JUDGMENT : Heard Mr. Rahul Kumar, learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. C.A. Bardhan, learned counsel for respondent nos. 1 to 4 and Mr. Anil Kumar Singh, learned counsel for respondent no.5. 2. The present petition has been filed for setting aside the order dated 07.07.2014 passed in Appeal Case No.14 of 2014 by the Secretary, Industry, Government of Jharkhand, Ranchi, whereby, the appeal filed by the petitioner has been rejected and the order of the Managing Director, Ranchi Industrial Area Development Authority (RIADA) cancelling the land allotted in favour of the petitioner in violation of lease condition has been held to be in accordance with law. The further prayer is made for quashing the letter dated 21.02.2013 issued by the Managing Director, RIADA, whereby the said authority has cancelled the allotment order dated 21.02.1986 of lease hold land made in favour of the petitioner of Plot Nos. 128-129(P), area 1.26 acres for a period of 99 years and the case of the petitioner has been dismissed. The prayer is also made for direction for accepting the offered proposal dated 12.12.2000 of the petitioner for selling/assigning of unuseful portion of the unit above the proposed finished product yard and the raw materials yard in order to liquidate the outstanding dues of the respondents. 3. Mr. Rahul Kumar, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that the petitioner is a partnership firm having its office at 128-Industrial Area, Tupudana, Ranchi. The petitioner applied for allotment of land measuring an area of 1.26 acres situated at village Pugru, Hatia, District Ranchi to set up an industry. RIADA by terms of letter dated 21.02.1986 allotted the said land to the petitioner on 21.02.1986 for running industry in the name and style of Pandava Ceramics and Refractories on perpetual lease for a period of 99 years directing the petitioner to deposit the amount of salami @ Rs.6,930/-per acre annually in ten equal installments amounting to Rs.69,300/-per acre besides development and administrative expenses. The petitioner was put in possession over the aforementioned land and the petitioner immediately applied for provisional registration before RIADA and the unit of the petitioner was granted provisional registration for a period of one year. The petitioner was put in possession over the aforementioned land and the petitioner immediately applied for provisional registration before RIADA and the unit of the petitioner was granted provisional registration for a period of one year. The petitioner applied on 14.03.1986 for sanction of term loan before the Bihar State Financial Corporation to set up the Industry for manufacturing of fire bricks amounting to Rs.18,42,000/-and the Bihar State Financial Corporation after physical verification of the proposed site of the project and after considering the expert appraisal project report sanctioned a term loan on 25.11.1986 of Rs.26,25,000/-to the petitioner and accordingly an agreement was executed between the Bihar State Financial Corporation on the one hand and the petitioner on the other hand on 24.11.1987. Thereafter, the RIADA executed an indenture of lease in favour of the petitioner on 12.06.1987 contained in Annexure-3. The petitioner vide letter dated 02.07.1987 applied for renewal/extension of provisional registration, which was subsequently extended. Thereafter, on certain dates, the period of provisional registration was extended. It has been further submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that thereafter upon request of the petitioner to the RIADA, Ranchi, it has recommended the Coal India Ltd. for supply of coal to the petitioner unit and vide letter dated 14.03.1989, monthly linkage of coal was granted to the petitioner unit from March 1989. Thereafter, annual renewal of coal linkage were made by the RIADA till the year 1992 and thereafter suddenly from 1993 despite of 25% of dues payment along with written undertaking for further payment of balance dues amount within agreed period till March, 1996 made on 12.02.1993 several requests made by the petitioner, RIADA did not recommend to the C.C.L. regarding renewal of the annual coal linkage of the petitioner unit. He further submits that during the period from February, 1990 to December, 1992, the petitioner unit remained working/functioning and also did production and supply was made to Bhandridih Refractories Plant, a unit of Bharat Refractories Ltd. He also submits that the petitioner also represented before the Managing Director, RIADA on 18.10.1993 praying therein for recommendation of annual coal linkage to Central Coalfields limited and for grant of permanent registration number in order to make the unit of the petitioner viable, but the authority concerned did not take any action. On 12.12.2000, the petitioner made proposal before the RIADA for sale of unuseful portion of the unit above proposed finished product yard and raw materials yard in accordance with the terms and conditions mentioned in Clause 6(v) of lease deed and in accordance with interim order dated 03.09.1992 in T.S. No.151/1992 in order to liquidate the outstanding dues of RIADA and BSFC which was received on 13.12.2000, but in spite of repeated request, the RIADA authority did not take any decision. He further submits that by letter dated 18.11.2009, the petitioner was served a notice for cancellation of allotment of land, which was replied by the petitioner vide letter dated 02.12.2009, but no decision has been taken by the RIADA. He further submits that the petitioner has challenged the said notice by filing a writ petition being W.P.(C) No.1322 of 2010, which was disposed of vide order dated 15.06.2012 with liberty to the petitioner to appear before the Managing Director, RIADA and pursuant to that the petitioner appeared before the Managing Director and on hearing the Managing Director, RIADA has rejected the claim of the petitioner and allotment order has been cancelled vide order dated 21.02.2013. He also submits that the petitioner again moved before this Court in W.P.(C) No.1966 of 2013, which was disposed of vide order dated 23.07.2013 with liberty to the petitioner to file an appeal before the competent authority and pursuant to that the petitioner filed an appeal which was dismissed vide order dated 07.07.2014 and the claim of the petitioner has been rejected by the appellate authority. Aggrieved with that, the petitioner has filed the present writ petition. In the aforesaid background, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that nonproduction is bonafide one and the petitioner is still ready to make settlement with RIADA. He submits that the petitioner is ready to pay update dues to RIADA. He also submits that the petitioner has cleared the dues of BSFC. 4. On the other hand, Mr. C.A. Bardhan, learned counsel for respondent nos. 1 to 4 submits that lease conditions have not been fulfilled by the petitioner. He further submits that in view of clause 12 of land allotment order and clause 6(xiv) of lease deed, which stipulate that if the unit is not starting production within stipulated time and become operational, the lease itself be cancelled. 1 to 4 submits that lease conditions have not been fulfilled by the petitioner. He further submits that in view of clause 12 of land allotment order and clause 6(xiv) of lease deed, which stipulate that if the unit is not starting production within stipulated time and become operational, the lease itself be cancelled. He further submits that the condition has been violated by the petitioner and RIADA was competent to pass the order. He also submits that the said order was also affirmed by the learned appellate authority. There is no illegality in the impugned orders. He further submits that in spite of the observation made by the coordinate Bench of this Court vide order dated 14.03.2016, no action has been taken by the petitioner to clear the dues and in that view of the matter, there is no illegality in the impugned orders. 5. In view of the above submissions of the learned counsel for the parties, the Court has gone through the materials on record and finds that admittedly the land in question was allotted to the petitioner on certain terms and conditions stipulated in the lease agreement. Looking to the allotment letter especially Clause 12, it transpires that the petitioner was required to start the work of the unit within six months form the date of handing over the possession of the land in question. It has been further disclosed therein that if concrete proof of construction is not found, the lease shall be cancelled. Clause 17 of the said letter speaks of cancelling of lease even in violation of any of the conditions made in the lease agreement. Clause 6(xiv) also speaks of cancellation if the unit is not operative within six months. Clause 7 speaks of further action. Clause 6(xiv) and Clause 7 of the lease agreement are quoted herein below: “6(xiv). That the lessee shall use the land for the specified purpose within a period of six months from the date of the lease failing which the lease may be terminated and the lessee evicted from the lands without notice. In case extension is required it can be granted within the discretion of the lessor. 7. That the lessee shall use the land for the specified purpose within a period of six months from the date of the lease failing which the lease may be terminated and the lessee evicted from the lands without notice. In case extension is required it can be granted within the discretion of the lessor. 7. In case of breach by the lessee of any of the term and conditions the lessor shall have right to resume and enter upon the whole of the said land without payment of any compensation to the lessee and upon such re-entry all and every interest of the lessee in the said land shall cease and determine. Provided that the lessee shall be given by the lessor reasonable opportunity to show-cause and to rectify the omissions or defects, if any.” 6. Admittedly, the unit is not operational since 1993, which has been contended and disclosed in the counter affidavit of RIADA. Admittedly, ample opportunity was provided to the petitioner including personal hearing in after remand in the first round of litigation by the High Court and the business has not started and stops since 1993. The Managing Director of RIADA as well as the appellate authority have considered factual aspects and on the basis of which conclusion has been arrived at about non-utilization of the aforesaid plots and in view of that the decision has been taken by the RIADA for cancelling the allotment of plots vide orders dated 21.02.2013 which was affirmed by the appellate authority. 7. It is well settled that writ of certiorarican only be issued if there is perversity in finding or there is jurisdictional error or miscarriage of justice, which is not a case in the case in hand. A reference made be made to the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Syed Yakoob v. K.S. Radhakrishnan & ors.; (AIR 1964 Supreme Court 477) . Paragraph 7 of the said judgment is quoted herein below: “7.The question about the limits of the jurisdiction of High Courts in issuing a writ of certiorari under Art. 226 has been frequently considered by this Court and the true legal position in that behalf is no longer in doubt. Paragraph 7 of the said judgment is quoted herein below: “7.The question about the limits of the jurisdiction of High Courts in issuing a writ of certiorari under Art. 226 has been frequently considered by this Court and the true legal position in that behalf is no longer in doubt. A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals : these are cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals without jurisdiction, or is in excess of it, or as a result of failure to exercise jurisdiction. A writ can similarly be issued where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the Court or Tribunal Acts illegally or improperly, as for instance, it decides a question without giving an opportunity to be heard to the party affected by the order, or where the procedure adopted in dealing with the dispute is opposed to principles of natural justice. There is, however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the Court exercising it is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. This limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal as result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Similarly, if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In dealing with this category of cases, however, we must always bear in mind that a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal was insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. In dealing with this category of cases, however, we must always bear in mind that a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal was insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and the said points cannot be agitated before a writ Court. It is within these limits that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Art. 226 to issue a writ of certiorari can be legitimately exercised (vide Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Ahmad Ishaque, 1955-1 SCR 1104 : ((S) AIR 1955 SC 233 ); Nagendra Nath v. Commr. Of Hills Division, 1958 SCR 1240 : ( AIR 1958 SC 398 ) and Kaushalya Devi v. Bachittar Singh, AIR 1960 SC 1168 .” 8. The character and scope of writ of certiorari was again considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Ahmad Ishaque & ors.; (AIR 1955 Supreme Court 233). Paragraph 21 of the said judgment is quoted herein below: “21. With regard to the character and scope of the writ of certiorari and the conditions under which it can be issued, the following propositions may be taken as established: (1) Certiorari will be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction, as when an inferior Court or Tribunal acts without jurisdiction or in excess of it, or fails to exercise it. (2) Writ of certiorari will also be issued when the Court or Tribunal acts illegally in the exercise of its undoubted jurisdiction, as when it decides without giving an opportunity to the parties to be heard, or violates the principles of natural justice. (3) The Court issuing a writ of certiorari acts in exercise of a supervisory and not appellate jurisdiction. One consequence of this is that the Court will not review findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal even if they be erroneous. (3) The Court issuing a writ of certiorari acts in exercise of a supervisory and not appellate jurisdiction. One consequence of this is that the Court will not review findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal even if they be erroneous. This is on the principle that a Court which has jurisdiction over a subject matter has jurisdiction to decide wrong as well as right, and when the Legislature does not choose to confer a right of appeal against that decision, it would be defeating its purpose and policy, if a superior Court were to rehear the case on the evidence and substitute its own findings in certiorari.” 9. Even considering the submission of Mr. Rahul Kumar, learned counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner has cleared the dues of BSFC, it is admitted position that the terms and conditions of the lease agreement has been violated by the petitioner and that will not help the petitioner. 10. In view of the above facts, reasons and analysis and considering that terms and conditions of lease has not been fulfilled by the petitioner even after providing ample opportunity including the observation made by the coordinate Bench of this Court vide order dated 14.03.2016, the Court comes to the conclusion that neither there is perversity of finding nor the orders impugned suffer from jurisdictional error nor there is miscarriage of justice, which have been passed on consideration of materials on record. No case of interference is made out. 11. Accordingly, this petition stands dismissed. 12. Pending I.As., if any, stand disposed of.