforesaid basis, the Court has revisited the practice of awarding compensation under conventional heads. 52. As far as the conventional heads are concerned, we find it difficult to agree with the view expressed in Rajesh [Rajesh v. Rajbir Singh, (2013) 9 SCC 54 : (2013) 4 SCC (Civ) 179 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 817 : (2014) 1 SCC (L&S) 149]. It has granted Rs.25,000 towards funeral expenses, Rs.1,00,000 towards loss of consortium and Rs.1,00,000 towards loss of care and guidance for minor children. The head relating to loss of care and minor children does not exist. Though Rajesh [Rajesh v. Rajbir Singh, (2013) 9 SCC 54 : (2013) 4 SCC (Civ) 179 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 817 : (2014) 1 SCC (L&S) 149] refers to Santosh Devi [Santosh Devi v. National Insurance Co. Ltd., (2012) 6 SCC 421 : (2012) 3 SCC (Civ) 726 : (2012) 3 SCC (Cri) 160 : (2012) 2 SCC (L&S) 167], it does not seem to follow the same. The conventional and traditional heads, needless to say, cannot be determined on percentage basis because that would not be an acceptable criterion. Unlike determination of income, the said heads have to be quantified. Any quantification must have a reasonable foundation. There can be no dispute over the fact that price index, fall in bank interest, escalation of rates in many a field have to be noticed. The court cannot remain oblivious to the same. There has been a thumb rule in this aspect. Any quantification must have a reasonable foundation. There can be no dispute over the fact that price index, fall in bank interest, escalation of rates in many a field have to be noticed. The court cannot remain oblivious to the same. There has been a thumb rule in this aspect. Otherwise, there will be extreme difficulty in determination of the same and unless the thumb rule is applied, there will be immense variation lacking any kind of consistency as a consequence of which, the orders passed by the tribunals and courts are likely to be unguided. Therefore, we think it seemly to fix reasonable sums. It seems to us that reasonable figures on conventional heads, namely, loss of estate, loss of consortium and funeral expenses should be Rs.15,000, Rs.40,000 and Rs.15,000 respectively. The principle of revisiting the said heads is an acceptable principle. But the revisit should not be fact-centric or quantum-centric. We think that it would be condign that the amount that we have quantified should be enhanced on percentage basis in every three years and the enhancement should be at the rate of 10% in a span of three years. We are disposed to hold so because that will bring in consistency in respect of those heads.” (emphasis by Court) 27. What compensation for the loss of consortium is to be awarded and to which of the claimants, was the issue that was considered by the Supreme Court in Magma General Insurance Company Ltd. v. Nanu Ram alias Chuhru Ram and others, (2018) 18 SCC 130 , where it was held : “21. A Constitution Bench of this Court in Pranay Sethi [National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi, (2017) 16 SCC 680 : (2018) 3 SCC (Civ) 248 : (2018) 2 SCC (Cri) 205] dealt with the various heads under which compensation is to be awarded in a death case. One of these heads is loss of consortium. In legal parlance, “consortium” is a compendious term which encompasses “spousal consortium”, “parental consortium”, and “filial consortium”. The right to consortium would include the company, care, help, comfort, guidance, solace and affection of the deceased, which is a loss to his family. One of these heads is loss of consortium. In legal parlance, “consortium” is a compendious term which encompasses “spousal consortium”, “parental consortium”, and “filial consortium”. The right to consortium would include the company, care, help, comfort, guidance, solace and affection of the deceased, which is a loss to his family. With respect to a spouse, it would include sexual relations with the deceased spouse : [Rajesh v. Rajbir Singh, (2013) 9 SCC 54 : (2013) 4 SCC (Civ) 179 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 817 : (2014) 1 SCC (L&S) 149] 21.1. Spousal consortium is generally defined as rights pertaining to the relationship of a husband-wife which allows compensation to the surviving spouse for loss of “company, society, cooperation, affection, and aid of the other in every conjugal relation”. [Black's Law Dictionary(5th Edn., 1979).] 21.2. Parental consortium is granted to the child upon the premature death of a parent, for loss of “parental aid, protection, affection, society, discipline, guidance and training”. 21.3. Filial consortium is the right of the parents to compensation in the case of an accidental death of a child. An accident leading to the death of a child causes great shock and agony to the parents and family of the deceased. The greatest agony for a parent is to lose their child during their lifetime. Children are valued for their love, affection, companionship and their role in the family unit. (emphasis by Court) 28. The Tribunal had directed compensation payable to the minor claimants to be placed in a fixed deposit with a nationalized bank until the minors attained majority. The youngest of the minors, who was two years at the time when the claim petition was instituted, would now be aged about 25 years. The others would be older. Therefore, the direction to invest any part of the compensation, now payable in fixed deposit, is not called for. 29. The youngest of the minors, who was two years at the time when the claim petition was instituted, would now be aged about 25 years. The others would be older. Therefore, the direction to invest any part of the compensation, now payable in fixed deposit, is not called for. 29. In view of the aforesaid conclusion, the compensation payable to the claimants in this appeal is revised and would have to be determined in the following manner : (i) Monthly Income (of the deceased) Rs.3000 (ii) Annual Income (of the deceased) = 3000x12 Rs.36000 (iii) Annual Income+Future Prospects (annual income x 50%) = 36000+18000 Rs.54000 (iv) Annual Dependency = Annual Income - one-fourth deduction towards personal expenses of the deceased = 54000-13500 Rs.40500 (v) Total Dependency = Annual Dependency x Applied Multiplier = 40500 x 16 Rs.648000 (vi) Claimant’s entitlement towards conventional heads = Loss of Estate + Funeral Expenses + dependents’ Consortium =15000+15000+40000x5 Rs.230000 The total compensation would therefore, work out to a figure of Rs.648000+ Rs.230000 Rs.878000 30. In the result, this appeal is allowed in part. The impugned award passed by the Tribunal is modified and the compensation awarded enhanced to Rs.8,78,000/-. The aforesaid sum of money shall carry simple interest at the rate of 7% per annum from the date of institution of the claim petition, until realization. Any sum of money already deposited with the Tribunal by the Insurers, pursuant to the impugned award, shall be adjusted against it. The directions of the Tribunal for apportionment amongst the claimants shall remain intact, but it will no longer be necessary to require the compensation to be invested in any kind of a fixed deposit. It shall be payable as per entitlement to each of the claimants and/ or their legal representatives in account in such manner as the Tribunal directs.