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2023 DIGILAW 1203 (ALL)

Kalyan Singh v. New India Assurance Company Ltd.

2023-05-01

J.J.MUNIR

body2023
JUDGMENT : This appeal by the claimant is directed against a judgment and award passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal/ 8th Additional District Judge, Etawah dated the 29th November, 1997, rejecting Motor Accident Claims Petition No.107 of 1995. 2. According to the claimant-appellant, Kalyan Singh (for short, 'the claimant') on 27.11.1994 at about half past six in the evening hours, rode out on his scooter from an alley on to the Municipal Bypass, connecting the Highway. A mini truck, bearing registration No. UHK-300, driven negligently and at a high speed, without sounding horn, approached from Auraiya end of the road and hit the claimant's motor scooter. The collision led the claimant to lose the little finger of his left hand, that was crushed, broken and severed. The mini truck sped away towards Agra. The claimant was conveyed to the District Hospital. The claimant went to Police Station Kotwali to lodge a report on 11.01.1995, but the Police refused to register the case citing the delay. Thereupon, on 12.01.1995, the claimant sent a written information by registered post to the Senior Superintendent of Police, Etawah, which was a typed written document. It is the claimant's case that if the truck driver had not been negligent and observed rules of the road, the accident would not have happened and the claimant spared the deprivation of a digit of his hand. The deprivation has led the claimant to suffer from a feeling of inferiority complex and his capacity to work has diminished. Accordingly, the claimant instituted the present claim petition, asking for a compensation in the sum of Rs.2,29,000/-. He also sought interim relief in the sum of Rs.20,000/-. 3. A written statement was filed by one Shamim Begum, the owner of mini truck, bearing registration No. UHK-300, resisting the claim. Shamim Begum was impleaded as opposite party No.1 to the claim petition and is arrayed as respondent No.2 to this appeal. She will hereinafter be called 'the owner'. It was asserted in the owner's written statement that the offending truck was insured with The New India Assurance Company Ltd. vide Cover Note No. 169379, comprehensively. The insurance was valid from 21.01.1994 to 20.01.1995. The obligation to make good the compensation, therefore, rests with the aforesaid Insurance Company. It has been pleaded that on 27.11.1994, no crime was reported at Police Station Kotwali. The insurance was valid from 21.01.1994 to 20.01.1995. The obligation to make good the compensation, therefore, rests with the aforesaid Insurance Company. It has been pleaded that on 27.11.1994, no crime was reported at Police Station Kotwali. The claimant has not fractured his finger in the so called motor accident. It was denied that the claimant earns a sum of Rs.5000/- per month. He has suffered no loss of income. The mini truck was being operated carefully and according to the rules. Even if the compensation be held payable, the burden would go to the Insurance Company, considering that the offending truck was insured on the date of the accident. According to the owner, the claim petition deserved to be rejected. 4. A separate written statement was filed on behalf of The New India Assurance Company Ltd. (for short, 'the Insurers') urging in defence that no cause of action arose to the claimant to institute this claim petition. The claim petition was bad for non-joinder of necessary parties, inasmuch as the driver of the truck was not impleaded. Also, it was bad for non-joinder, because the insurer of the motor scooter was not impleaded. On the date of the accident, the offending truck was not insured with the Insurers. The truck owner has committed breach of the conditions of insurance and did not inform the Insurers about the accident. It is the claimant, who has to prove that on the date of the accident, the driver of the offending truck held a valid licence and that the offending truck had a route permit, besides a registration certificate. It was pleaded that unless the owner proves that premium for the insurance policy had been credited in the Insurers' account, the Insurers are not liable to indemnify. In the alternative, it was pleaded that the premium had not been credited and there is a violation of Section 64-VB of the Insurance Act, 1938. The Police have not complied with sub-Sections (1) to (6) of Section 158 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for short, 'the Act'). The offending truck was being driven on the date of the accident without the driver holding a valid driving licence or the truck being covered by a permit. The offending truck did not have a registration certificate. The Police have not complied with sub-Sections (1) to (6) of Section 158 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for short, 'the Act'). The offending truck was being driven on the date of the accident without the driver holding a valid driving licence or the truck being covered by a permit. The offending truck did not have a registration certificate. The claimant has wrongly asserted his age and the medical expenses to be incurred in the future, all in order to secure a higher award. The compensation claimed under different heads is wrong and bogus. The claim petition deserved to be rejected. 5. On the pleadings of parties, the following issues were framed (translated into English from Hindi) : “1. Whether the driver of Truck No. UHK-300 on 27.11.1994, driving it negligently, caused injury to the claimant, resulting in permanent disablement? 2. Whether on the date of the accident, Truck No. UHK-300 was insured with the Insurance Company, opposite party No.2? 3. Whether on the date of the accident, the driver held a valid driving licence and the vehicle a permit and registration (certificate)? 4. To what compensation is the claimant entitled and from which opposite party?” 6. In support of the claim petition, the claimant filed documents through list bearing paper No.24-Ga and examined Km. Radha Singh as PW-1 and himself as PW-2. 7. The owner filed documents through a list, paper No.17-Ga, numbering four. All the documents are noticed to be photostat copies by the Tribunal. No oral evidence was led on behalf of the owner. 8. The Insurers filed documents through a list, bearing paper No.31-Ga. It includes a certified copy of the insurance policy. No oral evidence was led on behalf of the Insurers as well. Before the Tribunal, the claim petition proceeded ex parte against the owner and heard as such. 9. The Tribunal while answering Issue No.1 held that no accident was caused by the offending truck nor any injury sustained by the claimant. Issue No.2 was answered in the manner that on the date of accident, the offending truck was validly insured with the Insurers. Issue No.3 was answered holding that on the date of the accident, the driver of the offending truck had a valid driving licence and that the offending truck was moving on a valid permit and registration certificate. Issue No.2 was answered in the manner that on the date of accident, the offending truck was validly insured with the Insurers. Issue No.3 was answered holding that on the date of the accident, the driver of the offending truck had a valid driving licence and that the offending truck was moving on a valid permit and registration certificate. Issue No.4 was answered in the negative and against the claimant in view of the findings returned on Issue No.1. 10. Heard Mr. R.K. Porwal, learned Counsel for the claimant and Mr. Arun Kumar Shukla, learned Counsel for the Insurers. No one has appeared on behalf of the owner. 11. Mr. R.K. Porwal, learned Counsel for the claimant has submitted that the Tribunal has erred in disbelieving the factum of accident and the injury sustained, because there was no oral or other evidence produced on behalf of the owner or the Insurers. There was no reason to disbelieve the claimant's testimony and the documentary evidence. It is urged that the documents filed clearly indicate the injury sustained by the claimant in the accident. Amongst these, of particular importance is the disability certificate issued by the Medical Board, where the injured is shown to have sustained a disability to the extent of 10% with the little finger of the left hand being amputated. 12. Mr. Porwal has referred to the testimony of PW-1, Km. Radha Singh, an eye witness and that of PW-2, the victim, to say that there is no reason to disbelieve their evidence by holding them to be interested witnesses. Mr. Porwal has pointed out the documentary evidence with regard to the injuries and the treatment papers that are on record. Mr. Porwal has gone to the extent of arguing that the Tribunal has virtually accepted all that the Insurers have said in their written statement without producing any evidence. He has also criticized the Tribunal's approach in disbelieving the victim's daughter by dubbing her as an interested witness. It is argued that non-registration of an FIR by the Police does not make the factum of the accident improbable or the injury sustained doubtful. The Tribunal is not to look upto the proceedings in the crime before the Police in order to arrive at a correct conclusion whether the accident happened in the manner pleaded and the consequent injuries sustained. The Tribunal is not to look upto the proceedings in the crime before the Police in order to arrive at a correct conclusion whether the accident happened in the manner pleaded and the consequent injuries sustained. The approach of the Claims Tribunal in appraising the evidence has been criticized by the learned Counsel as hyper-technical and hairsplitting. 13. Mr. Arun Kumar Shukla, learned Counsel for the Insurers, on the other hand, has supported the impugned judgment and submitted that there was a denial of the involvement of the offending truck in the accident. It is urged that no documentary evidence was produced by the claimant to prove the accident as one caused by the offending truck. It is submitted that there was no independent eye witness account of the accident. Both the witnesses were interested, that is to say, they were father and daughter. The presence of PW-1, Radha Singh has been urged to be doubtful, because there is no mention about the fact in the claim petition. It is submitted that the claimant's case is based on a cock and bull story with not the slightest of convincing evidence about it. Mr. Shukla has placed reliance upon the decision of a learned Single Judge of this Court in Chhotey Lal v. The Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. and others, FAFO No. 1468 of 2021, decided on 12.10.2022, where in similar circumstances relating to an injury case, it was held : “The record reveals that the accident had taken place on 03.06.1983 and the claim petition was filed for a compensation of Rs.1,57,500/-. As per claim petition, the claimant had got treatment for the injuries suffered in the accident for three months in Beli Hospital, Allahabad but he did not file any prescription or other documents to demonstrate that he met with an accident and for the injuries suffered by him in the accident, he was treated in Beli Hospital for three months. The claimant has also not produced any independent evidence to prove the accident. Further the claimant did not file any FIR in respect to the alleged accident. The claimant has also not produced any independent evidence to prove the accident. Further the claimant did not file any FIR in respect to the alleged accident. It is true that the FIR is not relevant to prove the accident but in the instant case, there was no evidence on record except the testimony of claimant and, therefore, this Court finds that the tribunal has rightly held that in absence of any independent evidence or documentary evidence on record, the claimant has failed to prove the accident and, thus, this Court does not find any illegality in the findings returned by the tribunal.” 14. Mr. Shukla has next placed reliance on a decision of this Court in Smt. Richa Khare and others v. Ankit Gupta and others, FAFO No. 120 of 2017, decided on 08.03.2022, where it has been held : 8. As per above case law, it is held by the Apex Court that delay in lodging the first information report should not be treated to be fatal in genuine cases. In this judgment, Hon'ble Apex Court has laid emphasis on the words "in genuine cases". These words are of utmost importance. In the facts and circumstances of the case in hand, this case-law is not applicable as the facts of this case are entirely different. We had opined in on-going discussion that it is evident from the evidence on record that offending truck was not involved in the accident. Merely filing the charge-sheet cannot be the sole basis to reach to the conclusion that offending vehicle was involved in the accident. In this case, firstly, the closure-report was filed by the Investigating Officer, which mentions that the accident took place due to slipping the wheel of the motorcycle. Although, the charge-sheet was filed by the Investigating Officer against the driver of the truck after making further investigation, but it is to be seen in the light of the inquest report also wherein there are five witnesses, who were close-relative of the deceased. The opinion of all the witnesses of inquest report was that accident occurred due to slipping of front-wheel of the motorcycle. At the cost of repetition, we again lay the emphasis on the fact that inquest report was prepared after six days of the accident and even then it is not mentioned in it that accident took place due to involvement of any vehicle. At the cost of repetition, we again lay the emphasis on the fact that inquest report was prepared after six days of the accident and even then it is not mentioned in it that accident took place due to involvement of any vehicle. Hence, we have no reason to differ with the view taken by the learned Tribunal while dismissing the claim petition. 15. Upon hearing learned Counsel for the parties and perusing the record, what this Courts finds is that the Tribunal indeed has adopted a hyper-technical approach to evaluate the parties’ case. It has almost imposed upon the claimant the standard of proving his case beyond reasonable doubt. That is not to be done at all in a claim petition before the Tribunal. The Tribunal has noted that PW-1, Radha Singh has said that the offending truck had swerved to the wrong side and hit her father's scooter, causing the injury. It has been remarked that according to the claimant, the offending truck was moving from east to west, whereas the claimant was entering the main road from the north turning to the west. This would show that both the claimant's scooter and the offending truck were moving in the same direction. Therefore, it is incorrect to say that the offending truck moved to the wrong side and hit the scooter. The offending truck too was moving on the same side of the road as the scooter, according to rule of the road. The Tribunal has remarked that if the offending truck was moving west to east and hit the scooter moving east to west, on the left hand side of the road, going by the claimant's orientation, that would have been a case of the truck hitting the scooter on the wrong side. We do not agree. 16. While it is true that a person entering a main road from a side lane or alley, ought to take care about the moving traffic on the main road, it is the duty of a bigger vehicle to bear caution about the smaller vehicle, like cars, two wheelers, bicycles or even pedestrians, moving on the same side of the road, that they do not get hit from the rear or by a lateral contact with the middle section or the back end of a wide bodied vehicle. Here, this precisely appears to be the case. Here, this precisely appears to be the case. In the examination-in-chief of PW-1, Km. Radha, it has been stated : ^^4- esjs firkth vius ck,a gkFk ij lM+d ij LdwVj yk pqds FksA ?kVukLFky ij lM+d dkQh pkSM+h gS vkSj lM+d ij fdlh Ádkj ds xÔs vkfn ugha gSA 5- Vªd pkyd }kjk ;fn fu;fer xfr ls okgu pyk;k tk jgk gksrk rks nq?kZVuk ugha gksrh- Vªd pkyd ds }kjk esjs firk ds LdwVj dks xyr lkÃM esa vkdj ikl fd;k Fkk- VDdj ekjdj Vªd vkxjk dh vksj Hkkx x;k- ?kk;y firk dks mBkdj ge vLirky ys x,- ogka mudks HkrhZ dj fy;k x;k rFkk mipkj fd;k x;k- mipkj ds nkSjku esjs firkth dh vaxqyh dks MkWDVjksa }kjk dkV fn;k x;k- ?kj ij esjs firkth dk 3&6 ekg bykt pyrk jgkA** 17. In the cross-examination, no question has been put to the witness regarding the manner of the impact described by her. This Court is, therefore, of opinion, as already held, that the Tribunal went astray in holding that the offending truck did not move to the wrong side of the road while hitting the motor scooter. The Tribunal has much emphasized the fact that the claimant has said in his testimony that he was admitted to the hospital for two days, whereas the discharge slip, paper No. 24-Ga/3 from the District Hospital, Etawah shows that he was discharged the same day i.e. 27.11.1994 by writing the word 'relieved' in the relevant column. The Tribunal has gone on a tangent reckoning the hours left in the day on 27.11.1994 to conclude that the date of admission and discharge, both being 27.11.1994, could never account for two days. The Tribunal has also taken note of the document under reference to opine that the endorsement on the reverse of it indicates the dates from 30.11.1994 to 17.12.1994, when different medicines were prescribed. It has been remarked that mention on this document about relieving the patient on 27.11.1994, would not lead to the inference that the consistent prescription of medicines on different dates show a longer duration of internment in the Hospital for the claimant. 18. This Court again is not in agreement with the Tribunal on this part of the finding. It may be true that the discharge slip may not prove the two days of indoor treatment for the claimant, but that is not decisive of the claim that he makes. 18. This Court again is not in agreement with the Tribunal on this part of the finding. It may be true that the discharge slip may not prove the two days of indoor treatment for the claimant, but that is not decisive of the claim that he makes. The claimant says that in the accident, he lost one of his fingers that was amputated. The Tribunal has clearly ignored from consideration documentary evidence that shows the claimant's case to be well-founded. It has ignored from consideration an injury report dated 27.11.1994 issued by Dr. Pulakraj, Medical Officer, District Hospital, Etawah. It is countersigned by the Medical Officer. The injuries, mentioned in this report bearing paper No. 24-Ga/2, read : “Injuries – (1) Crushed Injury ? little finger which is about completely separated from ? hand. Opinion – Injury is caused by hard and blunt object. Nature – Grievous. Duration – fresh.” 19. Also not considered is another document dated 27.11.1994 issued by the District Hospital, Etawah. The document is a bed head ticket, which does show that the claimant was admitted to the District Hospital on 27.11.1994 at 8.04 p.m. It is true that the bed head ticket also shows that he was relieved on 27.11.1994. But, that is of no consequence, as already said. What is relevant is that in the column of disease, it is mentioned 'Crushed injury ? little finger'. In the column of 'B/B', the name of Km. Radha Singh daughter of Kalyan Singh is written. The next column mentions the injury as 'accidental injury ? little finger due to collision of Metador and scooter at about 7.15 p.m. today.' There is also a note, which says 'injury noted in accidental register'. There is a further note which says, 'police informed'. This document bears paper No.24-Ga/6, that has been completely ignored from consideration by the Tribunal while writing its finding on Issue No.1. 20. There is yet another document not at all taken into consideration by the Tribunal and that is the disability certificate 18.07.1995. It has been issued by a Board of Doctors in the office of the Chief Medical Officer, Etawah. It mentions the injury as 10% and indicates it to be amputation of the little finger. The aforesaid certificate bears paper No.24-Ga/4. This disability certificate also bears the claimant's photograph attested by the Doctor. It has been issued by a Board of Doctors in the office of the Chief Medical Officer, Etawah. It mentions the injury as 10% and indicates it to be amputation of the little finger. The aforesaid certificate bears paper No.24-Ga/4. This disability certificate also bears the claimant's photograph attested by the Doctor. The disability certificate is signed by three doctors comprising the Board. With so much of overwhelming evidence on record, the finding returned by the Tribunal says : ^^blds vykok ;kph }kjk fdlh Hkh bUtjh fjiksVZ dh Áfr Hkh nkf[ky ugha dh xà gS fd ftlls rgjhjh fjiksVZ dk fl} gksuk rFkk ;kph dks vk;h pksV dk mDr nq?kZVuk ls lacaf/kr gksuk fl} ugha gksrk gSA** 21. The aforesaid finding and conclusion of the Tribunal cannot be accepted. Rather, the bed head ticket clearly indicates that the injured was brought to the hospital by his daughter, Km. Radha Singh, PW-1, which lends inherent credibility to the claim when seen in conjunction with the injury. This Court is constrained to say that with the claimant suffering an amputated digit of the hand, the approach of the Tribunal is most insensitive. 22. In our opinion, by the medical evidence alone and the clear testimony of PW-1 and PW-2, the factum of accident involving the offending truck and the resultant injury are overwhelmingly proven. The remarks of the Tribunal about the delay in lodging the FIR or non-registration of the criminal case are of trivial consequence, if none. 23. The Tribunal has then gone on to remark that a report of the incident is said to have been sent to the SSP, Etawah on 12.01.1995, but a copy of the said information has not been brought on record. A copy of the information that had been brought on record is one dated 12.01.1995, but that has not been proved. It has been held that the written information bearing paper No. 24-Ga/5 is not proved, and, therefore, not admissible in evidence. The said finding of the Tribunal is again utterly wrong. What is on record is a copy of the information sent to the SSP dated 11.01.1995 and also on record are copies of the registered postal receipts and AD Card. The information bears paper No. 24-Ga/5 and the registered postal receipts and AD Card bears paper No. 24-Ga/8. The said finding of the Tribunal is again utterly wrong. What is on record is a copy of the information sent to the SSP dated 11.01.1995 and also on record are copies of the registered postal receipts and AD Card. The information bears paper No. 24-Ga/5 and the registered postal receipts and AD Card bears paper No. 24-Ga/8. Regarding these documents, PW-2, Kalyan Singh, the claimant has stated in his examination-in-chief thus : ^^?kVuk dh fjiksVZ iqfyl us ugha fy[kh eSaus SP dks Mkd }kjk nj[kkLr nh FkhA** 24. The registered postal receipt is evident to be one of the day following, when the information to the SP was written. It is to be noted that with so much said about the document paper No. 25-Ga/5, no question was put to contradict the witness in the cross-examination. To a proceeding before the Tribunal, where provisions of the Evidence Act do not apply, we are of opinion that the document has been sufficiently proved. The duties of the Tribunal in judging a motor accident claim are more inquisitorial than adversarial. Here, the Tribunal has gone after the claimant's evidence as if it were judging a prosecution case in a criminal trial. There is then a facet of the finding on this issue by the Tribunal, where the testimony of PW-1 has been criticized to say that the witness has not disclosed in his evidence the names of persons, who had witnessed the accident. It has done a hairsplitting comparison of the testimony of the claimant, comparing what was said in the examination-in-chief and that in the cross-examination about the events that followed the accident. It has been remarked that whereas in the examination-in-chief, he has stated that after the accident, people carried him to the District Hospital, Etawah, at the tail end of his cross-examination, he has said that Ramveer, Manohar and his daughter carried him to the hospital. The Tribunal has not rest content with this much of criticism of the claimant's testimony. The learned Judge has gone on to say that PW-2 is PW-1's daughter (when in fact, PW-1 is PW-2's daughter) and, therefore, an interested witness. 25. It has been remarked further that if she was present on the spot, the claimant would have certainly mentioned the fact in his claim petition as well as his testimony. The learned Judge has gone on to say that PW-2 is PW-1's daughter (when in fact, PW-1 is PW-2's daughter) and, therefore, an interested witness. 25. It has been remarked further that if she was present on the spot, the claimant would have certainly mentioned the fact in his claim petition as well as his testimony. It is also said by the Tribunal that PW-2 could mention the name of witnesses in his testimony, but has merely said that some people took him to the hospital. It has been deduced from this part of PW-2's testimony that if his daughter was present, he would not have employed the words 'some people'. This kind of an appraisal of testimony by the Tribunal in a claim petition is completely incompatible with the jurisdiction that the Tribunal exercises. 26. To emphasize again, the bed head ticket from the District Hospital shows that it was PW-1, Km. Radha Singh, who had brought PW-2, the claimant Kalyan Singh to the hospital. Her names figures in the column 'brought by'. The bed head ticket is an official document from the District Hospital and cannot be trifled. This witness if not present, would not have been the one to carry her father to the hospital. At least the mention of her name on the bed head ticket lends a strong buttress to the claimant's case that PW-1 was present at the scene of accident and witnessed it. Read together with the medical evidence, all of which has been omitted from consideration, the inescapable conclusion is that the Tribunal has gone completely wrong in finding against the claimant on Issue No.1. 27. Read together with the medical evidence, all of which has been omitted from consideration, the inescapable conclusion is that the Tribunal has gone completely wrong in finding against the claimant on Issue No.1. 27. Before concluding on the issue, I am much supported in my view by the opinion of my esteemed brother Jaspreet Singh in Raj Kumar Hans and others v. Saroj and others, FAFO No.737 of 2013, decided on 14.07.2021, where in very similar circumstances His Lordship taking note of the decisions of the Supreme Court in Sunita and others v. Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation and others, (2020) 13 SCC 486 ; Mangla Ram v. Oriental Insurance Company Limited and others, (2018) 5 SCC 656 ; and Anita Sharma and others v. New India Assurance Company Limited and another, (2021) 1 SCC 171 , has held : “Considering the material available on record, this Court finds that the Tribunal has erred in its approach in evaluating the evidence available on record. It has been a clear case of the claimant that the claimant sustained injuries on account of the accident which occurred on 26.10.2011. He was admitted in the hospital and only after he was discharged that he had lodged the First Information Report. The claimant has also brought on record the copy of the First Information Report. He has also brought on record the documents relating to the offending driver being charge-sheeted and being prosecuted in the same accident. A number of documents, relating his initial treatment at Navjeewan Hospital at Lakhimpur Kheri and the documents relating to his treatment at K.G.M.U. has been brought on record, however, none of the aforesaid documents have been considered by the Tribunal in its order. The claimant has also filed a disability certificate indicating that he had suffered 45% disability certificate which has also not been noticed by the Tribunal rather there is no mention, consideration of the said documents in the judgment and why they have been discarded. As noticed by the Apex Court in the cases relating to motor accidents it is the claimant who has to prove the case on the basis of pre-ponderence of probability. The foundational facts regarding the accident, the treatment, the First Information Report as well as the charge sheet which had been brought on record have not been considered in the correct perspective by the Tribunal. The foundational facts regarding the accident, the treatment, the First Information Report as well as the charge sheet which had been brought on record have not been considered in the correct perspective by the Tribunal. Once the aforesaid foundational facts have been connected with the evidence and considering the fact that neither the owner nor the driver led any evidence to contradict the statement of the claimant and his witnesses and nothing adverse having been elicited in their testimony, thus, the Tribunal has erred in appreciating the evidence on record. It ignored material evidence and has recorded findings which are based on surmises and against the weight of the material on record.” 28. The finding of the Tribunal on Issue No.1 is, accordingly, set aside and the issue is answered in favour of the claimant; against the owner and the Insurers. 29. The findings on Issues Nos.2 and 3 have been recorded in favour of the claimant by the Tribunal. Those findings are affirmed. 30. Since Issue No.4 has not at all been decided by the Tribunal, I am of opinion that this matter ought to go back to the Tribunal for the purpose of the said issue being decided afresh on merits, after hearing parties. 31. Accordingly, this appeal succeeds and is allowed in part. The impugned judgment and award dated 29.11.1997 passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal/ 8th Additional District Judge, Etawah is set aside with a remit of the matter to the Tribunal, that would now hold jurisdiction in the matter. The Presiding Officer of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal will hear the parties afresh with full opportunity to lead evidence limited to Issue No.4 alone. The findings on Issues Nos.1, 2 and 3 shall not be re-opened and abide by this judgment. The Tribunal shall pass an award in accordance with its finding on Issue No.4, after hearing parties, within a period of three months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order, bearing in mind the directions in this judgment and in accordance with law. Costs easy.