JUDGMENT : Heard the parties. 2. Petitioner has assailed the order of dismissal affirmed by the Appellate Authority as well as by the Revisional Authority. 3. Earlier, the petitioner has approached this Court in W.P.(S). No. 2404 of 2012 and this Court, after hearing the parties, was pleased to remit the matter back for reconsideration on the point of quantum of punishment. Thereafter, the reasoned order was passed and the order of dismissal was affirmed. Aggrieved by the same, the petitioner has been constrained to knock the door of this Court. 4. Assailing the impugned order dated 07.06.2021, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that though the matter was remitted back to the respondents for considering the same on the point of quantum of punishment but in spite of the same, the order of the Court was not considered and the earlier order passed by the respondents has been reiterated. Learned counsel further argues that 8 persons similarly situated to the present petitioner have been granted lesser punishment and the petitioner along with one another has been slapped with the punishment of dismissal, which is admittedly a harsh punishment. Learned counsel submits that for the aforesaid facts and reasons, impugned order dated 07.06.2021 is fit to be quashed and set along with earlier order passed by the Disciplinary Authority as well as by the Appellate Authority and the Revisional Authority. 5. Countering the arguments advanced by learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Gaurav Raj, AC to learned AAG-II submits that no new plea has been raised by the petitioner in the instant writ petition. In the earlier round of litigation, the petitioner raised all these points which were considered and thereafter, the matter was remitted back. It has been brought to the notice of the Court that during the course of arguments and while passing the order of punishment, it was specifically mentioned that petitioner had earlier duped the Court by giving wrong facts and placing wrong documents before this Court so as to impress the Court that in similar proceedings different orders have been passed, whereas, the facts remains that all the Constables were proceeded differently and thereafter, on different consideration, order has been passed. Learned counsel submits that allegation levelled against the petitioner is theft of 3 SLR Riffles, 2 Magazines and 30 nos. Learned counsel submits that allegation levelled against the petitioner is theft of 3 SLR Riffles, 2 Magazines and 30 nos. of live cartridges, which is serious in nature and therefore, rightly the order of dismissal has been passed, which was subsequently affirmed by the Appellate Authority as well as by the Revisional Authority. Learned counsel further argues that at this juncture no interference is warranted in the instant writ petition. 6. Having gone through the rival submissions of learned counsel for the parties across the bar, this Court is of the considered view that no interference is warranted in the instant writ petition for the following facts and reasons: I) Earlier after hearing the parties at length and considering every aspects, the matter was remitted back to the respondent-authorities for reconsideration. At the time of reconsideration it was found that petitioner had placed wrong facts before this Court due to which matter was remitted back. II) The petitioner belongs to a disciplined force and any indiscipline cannot be accepted in a disciplined force. III) It has been brought in the enquiry report that petitioner was guilty of the charges and the same was proved by the Disciplinary Authority and thereafter, affirmed by the Appellate as well as Revisional Authority. 7. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of B.C. Chaturvedi Vs. Union of India & Ors., reported in (1995) 6 SCC 749 has held thus; “The High Court does not act as appellant authority. Its jurisdiction is circumscribed by limits of judicial review to correct errors of law or procedural errors leading to manifest injustice or violation of principles of natural justice. Judicial review is not akin to the decision of a case on merit as an appellate authority. (ii) Insufficiency of materials cannot be a ground to annul the findings of the Enquiry Officer neither can a substituted view be taken in place of Enquiry officer/disciplinary authority in cases of departmental proceeding.” The Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Apparel Export Promotion Council v. A.K. Chopra, reported in (1999) 1 SCC 759 has held as under: “16. (ii) Insufficiency of materials cannot be a ground to annul the findings of the Enquiry Officer neither can a substituted view be taken in place of Enquiry officer/disciplinary authority in cases of departmental proceeding.” The Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Apparel Export Promotion Council v. A.K. Chopra, reported in (1999) 1 SCC 759 has held as under: “16. The High Court appears to have overlooked the settled position that in departmental proceedings, the disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts and in case an appeal is presented to the appellate authority, the appellate authority has also the power/and jurisdiction to reappreciate the evidence and come to its own conclusion, on facts, being the sole fact-finding authorities. Once findings of fact, based on appreciation of evidence are recorded, the High Court in writ jurisdiction may not normally interfere with those factual findings unless it finds that the recorded findings were based either on no evidence or that the findings were wholly perverse and/or legally untenable. The adequacy or inadequacy of the evidence is not permitted to be canvassed before the High Court. Since the High Court does not sit as an appellate authority over the factual findings recorded during departmental proceedings, while exercising the power of judicial review, the High Court cannot, normally speaking, substitute its own conclusion, with regard to the guilt of the delinquent, for that of the departmental authorities. Even insofar as imposition of penalty or punishment is concerned, unless the punishment or penalty imposed by the disciplinary or the departmental appellate authority, is either impermissible or such that it shocks the conscience of the High Court, it should not normally substitute its own opinion and impose some other punishment or penalty. Both the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court, it appears, ignored the well-settled principle that even though judicial review of administrative action must remain flexible and its dimension not closed, yet the court, in exercise of the power of judicial review, is not concerned with the correctness of the findings of fact on the basis of which the orders are made so long as those findings are reasonably supported by evidence and have been arrived at through proceedings which cannot be faulted with for procedural illegalities or irregularities which vitiate the process by which the decision was arrived at. Judicial review, it must be remembered, is directed not against the decision, but is confined to the examination of the decision-making process. Lord Hailsham in Chief Constable of the North Wales Police v. Evans observed: “The purpose of judicial review is to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment, and not to ensure that the authority, after according fair treatment, reaches, on a matter which it is authorized or enjoined by law to decide for itself, a conclusion which is correct in the eyes of the court.” 22. In the established facts and circumstances of this case, we have no hesitation to hold, at the outset, that both the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court fell into patent error in interfering with the findings of fact recorded by the departmental authorities and interfering with the quantum of punishment, as if the High Court was sitting in appellate jurisdiction. From the judgments of the learned Single Judge as well as the Division Bench, it is quite obvious that the findings with regard to an “unbecoming act” committed by the respondent, as found by the departmental authorities, were not found fault with even on reappreciation of evidence. The High Court did not find that the occurrence, as alleged by the complainant, had not taken place. Neither the learned Single Judge nor the Division Bench found that the findings recorded by the enquiry officer or the departmental appellate authority were either arbitrary or even perverse. As a matter of fact, the High Court found no fault whatsoever with the conduct of enquiry. The direction of the learned Single Judge to the effect that the respondent was not entitled to back wages and was to be posted outside the city for at least two years, which was upheld by the Division Bench, itself demonstrates that the High Court believed the complainant’s case fully for otherwise, neither the withholding of back wages nor a direction to post the respondent outside the city for at least two years was necessary. The High Court in our opinion fell in error in interfering with the punishment, which could be lawfully imposed by the departmental authorities on the respondent for his proven misconduct. The High Court in our opinion fell in error in interfering with the punishment, which could be lawfully imposed by the departmental authorities on the respondent for his proven misconduct. To hold that since the respondent had not “actually molested” Miss X and that he had only “tried to molest” her and had “not managed” to make physical contact with her, the punishment of removal from service was not justified, was erroneous. The High Court should not have substituted its own discretion for that of the authority. What punishment was required to be imposed, in the facts and circumstances of the case, was a matter which fell exclusively within the jurisdiction of the competent authority and did not warrant any interference by the High Court. The entire approach of the High Court has been faulty. The impugned order of the High Court cannot be sustained on this ground alone. But there is another aspect of the case which is fundamental and goes to the root of the case and concerns the approach of the Court while dealing with cases of sexual harassment at the place of work of female employees.” 8. The Hon’ble Apex Court in case Pravin Kumar Vs. Union of India & Ors., reported in (2020) 9 SCC 471 held that if the highest authority has approved the order of disciplinary authority, the same cannot be interfered by the High Court sitting under Article 226 of the Constitution. The relevant para of the said judgment reads as under: Scope of judicial review in service matter 25. The learned counsel for the appellant spent considerable time taking us through the various evidence on record with the intention of highlighting lacunae and contradictions. We feel that such an exercise was in vain, as the threshold of interference in the present proceedings is quite high. The power of judicial review discharged by constitutional courts under Article 226 or 32, or when sitting in appeal under Article 136, is distinct from the appellate power exercised by a departmental appellate authority. It would be gainsaid that judicial review is an evaluation of the decision-making process, and not the merits of the decision itself. Judicial review seeks to ensure fairness in treatment and not fairness of conclusion. It would be gainsaid that judicial review is an evaluation of the decision-making process, and not the merits of the decision itself. Judicial review seeks to ensure fairness in treatment and not fairness of conclusion. It ought to be used to correct manifest errors of law or procedure, which might result in significant injustice; or in case of bias or gross unreasonableness of outcome. [State of A.P. v. Mohd. Nasrullah Khan, (2006) 2 SCC 373 , para 11 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 316]. Further, the Hon’ble Apex Court in case of SBI v. Ajai Kumar Srivastava, reported in (2021) 2 SCC 612 has held thus: 28. The constitutional court while exercising its jurisdiction of judicial review under Article 226 or Article 136 of the Constitution would not interfere with the findings of fact arrived at in the departmental enquiry proceedings except in a case of mala fides or perversity i.e. where there is no evidence to support a finding or where a finding is such that no man acting reasonably and with objectivity could have arrived at those findings and so long as there is some evidence to support the conclusion arrived at by the departmental authority, the same has to be sustained. Of late, the Hon’ble Apex Court in case of UCO Bank v. Krishna Kumar Bhardwaj, (2022) 5 SCC 695 has held as under:- 17. The power of judicial review in the matters of disciplinary inquiries, exercised by the departmental/appellate authorities discharged by constitutional courts under Article 226 or Article 136 of the Constitution of India is well circumscribed by limits of correcting errors of law or procedural errors leading to manifest injustice or violation of principles of natural justice and it is not akin to adjudication of the case on merits as an appellate authority which has earlier been examined by this Court in B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, (1995) 6 SCC 749 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 80 ; H.P. SEB v. Mahesh Dahiya, (2017) 1 SCC 768 : (2017) 1 SCC (L&S) 297 and recently by a three-Judge Bench of this Court (of which one of us is a member) in SBI v. Ajai Kumar Srivastava, (2021) 2 SCC 612 : (2021) 1 SCC (L&S) 457 wherein this Court has held as under : (Ajai Kumar Srivastava case [SBI v. Ajai Kumar Srivastava, (2021) 2 SCC 612 : (2021) 1 SCC (L&S) 457], SCC pp. 626-27, paras 24-28) “24. It is thus settled that the power of judicial review, of the Constitutional courts, is an evaluation of the decision-making process and not the merits of the decision itself. It is to ensure fairness in treatment and not to ensure fairness of conclusion. The court/tribunal may interfere in the proceedings held against the delinquent if it is, in any manner, inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of the statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry or where the conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence. If the conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable person would have ever reached or where the conclusions upon consideration of the evidence reached by the disciplinary authority are perverse or suffer from patent error on the face of record or based on no evidence at all, a writ of certiorari could be issued. To sum up, the scope of judicial review cannot be extended to the examination of correctness or reasonableness of a decision of authority as a matter of fact. 25. When the disciplinary enquiry is conducted for the alleged misconduct against the public servant, the court is to examine and determine: (i) whether the enquiry was held by the competent authority; (ii) whether rules of natural justice are complied with; (iii) whether the findings or conclusions are based on some evidence and authority has power and jurisdiction to reach finding of fact or conclusion. 26. It is well settled that where the enquiry officer is not the disciplinary authority, on receiving the report of enquiry, the disciplinary authority may or may not agree with the findings recorded by the former, in case of disagreement, the disciplinary authority has to record the reasons for disagreement and after affording an opportunity of hearing to the delinquent may record his own findings if the evidence available on record be sufficient for such exercise or else to remit the case to the enquiry officer for further enquiry. 27. It is true that strict rules of evidence are not applicable to departmental enquiry proceedings. However, the only requirement of law is that the allegation against the delinquent must be established by such evidence acting upon which a reasonable person acting reasonably and with objectivity may arrive at a finding upholding the gravity of the charge against the delinquent employee. It is true that strict rules of evidence are not applicable to departmental enquiry proceedings. However, the only requirement of law is that the allegation against the delinquent must be established by such evidence acting upon which a reasonable person acting reasonably and with objectivity may arrive at a finding upholding the gravity of the charge against the delinquent employee. It is true that mere conjecture or surmises cannot sustain the finding of guilt even in the departmental enquiry proceedings. 28. The constitutional court while exercising its jurisdiction of judicial review under Article 226 or Article 136 of the Constitution would not interfere with the findings of fact arrived at in the departmental enquiry proceedings except in a case of mala fides or perversity i.e. where there is no evidence to support a finding or where a finding is such that no man acting reasonably and with objectivity could have arrived at those findings and so long as there is some evidence to support the conclusion arrived at by the departmental authority, the same has to be sustained.” 9. In view of the aforesaid observations, rules, guidelines, legal propositions and judicial pronouncements, no interference is warranted in the instant writ petition and the same is hereby dismissed.