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2023 DIGILAW 1220 (KAR)

Jayashree Jayanth v. N. Krishnaswamy

2023-10-13

S.SUNIL DUTT YADAV, SURAJ GOVINDARAJ

body2023
JUDGMENT SURAJ GOVINDARAJ, J. The petitioner is before this Court seeking for the following reliefs: a) Review its order dtd. 9/10/2019 on I.A No.1/19 in RFA 1226/2016 in the interests of justice and equity. b) Award cost and litigation expenses. c) Pass such other order or directions this Hon'ble Court may deem fit in the interest of justice and equity, including remanding the matter to the lower court for trial on an expedited basis. 2. The petitioner, who is the appellant in the Regular First Appeal, is represented by her husband and GPA holder, who has appeared as a party-in-person. The petitioner is seeking a review of the order dtd. 9/10/2019 passed in IA-1/2019 in RFA No.1226/2016. 3. By way of the said order, this Court modified the interim order granted on 18/2/2019 by observing that any alienation to be made by the respondents shall be subject to the result of the appeal and subject to Sec. 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, ['T.P.Act' for short]. The review petition has been filed on the following grounds: 3.1. The proposition of law on which the impugned order dtd. 9/10/2019 is based permitting alienation of greater than one dozen of immovable properties, is unsound in law. 3.2. The application for review is justified for sufficient reasons. 3.3. It is inequitable to the petitioner for the Court to permit creation of third-party rights in admittedly coparcenary undivided agricultural lands which leads to multiplicity of proceedings. 4. Sri.Jayanth Balakrishna, party-in-person would submit that: 4.1. Order 39 of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 ['CPC' for short] is to be considered in an equitable manner. For any variance to be made of an order of injunction already granted, the person seeking such variance has to make out a case under Order 39 Rule 4 of CPC and any such person seeking for such variance should have approached the Court with clean hands and must have done equity. These aspects not having been taken into consideration while modifying the order dtd. 18/2/2019, the same is a mistake or error apparent on the face of the record requiring review thereof. 4.2. The principles laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in M/s Gujarat Bottling Co. Ltd. v. Coca Cola Co., 1995 INSC 441/ 1995 SCC (5) 545. These aspects not having been taken into consideration while modifying the order dtd. 18/2/2019, the same is a mistake or error apparent on the face of the record requiring review thereof. 4.2. The principles laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in M/s Gujarat Bottling Co. Ltd. v. Coca Cola Co., 1995 INSC 441/ 1995 SCC (5) 545. have not been considered, this Court ought to have looked into the conduct of the respondents before modifying the said order. 4.3. The application under Sec. 340(2) of Cr.P.C. having been filed, the same ought to have been taken into consideration along with the application for vacating the interim order. 4.4. Merely because the suit had been dismissed would not be a ground for modifying the interim order. Once an order of injunction had been granted, the same could only be modified in terms of Rule 4 of Order 39 of CPC by following all concomitants relating thereto. By way of modification this Court has virtually vacated the interim order vide its order dtd. 9/10/2019. By doing so, an opportunity has been provided to the respondents to alienate the properties which opportunity has been used by the respondents as regards properties which would now necessitate multiplicity of proceedings and as such, the order dtd. 9/10/2019 modifying the interim order needs to be reviewed. 4.5. The power of review is not limited to those instances covered under Order 47 but an order could also be reviewed for sufficient cause. In the present matter, multiplicity of proceedings is a sufficient cause to review the aforesaid order. The whole purpose of granting an order of injunction in a suit filed for partition is to preserve the properties in status-quo, and if the said properties are permitted to be sold and third-party interest are created, apart from multiplicity of proceedings, the interest of the petitioner would be adversely affected. 4.6. The petitioner has not been permitted a right to exercise pre-emption rights in terms of the decision of Hon'ble Apex Court in Babu Ram - vs- Santokh Singh and others, 1963 Supp (2) SCR 585 : AIR (2019) INSC 335. and as such, no sale could have been made by the respondents. 4.7. The respondents are guilty of fraud, fraud vitiating all acts, the modification is required to be reviewed and the order of injunction be restored. and as such, no sale could have been made by the respondents. 4.7. The respondents are guilty of fraud, fraud vitiating all acts, the modification is required to be reviewed and the order of injunction be restored. In this regard, he relies on the decision in Bhaurao Dagdu Paralkar v. State of Maharashtra, 2005 INSC 365. particularly para 9, 10 and 11 thereof which are reproduced hereunder for easy reference: 9. By "fraud" is meant an intention to deceive; whether it is from any expectation of advantage to the party himself or from ill will towards the other is immaterial. The expression "fraud" involves two elements, deceit and injury to the person deceived. Injury is something other than economic loss, that is, deprivation of property, whether movable or immovable or of money and it will include any harm whatever caused to any person in body, mind, reputation or such others. In short, it is a non- economic or non-pecuniary loss. A benefit or advantage to the deceiver, will almost always cause loss or detriment to the deceived. Even in those rare cases where there is a benefit or advantage to the deceiver, but no corresponding loss to the deceived, the second condition is satisfied. [See Vimla (Dr.) v. Delhi Admn. [ 1963 SC 1572] and Indian Bank v. Satyam Fibres (India) (P) Ltd. [ (1996) 5 SCC 550 ] ] 10. A "fraud" is an act of deliberate deception with the design of securing something by taking unfair advantage of another. It is a deception in order to gain by another's loss. It is a cheating intended to get an advantage. (See S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu v. Jagannath [ (1994) 1 SCC 1 ] .) 11. "Fraud" as is well known vitiates every solemn act. Fraud and justice never dwell together. Fraud is a conduct either by letters or words, which induces the other person or authority to take a definite determinative stand as a response to the conduct of the former either by words or letters. It is also well settled that misrepresentation itself amounts to fraud. Indeed, innocent misrepresentation may also give reason to claim relief against fraud. A fraudulent misrepresentation is called deceit and consists in leading a man into damage by wilfully or recklessly causing him to believe and act on falsehood. It is also well settled that misrepresentation itself amounts to fraud. Indeed, innocent misrepresentation may also give reason to claim relief against fraud. A fraudulent misrepresentation is called deceit and consists in leading a man into damage by wilfully or recklessly causing him to believe and act on falsehood. It is a fraud in law if a party makes representations, which he knows to be false, and injury ensues therefrom although the motive from which the representations proceeded may not have been bad. An act of fraud on court is always viewed seriously. A collusion or conspiracy with a view to deprive the rights of others in relation to a property would render the transaction void ab initio. Fraud and deception are synonymous. Although in a given case a deception may not amount to fraud, fraud is anathema to all equitable principles and any affair tainted with fraud cannot be perpetuated or saved by the application of any equitable doctrine including res judicata. (See Ram Chandra Singh v. Savitri Devi [ (2003) 8 SCC 319 ] .) 4.8. The respondents are guilty of misleading the Court and not disclosing the true facts and as such, the order is required to be reviewed. In this regard, he placed reliance on the decision in Manohar Lal v. Ugrasen, 2010 INSC 341. particularly para 48 thereof which is reproduced hereunder for easy reference: 48. The present appellants had also not disclosed that land allotted to them falls in commercial area. When a person approaches a court of equity in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution, he should approach the court not only with clean hands but also with clean mind, clean heart and clean objective. "Equally, the judicial process should never become an instrument of oppression or abuse or a means in the process of the court to subvert justice." Who seeks equity must do equity. The legal maxim "Jure naturae aequum est neminem cum alterius detrimento et injuria fieri locupletiorem", means that it is a law of nature that one should not be enriched by the loss or injury to another. (Vide Ramjas Foundation v. Union of India [1993 Supp (2) SCC 20 : AIR 1993 SC 852 ], K.R. Srinivas v. R.M. Premchand [ (1994) 6 SCC 620 ] and Noorduddin v. Dr. (Vide Ramjas Foundation v. Union of India [1993 Supp (2) SCC 20 : AIR 1993 SC 852 ], K.R. Srinivas v. R.M. Premchand [ (1994) 6 SCC 620 ] and Noorduddin v. Dr. K.L. Anand [ (1995) 1 SCC 242 ] at SCC p. 249, para 9.) 4.9. The modification of the order has been obtained by respondents by fraud and the said fraud voids even judicial acts and as such, the order is required to be reviewed. In this regard, he relies upon the decision in A.V. Papayya Sastry v. Govt. of A.P., 2007 INSC 246 . particularly para 21 and 22 thereof which are reproduced hereunder for easy reference: 21. Now, it is well-settled principle of law that if any judgment or order is obtained by fraud, it cannot be said to be a judgment or order in law. Before three centuries, Chief Justice Edward Coke proclaimed: "Fraud avoids all judicial acts, ecclesiastical or temporal." 22. It is thus settled proposition of law that a judgment, decree or order obtained by playing fraud on the court, tribunal or authority is a nullity and non-est in the eye of the law. Such a judgment, decree or order--by the first court or by the final court--has to be treated as nullity by every court, superior or inferior. It can be challenged in any court, at any time, in appeal, revision, writ or even in collateral proceedings. 4.10. He relies upon the decision in Deepa Gourang Murdeshwar Katre v. V.A.V. College of Arts, 2007 INSC 132. particularly para 31 to 34 thereof which are reproduced hereunder for easy reference: 31. We are of the opinion that the case on hand is a fit case for interference by this Court in exercise of the jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India in view of the misrepresentations made by the respondent University and considering the long service rendered by the appellant to the respondent College at a time when no other candidate was willing to take the assignment. 32. This apart, the appellant would be deprived of her livelihood if she is thrown out of her employment and irreparable injury would be caused to the appellant if the prayer made in the appeal is not granted. 32. This apart, the appellant would be deprived of her livelihood if she is thrown out of her employment and irreparable injury would be caused to the appellant if the prayer made in the appeal is not granted. On the other hand, the respondents would not suffer any prejudice by granting the prayer made in the appeal as the appellant is fully qualified to teach English and has been doing so for the last 12 years. 33. It is well settled by a catena of decisions of this Court that if a case of fraud or misrepresentation of such a dimension is discovered that the very basis of the order passed by a court of law is affected, the court can recall its order. The power to recall an order founded upon fraud and misrepresentation is an inherent power of the court. 34. The present case is one such instance where the High Court has been misled by incorrect representations made by the University at the time of hearing of the writ petition and the review petition. The question was whether the post occupied by the appellant was entitled to be dereserved as for six years no Backward Class candidate was available. 4.11. By placing reliance on the above, he submits that whenever there is fraud or misrepresentation discovered which goes to the root of the order passed, then the same can be recalled by exercise of inherent powers of the Court. 4.12. Again by relying on the decision in S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu v. Jagannath, 1993 INSC 344. he submits that a Judgment obtained by playing a fraud is a nullity. He refers to para 1 thereof of the said Judgment which is reproduced hereunder for easy reference: 1. "Fraud avoids all judicial acts, ecclesiastical or temporal" observed Chief Justice Edward Coke of England about three centuries ago. It is the settled proposition of law that a judgment or decree obtained by playing fraud on the court is a nullity and non est in the eyes of law. Such a judgment/decree -- by the first court or by the highest court -- has to be treated as a nullity by every court, whether superior or inferior. It can be challenged in any court even in collateral proceedings. 4.13. By relying on the decision in Indian Bank v.Satyam Fibres (India) (P) Ltd., 1996 INSC 861. Such a judgment/decree -- by the first court or by the highest court -- has to be treated as a nullity by every court, whether superior or inferior. It can be challenged in any court even in collateral proceedings. 4.13. By relying on the decision in Indian Bank v.Satyam Fibres (India) (P) Ltd., 1996 INSC 861. he submits that the courts have inherent power to recall a Judgment and/or order obtained by fraud on court. In this regard, he refers to para 22 thereof which is reproduced hereunder for easy reference: 22. The judiciary in India also possesses inherent power, specially under Sec. 151 CPC, to recall its judgment or order if it is obtained by fraud on court. In the case of fraud on a party to the suit or proceedings, the court may direct the affected party to file a separate suit for setting aside the decree obtained by fraud. Inherent powers are powers which are resident in all courts, especially of superior jurisdiction. These powers spring not from legislation but from the nature and the constitution of the tribunals or courts themselves so as to enable them to maintain their dignity, secure obedience to its process and rules, protect its officers from indignity and wrong and to punish unseemly behaviour. This power is necessary for the orderly administration of the court's business. 4.14. The respondents being guilty of malpractices, necessary action under Sec. 340 of Cr.P.C. is required to be taken against them. In this regard, he relies upon the decision of this Court in A. Hiriyanna Gowda v. State of Karnataka, 1998 SCC OnLine Kar 351. more particularly para 2 and 3 thereof which are reproduced hereunder for easy reference: 2. It has unfortunately become common place for the pleadings to be taken very lightly and for nothing but false and incorrect statements to be made in the course of judicial proceedings, for fabricated documents to be produced and even in cases where this comes to the light of the Court the party seems to get away because the Courts do not take necessary counter-action. 3. The disastrous result of such leniency or indulgence is that it sends out wrong signals. It creates almost a licence for litigants and their lawyers to indulge in such serious malpractices because of the confidence that no action will result. 3. The disastrous result of such leniency or indulgence is that it sends out wrong signals. It creates almost a licence for litigants and their lawyers to indulge in such serious malpractices because of the confidence that no action will result. To my mind, therefore, the fact that the petitioner has pressed in this application requires to be commended because it is a matter of propriety and it is very necessary at least in a few glaring cases that an example be made of persons who are indulging in such malpractices which undermine the very administration of justice dispensation system and the orking of the Courts. This will at least have a deterrent effect on others. 4.15. Reliance is placed on the decision in Swaran Singh v. State of Punjab, 2000 INSC 253. and submission is made that perjury has to be strictly dealt with. Para 36 thereof which is reproduced hereunder for easy reference: 36. A criminal case is built on the edifice of evidence, evidence that is admissible in law. For that, witnesses are required whether it is direct evidence or circumstantial evidence. Here are the witnesses who are a harassed lot. A witness in a criminal trial may come from a far-off place to find the case adjourned. He has to come to the court many times and at what cost to his own self and his family is not difficult to fathom. It has become more or less a fashion to have a criminal case adjourned again and again till the witness tires and gives up. It is the game of unscrupulous lawyers to get adjournments for one excuse or the other till a witness is won over or is tired. Not only is a witness threatened, he is abducted, he is maimed, he is done away with, or even bribed. There is no protection for him. In adjourning the matter without any valid cause a court unwittingly becomes party to miscarriage of justice. A witness is then not treated with respect in the court. He is pushed out from the crowded courtroom by the peon. He waits for the whole day and then he finds that the matter is adjourned. He has no place to sit and no place even to have a glass of water. A witness is then not treated with respect in the court. He is pushed out from the crowded courtroom by the peon. He waits for the whole day and then he finds that the matter is adjourned. He has no place to sit and no place even to have a glass of water. And when he does appear in court, he is subjected to unchecked and prolonged examination and cross-examination and finds himself in a hapless situation. For all these reasons and others a person abhors becoming a witness. It is the administration of justice that suffers. Then appropriate diet money for a witness is a far cry. Here again the process of harassment starts and he decides not to get the diet money at all. High Courts have to be vigilant in these matters. Proper diet money must be paid immediately to the witness (not only when he is examined but for every adjourned hearing) and even sent to him and he should not be left to be harassed by the subordinate staff. If the criminal justice system is to be put on a proper pedestal, the system cannot be left in the hands of unscrupulous lawyers and the sluggish State machinery. Each trial should be properly monitored. Time has come that all the courts, district courts, subordinate courts are linked to the High Court with a computer and a proper check is made on the adjournments and recording of evidence. The Bar Council of India and the State Bar Councils must play their part and lend their support to put the criminal system back on its trail. Perjury has also become a way of life in the law courts. A trial Judge knows that the witness is telling a lie and is going back on his previous statement, yet he does not wish to punish him or even file a complaint against him. He is required to sign the complaint himself which deters him from filing the complaint. Perhaps law needs amendment to clause (b) of Sec. 340(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure in this respect as the High Court can direct any officer to file a complaint. To get rid of the evil of perjury, the court should resort to the use of the provisions of law as contained in Chapter XXVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 4.16. To get rid of the evil of perjury, the court should resort to the use of the provisions of law as contained in Chapter XXVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 4.16. On the above basis, he submits that the above petition for review is to be allowed. The order dtd. 19/10/2019 is required to be reviewed by restoring the order of injunction. 5. Sri.Dhananjay V.Joshi, learned Senior counsel appearing for respondents No.14 to 17, 18(A and B) and 19 submits that: 5.1. The petitioner has not made out any grounds for review in terms of Order 47 of CPC. His submission is that if those grounds are not satisfied, no review can be made. In this regard he relies upon the Judgment in Ram Sahu (Dead) through LRs and others -v- Vinod Kumar Rawat11, 2020:INSC:627: (2021) 13 SCC 1 , more particularly paras 8, 9.2 and 10 thereof which are reproduced hereunder for easy reference: 8. The dictionary meaning of the word "review" is "the act of looking, offer something again with a view to correction or improvement". It cannot be denied that the review is the creation of a statute. In Patel Narshi Thakershi v. Pradyumansinghji Arjunsinghji [ (1971) 3 SCC 844 ], this Court has held that the power of review is not an inherent power. It must be conferred by law either specifically or by necessary implication. The review is also not an appeal in disguise. 9.2. In State of W.B. v. Kamal Sengupta [State of W.B. v. Kamal Sengupta, (2008) 8 SCC 612 : (2008) 2 SCC (L&S) 735], this Court had an occasion to consider what can be said to be "mistake or error apparent on the face of record". In paras 22 to 35 it is observed and held as under : (SCC pp. 633-38) "22. The term "mistake or error apparent" by its very connotation signifies an error which is evident per se from the record of the case and does not require detailed examination, scrutiny and elucidation either of the facts or the legal position. If an error is not self- evident and detection thereof requires long debate and process of reasoning, it cannot be treated as an error apparent on the face of the record for the purpose of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC or Sec. 22(3)(f) of the Act. If an error is not self- evident and detection thereof requires long debate and process of reasoning, it cannot be treated as an error apparent on the face of the record for the purpose of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC or Sec. 22(3)(f) of the Act. To put it differently an order or decision or judgment cannot be corrected merely because it is erroneous in law or on the ground that a different view could have been taken by the court/tribunal on a point of fact or law. In any case, while exercising the power of review, the court/tribunal concerned cannot sit in appeal over its judgment/decision. 23. We may now notice some of the judicial precedents in which Sec. 114 read with Order 47 Rule 1CPC and/or Sec. 22(3)(f) of the Act have been interpreted and limitations on the power of the civil court/tribunal to review its judgment/decision have been identified. 24. In Kotagiri Venkata Subbamma Rao v. Vellanki Venkatarama Rao [Kotagiri Venkata Subbamma Rao v. Vellanki Venkatarama Rao, 1900 SCC OnLine PC 12 : (1899-1900) 27 IA 197] the Privy Council interpreted Ss. 206 and 623 of the Civil Procedure Code and observed : (SCC OnLine PC : IA p. 205) '... Sec. 623 enables any of the parties to apply for a review of any decree on the discovery of new and important matter and evidence, which was not within his knowledge, or could not be produced by him at the time the decree was passed, or on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, or for any other sufficient reason. It is not necessary to decide in this case whether the latter words should be confined to reasons strictly ejusdem generic with those enumerated, as was held in Roy Meghraj v. Beejoy Gobind Burral [Roy Meghraj v. Beejoy Gobind Burral, ILR (1875) 1 Cal 197] . In the opinion of their Lordships, the ground of amendment must at any rate be something which existed at the date of the decree, and the Sec. does not authorise the review of a decree which was right when it was made on the ground of the happening of some subsequent event.' 25. In the opinion of their Lordships, the ground of amendment must at any rate be something which existed at the date of the decree, and the Sec. does not authorise the review of a decree which was right when it was made on the ground of the happening of some subsequent event.' 25. In Hari Sankar Pal v. Anath Nath Mitter [Hari Sankar Pal v. Anath Nath Mitter, 1949 SCC OnLine FC 4 : (1949-50) 11 FCR 36] a five-Judge Bench of the Federal Court while considering the question whether the Calcutta High Court was justified in not granting relief to non-appealing party, whose position was similar to that of the successful appellant, held : (SCC OnLine FC : FCR p. 48) 'That a decision is erroneous in law is certainly no ground for ordering review. If the court has decided a point and decided it erroneously, the error could not be one apparent on the face of the record or even analogous to it. When, however, the court disposes of a case without adverting to or applying its mind to a provision of law which gives it jurisdiction to act in a particular way, that may amount to an error analogous to one apparent on the face of the record sufficient to bring the case within the purview of Order 47 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code.' 26. In Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos v. Mar Poulose Athanasius [Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos v. Mar Poulose Athanasius, AIR 1954 SC 526 ] this Court interpreted the provisions contained in the Travancore Code of Civil Procedure which are analogous to Order 47 Rule 1 and observed : (AIR p. 538, para 32) 32. ... Under the provisions in the Travancore Code of Civil Procedure which is similar in terms to Order 47 Rule 1 of our Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, the court of review has only a limited jurisdiction circumscribed by the definitive limits fixed by the language used therein. It may allow a review on three specified grounds, namely, (i) discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within the applicant's knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed, (ii) mistake or error apparent on the face of the record and (iii) for any other sufficient reason. It has been held by the Judicial Committee that the words 'any other sufficient reason' must mean "a reason sufficient on grounds, least analogous to those specified in the rule".' 27. In Thungabhadra Industries Ltd. v. State of A.P. [Thungabhadra Industries Ltd. v. State of A.P., AIR 1964 SC 1372 ] it was held that a review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereof an erroneous decision can be corrected. 28. In Parsion Devi v. Sumitri Devi [Parsion Devi v. Sumitri Devi, (1997) 8 SCC 715 ] it was held as under : (SCC p. 716) 'Under Order 47 Rule 1CPC a judgment may be open to review inter alia if there is a mistake or an error apparent on the face of the record. An error which is not self-evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning, can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record justifying the court to exercise its power of review under Order 47 Rule 1CPC. In exercise of the jurisdiction under Order 47 Rule 1CPC it is not permissible for an erroneous decision to be "reheard and corrected". There is a clear distinction between an erroneous decision and an error apparent on the face of the record. While the first can be corrected by the higher forum, the latter only can be corrected by exercise of the review jurisdiction. A review petition has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be "an appeal in disguise".' 29. In Haridas Das v. Usha Rani Banik [Haridas Das v. Usha Rani Banik, (2006) 4 SCC 78 ] this Court made a reference to the Explanation added to Order 47 by the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976 and held : (SCC p. 82, para 13) 13. In order to appreciate the scope of a review, Sec. 114CPC has to be read, but this Sec. does not even adumbrate the ambit of interference expected of the court since it merely states that it 'may make such order thereon as it thinks fit'. The parameters are prescribed in Order 47CPC and for the purposes of this lis, permit the defendant to press for a rehearing 'on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the records or for any other sufficient reason'. The parameters are prescribed in Order 47CPC and for the purposes of this lis, permit the defendant to press for a rehearing 'on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the records or for any other sufficient reason'. The former part of the rule deals with a situation attributable to the applicant, and the latter to a jural action which is manifestly incorrect or on which two conclusions are not possible. Neither of them postulate a rehearing of the dispute because a party had not highlighted all the aspects of the case or could perhaps have argued them more forcefully and/or cited binding precedents to the court and thereby enjoyed a favourable verdict. This is amply evident from the Explanation to Rule 1 of Order 47 which states that the fact that the decision on a question of law on which the judgment of the court is based has been reversed or modified by the subsequent decision of a superior court in any other case, shall not be a ground for the review of such judgment. Where the order in question is appealable the aggrieved party has adequate and efficacious remedy and the court should exercise the power to review its order with the greatest circumspection.' 30. In Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma v. Aribam Pishak Sharma [Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma v. Aribam Pishak Sharma, (1979) 4 SCC 389 ] this Court considered the scope of the High Courts' power to review an order passed under Article 226 of the Constitution, referred to an earlier decision in Shivdev Singh v. State of Punjab [Shivdev Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1963 SC 1909 ] and observed : (Aribam Tuleshwar case [Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma v. Aribam Pishak Sharma, (1979) 4 SCC 389 ], SCC p. 390, para 3) 3. ... It is true as observed by this Court in Shivdev Singh v. State of Punjab [Shivdev Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1963 SC 1909 ], there is nothing in Article 226 of the Constitution to preclude a High Court from exercising the power of review which inheres in every court of plenary jurisdiction to prevent miscarriage of justice or to correct grave and palpable errors committed by it. But, there are definitive limits to the exercise of the power of review. But, there are definitive limits to the exercise of the power of review. The power of review may be exercised on the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence was not within the knowledge of the person seeking the review or could not be produced by him at the time when the order was made; it may be exercised where some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record is found; it may also be exercised on any analogous ground. But, it may not be exercised on the ground that the decision was erroneous on merits. That would be the province of a court of appeal. A power of review is not to be confused with appellate powers which may enable an appellate court to correct all manner of errors committed by the subordinate court.' 31. In K. Ajit Babu v. Union of India [K. Ajit Babu v. Union of India, (1997) 6 SCC 473 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 1520], it was held that even though Order 47 Rule 1 is strictly not applicable to the tribunals, the principles contained therein have to be extended to them, else there would be no limitation on the power of review and there would be no certainty or finality of a decision. A slightly different view was expressed in Gopabandhu Biswal v. Krishna Chandra Mohanty [Gopabandhu Biswal v. Krishna Chandra Mohanty, (1998) 4 SCC 447 : 1998 SCC (L&S) 1147] . In that case it was held that the power of review granted to the tribunals is similar to the power of a civil court under Order 47 Rule 1. 32. In Ajit Kumar Rath v. State of Orissa [Ajit Kumar Rath v. State of Orissa, (1999) 9 SCC 596 : 2000 SCC (L&S) 192], this Court reiterated that power of review vested in the Tribunal is similar to the one conferred upon a civil court and held : (SCC p. 608, paras 30-31) '30. The provisions extracted above indicate that the power of review available to the Tribunal is the same as has been given to a court under Sec. 114 read with Order 47CPC. The power is not absolute and is hedged in by the restrictions indicated in Order 47. The provisions extracted above indicate that the power of review available to the Tribunal is the same as has been given to a court under Sec. 114 read with Order 47CPC. The power is not absolute and is hedged in by the restrictions indicated in Order 47. The power can be exercised on the application of a person on the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the order was made. The power can also be exercised on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record or for any other sufficient reason. A review cannot be claimed or asked for merely for a fresh hearing or arguments or correction of an erroneous view taken earlier, that is to say, the power of review can be exercised only for correction of a patent error of law or fact which stares in the face without any elaborate argument being needed for establishing it. It may be pointed out that the expression 'any other sufficient reason' used in Order 47 Rule 1 means a reason sufficiently analogous to those specified in the Rule. 31. Any other attempt, except an attempt to correct an apparent error or an attempt not based on any ground set out in Order 47, would amount to an abuse of the liberty given to the Tribunal under the Act to review its judgment.' 33. In State of Haryana v. M.P. Mohla [State of Haryana v. M.P. Mohla, (2007) 1 SCC 457 : (2007) 1 SCC (L&S) 303] this Court held as under : (SCC pp. 465-66, para 27) 27. A review petition filed by the appellants herein was not maintainable. There was no error apparent on the face of the record. The effect of a judgment may have to be considered afresh in a separate proceeding having regard to the subsequent cause of action which might have arisen but the same by itself may not be a ground for filing an application for review.' 34. Gopal Singh v. State Cadre Forest Officers' Assn. The effect of a judgment may have to be considered afresh in a separate proceeding having regard to the subsequent cause of action which might have arisen but the same by itself may not be a ground for filing an application for review.' 34. Gopal Singh v. State Cadre Forest Officers' Assn. [Gopal Singh v. State Cadre Forest Officers' Assn., (2007) 9 SCC 369 : (2007) 2 SCC (L&S) 819] this Court held that after rejecting the original application filed by the appellant, there was no justification for the Tribunal to review its order and allow the revision of the appellant. Some of the observations made in that judgment are extracted below : (SCC p. 387, para 40) 40. The learned counsel for the State also pointed out that there was no necessity whatsoever on the part of the Tribunal to review its own judgment. Even after the microscopic examination of the judgment of the Tribunal we could not find a single reason in the whole judgment as to how the review was justified and for what reasons. No apparent error on the face of the record was pointed, nor was it discussed. Thereby the Tribunal sat as an appellate authority over its own judgment. This was completely impermissible and we agree with the High Court (Sinha, J.) that the Tribunal has travelled out of its jurisdiction to write a second order in the name of reviewing its own judgment. In fact the learned counsel for the appellant did not address us on this very vital aspect.' 35. The principles which can be culled out from the abovenoted judgments are: (i) The power of the Tribunal to review its order/decision under Sec. 22(3)(f) of the Act is akin/analogous to the power of a civil court under Sec. 114 read with Order 47 Rule 1CPC. (ii) The Tribunal can review its decision on either of the grounds enumerated in Order 47 Rule 1 and not otherwise. (iii) The expression "any other sufficient reason" appearing in Order 47 Rule 1 has to be interpreted in the light of other specified grounds. (iv) An error which is not self-evident and which can be discovered by a long process of reasoning, cannot be treated as an error apparent on the face of record justifying exercise of power under Sec. 22(3)(f). (iv) An error which is not self-evident and which can be discovered by a long process of reasoning, cannot be treated as an error apparent on the face of record justifying exercise of power under Sec. 22(3)(f). (v) An erroneous order/decision cannot be corrected in the guise of exercise of power of review. (vi) A decision/order cannot be reviewed under Sec. 22(3)(f) on the basis of subsequent decision/judgment of a coordinate or larger Bench of the tribunal or of a superior court. (vii) While considering an application for review, the tribunal must confine its adjudication with reference to material which was available at the time of initial decision. The happening of some subsequent event or development cannot be taken note of for declaring the initial order/decision as vitiated by an error apparent. (viii) Mere discovery of new or important matter or evidence is not sufficient ground for review. The party seeking review has also to show that such matter or evidence was not within its knowledge and even after the exercise of due diligence, the same could not be produced before the court/tribunal earlier." 10. To appreciate the scope of review, it would be proper for this Court to discuss the object and ambit of Sec. 114CPC as the same is a substantive provision for review when a person considering himself aggrieved either by a decree or by an order of court from which appeal is allowed but no appeal is preferred or where there is no provision for appeal against an order and decree, may apply for review of the decree or order as the case may be in the court, which may order or pass the decree. From the bare reading of Sec. 114CPC, it appears that the said substantive power of review under Sec. 114CPC has not laid down any condition as the condition precedent in exercise of power of review nor the said Sec. imposed any prohibition on the court for exercising its power to review its decision. However, an order can be reviewed by a court only on the prescribed grounds mentioned in Order 47 Rule 1CPC, which has been elaborately discussed hereinabove. An application for review is more restricted than that of an appeal and the court of review has limited jurisdiction as to the definite limit mentioned in Order 47 Rule 1CPC itself. However, an order can be reviewed by a court only on the prescribed grounds mentioned in Order 47 Rule 1CPC, which has been elaborately discussed hereinabove. An application for review is more restricted than that of an appeal and the court of review has limited jurisdiction as to the definite limit mentioned in Order 47 Rule 1CPC itself. The powers of review cannot be exercised as an inherent power nor can an appellate power be exercised in the guise of power of review. 5.2. By relying on the above, he submits that the power of review is not one which is required to be exercised in all cases, but can be so exercised only if the petitioner satisfies the requirements of law. He submits that in the present case there is no fraud which has been played by the respondents on the Court as alleged or otherwise requiring review of the order. This Court having taken into account that the suit itself had been dismissed has modified the order and while doing so has protected the interest of the petitioner by making it clear that any sale shall be subject to the principles of lis pendense and this would protect the interest of the petitioner. There was no order of injunction in force in the suit at any point of time. The suit having been dismissed, it was for the first time that an order of injunction was passed by this Court which came to be modified. Therefore, the petitioner cannot find any fault in relation thereto. 5.3. Even the alienation which has been made by the respondents is with full knowledge and disclosure of the pendency of the above petition and the same has been incorporated in the sale deed executed. Thus, the petitioner need not worry about the purchaser not being bound by any order passed by this Court in the Regular First Appeal since by way of sale deed it has been made clear that the purchaser would be bound by the decree to be passed by this Court. 5.4. Insofar as perjury, etc., are concerned, he submits that those are matters which cannot be considered in a review petition. The RFA being pending, those aspects would be considered in the pending RFA. 5.5. On these grounds, he submits that there are no grounds which have been made out for review. 6. 5.4. Insofar as perjury, etc., are concerned, he submits that those are matters which cannot be considered in a review petition. The RFA being pending, those aspects would be considered in the pending RFA. 5.5. On these grounds, he submits that there are no grounds which have been made out for review. 6. Sri.Kashyap N. Naik, learned counsel for essentially adopt the submissions of Sri.Dhananjay V. Joshi, learned Senior counsel but would further submit that the petitioner has no interest in the property inasmuch as the property is not ancestral property but by way of an order of injunction the respondents cannot be prevented from dealing with their own property. 7. Heard Sri.Jayanth Balakrishna, party-in-person, GPA holder for the petitioner, Sri.Dhananjay V. Joshi, learned Senior counsel for Sri.N.D.Jayakumar, learned counsel for respondents No.14 to 17, 18 (A and B) and 19 and Sri.Kashyap N. Naik, learned counsel for respondents No.1, 3 (A and B), 4 and 6 to 13. Perused papers. 8. The short question that arises for determination in the present matter is, whether the order dtd. 9/10/2019 is required to be reviewed or not? 9. By order dtd. 18/2/2019 pending disposal of the RFA, the respondents or any one claiming under them were restrained from alienating the properties, however liberty was reserved to the respondents to file an application seeking modification of the order. An application had been filed not for modification but for vacating the said interim order. It is this fact which the petitioner, party-in-person Mr.Jayanth Balakrishna seeks to make use of to contend that modification will not include vacating, modification would only include alteration. We are of the considered opinion that modification would also include vacating since by such vacating the order the interim order will stand modified. The pedantics and or semantics on which the above arguments are advanced by party-in-person will not enure to his benefit. We are of the considered opinion that modification would also include vacating since by such vacating the order the interim order will stand modified. The pedantics and or semantics on which the above arguments are advanced by party-in-person will not enure to his benefit. The reference made to M/s Gujarat Bottling Co.ltd's case (supra) to contend that modification would not include vacating the order of injunction and that the conduct of respondents would have to be looked into, in our considered opinion would not apply to the present case inasmuch as what was considered when the order under review was passed was that the suit of the petitioner had been dismissed and as such, the petitioner was required to establish her rights and until doing so, the question of granting of injunction would not arise. 10. An application for vacating having been made, this Court after hearing counsel for respondents NO.1 to 13, as also counsel for appellant came to a conclusion that the suit had been dismissed in which background the respondents cannot be restrained from alienating schedule properties or other properties, however, protected the interest of the petitioner by observing that any alienation would be subject to the provision of lis pendense and as per Sec. 52 of T.P. Act and subject to the result of the appeal. 11. Sec. 52 of the T.P. Act reads as under: 52. Transfer of property pending suit relating thereto.-- During the pendency in any Court having authority within the limits of India excluding the State of Jammu and Kashmir or established beyond such limits by 4 the Central Government of any suit or proceedings which is not collusive and in which any right to immoveable property is directly and specifically in question, the property cannot be transferred or otherwise dealt with by any party to the suit or proceeding so as to affect the rights of any other party thereto under any decree or order which may be made therein, except under the authority of the Court and on such terms as it may impose. [Explanation.--For the purposes of this Sec., the pendency of a suit or proceeding shall be deemed to commence from the date of the presentation of the plaint or the institution of the proceeding in a Court of competent jurisdiction, and to continue until the suit or proceeding has been disposed of by a final decree or order and complete satisfaction or discharge of such decree or order has been obtained, or has become unobtainable by reason of the expiration of any period of limitation prescribed for the execution thereof by any law for the time being in force.] 12. A perusal of the provision would indicate that during the pendency of any proceedings if any alienation is made, the same would be subject to the result of the said proceedings. The appeal being an extension of the suit any sale made in future as also in the past from the time suit has been filed will be subject to Sec. 52 of the T.P. Act. Thus, any person who purchases the property will be bound by any decree which is passed in the present matter. Though this Court had not directed the respondents to inform the purchaser about the same, the submission of Sri.Dhananjay V. Joshi, learned Senior counsel is that respondents have informed and have in fact included a clause in the sale deed about the sale being subject to the result of the appeal and subject to Sec. 52 of the T.P. Act. This in our considered opinion would satisfy the grievance as also assuage the apprehension on part of the petitioner inasmuch as in the event of the petitioner succeeding in the appeal, sales if any carried out would be subject to the result of the appeal and in the event of the petitioner succeeding, those purchasers cannot claim any equities nor can they question the Judgment passed in the appeal since they are aware of the proceedings. 13. If necessary, the petitioner can also implead those purchasers in the appeal so that there is no doubt about them being bound by any decree that may be passed. In the above background, the contention of Sri.Jayanth Balakrishna, party-in-person that any sale would result in multiplicity of proceedings cannot be sustained inasmuch as they could always be made part of the proceedings already pending and there would be no new proceedings which are required to be initiated. In the above background, the contention of Sri.Jayanth Balakrishna, party-in-person that any sale would result in multiplicity of proceedings cannot be sustained inasmuch as they could always be made part of the proceedings already pending and there would be no new proceedings which are required to be initiated. Needless to say, if the purchaser were to sell it to any third party, such third party will also be bound by the covenant in the sale deed executed by the respondents, as also by Sec. 52 of the T.P. Act. 14. The ground which has been urged by the petitioner that on account of fraud the order is required to be reviewed has not been established by the petitioner inasmuch as the word 'fraud' having been made use of, there is no basis for such usage as such we are of the considered opinion that it is on merits of the matter that the modification was made. There is no fraud or misrepresentation made by the respondents when the order was modified. For the petitioner to invoke the aspect of fraud, the petitioner would have to establish fraud at the time when the order subject matter of review was passed and further that the said order was passed on account of fraud or misrepresentation by the Respondents. The mere submission made by counsel for the respondents that the suit had been dismissed, which cannot be disputed cannot amount to fraud or misrepresentation. 15. The reliance on the decision in Baburao Dagdu Paralkar's case (supra) to contend that there is fraud would not apply to the present situation since in that case it was held that fraud would involve deceit and injury. The petitioner has not been able to establish any deceit on part of the respondent when the interim order was modified. Deceit or fraud in respect of any other dispute between the petitioner and the respondents cannot be a basis for review under Order 47 of CPC. 16. The decisions in A.V.Papayya Sastry, Deepa Gourang, S.P.Chengalvaraya Naidu, Indian Bank, A.Hiriyanna Gowda and Swaran Singh (supra) are sought to be relied upon to say that fraud voids all acts and as such, the order of modification is required to be reviewed and recalled. 16. The decisions in A.V.Papayya Sastry, Deepa Gourang, S.P.Chengalvaraya Naidu, Indian Bank, A.Hiriyanna Gowda and Swaran Singh (supra) are sought to be relied upon to say that fraud voids all acts and as such, the order of modification is required to be reviewed and recalled. Again as afore observed, the petitioner has not been able to establish any fraud allegedly played by the respondents at the time of modification of the order without even averring those elements of fraud, the petitioner cannot bring into service the asforesaid decisions. Fraud not only would have to be averred but has to be proved which has not been done in the present case. There being no element of fraud which has been established by the petitioner, same cannot be pressed into service for seeking review of the order. 17. The decision in Manohar Lal's case (supra) was also brought into service to contend that judicial process should never become an instrument for oppression, though such a strong statement has been made, we find there to be no basis for the same inasmuch as RFA would be required to be prosecuted for the petitioner to establish her rights, the suit having been dismissed the claim of the petitioner having been rejected by the trial court, the passing of the order under review modifying the earlier order of injunction cannot be said to amount to oppression. 18. Now that we are also informed that there was never any order of injunction in the said suit from the time of filing till its disposal, we are of the considered opinion that even on that account the order under review is proper and correct. 19. There is no cause let alone sufficient cause which has been made out by the petitioner for review of the aforesaid order, the order being passed taking into consideration the equities of both the parties, we are of the considered opinion that even these additional grounds urged by party-in-person would not enure to his benefit. 20. In view of the above, the above Review Petition stands dismissed. 21. 20. In view of the above, the above Review Petition stands dismissed. 21. It is reiterated that any alienation made or to be made by the respondents shall be subject to the result of the appeal and subject to Sec. 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, the Respondents shall keep informed the purchaser/transferee of the pendency of the Appeal and include a clause to that effect in the transfer document which shall make the purchaser and anyone claiming through or under him/her bound by any judgement passed in the appeal so that they do not claim any equity on account of such purchase and putting the property to any particular use including putting up construction thereon. Copy of this order to also be made available to such purchaser/transferee. 22. All contentions relating to fraud, perjury, rights of the petitioner, any violation on part of respondents are left open to be agitated in the pending appeal.