JUDGMENT : 1. Since common issue is involved in both the second appeals, they are heard and decided together. 2. During pendency of these appeals, respondent/plaintiff 1 Anand Kumari died and, therefore, her name was deleted from the array of cause title of the appeals. 3. The other respondents/plaintiffs and deceased plaintiff Anand Kumari brought a suit for declaration that two sale-deeds both dated 16.8.1988 executed by Aminabai in favour of appellant/defendant 1 Sunderlal Leharey are not binding upon them as Aminabai had no right to sell the property and also for declaration of title on the ground of adverse possession and confirmation of possession basing the claim over the suit property on the ground of their adverse possession. 4. According to the pleadings of the plaintiffs, one Filkash Prakash, a resident of Ganeshpur and owner of the property of Schedule A and Schedule B died 30 years back. He had 3 sons, namely, Prem Prakash, Masih Bux and Arther Bux. Arther Bux died issueless in the year 1998. Prem Prakash also died 25 years back. His wife Aminabai also died issueless in the year 1990. Masih Bux died 18 years back. Deceased/plaintiff Anand Kumari was wife of Masih Bux. Rest of the plaintiffs were children of Masih Bux and Anand Kumari. Prem Prakash was living at Raipur and was employed there. He was also issueless. Therefore, he had relinquished his right in the property of Scheduled A and Schedule B. He never visited Village Ganeshpur. After his death, his wife Aminabai also never visited Village Ganeshpur. Though Prem Prakash had relinquished his right in the aforesaid property, relation between all the brothers were cordial and, therefore, name of Prem Prakash was continuing in the revenue record. After death of Prem Prakash, appellant/defendant Sunderlal Leharey started living in the house of Prem Prakash on rent. After his death, his wife Aminabai also never visited Village Ganeshpur. Though Prem Prakash had relinquished his right in the aforesaid property, relation between all the brothers were cordial and, therefore, name of Prem Prakash was continuing in the revenue record. After death of Prem Prakash, appellant/defendant Sunderlal Leharey started living in the house of Prem Prakash on rent. Aminabai was an old lady and was dependent on Sunderlal Leharey and taking benefit of her old age and dependency, on 16.8.1988, Sunderlal Leharey got executed one sale deed (Ex.P5) for Rs.35,600 from her for the property of Schedule B, i.e., for the land bearing Khasra No.239 and 525 area 1.271 hectares and 1.157 hectares, respectively of Village Ganeshpur without giving her any consideration amount and on the same date he also got executed another sale-deed (Ex.P6) for Rs.3,500 for the property of Schedule A, i.e., for the land bearing Khasra No.16/3 and 153/1 area 0.206 hectare and 0.020 hectare, respectively of the same village Ganeshpur without giving her any consideration amount. It was further pleaded that as Prem Prakash, husband of Aminabai had already relinquished his right in the aforesaid property, therefore, otherwise also, Aminabai had no right to sell the property. Therefore, on the basis of above two sale-deeds, Sunderlal Leharey does not acquire any title over the aforesaid lands. It was further pleaded that otherwise also the plaintiffs had continuous possession over those lands for more than 30 years and, therefore, they got title over those lands on the basis of adverse possession. 5. In his written statement, Appellant/defendant Sunderlal Leharey denied the averments made by the plaintiffs in their plaint. It was pleaded by him that Prem Prakash and his wife Aminabai had never relinquished their right over the suit property. Therefore, Aminabai was the absolute owner of the suit property and she had every right to sell the said property. It was further pleaded by him that he was never a tenant of Aminabai and he got executed the subject sale deeds after giving full consideration amount to Aminabai. Pursuant to the order dated 23.3.1982 passed by the Tahsildar, Simga in Revenue Case No.2-v/27 Year 1975-76, name of Aminabai was registered separately in the revenue record and, therefore also, she had every right to sell the suit lands. Pursuant to the order dated 23.3.1982 passed by the Tahsildar, Simga in Revenue Case No.2-v/27 Year 1975-76, name of Aminabai was registered separately in the revenue record and, therefore also, she had every right to sell the suit lands. The plaintiffs were aware of both the sale-deeds from the year 1988-89, but, they did not file any suit within a period of 3 years since then and, therefore, their suit is time barred. It was further pleaded that the suit is not properly valued and sufficient Court fee has not been paid and, therefore, the suit is not tenable. 6. On the basis of the pleadings, the Trial Court framed the following issues and recorded its findings against the issues, which read as under: oknÁ'u fu"d"kZ 01& D;k e`rd vehuk dks oknHkwfe Áfroknh Ø0 1 dks foØ; djus dk vf/kdkj FkkA ^^lkfcr** 02& D;k e`rd vehuk ds }kjk fu"ikfnr okn Hkwfe dk fo Ø;i= Áfroknh us mls vius ÁHkko esa ysdj cxSj ÁfrQy vnk fd;s fu"ikfnr djk fy;k ^^lkfcr ugha** 03&Dk oknh us okn dk ewY;kadu mfpr #i ls dj ml ij i;kZIr U;k; 'kqYd vnk fd;k gS **ugha** 04&Dk oknh dk okn E;kn ds vanj gS ^^ugha** 05&Dk okn Hkwfe oknhx.k vius LoRo dk ?kksf"kr djk ikus dk vf/kdkjh gS ^^lkfcr ugha** 06&lgkrk ,oa okn O;; ^^nkok va'kr% Lohdkj fd;k x;k^^ 7. The Trial Court decreed the suit in favour of the respondents/plaintiffs. However, it was held by the Trial Court that the plaintiffs had not paid ad valorem Court fee. It was also held by the Trial Court that the suit was time barred. Hence, against the judgment passed by the Trial Court, two separate appeals were preferred before the First Appellate Court, one by the plaintiffs and the other by the defendant. The appeal preferred by the plaintiffs was registered as Civil Appeal No.20A of 2007 and the appeal preferred by defendant Sunderlal Leharey was registered as Civil Appeal No.21A of 2007. Both the civil appeals were decided by the First Appellate Court on 21.2.2008 by two separate judgments. The appeal preferred by the plaintiffs was registered as Civil Appeal No.20A of 2007 and the appeal preferred by defendant Sunderlal Leharey was registered as Civil Appeal No.21A of 2007. Both the civil appeals were decided by the First Appellate Court on 21.2.2008 by two separate judgments. However, the First Appellate Court gave its finding that the suit filed by the plaintiffs was within limitation and it also arrived at a finding that appellant/defendant Sunderlal Leharey, without giving any consideration amount to Aminabai, by deceiving her, got the saledeed (Ex.P5) executed for the property mentioned in Schedule B. It was also held that the plaintiffs had valued the suit properly. Being aggrieved by both the judgments passed by the First Appellate Court, the present two second appeals have been filed. 8. On 11.4.2016, both the second appeals were admitted by this Court for hearing on the following substantial questions of law: “1. Whether the suit filed on 26.02.1999 for cancellation of sale deed dated 16.08.1988 was barred by time? 2. Whether the burden to prove could have been shifted on defendant to prove undue influence and fraud though it was pleaded by the plaintiff?” 9. It was submitted by Learned Counsel appearing for the Appellant in both the appeals that the Respondents/plaintiffs themselves pleaded in paragraph 21 of the plaint that the cause of action arose on 9.2.1988 when the plaintiffs knew the fact that the Appellant/defendant got his name mutated in the revenue record and the Respondents/plaintiffs filed the suit in the year 1999. Therefore, the suit was time barred. Despite that, the First Appellate Court erroneously held that the suit was within limitation. It was further submitted by the Learned Counsel that the plaintiffs in paragraph 14 of the plaint categorically pleaded that the sale deeds were got executed by deceiving Aminabai without giving her any consideration amount. Therefore, the burden was upon the plaintiffs to prove this fact. But, both the Courts below wrongly shifted the burden on the Appellant/defendant. 10. Learned Counsel appearing for the Respondents/plaintiffs relying on the judgment of (1993) JabLJ 552 (Sujan Singh v. Lalsahab) submitted that whether the amount of sale consideration was given or not this burden to prove is upon the purchaser of the property. But, both the Courts below wrongly shifted the burden on the Appellant/defendant. 10. Learned Counsel appearing for the Respondents/plaintiffs relying on the judgment of (1993) JabLJ 552 (Sujan Singh v. Lalsahab) submitted that whether the amount of sale consideration was given or not this burden to prove is upon the purchaser of the property. It was submitted that as the Appellant/defendant has failed to prove the fact that he has paid the entire consideration amount to Aminabai, the sale deeds executed are void. Since the sale deeds are void since beginning, no question of limitation arises. Reliance was placed on 2021 Supp SAR (Civ) 809 (Kewal Krishan v. Rajesh Kumar). It was further submitted by the Learned Counsel that the Respondents/plaintiffs have not taken any specific plea of fraud, therefore, the First Appellate Court rightly shifted the burden on the Appellant/defendant that he got the sale deeds executed from Aminabai by giving her full consideration amount. 11. I have heard the rival contentions put-forth on behalf of the parties and perused the records of both the Courts below with due care. 12. Undisputedly, the sale deeds were executed on 16.8.1988 and the suit was preferred by the plaintiffs in the year 1999. With regard to cause of action, specific pleading is made by the plaintiffs in paragraph 21 of the plaint, which reads thus: ^^¼21½ ;g fd okn dkj.k fnukad 09@02@88 dk mRiUu gqvk tc oknx.kksa dks bl ckr dh tkudjh gqbZ fd Áfroknh us fujFkZd nLrkost ds vk/kkj ij vius uke jktLo vfHkys[k esa ntZ djok fy;k gS fnukad 16@07@98 dks mRiUu gqvk tc LoRo dk Á'u mRiUu gksus ls dfFkr U;k;ky; dk {ks=kf/kdkj ugha gksus ls okn [kkfjt+ djk fy;k x;kA** 13. Pleadings of the plaint themselves show that cause of action arose on 9.2.1988 when on the basis of sale deeds the Appellant/defendant got his name mutated in the revenue record. The First Appellate Court only on the ground that the plaintiffs had filed a litigation before the Revenue Court and that litigation was withdrawn by them on 16.7.1998 held that the suit was within limitation. The order-sheet (Ex.P3) of the Revenue Court shows that on 16.7.1998 the litigation which was pending before the Revenue Court was withdrawn by the plaintiffs. What was that litigation and when it was filed, no specific pleading or document in this regard is available on record. The order-sheet (Ex.P3) of the Revenue Court shows that on 16.7.1998 the litigation which was pending before the Revenue Court was withdrawn by the plaintiffs. What was that litigation and when it was filed, no specific pleading or document in this regard is available on record. Ex.P3 shows that the order dated 16.7.1998 was passed in Revenue Case No.39v-6 Year 1997-98. Thus, it appears that the litigation was filed by the plaintiffs in the Revenue Court in the year 1997-98. In paragraph 21 of the plaint, the plaintiffs themselves admitted the fact that cause of action arose on 9.2.1988 when the Appellant/defendant got his name mutated in the revenue record. Thus, it is clear that from the year 1988 itself the plaintiffs were aware of the fact that the aforesaid sale deeds were executed. But, within 3 years since then, they did not prefer any civil suit. Aminabai also died in the year 1990, but, she also did not file any suit during her life time nor did the plaintiffs file any suit after her death till 1999. Rather, they filed the litigation before the Revenue Court in the year 1997-98. Thus, it is clear that the suit preferred by the plaintiffs was time barred and the finding of the First Appellate Court in this regard is perverse. Resultantly, the substantial question of law No.1 is answered in positive. 14. With regard to substantial question of law No.2, from perusal of paragraph 14 of the plaint, it reveals that the plaintiffs pleaded that the Appellant/defendant was a tenant of Aminabai, who was an old and helpless lady and the Appellant/defendant got both the sale deeds executed from her by deceiving her without giving her any consideration amount. A specific pleading of fraud is taken by the plaintiffs in their plaint. Therefore, as contended by Learned Counsel Shri Raja Sharma, the burden to prove this fact was upon the plaintiffs themselves. Despite that, the First Appellate Court shifted this burden upon the Appellant/defendant. In (2019) 2 SCC 338 (Chairman, Board of Trustees, Sri Ram Mandir Jagtial Karimnagar District, Andhra Pradesh v. S. Rajyalaxmi (Dead) and others), it was held by the Supreme Court as under: “21. It is an established position of law that, the burden to prove ownership over the suit property is on the plaintiffs. (See Corpn. In (2019) 2 SCC 338 (Chairman, Board of Trustees, Sri Ram Mandir Jagtial Karimnagar District, Andhra Pradesh v. S. Rajyalaxmi (Dead) and others), it was held by the Supreme Court as under: “21. It is an established position of law that, the burden to prove ownership over the suit property is on the plaintiffs. (See Corpn. of City of Bangalore v. Zulekha Bi, (2008) 11 SCC 306 .) This Court in Parimal v. Veena, (2011) 3 SCC 545 held that: (SCC p. 552, para 19) “19. The provisions of Section 101 of the Evidence Act provide that the burden of proof of the facts rests on the party who substantially asserts it and not on the party who denies it. In fact, burden of proof means that a party has to prove an allegation before he is entitled to a judgment in his favour. Section 103 provides that the burden of proof as to any particular fact lies on that person who wishes the court to believe in its existence, unless it is provided by any special law that the proof of that fact shall lie on any particular person. The provision of Section 103 amplifies the general rule of Section 101 that the burden of proof lies on the person who asserts the affirmative of the facts in issue.” (emphasis supplied) 15. In the case in hand also, a specific pleading of fraud is taken by the plaintiffs. Therefore, to prove this fact the burden lies on the plaintiffs themselves. But, the plaintiffs failed to produce any evidence before the Trial Court in this regard. The Appellant/defendant before the Trial Court admitted the fact that deceased Aminabai sent a legal notice (Ex.P4) dated 28.3.1989 to the Appellant/defendant, which was also replied by him. This notice was sent on 28.3.1989 and Aminabai died in the year 1990, but, during her lifetime, she did not take any further action pursuant to her notice (Ex.P4). After 8-9 years of her death, the suit was preferred by the plaintiffs on the ground of fraud. Therefore, burden to establish the fraud was upon the plaintiffs themselves. But, the First Appellate Court wrongly shifted this burden on the Appellant/defendant. Resultantly, substantial question of law No.2 is answered in negative. 16. Consequently, both the second appeals are allowed. The judgments and decrees passed by both the Courts below are set aside. 17. Therefore, burden to establish the fraud was upon the plaintiffs themselves. But, the First Appellate Court wrongly shifted this burden on the Appellant/defendant. Resultantly, substantial question of law No.2 is answered in negative. 16. Consequently, both the second appeals are allowed. The judgments and decrees passed by both the Courts below are set aside. 17. A decree be drawn up in both the appeals accordingly.