JUDGMENT : D.V.S.S.SOMAYAJULU, J. This Court has heard Sri O.Manohar Reddy learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant and Sri Kirthi Teja Kondaveeti and learned Government Pleader for Labour for respondents. 2. Sri O.Manohar Reddy, learned senior counsel for the appellant contends that the learned single Judge committed an error in interpreting sections 33(1)(b) and 33(2) (b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short ‘the Act’). He points out that there is no unfair trade practice at all in this case and that before taking action, the petitioners had in fact sought approval from the Labour Court for taking action against the workman. Only after the approval was granted, the management had taken action. He also argues that the services of the workman were terminated on 13.07.2009 and a writ was filed thereafter, but the order of termination was not challenged. 3. He points out that labour Court after going through the relevant provisions of the law has granted permission on 01.07.2019 for taking action. He points out to the prayer in I.A.No.61 of 2008 and the findings given by the Labour Court. He relies on the questions framed by the Labour Court and the answers to the said questions. Lastly, he submits that the single Judge himself incorporated the provisions of law but passed the impugned order contrary to the law. It is his contention that the scope of enquiry can only be limited to the order dated 01.07.2019 which has been passed in the I.D. by the Labour Court and it cannot extend to setting aside the dismissal order. 4. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent points out that the order of the learned single Judge is strictly in accordance with law and is in consonance with the decided case law on the subject which is referred to in the impugned order. He points out that the industrial dispute pending before the labour Court was with relation to the frequent transfers and harassment meted out to the workman. The later dispute (on the basis of which the impugned order is passed) relates to the unauthorized absence of the workman. Therefore, he submits that section 33(2)(b) of the Act that applies and not section 33(1) of the Act or its sub-sections. He points out that the action taken is contrary to law and amounts to an unfair Labour practice. The later dispute (on the basis of which the impugned order is passed) relates to the unauthorized absence of the workman. Therefore, he submits that section 33(2)(b) of the Act that applies and not section 33(1) of the Act or its sub-sections. He points out that the action taken is contrary to law and amounts to an unfair Labour practice. Therefore, it is his contention that the learned single Judge did not commit any error whatsoever. He relies upon Sri Dorairaj Spintex v. R.Chittibabu and others, (2021) 12 SCC 38 , Lalla Ram v. D.C.M.Chemical Works Ltd and another, (1978) 3 SCC 1 and Jaipur Zila Sahakari Bhoomi Vikas Bank Ltd. V. Shri Ram Gopal Sharma and others, AIR 2002 SC 643 in support of his case. 5. The facts which are necessary for adjudication are as follows: (a) The Industrial Dispute which was pending before the Labour Court, Ananthapur in I.D.No.199 of 2005 pertains to the dispute with regard to the repeated transfers of the workman to different stations and harassing him mentally. The said dispute was referred by the Government by G.O.Rt.No.1903 and it was numbered as I.D.No.199 of 2005 on the file of this labour Court, Ananthapur. This is visible from para 3 of the order passed in I.A.No.61 of 2008 in I.D.No.199 of 2008. (b) The disciplinary proceedings initiated against the workman pertain to his unauthorized absence of the workman (absence without leave) for a total period of 80 days in between 30.03.2004 to 02.02.2005. This is visible from the report of the findings in respect of the domestic enquiry held. Same is filed as a material paper. 6. The relevant sections of law are sections 33 (1) and (2) of the Act, which are as follows: 33. Conditions of service, etc., to remain unchanged under certain circumstances during pendency of proceedings. This is visible from the report of the findings in respect of the domestic enquiry held. Same is filed as a material paper. 6. The relevant sections of law are sections 33 (1) and (2) of the Act, which are as follows: 33. Conditions of service, etc., to remain unchanged under certain circumstances during pendency of proceedings. - (1) During the pendency of any conciliation proceeding before a conciliation officer or a Board or of any proceeding before][an arbitrator or][a Labour Court or Tribunal or National Tribunal in respect of an industrial dispute, no employer shall- (a) in regard to any matter connected with the dispute, alter, to the prejudice of the workmen concerned in such dispute, the conditions of service applicable to them immediately before the commencement of such proceeding; or (b) for any misconduct connected with the dispute, discharge or punish, whether by dismissal or otherwise, any workmen concerned in such dispute, any with the express permission in writing of the authority before which the proceeding is pending. (2) During the pendency of any such proceeding in respect of an industrial dispute, the employer may, in accordance with the standing orders applicable to a workman concerned in such dispute][or, where there are no such standing orders, in accordance with the terms of the contract, whether express or implied, between him and the workman] [(a) alter, in regard to any matter not connected with the dispute, the conditions of service applicable to that workman immediately before the commencement of such proceeding; or (b) for any misconduct not connected with the dispute, discharge or punish, whether by dismissal or otherwise, that workman: Provided that no such workman shall be discharged or dismissed, unless he has been paid wages for one month and an application has been made by the employer to the authority before which the proceeding is pending for approval of the action taken by the employer. 7. It is clear from a bare and simple reading of the sections that section 33(1) of the Act pertains to express permission to be obtained from the Authority before whom the dispute is pending in regard to ‘any matter connected with the dispute’. Section 33(2) of the Act on the other hand pertains to action being taken for any misconduct ‘not connected with the dispute’. Section 33(2) of the Act on the other hand pertains to action being taken for any misconduct ‘not connected with the dispute’. The proviso also states that no workman shall be discharged or dismissed unless he has been (a) paid wages by one month and (b) an application has been made by the employer before the authority. Therefore, on a plain reading of these sections make it clear that sections 33(1) and 33 (2) of the Act operate in different scenarios and fact situations. 8. In paras 8 and 9 of Sri Dorairaj Spintex’s case (1 supra), this issue has been discussed and the Hon’ble Supreme Court clearly held whether the action is connected to the dispute or not has to be decided on the basis of the facts of each case. Ultimately, in para 16, the following is held: 16. Once we have come to the conclusion that the action of dismissal for misconduct was not connected with the dispute which was pending in conciliation, the provisions of Section 33(2)(b) of the ID Act would stand attracted. There is no dispute about the fact that there was compliance of the provisions of Section 33(2)(b), nor is there a finding to the contrary. In this view of the matter, the order of the Assistant Commissioner of Labour was contrary to law and there was an error on the part of the Single Judge and the Division Bench in affirming the order. We accordingly allow the appeal and set aside the impugned judgment and order of the Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature at Madras dated 14 March 2018. In consequence, the application for approval filed by the appellant under Section 33(2)(b) of the ID Act would stand approved. 9. We accordingly allow the appeal and set aside the impugned judgment and order of the Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature at Madras dated 14 March 2018. In consequence, the application for approval filed by the appellant under Section 33(2)(b) of the ID Act would stand approved. 9. In Lalla Ram ‘s case (2 supra), the following was held in para 12: ‘……..the jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal is confined to the enquiry as to (i) whether a proper domestic enquiry in accordance with the relevant rules/Standing Orders and principles of natural justice has been held; (ii) whether a prima facie case for dismissal based on legal evidence adduced before the domestic tribunal is made out; (iii) whether the employer had come to a bona fide conclusion that the employee was guilty and the dismissal did not amount to unfair labour practice and was not intended to victimise the employee regard being had to the position settled by the decisions of this Court………………….. whether the employer has paid or offered to pay wages for one month to the employee and (v) whether the employer has simultaneously or within such reasonably short time as to form part of the same transaction applied to the authority before which the main industrial dispute is pending for approval of the action taken by him. If these conditions are satisfied, the Industrial Tribunal would grant the approval which would relate back to the date from which the employer had ordered the dismissal. If however, the domestic enquiry suffers from any defect or infirmity, the labour authority will have to find out on its own assessment of the evidence adduced before it whether there was justification for dismissal and if it so finds it will grant approval of the order of dismissal which would also relate back to the date when the order was passed provided the employer had paid or offered to pay wages for one month to the employee and the employer had within the time indicated above applied to the authority before which the main industrial dispute is pending for approval of the action taken by him.’ 10. Against the backdrop of this case law, if the facts of the present case are examined, it is clear that the dispute pending before the Labour Court was about the frequent transfers of the workman. Against the backdrop of this case law, if the facts of the present case are examined, it is clear that the dispute pending before the Labour Court was about the frequent transfers of the workman. The disciplinary enquiry pending before the authority is about his unauthorized absence for 80 days. Therefore, the enquiry is not connected with the dispute pending. Hence, this Court is of the opinion that it is 33(2) of the Act alone that is applicable to the facts of the case and in particular, section 33(2)(b) of the Act is applicable. The scope of enquiry to be held was also discussed in the judgments cited above and in particular in Lalla Ram’s case (2 supra). If the order of the Labour Court is examined, it is seen that the points framed for consideration are (1) whether the workman was given sufficient opportunity during the course of the enquiry; (2) whether the principles of natural justice were violated by the petitioner. Ultimately, in para 33 of the Act, it was held that the workman failed to substantiate that he was not given sufficient opportunity or that the principles of natural justice were violated. In the opinion of this Court, the Labour Court Judge, (a) did not see if a proper domestic enquiry in consonance with the rules and orders and principles of natural justice has been held; (b) did not examine if the legal evidence was adduced to see if a prima facie case for disposal had been made out. (c) Did not come to a conclusion that there was a bona fide conclusion that the employee was guilty and the dismissal did not amount to an unfair Labour practice and was not intended to victimize the employee. The conditions stipulated in the proviso are also not fulfilled. The record shows that the contents of the domestic enquiry report and its findings were not even examined by the Judge of the labour Court. 11. Even more interesting is the finding recorded in the unnumbered second para of para 32 of the award, wherein the Labour Court Judge held that no prejudice will be caused to the workman even if further action is initiated since he can challenge the validity of the enquiry before the Labour Court. 11. Even more interesting is the finding recorded in the unnumbered second para of para 32 of the award, wherein the Labour Court Judge held that no prejudice will be caused to the workman even if further action is initiated since he can challenge the validity of the enquiry before the Labour Court. In the opinion of this Court, this finding is also fallacious for the reason for section 33 of the Act has been introduced and has been in the statute book to prevent an unfair Labour practice from occurring and to protect the interest of the workmen. 12. The other contention urged by the learned senior counsel for the writ petitioner is that the workman was terminated on 13.07.2009 itself but the same is not challenged in the writ petition, wherein the prayer made is only to quash the order dated 01.07.2009. Therefore, learned senior counsel submits that the petitioner is not entitled to a writ of certiorari as prayed and in particular, the proceedings dated 13.07.2009 cannot be set aside by this Court. 13. Learned counsel for the respondents also cited a full Bench judgment reported in Jaipur Zila Sahakari Bhoomi Vikas Bank Ltd. (3 supra). The following is held in para 13: 13. The proviso to Section 33(2)(b), as can be seen from its very unambiguous and clear language, is mandatory. This apart, from the object of Section 33 and in the context of the proviso to Section 33(2)(b), it is obvious that the conditions contained in the said proviso are to be essentially complied with. Further any employer who contravenes the provisions of Section 33 invites a punishment under S. 31(1) with imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months or with fine which may extend to Rs. 1000/- or with both. This penal provision is again a pointer of the mandatory nature of the proviso to comply with the conditions stated therein. To put it in other way, the said conditions being mandatory, are to be satisfied if an order of discharge or dismissal passed under Section 33(2)(b) is to be operative. If an employer desires to take benefit of the said provision for passing an order of discharge or dismissal of an employee. he has also to take the burden of discharging the statutory obligation placed on him in the said proviso. If an employer desires to take benefit of the said provision for passing an order of discharge or dismissal of an employee. he has also to take the burden of discharging the statutory obligation placed on him in the said proviso. Taking a contrary view that an order of discharge or dismissal passed by an employer in contravention of the mandatory conditions contained in the proviso does not render such an order inoperative or void, defeats the very purpose of the proviso and it becomes meaningless. It is well-settled rule of interpretation that no part of statute shall be construed as unnecessary or superfluous. The proviso cannot be diluted or disobeyed by an employer. He cannot disobey the mandatory provision and then say that the order of discharge or dismissal made in contravention of Section 33(2)(b) is not void or inperative. 'He cannot be permitted to take advantage of his own wrong. The interpretation of statute must be such that it should advance the legislative intent and serve the purpose for which it is made rather than to frustrate it. The proviso to Section 33(2)(b) affords protection to a workman to safeguard his interest and it is a shield against victimization and unfair labour practice by the employer during the pendency of industrial dispute when the relationship between them are already strained. An employer cannot be permitted to use the provision of Section 33(2)(b) to ease out a workman without complying with the conditions contained in the said proviso for any alleged misconduct said to be unconnected with the already pending industrial dispute. The protection afforded to a workman under the said provision cannot be taken away. If it is to be held that an order of discharge or dismissal passed by the employer without complying with the requirements of the said proviso is not void or inoperative, the employer may with impunity discharge or dismiss a workman. 14. If the action taken by the Management is viewed against the backdrop of this finding of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, it is clear that the very basis on which they have exercised their jurisdictional power is set aside, namely the order dated 01.07.2009 passed by the Labour Court. The Labour Court has failed to exercise the jurisdiction that is vested in it and nor did it act in accordance with law. The Labour Court has failed to exercise the jurisdiction that is vested in it and nor did it act in accordance with law. Relying upon para 13 of the judgment of the five Judge Bench, this Court holds that as the Management failed to comply with the mandatory provisions of section 33(2)(b) of the Act, the interpretation must be in such a way that it advances the cause of justice rather than frustrating the same. The approach of the Management is totally incorrect. They could not have filed an application under section 33(1) of the Act at all nor could the Labour Court have entertained the same in the manner that it did. Keeping quiet in these circumstances would amount to condoning the clear statutory lapses. 15. The very foundation of the order of dismissal dated 13.07.2009 is the permission granted on 01.07.1990 by the Labour Court. As the order dated 01.07.2009 fails; all consequential actions also have to fall to the ground. This Court therefore makes it clear that the learned single Judge did not commit any error in passing the impugned order. On the contrary, he also took care to ensure that a further option was given to the Management to pass orders by complying with the provisions of section 33(2)(b) of the Act itself in the last para of order. This was not done by the Management. 16. For all the above mentioned reasons, the writ appeal is dismissed. No order as to costs. As a sequel, the miscellaneous petitions if any shall stand dismissed.