JUDGMENT : MANINDRA MOHAN SHRIVASTAVA, J. 1. This appeal is directed against order dated 20.08.2009 passed by the learned Single Judge, whereby, writ petition filed by Respondent No. 1 has been allowed, setting aside order dated 25.04.2003 passed by the Board of Revenue, Ajmer (for short ‘the Board of Revenue’) and the appellants have been directed to forthwith record the land in dispute in the name of Respondent No. 1-writ petitioner-trust, however, with the observation that Respondent No. 1-trust shall adhere to fulfill the undertakings given in proceedings before the learned Single Judge. 2. Case of Respondent No. 1-writ petitioner is that its predecessor-ininterest namely, Seth Pali Ram and Brij Lal (Respondents No. 4 and 5 in writ petition), bought the subject land in the year 1942 from one Thakur Raghuvir Singh (who according to Respondent No. 1-writ petitioner was Thikanedar of Bissau). According to Respondent No. 1-writ petitioner, the land in dispute was subsequently transferred in favour of Respondent No. 1-Paliram Charity Trust by Seth Pali Ram and Brij Lal. Further, Seth Pali Ram wanted to establish a pasture land for cows and in order to earn pious deeds, Seth Pali Ram purchased the land from Thakur Raghuvir Singh for consideration of Rs. 17,683/-. According to the patta (title deed) issued by the then Thikanedar of Bissau, the land was to be used only as a pasture land for the cattle of the village. Further case of Respondent No. 1- writ petitioner is that even if part of the land were to be used for agricultural purpose, even then the income earned from the agricultural activities was to be used for the benefit of the pasture land. It was also the case of Respondent No. 1-writ petitioner based on recitals contained in the so-called patta that though, a house could be built, but it was to be used only for the purpose of housing of such persons who would look after the pasture land and further the land could not be used for the personal usage of Seth Pali Ram. 3. Further case of Respondent No. 1-writ petitioner was that though the patta was issued in favour of Seth Pali Ram by Thakur Raghuvir Singh, the land was not mutated in his name, therefore, till 1954, the land was shown in the revenue records as Shamlat Deh (common land). 3. Further case of Respondent No. 1-writ petitioner was that though the patta was issued in favour of Seth Pali Ram by Thakur Raghuvir Singh, the land was not mutated in his name, therefore, till 1954, the land was shown in the revenue records as Shamlat Deh (common land). In 1954, Seth Pali Ram and Brij Lal moved an application before the Sub Divisional Officer, Jhunjhunu (for short ‘the SDO’) for necessary corrections in the revenue records. The SDO called for a report from the Numberdar of the area and on 27.08.1954, the Numberdar submitted its report to the SDO stating that Seth Pali Ram and Brij Lal had bought the land from Thikanedar of Bissau and they were in possession for the last 12 years. They have constructed a boundary wall around the said land. The land has been left as Gochar-bhoom, i.e. pasture land. Out of the total land, 16 bighas of land has been kept for agricultural purposes. The SDO also called for a report from Tehsildar. The Tehsildar submitted its report on 18.09.1954 in which it was stated that, although the land was shown as Shamlat (common land), the land was earlier sold by Thikana Bissau after taking the consideration from Seth Pali Ram and Brij Lal. The report of the Tehsildar reflected that he visited the land and discovered that Seth Pali Ram had constructed a wall around the land and the land was in his possession. It was also reported that the cattle belonging to village graze in the land without the villagers paying any tax. The Tehsildar further noted that according to the patta of 1942, the land could be used for agricultural purpose and not for purpose of construction of a house or for any personal use. According to this report, statement of Numberdar was recorded who informed possession of Seth Pali Ram for the last 12 years. The Tehsildar also got a site plan prepared of the area by the Patwari which also formed part of his report. According to Patwari, the land should have been recorded in the name of Seth Pali Ram and Brij Lal. Tehsildar, accordingly, recommended that the revenue records be corrected and the land be shown in the name of Seth Pali Ram and Brij Lal. According to Patwari, the land should have been recorded in the name of Seth Pali Ram and Brij Lal. Tehsildar, accordingly, recommended that the revenue records be corrected and the land be shown in the name of Seth Pali Ram and Brij Lal. On the basis of aforesaid two reports, the SDO passed an order on 01.11.1954 directing that the revenue records be corrected and the land be entered in the name of Seth Pali Ram and Brij Lal. 4. It is further case of Respondent No. 1-writ petitioner that even though the order was passed by the SDO, necessary corrections were not carried out in the revenue records. On account of such inaction in making necessary corrections in the revenue records pursuant to order dated 01.11.1954 passed by the SDO, the revenue records were not corrected and after coming into force the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 (for short ‘the Act of 1955’), the land continued to be recorded as Shamlat Gochar (common pasture land) till 1980. Thereafter, on 16.06.1980, an application was moved before the Settlement authorities for correcting the revenue records whereafter an order was passed on 28.06.1980 by the Assistant Land Settlement Officer-cum-Assistant Land Record Officer, Chirawa, District Jhunjhunu (for short ‘the Assistant Settlement Officer’) whereby the land in question was recorded as sivai-chak (government land). Taking into consideration order dated 01.11.1954 passed by the SDO, the Assistant Settlement Officer directed that necessary corrections be carried out and the land be entered in the name of Seth Pali Ram and Brij Lal. 5. The villagers of Village Jakhod submitted an application under Section 82 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, 1956 (for short ‘the Act of 1956’) on 12.09.1980 with the prayer that order dated 28.06.1980 be quashed and set aside. Said application was transferred to the Settlement Commissioner and Director of Land Records, Rajasthan, Jaipur (for short ‘the Settlement Commissioner’) who vide order dated 07.11.1983, dismissed the application for reference made under Section 82 of the Act of 1956. In the aforesaid order, amongst other things, the Settlement Commissioner recorded that order dated 28.06.1980 was an appellable order, therefore, either appeal should have been preferred or a review petition could have been filed against the said order. As neither review, nor any appeal had been filed, it was held that application for reference was not maintainable. In the aforesaid order, amongst other things, the Settlement Commissioner recorded that order dated 28.06.1980 was an appellable order, therefore, either appeal should have been preferred or a review petition could have been filed against the said order. As neither review, nor any appeal had been filed, it was held that application for reference was not maintainable. Aggrieved by order dated 07.11.1983, Gram Panchayat Jakhod filed an appeal under Section 75 of the Act of 1956 before the Board of Revenue. The Board of Revenue, vide order dated 26.08.1988, dismissed the appeal. It was also observed that in case, the Gram Panchayat was aggrieved by order dated 28.06.1980 passed by the Assistant Settlement Officer, either an appeal or revision petition should have been filed or request could be made to the State Government to refer the matter. The order of the Board of Revenue dismissing the appeal on 26.08.1988 was not challenged thereafter. 6. After five years, in 1993, Tehsildar Chirawa submitted a fresh application under Section 82 of the Act of 1956 before the Additional Collector, Jhunjhunu (for short ‘the Additional Collector’) for making a reference against order dated 28.06.1980 impleading Seth Pali Ram, Brij Lal and Respondent No. 1-trust as party respondents. Additional Collector, vide ex-parte order dated 17.07.1993, made a reference to the Board of Revenue. Without issuing any notice to Seth Pali Ram or Brij Lal and even Respondent No. 1-trust was not noticed, vide order dated 06.05.1998, the Board of Revenue accepted the reference and set aside the khatedari rights of Respondent No. 1-writ petitioner. It ordered that the land be again recorded as Shamlat Gocharai (common pasture land). Respondent No. 1-writ petitioner moved an application before the Board of Revenue for setting aside the ex-parte order whereafter, vide order dated 20.05.1999, ex-parte order was recalled and reference was directed to be placed before the Board of Revenue. Vide order dated 25.04.2003, the Board of Revenue accepted the reference and again directed that the name of the writ petitioner and Seth Pali Ram and Brij Lal be removed from the revenue records and the land be recorded as common government pasture land. Aggrieved by this order, Respondent No. 1-writ petitioner filed writ petition which came to be allowed by the learned Single Judge vide impugned order dated 20.08.2009, giving rise to this appeal. 7. Aggrieved by this order, Respondent No. 1-writ petitioner filed writ petition which came to be allowed by the learned Single Judge vide impugned order dated 20.08.2009, giving rise to this appeal. 7. Assailing the correctness and validity of the orders passed by the Board of Revenue and the learned Single Judge, the appellant-State has made the following submissions: (A) It is argued that the land in question was recorded as Shamlat Deh, i.e. common village pasture/grazing land in the year 1941-42. The land was allotted by way a patta for a specific purpose of grazing of the cattle with the condition that the land shall not be used for any other purpose or personal use. There shall be no residential use and pumps shall be deployed only for the benefit of pasture. 15 bighas land shall be allowed for self subsistence of caretaker and 16 bighas shall be allowed to be used for self subsistence of Guard. Thus, so called patta was only meant for use as pasture of village cattle. The typed copy of alleged patta does not show that it was an outright sale or any heritable or transferable right was transferred. There is no date or period mentioned in the alleged allotment patta. No permission from the Jaipur State was taken. Raghuvir Singh was only a Jagirdar and did not have the right to sell or alienate or give permission for cultivation on the land without prior approval of the ruler, particularly when the land was reserved for grazing of cattle. (B) Order of Revenue Department of the Government of His Highness the Maharaja of Jaipur was notified vide Gazette Notification dated 08.06.1945 making it clear that an arrogation of status by the Thikanedars of Shekhawati was illegal as they did not possess any such status and was against the explicit orders of His Highness. Clause 36 of notification dated 08.06.1945 restricted the transfer of even agriculture land which formed the part of the Jagir, without proper sanction of the Government. Therefore, Jagirdar had no authority under the law to transfer the land in question which was a pasture land without prior permission of the State. (C) It is further argued that the Jaipur Tenancy Act, 1945 (for short ‘the Act of 1945’) came into force on 04.09.1945, consolidating and amending the laws relating to agriculture tenancies and other matters. Therefore, Jagirdar had no authority under the law to transfer the land in question which was a pasture land without prior permission of the State. (C) It is further argued that the Jaipur Tenancy Act, 1945 (for short ‘the Act of 1945’) came into force on 04.09.1945, consolidating and amending the laws relating to agriculture tenancies and other matters. Section 9(i) of the Act of 1945 bars accrual of khatedari rights over the land reserved for grazing. Even Clause 34 of the Khetri Revenue Manual prohibited sale of land. Clause 35 of the aforesaid Manual further provided that Jagirdars have no nazul rights in the jagir lands, meaning thereby they do not have any rights over lands reserved for non-agricultural purposes. Therefore, even prior to 1942, Jagirdars had very limited rights of management of agricultural land. (D) It is next argued that the Jaipur State Grants Land Tenures Act, 1947 (for short ‘the Act of 1947’) was enacted to consolidate and amend the law relating to tenancies in state grants. The provisions of the Act of 1947 created specific bar against khatedari rights over grazing lands. (E) The Jaipur Land Revenue Act, 1947 (for short ‘the Jaipur Land Revenue Act’) was enacted to consolidate law relating to land revenue as also constitution, powers and jurisdiction of the revenue courts. Though the aforesaid Act provided for creation of the Board of Revenue and other revenue courts, however, no Court of Sub Divisional Officer was created under the Act. (F) The report on Jagirdari abolition submitted by Shri Govind Ballabh Pant, the then Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh clarified that Jagirs are not the property of the Jagirdars and Jagirdars are, therefore, not entitled, in the event of resumption, to any compensation on the ground of Jagirs being private property. (G) It is argued that the Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of Jagir Act, 1952 (for short ‘the Act of 1952’) came into force in 1952. As per Section 9 of the said Act, Seth Pali Ram, Brij Lal or the successor in interest, i.e. Respondent No. 1-writ petitioner-trust were not paying any rent and, therefore, they could not be treated as tenants. As such, they could not be classified as khatedar tenants under Section 9 of the Act of 1952. As per Section 9 of the said Act, Seth Pali Ram, Brij Lal or the successor in interest, i.e. Respondent No. 1-writ petitioner-trust were not paying any rent and, therefore, they could not be treated as tenants. As such, they could not be classified as khatedar tenants under Section 9 of the Act of 1952. (H) The Jagir of Jagirdar Raghuvir Singh was resumed in August, 1954 which is reflected from his own letter of October, 1964 wherein he admitted that his Jagir was resumed on 01.07.1954 under the Act of 1952 and claimed that payment of interest on late delivery of jagir bonds is due to him. (I) So-called order dated 01.11.1954, on which reliance has been placed by Respondent No. 1-writ petitioner, is highly doubtful because at the time when the order was passed, no Court of the SDO existed. The order passed by the SDO was non-speaking, vague in nature and no clear direction with regard to recording the name either as tenant or khatedar or owner of the land was given. (J) No record of the proceedings drawn by the SDO is available with the State Government. As Jagir of Bissau was resumed much prior to passing of the order by the SDO, the order dated 01.11.1954 passed by the SDO was without jurisdiction. The order did not see the light of the day for more than 26 years, therefore, the State Government did not have the occasion to challenge the null and void order of the SDO. The direction for correction of entries in the revenue records was issued on the basis of unregistered, undated so-called sale deed much after resumption of the land under the Act of 1952. (K) After coming into force the Act of 1955, according to provisions contained in Section 15 thereof, those cultivators under Jagirs, who were cultivating the land and paying land revenue, alone were entitled for khatedari rights. Respondent No. 1-writ petitioner-trust or its predecessors in title made no application under the Act of 1955 to be recorded as khatedar tenants of the land in question as they could not be conferred khatedari rights on pasture land in view of the bar created under Section 16 of the Act of 1955 read with definition of khatedar/tenant under Section 5(43) of the Act of 1955. Even the so-called sale deed recorded that the land was pasture land and was said to be given only for the purpose of pasture creating bar against personal use or for agricultural activities. (L) After about 26 years, on 28.06.1980, the Assistant Settlement Officer, without inviting objections from the villagers and public at large, recorded the land in the name of Respondent No. 1-writ petitioner on the basis of an illegal and void order dated 01.11.1954 passed by the SDO. The Assistant Settlement Officer incorrectly described the land as sivai-chak whereas the land, in fact, was recorded as common grazing land. The order of the Assistant Settlement Officer was, therefore, void-ab-initio. (M) On 12.09.1980, application for cancellation of order dated 28.06.1980 was submitted before the Settlement Officer, Bikaner who referred the matter to the Settlement Commissioner for necessary orders. The Settlement Commissioner, after registering the case under Section 82 of the Act of 1956, wrongly rejected the application vide order dated 07.11.1983 on the technical ground that the villagers should have filed appeal or review petition against the order of the Assistant Settlement Officer. Even then, the Settlement Commissioner modified the order to the effect that the land should be used only for cattle grazing in future. It was beyond the jurisdiction of the Settlement Commissioner to reject the application and issue direction as he was required to make reference to the Board of Revenue which alone was having authority to decide the matter. Section 82 of the Act of 1956 does not empower the Settlement Commissioner or Director of Land Records or a Collector to modify or reverse or cancel/rescind any order under Section 82 of the Act of 1956. Except making a reference to the Board of Revenue, no other order, much less, order deciding the rights of the parties could be passed. (N) In an appeal filed by the villagers against order dated 07.11.1983, the Board of Revenue dismissed the same vide order dated 26.08.1988 on the ground that either appeal or an application to State Government to make reference should have been made and the merits of the case were not examined by the Board of Revenue though the Board of Revenue had jurisdiction under Section 84 of the Act of 1956. In view of the order passed by the Board of Revenue, on 17.07.1993 reference was made by the Additional Collector on an application made by the Tehsildar seeking reference to the Board of Revenue. The Tehsildar applied for setting aside order dated 28.06.1980 and restoration of land as Shamlati Deh Charagah of the village. (O) The Board of Revenue vide order dated 06.05.1998 allowed the reference taking into consideration all the aspects of the matter, particularly that the land in dispute throughout had remained recorded as common land/pasture land and even in the so-called sale deed, the use of the land was reserved for pasturage only. Though, order dated 06.05.1998 was recalled as it was an ex-parte order, the Board of Revenue again examined the matter after affording opportunity of hearing to the affected parties and finally vide order dated 25.04.2003 allowed reference on the considerations as existed in order dated 06.05.1998. (P) Learned Single Judge failed to appreciate that even though the land in dispute is said to have been purchased by Seth Pali Ram and Brij Lal for monetary consideration in the year 1942 from so-called Thakur Raghuvir Singh, who was only a Thikanedar, no application for correction of entries in the revenue records was made for 12 years which clearly casts shadow of doubt on the very existence and validity of the alleged patta. (Q) Learned Single Judge also did not properly appreciate that Respondent No. 1-writ petitioner slept over its rights for a period of 30 years even after the alleged order dated 01.11.1954 passed by the SDO, to get the name recorded in the revenue records. Learned Single Judge also not appreciated that that Settlement Officer was not empowered to correct the entries in the revenue records under the Rajasthan Land Revenue (Survey, Record and Settlement) (Government) Rules, 1957. Learned Single Judge ought to have appreciated that Seth Pali Ram and Brij Lal did not have the right to transfer the land and even otherwise, alleged gift deed on the basis of which Respondent No. 1-writ petitioner-trust claims to have acquired ownership over the land in dispute was unregistered, therefore, no right was created in favour of Respondent No. 1. (R) The learned Single Judge, without any basis, has recorded finding that Thakur Raghuvir Singh was Thikanedar of Bissau whereas he was only a Jagirdar which is admitted by him in his own letter dated 07.10.1964. Therefore, he had no right to sell the land in question. The case of Respondent No. 1-writ petitioner was not based on any documentary evidence to support its case that at the time of grant of alleged patta, Thakur Raghuvir Singh was Thikanedar. Bissau was a Jagir as has been recorded by this Court in the case of Harji Ram and Others vs. Dhronacharya and Others, 2005 SCC Online Raj 105 and Kedar Mal through LRs. vs. The Board of Revenue Ajmer and Others, 2014 SCC Online Raj 4059. In the writ petition filed by heirs of Jagirdar Raghuvir Singh wherein Raghuvir Singh has been described as ex-Jagirdar of Bissau, a stand has been taken that the land of Bissau was resumed under the Act of 1952. Therefore, the findings of the learned Single Judge that Bissau was ruled by Thikanedar of Bissau and was akin to a ruler is contrary to material on record and that aspect was not correctly examined by the learned Single Judge. Therefore, Thakur Raghuvir Singh, being only a Jagirdar and not ruler, had no authority to sell the land in dispute which was against the provisions of Khetri Revenue Manual as also Gazette notification of 1945 of the Revenue Department of the Government of His Highness, Maharaja of Jaipur and consequently, so-called sale by the deed was void-ab-initio. In the case of Thakur Amar Singhji and Others vs. State of Rajasthan and Others, AIR 1955 SC 504 , while considering validity of the Act of 1952, it was authoritatively held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that true position of the Thikanedars was that they got into possession of the properties as izaradars under the rulers of Jaipur and recognised as chiefs subordinate to the Maharaja. They derived their title to the properties only under the grants made by the ruler of Jaipur. Therefore, claim of Respondent No. 1-writ petitioner essentially based on the premise that Thakur Raghuvir Singh was Thikanedar/ruler and not Jagirdar under subordination of Jaipur State stands negated. They derived their title to the properties only under the grants made by the ruler of Jaipur. Therefore, claim of Respondent No. 1-writ petitioner essentially based on the premise that Thakur Raghuvir Singh was Thikanedar/ruler and not Jagirdar under subordination of Jaipur State stands negated. (S) In another case of Seth Mansukh Rai More vs. State of Rajasthan, 1967 RLW 478, it has been held that even agricultural land cannot be sold by Jagirdar without prior approval of the ruler. It is submitted that reference made by the Additional Collector to the Board of Revenue, which eventually led to passing of the order impugned in the writ petition, was in accordance with law as the order passed by the Settlement Commissioner was illegal and without authority of law inasmuch as Section 82 of the Act of 1956 does not empower the Settlement Commissioner or Director of Land Records or the Collector to modify or reverse or cancel or rescind any order under Section 82 of the Act of 1956. The power lies only with the Board of Revenue under Section 84 of the Act of 1956. (T) It is further argued that no time limit for filing reference application under Section 82 of the Act of 1956 has been prescribed as has been held by this Court in the case of Vidhyadhar Sunda vs. State of Rajasthan and Others, 2020 (2) RLW 1118 (Raj.). (U) Learned Single Judge failed to appreciate that the appellants clearly alleged fraud and the transactions were back dated in order to escape the rigors of the Act of 1952. (V) It is not a case where while passing order dated 25.04.2003 title has been examined by the revenue court. The alleged patta has not been examined and only accrual of claimed khatedari rights over the revenue land has been examined by the Board of Revenue for which it had jurisdiction under the law. 8. (V) It is not a case where while passing order dated 25.04.2003 title has been examined by the revenue court. The alleged patta has not been examined and only accrual of claimed khatedari rights over the revenue land has been examined by the Board of Revenue for which it had jurisdiction under the law. 8. Per contra, learned counsel for Respondent No. 1-writ petitioner-trust has made the following submissions: (a) The order passed by the learned Single Judge does not warrant any interference as the learned Single Judge allowed the writ petition, setting aside the order passed by the Board of Revenue considering that the Board of Revenue allowed second reference without taking into consideration the relevant orders and documents, particularly the legal consequences flowing from the valid patta of 1942 for consideration, order dated 01.11.1954 passed by the SDO as also order dated 07.11.1983 passed by the Settlement Commissioner under Section 82 of the Act of 1956. Patta was granted in 1942 much prior to enactment of the Act of 1955. The Settlement Commissioner, which is superior authority to Additional Collector, after conducting proper enquiry and referring to patta granted in 1942 as also order dated 01.11.1954 passed by the SDO, rejected the reference application under Section 82 of the Act of 1956 vide order dated 07.11.1983. Appeal against the aforesaid of the Settlement Commissioner was also dismissed by the Board of Revenue on 26.08.1988. The appellant-State did not assail those orders in any of the proceedings and the orders, thus, attained finality. (b) Subsequent reference by the Additional Collector was not at all competent under under the law as the Additional Collector is subordinate to the Settlement Commissioner. Apart from the legal position that second reference under Section 82 of the Act of 1956 in respect of the same subject matter of the dispute was not maintainable under the law, second reference was made after a long, inordinate and unexplained delay of more than 50 years from the date of patta; 12 years from order dated 28.06.1980 and 5 years from the date of dismissal of first reference on 26.08.1988. (c) Section 82 of the Act of 1956 does not empower all the three authorities mentioned therein to exercise or re-exercise such power again and again one after the other. (c) Section 82 of the Act of 1956 does not empower all the three authorities mentioned therein to exercise or re-exercise such power again and again one after the other. Once the application under Section 82 of the Act of 1956 was dismissed by the Settlement Commissioner, under the same set of facts, it was not competent for the Additional Collector to reexercise the power of making reference under Section 82 of the Act of 1956. Perusal of the reference application submitted before the Settlement Commissioner and reference application submitted before the Additional Collector subsequently for making reference would show that the dispute was said to be quasi-judicial in nature. Once the Settlement Commissioner passed order on 07.11.1983 in exercise of its quasi judicial function, after conducting enquiry into relevant facts and documents and hearing both the parties, it could not have been reviewed or undone even by the Settlement Commissioner himself in the absence of there being any power of review conferred upon it or by any other authority under Section 82 of the Act of 1956 or under any other provisions of the law. In any case, the Additional Collector, who is subordinate to the Settlement Commissioner by virtue of Section 24 of the Act of 1956, had no competence to sit over the order passed by the Settlement Commissioner earlier on 07.11.1983, more so, when appeal against the said order was dismissed by the Board of Revenue on 26.08.1988 which remained unassailed and attained finality. Reliance has been placed upon the decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the cases of Indian National Congress vs. Institute of Social Welfare and Others, (2002) 5 SCC 685 , State of Madhya Pradesh and Others vs. Balkrishan Nathani and Others, AIR 1967 SC 394 and Dr. Kuntesh Gupta vs. Management of Hindu Kanya Mahavidyalaya, Sitapur (U.P.) and Others, (1987) 4 SCC 525 . (d) Even if it is assumed, though not admitted, that the exercise of power was not quasi-judicial, but administrative under statute, then also, once the power is exercised, it stands exhausted and the authority exercising the power becomes functus officio and has no jurisdiction or authority to re-exercise the power on the same set of facts and circumstances. (d) Even if it is assumed, though not admitted, that the exercise of power was not quasi-judicial, but administrative under statute, then also, once the power is exercised, it stands exhausted and the authority exercising the power becomes functus officio and has no jurisdiction or authority to re-exercise the power on the same set of facts and circumstances. Reliance in this regard has been placed upon the decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the cases of Air India Statutory Corporation and Others vs. United Labour Union and Others, (1997) 9 SCC 377 and State of Himachal Pradesh vs. Nishant Sareen, (2010) 14 SCC 527 . The Board of Revenue vide its order dated 26.08.1988 did not empower the Additional Collector to sit over the earlier order passed on 07.11.1983 passed by the Settlement Commissioner. There was no reference made either by or to the State Government. Reference application was filed by the Tehsildar in the Court of Additional Collector for making a reference to the Board of Revenue which was not maintainable under the law. (e) Even if no limitation is prescribed for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, nevertheless, the power is required to be exercised within a reasonable time. Reliance has been placed on the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the cases of State of Gujarat vs. Patil Raghav Natha and Others, (1969) 2 SCC 187 and decision of this Court in the case of Anandi Lal vs. State of Rajasthan and Others, 1996 (2) WLC (Raj.) 36. In the absence of there being any case of fraud or collusion either regarding grant of patta or regarding order passed by the SDO on 01.11.1954, set up in any of the proceedings including writ proceedings, delay was fatal and, therefore, reference was not maintainable before the Board of Revenue. In the absence of there being any case of fraud or collusion either regarding grant of patta or regarding order passed by the SDO on 01.11.1954, set up in any of the proceedings including writ proceedings, delay was fatal and, therefore, reference was not maintainable before the Board of Revenue. (f) Though in reply to the writ petition, no specific objection was raised by the appellants regarding locus standi of Respondent No. 1-writ petitioner-trust in filing the writ petition, oral argument was raised to the effect that the gift/endowment executed in favour of the trust had been impounded and cancellation of the gift deed was also sought, which is falsified from applications dated 19.05.2007 and 12.05.2009 filed by Respondent No. 1- writ petitioner placing on record the endowment deed as also order dated 29.10.1993 passed by the Collector (Stamps) by which it was directed that stamp duty on ad valorem basis has to be paid on the endowment/gift of the said land by heirs of grantees of patta to the trust and accordingly, enhanced stamp duty as determined by the Collector (Stamps) was also paid along with penalty. (g) In the absence of any reference made by the Additional Collector or the Board of Revenue to the facts, circumstances and documents relating to grant of patta, the order passed by the Board of Revenue and the Additional Collector could not be defended on afterthought grounds and that was required to be adjudged on the basis of what was considered and concluded by the Board of Revenue and the Additional Collector. Reliance has been placed on the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Mohinder Singh Gill and Another vs. The Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi and Others AIR, 1978 SC 851. Further, the issue relating to title or validity of patta/instrument of transfer cannot be examined by revenue courts or administrative authorities. Reliance in this regard has been placed on the decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the cases of State of Gujarat vs. Patil Raghav Natha and Others (supra); Kutchi Lal Rameshwar Ashram Trust Evam Anna Kshetra Trust through Velji Devshi vs. Collector Haridwar and Others, (2017) 16 SCC 418 . It is further submitted that as per Section 259 of the Act of 1956, a dispute involving any question of title can only be adjudicated by a civil court. It is further submitted that as per Section 259 of the Act of 1956, a dispute involving any question of title can only be adjudicated by a civil court. (h) Challenge to the validity of patta collaterally made for the first time before the writ court and writ appellate court that the said document was void-ab-initio as per Para 5(A) of the Khetri Revenue Manual is misplaced in law because Khetri Revenue Manual placed on record by Respondent No. 1 would show that Part 5(A) thereof is applicable to Kotputali Pargana and not to any other Pargana including the Pargana of Shekhawati region where the land in question is situated. Apart from that, the appellants have failed to point out any law existing and in force in the year 1942 to establish that the ruler of Bissau was prohibited from granting patta. Patta was granted in the year 1942 much before coming into force the Act of 1945 and the Act of 1947. (i) Patta was granted in the year 1942, which was a grant without any tenure or rent but for valid consideration and could not be said to be a case of grant of patta for rent. The Act of 1955 was enacted much after grant of patta in the year 1942. Therefore, grant of patta is not covered under any of three categories of tenants as classified under Section 6 of the Act of 1945. (j) New documentary evidence has been placed for the first time before the writ court as also in the appellate proceedings which were not placed before the Board of Revenue. Reference to order of Revenue Department of Government of His Highness, the Maharaja of Jaipur notified vide gazette notification dated 08.06.1945, has been placed on record for the first time. (j) New documentary evidence has been placed for the first time before the writ court as also in the appellate proceedings which were not placed before the Board of Revenue. Reference to order of Revenue Department of Government of His Highness, the Maharaja of Jaipur notified vide gazette notification dated 08.06.1945, has been placed on record for the first time. In the absence of there being any such ground raised, there was no occasion for any of the revenue authorities including the SDO, Assistant Settlement Officer, Settlement Commissioner, Additional Collector, the Board of Revenue and even writ court to consider the same and challenge to the authority of the then Thikanedar Thakur Raghuvir Singh on such new material is liable to be rejected as the revenue court did not have the authority/occasion to examine the title based on patta of 1942, no enquiry into the authority of the then Thikanedar as to whether he was Thikanedar or Jagirdar is permissible in these proceedings. (k) Reference to new document, i.e. letter of Thakur Raghuvir Singh whereby compensation under the Act of 1952 is allegedly demanded is essentially a matter which could be examined only in duly drawn proceedings before the civil court seeking declaration against the patta. So-called letter claiming compensation under the Act of 1952, long after receipt of nazrana and grant of patta in 1942, is inconsequential and does not adversely affect the derivative title of the grantee based on patta of 1942 which has not been declared invalid or inoperative in law by any court of competent jurisdiction. Further, contention raised at the time of hearing that the provisions of the Registration Act, 1908 had become applicable at the time of grant of patta in 1942 is bereft of any foundation and pleadings. The appellants have not placed on record the date on which the Registration Act, 1908 was extended to the area where the land in dispute was situated. There is no material on record to show that the Registration Act, 1908 was universally applicable to the area where the land in dispute was situated. In the decision of this Court in the case of M/s. Stoneware Pipe and Sanitary Fitting Manufacturing Co. Ltd. Jaipur vs. State of Rajasthan and Others, AIR 1972 Raj 83 reference was made to Jaipur Registration Act, 1944 which came into force only on 08.02.1944, i.e. after grant of patta in 1942. In the decision of this Court in the case of M/s. Stoneware Pipe and Sanitary Fitting Manufacturing Co. Ltd. Jaipur vs. State of Rajasthan and Others, AIR 1972 Raj 83 reference was made to Jaipur Registration Act, 1944 which came into force only on 08.02.1944, i.e. after grant of patta in 1942. (l) Imaginative arguments have been raised to dispute order dated 01.11.1954 passed by the SDO on the ground that the Court of SDO was not in existence. No such plea was taken in any of the proceedings before the Board of Revenue, the Settlement Commissioner, the Additional Collector. Reference to the office of the SDO has been made in the decisions of this Court in the cases of Anandsingh vs. Rajasthan Govt. 1951 RLW 280 and Seth Gokulchand vs. Government of Rajasthan, 1951 RLW 429. Therefore, challenge to the validity of the order of the SDO is based on false grounds to mislead this Court without any basis. (m) In the absence of there being any challenge to the legality and validity of patta of 1942 by filing a suit before civil court of competent jurisdiction seeking appropriate declaration, the legality and validity of patta of 1942 was beyond scope of enquiry in any proceedings before the revenue courts and, therefore, in writ proceedings before this Court, no such enquiry at the instance of the appellant-State is permissible. Delay in correction of revenue entries on the basis of the order passed by the SDO on 01.11.1954 and continuation of wrong entries in the revenue records would not ipso-facto divest Respondent No. 1-writ petitioner of its title over the land in dispute as entries in the revenue records neither creates nor extinguishes any title, right or interest. Therefore, well reasoned order passed by the learned Single Judge does not warrant any interference. 9. We have bestowed our anxious consideration to the extensive submissions made by learned counsel for the parties as also perused the records of the case and the order under challenge. Be it noted that earlier vide order dated 04.07.2017 instant appeal was decided by Co-ordinate Division Bench of this Court, which order was challenged by filing Civil Appeal No. 6776 of 2021 and SLP (C) No. 18420 of 2021 by the State before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. Be it noted that earlier vide order dated 04.07.2017 instant appeal was decided by Co-ordinate Division Bench of this Court, which order was challenged by filing Civil Appeal No. 6776 of 2021 and SLP (C) No. 18420 of 2021 by the State before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. Granting leave, the Hon’ble Supreme Court vide order dated 12.11.2021, set aside the order dated 04.07.2017 and remanded the matter back to decide the appeal afresh in accordance with law as also on merits. It was further observed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that all the contentions, which may be available to the respective parties, are kept open to be considered by the Division Bench in accordance with law and on merits and that the Hon’ble Supreme Court had not entered into merits of the case at all, nor expressed anything on merits in favour of either parties. The Hon’ble Supreme Court further directed that during pendency of the present appeal, interim order dated 05.08.2019 passed by it shall continue. 10. This appeal arises out of order dated 20.08.2009 passed by the learned Single Judge in a writ petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India filed by Respondent No. 1-writ petitioner, Pali Ram Charitable Trust, Surajgarh against State of Rajasthan, assailing correctness and validity of order dated 25.04.2003 passed by the Board of Revenue. The Board of Revenue vide order dated 25.04.2003, invoking its jurisdiction and power under Section 82 of the Act of 1956, directed deletion of name of Respondent No. 1-writ petitioner-trust, Seth Pali Ram and Brij Lal from the revenue records as khatedars in respect of the land in dispute and recording the same as common government land for pasturage. The order passed by the Board of Revenue in reference proceedings was challenged by Respondent No. 1-writ petitioner by filing writ petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. In the writ petition, Respondent No. 1-writ petitioner pleaded that the land admeasuring 216 bighas and 13 biswas situated in Village Jakhod, Tehsil Chirawa, District Jhunjhunu formed part of Thikana of Bissau and the then Thakur of Thikana granted patta in the name of Seth Pali Ram and Brij Lal in Samvat year 1999 (corresponding to the year 1942) vide patta dated Asathbadi 1 Samvat 1999 (corresponding to the year 1942) for consideration (nazrana) of Rs. 17,683 and 12 Annas @ Rs. 17,683 and 12 Annas @ Rs. 35 per bigha for grazing on their application as they wanted the land for pasturage purposes. According to Respondent No. 1-writ petitioner-trust, its predecessors in title, namely, Seth Pali Ram and Brij Lal obtained possession of the land. However, as corrections in the revenue records were not made and names of Seth Pali Ram and Brij Lal, in whose favour patta was granted, were not recorded, they made an application before the SDO for mutation of their names in the revenue records. On such application, statement of the then Numberdar was recorded who stated that the land is being used for grazing of animals and cattle and is in possession of Seth Pali Ram and Brij Lal. Tehsildar, Chirawa also gave its report on 18.09.1954 that the land is being used for grazing of animals and cattle whereas 16 bighas of land is being used for cultivation. The land was reported to be in possession of grantees and, therefore, the Tehsildar, Chirawa also recommended that the land may be mutated in the name of Seth Pali Ram and Brij Lal. In the meanwhile, Seth Pali Ram and Brij Lal constituted and formed a charitable trust known as Pali Ram Charitable Trust vide trust deed dated 15.10.1954. The SDO vide order dated 01.11.1954 directed necessary corrections and mutation of the names of Seth Pali Ram and Brij Lal in the revenue records. However, despite order being passed by the SDO in judicial proceedings regarding mutation, the revenue records were not corrected. Therefore, application was moved during settlement operations between the period from 16.06.1980 to 28.06.1980 which led to passing of an order on 28.06.1980 by the concerned Assistant Settlement Officer and in this manner, the records were finally corrected in accordance with mutation order dated 01.11.1954 passed by the SDO. The villagers of Village Jakhod, however, raised objection and sought cancellation of the order passed by the Assistant Settlement Officer by which, names of Seth Pali Ram and Brij Lal were recorded as khatedars of the land in dispute. The Settlement Commissioner, after hearing the parties, dismissed the application vide order dated 07.11.1983. Aggrieved by the said order, the Gram Panchayat, Jakhod preferred an appeal under Section 75 of the Act of 1956 to the Board of Revenue. However, the Board of Revenue vide order dated 26.08.1988 dismissed the appeal. 11. The Settlement Commissioner, after hearing the parties, dismissed the application vide order dated 07.11.1983. Aggrieved by the said order, the Gram Panchayat, Jakhod preferred an appeal under Section 75 of the Act of 1956 to the Board of Revenue. However, the Board of Revenue vide order dated 26.08.1988 dismissed the appeal. 11. The Settlement Commissioner in its order dated 07.11.1983 recorded that Seth Pali Ram and Brij Lal had purchased the land in dispute from Thikana of Bissau in Samvat 1999 (corresponding to the year 1942) and on that basis, the SDO had passed an order on 01.11.1954 which order was never challenged in appeal or review. If anyone was aggrieved, the proper course of action was to challenge order dated 01.11.1954 passed by the SDO by way of appeal or revision which was not done, therefore, the application seeking reference was liable to be rejected. On such consideration, the application seeking reference was rejected by the Settlement Commissioner. However, the Settlement Commissioner did observe in the order the stand taken by Seth Pali Ram and Brij Lal that the land was granted to them on the condition of utilising the same for grazing purposes and the reports also show that the land was being used only for grazing purposes and not for any other purpose and that holders of the land have given undertaking that they will allow the villagers to use the land for grazing purposes. 12. The dismissal of the appeal by the Board of Revenue was on the consideration that if the appellant-Gram Panchayat was aggrieved by order dated 28.06.1980 passed by the Assistant Settlement Officer, the only remedy available was to file an appeal or revision. That having been not done, reference was not maintainable. Therefore, recording such finding that no reference could be made, the order of the Settlement Commissioner rejecting application seeking reference was affirmed and the appeal was dismissed by the Board of Revenue. It is noteworthy that order dated 26.08.1988 passed by the Board of Revenue which put quietus to legality, validity and correctness of order dated 01.11.1954 passed by the SDO, remained unchallenged either by the State Government or by the Gram Panchayat or anyone else. 13. It is noteworthy that order dated 26.08.1988 passed by the Board of Revenue which put quietus to legality, validity and correctness of order dated 01.11.1954 passed by the SDO, remained unchallenged either by the State Government or by the Gram Panchayat or anyone else. 13. Five years thereafter, the Tehsildar, Chirawa submitted an application before the Additional Collector, Jhunjhunu purporting to be under Section 82 of the Act of 1956 seeking reference of the same dispute relating to same land. The Additional Collector took cognizance of the said application of the Tehsildar and proceeded ex-parte. He recorded that as the land remained recorded as common government land for pasturage from Samvat 1999 to Samvat 2034, yet names of Seth Pali Ram and Brij Lal were illegally recorded as khatedars and without order of a competent Court, such entries could not be made by the Assistant Settlement Officer, therefore, reference was made to the Board of Revenue. On this, the Board of Revenue initially passed an order which was ex-parte in nature, accepting reference and directing correction of the land records by deleting names of Seth Pali Ram and Brij Lal. However, an application for setting aside ex-parte order having been made, the first ex-parte order on reference was set aside by the Board of Revenue. Thereafter, the State, Seth Pali Ram, Brij Lal and Respondent No. 1-writ petitioner-trust, all were heard. Vide order dated 25.04.2003, the Board of Revenue, invoking its power under Section 82 of the Act of 1956, held that as the land was throughout recorded as common government land for pasturage, under Section 16, sub-section (1) of the Act of 1955, no khatedari rights could be conferred and for that reason, the order passed by the Assistant Settlement Officer was against the law. 14. In the writ petition, while challenging order dated 25.04.2003 passed by the Board of Revenue, specific ground was taken to the effect that the Board of Revenue failed to consider the fact that the land in question was purchased by Seth Pali Ram and Brij Lal from Thakur of Thikana Bissau way back in the year 1942 after paying requisite nazrana and then transferred to Respondent No. 1-writ petitioner-trust. Therefore, the provisions of Section 16, sub-section (1) of the Act of 1955 were not applicable. Seth Pali Ram and Brij Lal, by virtue of deed (patta) of 1942 had become the owners. Therefore, the provisions of Section 16, sub-section (1) of the Act of 1955 were not applicable. Seth Pali Ram and Brij Lal, by virtue of deed (patta) of 1942 had become the owners. According to Respondent No. 1-writ petitioner, ownership rights having accrued in favour of Seth Pali Ram and Brij Lal, in the absence of any declaration in appropriate proceedings that it was common government land for pasturage, Section 16 of the Act of 1955 could not be taken recourse to, to deprive Seth Pali Ram and Brij Lal of their title as khatedars (owners) of the land in dispute. Seth Pali Ram, Brij Lal and Respondent No. 1-writ petitioner had remained in possession of the land in dispute even before coming into force the Act of 1955. 15. The other ground raised in the writ petition was with regard to maintainability of the reference proceedings, jurisdiction of the Collector/Additional Collector to make reference by recording findings contrary to what were earlier recorded by the Settlement Commissioner and the Board of Revenue. According to Respondent No. 1-writ petitioner, earlier application seeking reference was rejected by the Settlement Commissioner which was affirmed in appeal by the Board of Revenue also, therefore, the only remedy was to challenge those orders and no fresh proceedings for seeking reference by invoking the same provision under Section 82 of the Act of 1956 could be drawn by the Additional Collector, nor could the Board of Revenue entertain the application seeking second reference particularly when earlier application seeking reference was rejected and that order was affirmed by the Board of Revenue itself. Thus, according to Respondent No. 1-writ petitioner, the issue whether earlier order passed by the SDO on 01.11.1954, which was correct or not, had attained finality, second round of reference proceedings could not be maintained under the law and, therefore, subsequent order making reference and the order passed by the Board of Revenue on 25.04.2003 entertaining second reference were barred by the principles of res-judicata and were liable to be set aside. In addition, other grounds were that during settlement operations, no new rights were created or decided, but only on the basis of order passed by the SDO on 01.11.1954, corrections in revenue records were directed to be carried out. In addition, other grounds were that during settlement operations, no new rights were created or decided, but only on the basis of order passed by the SDO on 01.11.1954, corrections in revenue records were directed to be carried out. Apart from seeking relief to quash order dated 25.04.2003 passed by the Board of Revenue, direction was also sought to record the land in question in the name of Respondent No. 1-writ petitioner-trust on the basis of order dated 01.11.1954 passed by the SDO and order dated 07.11.1983 passed by the Settlement Commissioner. 16. In the reply to writ petition, the appellant-State denied that the land formed part of Thikana of Thakur Bissau, Tehsil Chirawa, for want of knowledge. Claim of Respondent No. 1-writ petitioner on the basis of patta of 1942, subsequent order dated 01.11.1954 passed by the SDO on the basis of the reports of Tehsildar and Numberdar was also denied in view of the provisions of the of 1952. Recommendation made by the Tehsildar dated 18.09.1954 was disowned as being not a legal and valid document. It was also stated in the reply that order dated 01.11.1954 passed by the SDO was not available on record and it was also sought to be doubted by asserting that it did not bear clear signatures of the then SDO. According to the State, the land remained recorded as common government land for pasturage which was recorded as public land for animals and cattle. The title of Seth Pali Ram and Brij Lal was also denied. The jurisdiction of the Settlement Department to change the nature of the land and right to mutation was also questioned. Thus, the authority of the Assistant Settlement Officer, who passed the order, was also questioned. 17. In the wake of aforesaid dispute before the learned Single Judge in the writ proceedings, learned Single Judge vide impugned order dated 20.08.2009 examined the correctness of the order passed by the Board of Revenue. Thus, the authority of the Assistant Settlement Officer, who passed the order, was also questioned. 17. In the wake of aforesaid dispute before the learned Single Judge in the writ proceedings, learned Single Judge vide impugned order dated 20.08.2009 examined the correctness of the order passed by the Board of Revenue. Since specific ground with regard to very maintainability of reference proceedings was raised, the learned Single Judge came to the conclusion that once the Board of Revenue had dismissed the appeal vide order dated 26.08.1988, not only refusing to interfere with order dated 07.11.1983 passed by the Settlement Commissioner, but also rejecting the application seeking reference, the Additional Collector could not have made reference to the Board of Revenue, nor could the Board of Revenue reopen the matter once it had decided the matter and the only remedy was to challenge those orders if the State Government was at all aggrieved. Learned Single Judge also noticed that the proceedings itself were initiated after a long and unexplained delay. It was noted by learned Single Judge that order dated 01.11.1954 passed by the SDO having attained finality, there was no scope for reopening the matter in the garb of reference proceedings after about 13 years from the date of passing of order dated 16.06.1980 by the Assistant Settlement Officer. 18. Learned Single Judge was also of the view that the State could not have raised, for the first time, a new contention that the sale of land was back dated. Learned Single Judge further observed that if the State was of the opinion that the original sale of 1942 was a fraud, it was always free to challenge the sale deed, but ever since 1942, it never challenged its genuineness and even in the writ proceedings, only in reply, the sale deed was being disputed, which was not permissible. It was also noted by the learned Single Judge that when the Court had directed the State to produce the entire records of the case, the State admitted that the relevant records had gone missing. Therefore, the learned Single Judge was of the view that the State cannot be permitted to take advantage of its own fault in losing the record and it cannot be permitted to cast aspersions on the bona fides of Seth Pali Ram, Thakur Raghuvir Singh and Respondent No. 1-writ petitioner-trust after lapse of five decades. Therefore, the learned Single Judge was of the view that the State cannot be permitted to take advantage of its own fault in losing the record and it cannot be permitted to cast aspersions on the bona fides of Seth Pali Ram, Thakur Raghuvir Singh and Respondent No. 1-writ petitioner-trust after lapse of five decades. Learned Single Judge also repelled State’s contention raising doubt on order dated 01.11.1954 passed by the SDO that order dated 01.11.1954 is fraudulent because order dated 01.11.1954 was never challenged by the State. No proceedings had even been drawn by the State challenging order dated 01.11.1954 and only in reply to writ petition, said contention was being raised and when called upon to produce the records, the State had expressed inability to produce the records on the statement that the records had gone missing. The existence of the office of the SDO was also sought to be challenged by the State which was also repelled taking into consideration report dated 27.08.1954 of the Numberdar and report dated 18.09.1954 of the Tehsildar which were addressed to the then SDO. 19. Learned Single Judge, referring to the provisions contained in Section 3(i) of the Act of 1956 which defines ‘Land Record Officer’, read with Section 125 of the Act of 1956 held that the Land Record Officer was empowered to settle the dispute as to entries in the records of the rights. Therefore, order dated 28.06.1980 passed by the Assistant Settlement Officer was not without jurisdiction. Order dated 28.06.1980 was not only passed by the Assistant Land Settlement Officer but was also passed by the concerned authority in his capacity as Assistant Land Records Officer. The order was passed on the basis of order dated 01.11.1954 passed by the SDO. Therefore, in the opinion of the learned Single Judge, the proceedings were perfectly valid and in accordance with law. Learned Single Judge was of the view that irrespective of the nature of use of the land in dispute, transfer of title by patta of 1942, in the absence of it being challenged and declared illegal and inoperative in law, the land in dispute could not be treated to be public land but only a private land. Learned Single Judge was of the view that irrespective of the nature of use of the land in dispute, transfer of title by patta of 1942, in the absence of it being challenged and declared illegal and inoperative in law, the land in dispute could not be treated to be public land but only a private land. While deciding the legality and validity of the order passed by the Board of Revenue, which essentially had arisen out of reference pertaining to correctness and validity of an order of mutation in the revenue records, the learned Single Judge also touched upon the historical background of rulers, though in revenue proceedings before the Board of Revenue, either in the first round or in the second round, that was not within the scope of enquiry. Learned Single Judge held that Thakur Raghuvir Singh was Thikanedar (ruler) in his own right and not a Jagirdar or Biswedar being subordinate to the majesty of His Highness of Jaipur State. On such considerations based on historical facts, learned Single Judge recorded a finding that Thikanedar, being head of his own state, had all the authority and freedom to sell part of his state to whomsoever he likes and there was no restriction or fetter on such exercise of right as a ruler. The sale had been held to be legal and valid. The aforesaid findings came to be recorded by the learned Single Judge in Para 42 to 44 of the impugned order because the State in its reply to the writ petition had denied the status of Thikanedar, who had sold the land in 1942 to Seth Pali Ram and Brij Lal. 20. In this appeal, this Court is called upon to decide the issue arising out of merits of the case as to whether the learned Single Judge was justified in setting aside order dated 25.04.2003 passed by the Board of Revenue. Learned Additional Advocate General appearing for the State assailed the findings as referred to hereinabove recorded by the learned Single Judge. Learned Additional Advocate General appearing for the State assailed the findings as referred to hereinabove recorded by the learned Single Judge. As the learned Single Judge had decided the very maintainability of the reference proceedings both on the ground of jurisdiction and delay, before entering upon the merits, we are inclined to first examine the correctness and validity of the findings on the issue with regard to maintainability of the reference proceedings in which order dated 25.04.2003 cane to be passed by the Board of Revenue. 21. According to learned State Counsel, notwithstanding earlier round of proceedings drawn up to the Board of Revenue which culminated in passing of order dated 26.08.1988 by the Board of Revenue, there was no bar under the law for the Additional Collector to initiate reference proceedings by passing order on 17.07.1993. The contentions made in that behalf have already been noted by us hereinabove. 22. The SDO, Chirawa passed an order way back on 01.11.1954 which is on record. This order was based on two reports, i.e. report of the Numberdar and report of the Tehsildar. A perusal of order dated 01.11.1954 passed by the SDO would show that the SDO directed the land to be recorded in the names of Seth Pali Ram and Brij Lal based on the aforesaid two reports. Obviously, that referred to report dated 27.08.1954 of the Numberdar and report dated 18.09.1954 of the Tehsildar. These two reports reflected that Seth Pali Ram and Brij Lal were enjoying possession of the land in dispute since 12 years. The land was being used for pasturage without any obstruction though camels and goats were not allowed to graze. The reports also show that 16 bighas of land was being used for personal agricultural purpose and nobody had any objection to this possession. The report of the Tehsildar revealed that Seth Pali Ram and Brij Lal were in possession on the basis of patta executed in their favour by Thakana Bissau and the land was being used in accordance with the terms of patta and not against it. On that basis, it was recommended that the land in question be recorded in the names of Seth Pali Ram and Brij Lal though they may be required to abide by the terms and conditions of the patta. On that basis, it was recommended that the land in question be recorded in the names of Seth Pali Ram and Brij Lal though they may be required to abide by the terms and conditions of the patta. It was on the basis of the aforesaid two reports that order dated 01.11.1954 was passed by the SDO. That order remained unchallenged by anyone including the appellant-State. However, at the same time, necessary corrections were not made in the revenue records despite the order of mutation passed way back on 01.11.1954. It was only in settlement proceedings that the Assistant Settlement Officer passed an order on 28.06.1980 directing corrections to be made in the revenue records on the basis of order dated 01.11.1954 passed by the SDO. Even at that stage, no one including the appellant-State sought to challenge that order. At this stage, we may note that order dated 01.11.1954 remained unchallenged. 23. Though the State did not challenge the aforesaid entries made in the revenue records, the villagers of Village Jakhod submitted an application on 12.09.1980 before the Assistant Settlement Officer for making reference and get the order earlier passed set aside. The Assistant Settlement Officer, therefore, forwarded the application seeking reference to the Settlement Commissioner. The Settlement Commissioner vide order dated 07.11.1983 held that the corrections in revenue records of rights was based on order dated 01.11.1954 passed by the SDO and if any one had any objection to the same, the remedy available was to file appeal or revision. Therefore, no reference could be made. Thus, the application seeking reference was dismissed by the Settlement Commissioner. 24. Upon the appeal being preferred, the Board of Revenue vide order dated 26.08.1988, dismissed the appeal and upheld order dated 07.11.1983 on same consideration that in the absence of there being any challenge to order dated 01.11.1954 passed by the SDO, no reference was maintainable. Order dated 26.08.1988 passed by the Board of Revenue was not challenged by the State before any other authority, much less, this Court. Even no review petition was filed before the Board of Revenue. The only legal consequence flowing from the aforesaid order was that the dispute with regard to correctness and validity of order dated 01.11.1954 passed by the SDO, consequent corrections in the revenue records entering the names of Seth Pali Ram and Brij Lal as khatedars attained finality. Even no review petition was filed before the Board of Revenue. The only legal consequence flowing from the aforesaid order was that the dispute with regard to correctness and validity of order dated 01.11.1954 passed by the SDO, consequent corrections in the revenue records entering the names of Seth Pali Ram and Brij Lal as khatedars attained finality. It was open for the State to challenge order dated 26.08.1988 passed by the Board of Revenue in higher courts. Having not challenged that order and the order having attained finality, it was not open for the State or any of its subordinate authorities to question correctness and validity of those proceedings which culminated in order dated 26.08.1988 passed by the Board of Revenue. 25. It, however, appears that after five years, suddenly, Tehsildar Chirawa submitted an application before the Additional Collector, Jhunjhunu of which cognizance was taken by the Additional Collector, Jhunjhunu and he passed an order on 17.07.1993 which is on record of the writ petition. If we examine the said order, what we find is that this was nothing but an attempt to reopen the earlier proceedings. The contents of the aforesaid order relate to the same parcel of land and order dated 28.06.1980 passed by the Assistant Settlement Officer. Curiously enough, despite it being very much on record, in order to wriggle out of the earlier proceedings, wherein prayer for reference was rejected and the said order affirmed up to the Board of Revenue, this time, the Additional Collector completely avoided to refer to patta of 1942 and order dated 01.11.1954 passed by the SDO which had otherwise attained finality. Despite the Additional Collector having full notice and knowledge that reference for examining correctness and validity of order dated 28.06.1980 passed by the Assistant Settlement Officer was rejected by the Settlement Commissioner on 07.11.1983 against which appeal was also dismissed by the Board of Revenue, the Additional Collector, exceeding its jurisdiction and authority, observed that earlier orders and proceedings were illegal. It was not within the jurisdiction and authority of the Additional Collector to make a reference on such findings as that would not only go against order dated 07.11.1983 passed by the Settlement Commissioner, but also order dated 26.08.1988 passed by the Board of Revenue. 26. It was not within the jurisdiction and authority of the Additional Collector to make a reference on such findings as that would not only go against order dated 07.11.1983 passed by the Settlement Commissioner, but also order dated 26.08.1988 passed by the Board of Revenue. 26. It is beyond comprehension as to how the Additional Collector, in the teeth of order dated 07.11.1983 passed by the Settlement Commissioner and order dated 26.08.1988 passed by the Board of Revenue, could reopen the matter by way of reference proceedings when the reference was already held to be not maintainable. 27. Section 82 of the Act of 1956 provides for power to call for records and proceeding and reference to State Government or the Board. The said provision being relevant for the purpose of present case is reproduced herein-below: “82. Power to call for records and proceeding and reference to State Government or Board - The Settlement Commissioner or the Director of Land Records or a Collector may call for and examine the record of any case decided or proceedings held by any Revenue Court or officer subordinate to him for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the legality or propriety of the order passed and as to the regularity of proceedings. If he is of opinion that the proceedings taken or order passed by such subordinate Court or officer should be varied, cancelled or reversed, he shall refer the case with his opinion thereon for the orders of the Board, if the case is of a judicial nature or connected with settlement, or for the orders of the State Government if the case is of a non-judicial nature not connected with settlement. The Board or the State Government, as the case may be, shall thereupon pass such order as it thinks fit.” 28. The aforesaid provision as it existed on the date when the Additional Collector passed order on 17.07.1993, conferred power on the Settlement Commissioner or the Director of Land Records or a Collector to call for and examine the record of any case decided or proceedings held by any Revenue Court or officers subordinate to him for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the legality or propriety of the order passed and as to the regularity of the proceedings. However, the Legislature, in its wisdom, has not conferred power on the aforesaid thee authorities to vary, cancel or reverse such order but that power is conferred on the Board of Revenue. This is reflected in the scheme of making reference to the Board of Revenue instead of passing the order itself. Thus, a reference is required to be made by the Settlement Commissioner or the Director of Land Records or the Collector in appropriate cases. There are as many as three revenue authorities, which can exercise power of making reference to the Board of Revenue. There are no other revenue officers enjoying such power of making reference. Further, the provision also makes it clear that if the case is of judicial nature or connected with settlement, it shall be referred for the orders to the Board of Revenue and if it is a case of non-judicial nature and not connected with settlement, it shall be referred to the State Government. On such reference being made, the Board of Revenue or the State Government, as the case may be, may pass such order as it thinks fit. Once an application seeking reference was examined by the Settlement Commissioner in respect of the same land and rejected on the ground that without challenge to order dated 01.11.1954 passed by the SDO either by way of appeal or review, no reference could be made to the Board of Revenue, another round of reference, i.e. second reference or a fresh reference, is not postulated under the statutory scheme of Section 82 of the Act of 1956. The Additional Collector was obviously aware of this legal position, therefore, vide order dated 17.07.1993, it conveniently avoided to refer to orders passed by the Settlement Commissioner and the Board of Revenue to which it is subordinate and bound. 29. Section 24 of the Act of 1956 deals with subordination of Revenue Courts and Officers. Sub-section (5) thereof provides thus: “24. Subordination of Revenue Courts and Officers - Subject to the provisions of sections 9 and 23: (1) xxx xxx xxx (2) xxx xxx xxx (3) xxx xxx xxx (4) xxx xxx xxx (5) All Additional Settlement Commissioners, Collectors, Additional Collectors, Settlement Officers, Tehsildars, Additional Tehsildars and Naib-Tehsildars shall be subordinate to the Settlement Commissioner.” 30. It is apparently clear that the Collectors, Additional Collectors shall be subordinate to the Settlement Commissioner. It is apparently clear that the Collectors, Additional Collectors shall be subordinate to the Settlement Commissioner. Therefore, once the application seeking reference was rejected earlier by the Settlement Commissioner way back on 07.11.1983, the Additional Collector had no jurisdiction and authority in the garb of Section 82 of the Act of 1956 to reinitiate the reference proceedings. The order passed by the Settlement Commissioner on 07.11.1983, whether right or wrong, was binding on the Additional Collector for all times to come. Not only that, the order passed by the Settlement Commissioner on 07.11.1983 was affirmed by the Board of Revenue on 26.08.1988. Nothing was then left to be touched upon by the Additional Collector in respect of the same land pertaining to the same dispute as to whether the names of Seth Pali Ram and Brij Lal could be recorded as khatedars of the land. 31. We must hasten to add here that we are not commenting upon or deciding whether the earlier order dated 01.11.1954 passed by the SDO and subsequent orders passed by the Assistant Settlement Officer, the Settlement Commissioner or the Board of Revenue were correct or not. But once certain proceedings have attained finality, without challenging the orders passed earlier, it was certainly not open for the revenue authorities, much less the Additional Collector to reopen the whole proceedings by conveniently avoiding the orders passed by the Settlement Commissioner and the Board of Revenue. 32. The aforesaid aspect of the matter was not at all taken into consideration by the Board of Revenue on a reference made by the Additional Collector to it. The Board of Revenue had earlier affirmed order dated 07.11.1983 passed by the Settlement Commissioner in appeal. The Board of Revenue had also affirmed the opinion that without order dated 01.11.1954 passed by the SDO and order dated 28.06.1980 passed by the Assistant Settlement Officer having been challenged by way of appeal or revision, no reference could be made. While initiating second reference on the same subject matter relating to the same property and concerning identical dispute raised earlier, the second reference could not have been entertained by the Board of Revenue at all. While initiating second reference on the same subject matter relating to the same property and concerning identical dispute raised earlier, the second reference could not have been entertained by the Board of Revenue at all. From perusal of order dated 25.04.2003 passed by the Board of Revenue, it is apparently clear that it is not a case where the Board of Revenue has exercised its power of review under Section 86 of the Act of 1956. The Board of Revenue, to our utter surprise, has also avoided to refer to its own order dated 26.08.1988 and order dated 07.11.1983 passed by the Settlement Commissioner. The short order only states that as the land was recorded in revenue records as common government land for pasturage, Seth Pali Ram and Brij Lal did not get any right over the land and, therefore, the same was contrary to the provisions of Section 16(1) of the Act of 1955. Irrespective of the merits of the case, we are of the considered view that the Board of Revenue, without having exercised its own powers of review as available to it under Section 86 of the Act of 1956 and fetters including the provisions relating to limitation as contained in Section 86, could not have ignored its own order passed earlier on 26.08.1988 and passed a fresh order on 25.04.2003. If such a course of action and exercise is permitted, any order passed by the Board of Revenue will remain open indefinitely and revenue officers subordinate to it may keep on making reference one after the other irrespective of the orders passed by the Board of Revenue. Such power has neither been expressly conferred, nor intended to be conferred under any of the provisions, much less Section 82 of the Act of 1956. 33. As a matter of law, order making reference dated 17.07.1993 passed by the Additional Collector was without jurisdiction and authority of law, which was made basis by the Board of Revenue to pass order on 25.04.2003. It is relevant to mention that earlier application seeking reference was submitted before the Settlement Commissioner who, after hearing the parties and upon consideration of relevant material, dismissed the reference application by detailed order with reference to the patta granted in the year 1942, transferee being put in possession as also order passed by the SDO on 01.11.1954. It is relevant to mention that earlier application seeking reference was submitted before the Settlement Commissioner who, after hearing the parties and upon consideration of relevant material, dismissed the reference application by detailed order with reference to the patta granted in the year 1942, transferee being put in possession as also order passed by the SDO on 01.11.1954. In view of the provisions contained in Section 24, sub-section (5) of the Act of 1956, Additional Collector, being subordinate to the Settlement Commissioner, could not have initiated reference to the Board of Revenue on the same subject matter on which the Settlement Commissioner had earlier rejected prayer for making reference to the Board of Revenue. The Additional Collector was fully conscious of this fact and limits of his jurisdiction and, therefore, he did not even refer to order dated 07.11.1983 passed by the Settlement Commissioner. The order of reference passed by the Additional Collector on 17.07.1993, if allowed to stand, would amount to sitting over and above order dated 07.11.1983 passed by the Settlement Commissioner. Not only that, the Additional Collector vide order dated 17.07.1993 also sat over and above the order passed by the Board of Revenue on 26.08.1988 by which the appeal against order dated 07.11.1983 passed by the Settlement Commissioner was dismissed. Therefore, viewed from any angle, reference made by the Additional Collector, which was the basis for the Board of Revenue to invoke its power under Section 82 of the Act itself was without jurisdiction and authority of law. 34. Though number of decisions have been cited at the bar by learned counsel for Respondent No. 1 in support of submission that in the absence of express power of review, no review was permissible, in view of our discussions, we are of the view that in view of the provisions contained in Section 86 of the Act of 1956, the Board of Revenue or officer may either on its or his own motion or on the application of any party interested, review any order passed by itself or himself or by any of its or his predecessors in office and pass such orders in reference thereto as it or he thinks fit subject to certain conditions contained in the provisos (i), (ii) and (iii) to sub-section (2) of Section 86 of the Act of 1956. However, in the present case, the Settlement Commissioner, who had passed order dated 07.11.1983, also could not review its order because the appeal against the said order was preferred and dismissed by the Board of Revenue vide order dated 26.08.1988. The power of review, if any available with the Settlement Commissioner, in any case, could not be exercised by the Additional Collector. Furthermore, even though the Board of Revenue is possessed of power of review under Section 86 of the Act of 1956, present case, on facts, is not a case of review. No review application was filed before the Board of Revenue seeking recall, review, modification, cancellation of earlier order passed on 26.08.1988. In fact, entirely new proceedings on the same subject matter were re-initiated by the Additional Collector and the matter was brought to the Board of Revenue through the channel provided under Section 82 of the Act of 1956 whereas the power under Section 82 of the Act of 1956 was already exercised by the Board of Revenue in the past. On the same facts and circumstances, it was not permissible under the law for the Board of Revenue to re-exercise its power (as distinguished from power to review). Even in the matter of exercise of non-judicial power/administrative power, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Himachal Pradesh vs. Nishant Sareen (supra) held as under: “12. It is true that the Government in the matter of grant or refusal to grant sanction exercises statutory power and that would not mean that power once exercised cannot be exercised again or at a subsequent stage in the absence of express power of review in no circumstance whatsoever. The power of review, however, is not unbridled or unrestricted. It seems to us a sound principle to follow that once the statutory power under Section 19 of the 1988 Act or Section 197 of the Code has been exercised by the Government or the competent authority, as the case may be, it is not permissible for the sanctioning authority to review or reconsider the matter on the same materials again. It is so because unrestricted power of review may not bring finality to such exercise and on change of the Government or change of the person authorised to exercise power of sanction, the matter concerning sanction may be reopened by such authority for the reasons best known to it and a different order may be passed. The opinion on the same materials, thus, may keep on changing and there may not be any end to such statutory exercise.” 35. Submission of learned Additional Advocate General appearing for the State that the order passed by the Settlement Commissioner on 07.11.1983 and subsequent order passed by the Board of Revenue on 26.08.1988 did not come in the way of the Additional Collector in making reference on 17.07.1993 and passing order on such reference on 25.04.2003 by the Board of Revenue, cannot be countenanced because the effect of order of rejection of application seeking reference, affirmed in appeal would be that on the same subject matter, proceedings of reference could not be re-initiated, nor it could be taken up for examination in exercise of power under Section 82 of the Act of 1956 by the Board of Revenue. The Settlement Commissioner vide order dated 07.11.1983 and the Board of Revenue vide order dated 26.08.1988 consistently held that no reference could be made and if anyone had any grievance against order dated 28.06.1980, the remedy was to file appeal or review. The order passed by the Board of Revenue on 26.08.1988 having not been challenged by the State or by anyone in any fora, the same attained finality and, therefore, it was not permissible under the statutory scheme of the Act of 1956 for any authority, revenue courts or revenue officers to re-look into the matter and start reference proceedings afresh as that would amount to ignoring earlier orders and proceedings which the law does not permit. If such a course of action is permitted, no finality could be attached to any proceedings and it will be an unending process. Once the matter has been set at rest up to the highest revenue court, i.e. the Board of Revenue, no revenue officer subordinate to it may either on his own motion or on an application made by any party re-agitate settlement issue and make reference to the Board of Revenue. Once the matter has been set at rest up to the highest revenue court, i.e. the Board of Revenue, no revenue officer subordinate to it may either on his own motion or on an application made by any party re-agitate settlement issue and make reference to the Board of Revenue. Existence of such a power under the scheme of Section 82 of the Act of 1956 would be against the public policy. 36. There is yet another reason why the entire exercise of reference which culminated in passing of order dated 25.04.2003 by the Board of Revenue cannot be allowed to stand in law. The Assistant Settlement Officer passed order way back on 16.06.1980. In view of orders passed by the Settlement Commissioner on 07.11.1983 and the Board of Revenue on 26.08.1988, order dated 16.06.1980 could be assailed only by way of appeal or revision. However, no appeal or revision was preferred. After five years, the Tehsildar moved an application for reference. The Additional Collector passed order making reference on 17.07.1993. Thus, after 13 years, reference was made and thereafter, in 2003, the Board of Revenue passed the order in purported exercise of its power under Section 82 of the Act of 1956. Impugned order was passed by the Board of Revenue on 25.04.2003, while the order making reference passed by the Additional Collector on 17.07.1993 did not contain any material so as to justify and explain the delay. True it is that there is no limitation for making reference, at the same time, the power is required to be exercised within a reasonable period. In the case of State of Gujarat vs. Patil Raghav Natha and Others (supra), Their Lordships in the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as below: “11. The question arises whether the Commissioner can revise an order made under Section 65 at any time. It is true that there is no period of limitation prescribed under Section 211, but it seems to us plain that this power must be exercised in reasonable time and the length of the reasonable time must be determined by the facts of the case and the nature of the order which is being revised.” 37. Division Bench of this Court in the case of Anandi Lal vs. State of Rajasthan and Others (supra), while dealing with Section 82 of the Act of 1956, held as below: “17. Division Bench of this Court in the case of Anandi Lal vs. State of Rajasthan and Others (supra), while dealing with Section 82 of the Act of 1956, held as below: “17. In this case it is an undisputed position that the Tehsildar made report on December 27, 1983 to the Additional Collector, Baran. On the basis of this report the Additional Collector made reference to the Board of Revenue. Thus, the decree which was passed in favour of the appellant/petitioner on October 12, 1957 and the Mutation Entry No. 334 which was made on September 22, 1958, are sought to be interfered with and set aside by invoking powers under Section 82 of the Act of 1956 and under Section 232 of the Act of 1955, after a period of about 25 years. The provisions of Section 232 of the Act of 1955 and Section 82 of the Act of 1956, read as follows: “232. Power to call for record and refer to the Board: The Collector may call for and examine the record of any case or proceeding decided by or pending before any revenue court subordinate to him for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the legality or propriety of the order or decree passed and as to the regularity of the proceedings, and if he is of opinion that the order or decree passed or the proceedings taken by such court should be varied, cancelled or reversed, he shall refer the case with his opinion thereon for the orders of the Board and the Board shall, thereupon, pass such orders as it thinks fit: Provided that the power conferred by this Section shall not be exercised in respect of suits or proceedings falling within the purview of Section 239.” 82. Power to call for records and proceedings and reference to State Government or Board: The Settlement Commissioner or the Director of Land Record or a Collector may call for and examine the record of any case decided or proceedings held by any revenue court or officer subordinate to him for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the legality or propriety of the order passed and as to the regularity of proceedings, and, if he is of opinion that the proceedings taken or order passed by such subordinate Court or officer should be varied, cancelled or reversed, he shall refer the case with his opinion thereon for the orders of the Board, if the case is of a judicial nature or connected with settlement, or for the orders of the State Government if the case is of a non-judicial nature not connected with settlement and the board or the State Government, as the case may be, shall thereupon pass such order as it thinks fit.” Bare reading of the aforesaid provisions show that no period of limitation is prescribed for the exercise of revisional power by the Board of Revenue. However, when no period of limitation is prescribed by the legislature, can it be said that the power could be exercised at any time even after lapse of unreasonably long period of time? 18. Similar question arose before the Supreme Court in the case of State of Gujarat vs. Patel Raghav Natha and Others, AIR 1969 SC 1297 . In that case facts were like this. On July 2, 1960 Collector granted permission for non-agricultural use of the land. The Commissioner, Rajkot Division set aside the order passed by the Collector in exercise of re-visional powers by order dated October 12, 1961. The revisional powers conferred upon the State Government under Section 211 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code, could be exercised by the Commissioner. The question arose as to whether the Commissioner could exercise this power at any time inasmuch as there was no period of limitation prescribed under Section 211 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code? After considering the provisions of Section 211 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code, in Para 11 of the judgment, the Supreme Court observed as follows: “The question arises whether the Commissioner can revise an order made under Section 65 at any time. After considering the provisions of Section 211 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code, in Para 11 of the judgment, the Supreme Court observed as follows: “The question arises whether the Commissioner can revise an order made under Section 65 at any time. It is true that there is no period of limitation prescribed under Section 211, but it seems to us plain that this power must be exercised in reasonable time and the length of the reasonable time must be determined by the facts of the case and the nature of the order which is being revised.” Thereafter in Para 12 of the judgment, after considering the provisions of Section 65 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code, and Section 211 of the Code, the Supreme Court further observed as follows: “....Regarding Sections 211 and 65 together it seems to us that the Commissioner must exercise his revisional powers within a few months of the order of the Collector, this is reasonable time because after the grant of the permission for building purposes the occupant is likely to spend money on starting building operations at least within a few months from the date of the permission. In this case the Commissioner set aside the order of the Collector on October 12, 1961, i.e. more than a year after the order, and it seems to us that this order was passed too late.” 19. Thus the Supreme Court has held that even when no limitation is prescribed, the power conferred upon the authority concerned could be exercised within reasonable time. In the facts of the case before it, the Supreme Court held that the powers under Section 211 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code in relation to the permission for user of the land for non-agricultural purposes, could be exercised within few months from the date of the permission. In that case, the power was exercised after a period of more than one year. The Supreme Court held that the exercise of power was too late. 20. The aforesaid principle has been reiterated by the Supreme Court in the case of Mansaram vs. S.P. Pathak and Others, AIR 1983 SC 1239 . In that case in Para 12 of the reported decision, the Supreme Court inter-alia observed as follows: “.....But when the power is conferred to effectuate a purpose, it has to be exercised in a reasonable manner. In that case in Para 12 of the reported decision, the Supreme Court inter-alia observed as follows: “.....But when the power is conferred to effectuate a purpose, it has to be exercised in a reasonable manner. Exercise of power in a reasonable manner inheres the concept of its exercise within a reasonable time. Undoubtedly, no limitation is prescribed in this behalf but one would stand aghast that a landlord to some extent in pari delicto could turn the tables against the person who was in possession for 22 years as a tenant...…” The Supreme Court has referred to the case of Patel Raghav Natha (supra) and has reiterated the same principle. 21. In view of the settled position of law, as stated above, simply because the provisions of Section 82 of the Act of 1956 and Section 232 of the Act of 1955 do not provide for the period of limitation, it does not mean that the authority on whom the power is conferred, can invoke the same at any time. This is so because each and every authority on whom the power is conferred, is expected to exercise the same in just and reasonable manner. The concept of exercise of power in a reasonable manner inheres with it the concept of exercising the same within a reasonable time. If the power is not exercised within reasonable time, the invocation of the power after inordinate delay and the exercise of the same after unreasonable length of time, would be unjust, arbitrary and unreasonable. Therefore, the action taken by exercise of such power would be illegal and void. If the requirement of exercise of power within reasonable time is not read into the provisions of Section 82 of the Act of 1956 and Section 232 of the Act of 1955, then the provision itself would become unconstitutional. It can never be presumed that the legislature intended to confer power on any authority to exercise the same in unjust and unreasonable manner. Therefore, to uphold the constitutionality of the aforesaid provisions, the requirement of exercise of the same power within reasonable period has got to be read into the same. 22. It can never be presumed that the legislature intended to confer power on any authority to exercise the same in unjust and unreasonable manner. Therefore, to uphold the constitutionality of the aforesaid provisions, the requirement of exercise of the same power within reasonable period has got to be read into the same. 22. In the case of the Government of India vs. The Citadel Fine Pharmaceuticals, Madras and Others, AIR 1989 SC 1771 , the question arose as to the constitutional validity of Rule 12 of the Medicinal and Toilet Preparations (Excise Duties) Rules, 1956. The said Rule provided for residuary powers of recovery of sums due to Government. Since no period of limitation was prescribed, it was contended that the provision of Rule 12 was unreasonable and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court negatived the contention. Then in Para 6 of the reported decision, the Supreme Court observed as follows: “....While it is true that Rule 12 does not prescribe any period within which recovery of any duty as contemplated by the Rules is to be made, but that by itself does not render the Rule unreasonable or violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. In the absence of any period of limitation it is settled that every authority is to exercise the power within a reasonable period. What would be reasonable period would depend upon the facts of each case.” 23. The contention that the land was a Muafi Murti Mandir Land, therefore, the power could be exercised after any length of time, cannot be accepted. The question is not with regard to the nature of the land. The question which is required to be examined is as to whether the revisional power conferred upon the authority concerned under the provisions of Section 82 of the Act of 1956 and under the provisions of Section 232 of the Act of 1955, could be exercised after unreasonable period of time. As held by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid decisions, the power could be exercised within reasonable time whenever the statute does not provide for the period of limitation. What would be the reasonable period, would depend upon the facts of the case and the nature of the order sought to be revised. 24. As held by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid decisions, the power could be exercised within reasonable time whenever the statute does not provide for the period of limitation. What would be the reasonable period, would depend upon the facts of the case and the nature of the order sought to be revised. 24. In our opinion, the settled legal position as stated above, would apply to the agricultural land in possession of the tenants/ khatedars also once the cases of such tenants/ khatedars are decided and their rights have been concluded and pursuant to the same they are in possession of the land. Ordinarily the revisional power under Section 82 of the Act of 1956 and under Section 232 of the Act of 1955, cannot be exercised after a period of one year from the date of the order sought to be revised. Once a tenant/khatedar acquires tenancy/ khatedari rights and continues to be in possession of the land, his rights cannot be called in question after unreasonable delay. Such tenants/khatedars are required to be treated at par, for all purposes, with all other tenants/khatedars who acquired tenancy/khatedari rights over the land. To permit the exercise of revisional powers under Section 82 of the Act of 1956 and/or under Section 232 of the Act of 1955 after unreasonable delay, would amount to putting imprimature of the courts on the unreasonable and arbitrary exercise of power. Within a period of one year the tenant/khatedar of the land would have spent money for the improvement of the land, he would have arranged his affairs of life on the basis that he is in occupation of the land, he would have entered into several transactions on this basis and made many commitments. Therefore, ordinarily revisional powers under Section 82 of the Act of 1956 and under Section 232 of the Act of 1955, cannot be exercised after a period of one year. If this requirement of reasonable length of time is not read into the aforesaid provisions, the provisions would become unconstitutional.” 38. Learned Additional Advocate General has relied upon the decision in the case of Vidhyadhar Sunda vs. State of Rajasthan andOthers (supra). A perusal of the aforesaid decision would show that this Court was dealing with a case where there were serious allegations of fraud. Learned Additional Advocate General has relied upon the decision in the case of Vidhyadhar Sunda vs. State of Rajasthan andOthers (supra). A perusal of the aforesaid decision would show that this Court was dealing with a case where there were serious allegations of fraud. In that case, it was alleged that though the property in dispute was never sold to other party, the other party in the garb of an erroneous entry in the jamabandi during settlement proceedings attempted to dispossess the aggrieved party. While holding that the absence of prescription of any period of limitation does not confer unbridled power on the authority to exercise the same on its whims, it was held that such power has to be exercised within reasonable time. Carving out case of exceptional nature that in case of fraud, collusion, lack of jurisdiction and under the circumstances where the orders are void being against the public interest and policy, it was held that power can be exercised at any time. On consideration of such principles applied to the peculiar facts and circumstances of that particular case, the power under Section 82 of the Act of 1956 was exercised after a long period of 19 years. However, such a situation does not exist in the present case. Order passed by the Additional Collector on 17.07.1993 making reference and the order passed by the Board of Revenue on 25.04.2003 do not whisper regarding any fraud whatsoever alleged to have been played by Seth Pali Ram, Brij Lal or by Respondent No. 1-writ petitioner-trust. Their case is based on bona fide claim of legal status on the basis of patta of 1942. Though a futile attempt was made by the State to create doubt on the title deed, i.e. patta of 1942 and even to create a cloud over the validity of the said document, there is no material placed on record by the State to show that any fraud was played by the holders of patta which led to passing of order dated 28.06.1980 by the Assistant Settlement Officer who directed cancellation of entry of sivai-chak (government land) and directed recording of the names of transferees under the patta of 1942 as khatedars. That order was passed on the basis that the SDO had already passed an order of mutation way back on 01.11.1954 in favour of the transferees Seth Pali Ram and Brij Lal, yet the records were not corrected. The basis was order dated 01.11.1954 passed by the SDO which also attained finality having not been challenged by anyone including the State for 26 years until the order was passed on 28.06.1980. Therefore, what was sought to be undone vide order dated 17.07.1993 was the mutation order passed 39 years ago directing correction of revenue records. 39. The scope of proceedings of reference as initiated by the Additional Collector which culminated in order dated 25.04.2003 passed by the Board of Revenue was confined to limited aspect as to whether names of Seth Pali Ram, Brij Lal and thereafter Respondent No. 1-writ petitioner-trust could be recorded as khatedars of the land in dispute. It was neither part of the enquiry, much less within the jurisdiction of the revenue authorities even up to the Board of Revenue to decide the issue of title as claimed by Seth Pali Ram and Brij Lal and thereafter, by Respondent No. 1-writ petitioner-trust on basis of patta of 1942. Therefore, when the matter was brought by way of filing writ petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India before this Court, the consideration was required to be necessarily confined only within the scope and ambit of the enquiry on reference proceedings and not beyond that. The order passed by the Additional Collector on 17.07.1993 as also order passed by the Board of Revenue on 25.04.2003 have not even touched on the issue of title, much less existence and validity of patta of 1942. It was neither raised, nor the Board of Revenue had any occasion to decide as to whether Thakur Raghuvir Singh was Thikanedar/ruler or merely a Jagirdar/Biswedar. There was no occasion for the Board of Revenue to examine the legality of patta of 1942. It was not even assailed in those proceedings by the State and it could not even be assailed in those proceedings as the issue of title could not be gone into by the revenue courts. There was no occasion for the Board of Revenue to examine the legality of patta of 1942. It was not even assailed in those proceedings by the State and it could not even be assailed in those proceedings as the issue of title could not be gone into by the revenue courts. In this regard, we may usefully refer to decision in the case of The State of Gujarat vs. Patil Raghav Natha and Others (supra) wherein it has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court as under: “14. We are also of the opinion that the Commissioner should not have gone into the question of title. It seems to us that when the title of an occupant is disputed by any party before the Collector or the Commissioner and the dispute is serious the appropriate course for the Collector or the Commissioner would be to refer the parties to a competent court and not to decide the question of title himself against the occupant.” 40. The aforesaid has been the consistent view as would be clear from the verdict of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Kutchi Lal Rameshwar Ashram Trust Evam Anna Kshetra Trust through Velji Devshi vs. Collector Haridwar and Others (supra) wherein it was held as below: “25. The principle that the law does not readily accept a claim to escheat and that the onus rests heavily on the person who asserts that an individual has died intestate, leaving no legal heir, qualified to succeed to the property, is founded on a sound rationale. Escheat is a doctrine which recognises the State as a paramount sovereign in whom property would vest only upon a clear and established case of a failure of heirs. This principle is based on the norm that in a society governed by the Rule of Law, the court will not presume that private titles are overridden in favour of the State, in the absence of a clear case being made out on the basis of a governing statutory provision. To allow administrative authorities of the State–including the Collector, as in the present case-to adjudicate upon matters of title involving civil disputes would be destructive of the Rule of Law. The Collector is an officer of the State. He can exercise only such powers as the law specifically confers upon him to enter upon private disputes. To allow administrative authorities of the State–including the Collector, as in the present case-to adjudicate upon matters of title involving civil disputes would be destructive of the Rule of Law. The Collector is an officer of the State. He can exercise only such powers as the law specifically confers upon him to enter upon private disputes. In contrast, a civil court has the jurisdiction to adjudicate upon all matters involving civil disputes except where the jurisdiction of the court is taken away, either expressly or by necessary implication, by statute. In holding that the Collector acted without jurisdiction in the present case, it is not necessary for the Court to go as far as to validate the title which is claimed by the petitioner to the property. The Court is not called upon to decide whether the possession claimed by the Trust of over forty-five years is backed by a credible title. The essential point is that such an adjudicatory function could not have been arrogated to himself by the Collector. Adjudication on titles must follow recourse to the ordinary civil jurisdiction of a court of competent jurisdiction under Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.” 41. Section 259 of the Act of 1956 makes this position clear in following words: “259. Jurisdiction of Civil Courts excluded - No suit or other proceedings shall, unless otherwise excepted by any express provision made in this Act or in any other enactment or law for the time being in force, lie or be instituted in any Civil Court with respect to any matter arising under, and provided for, by this act: Provided that, if, in a boundary dispute or any other dispute between estate-holders, a question of title is involved, a civil suit may be brought for the adjudication of such question.” Therefore, it is clear that the dispute involving any kind of title can only be adjudicated by a civil court and it is beyond the scope of jurisdiction of the revenue courts to decide the said issue. 42. It further appears that when writ petition was filed before this Court, Respondent No. 1-writ petitioner sought to trace its title on the basis of patta of 1942 with the averments of the same having been granted by Thikana of Bissau. The State denied those facts for want of knowledge. 42. It further appears that when writ petition was filed before this Court, Respondent No. 1-writ petitioner sought to trace its title on the basis of patta of 1942 with the averments of the same having been granted by Thikana of Bissau. The State denied those facts for want of knowledge. Even though, it was not a matter which directly or substantially arose for consideration in the writ petition, arising from the order passed by the Board of Revenue, the learned Single Judge seems to have examined this aspect taking into consideration certain historical background. In our considered opinion, it was not at all necessary for this Court to dwell into the aspect relating to legal status of Thakur Raghuvir Singh and to decide whether he was Thikanedar/ruler or Jagirdar/Biswedar. It was uncalled for to examine the validity of patta of 1942. That really was not the issue requiring decision by this Court in a petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India as that never fell for consideration of the revenue courts. Such an enquiry could be made only in a duly constituted proceedings either by transferees of patta of 1942 or its successors in interest by filing civil suit seeking declaration based on their title or by any other party seeking declaration against patta of 1942 as illegal and inoperative in law. That could have been considered only in a duly constituted civil suit and not otherwise, much less before the Revenue Court, i.e. the Board of Revenue. 43. In fact, neither the Board of Revenue, nor the Additional Collector examined the issue of title, obviously, for the reason that they could not do so. However, while challenging the legality and validity of order passed by the Board of Revenue on 25.04.2003 by filing writ petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, vague pleadings without any specific details were made by the parties. It, however, appears that during the course of arguments, contentious issue of title, bereft of material pleadings, was advanced before the learned Single Judge. It was not a case where after a full fledged trial before a civil court of competent jurisdiction, issue of title was adjudicated on the basis of the pleadings of the parties, oral and documentary evidence led before the court. It was not a case where after a full fledged trial before a civil court of competent jurisdiction, issue of title was adjudicated on the basis of the pleadings of the parties, oral and documentary evidence led before the court. The issue with regard to title, validity of patta of 1942, legal status of Thakur Raghuvir Singh, all developed during the course of arguments before the learned Single Judge which were responded to by the learned Single Judge. It was for this reason that the appellant-State, while filing this appeal, came out with many new facts, documents by moving an application on the analogy of Order 41 Rule 27 CPC and called upon this Court to examine as to whether Thakur Raghuvir Singh was Thikanedar/ruler or he was simply a Jagirdar/Biswedar and, therefore, bound by the order of the Revenue Department of the Government of His Highness, Maharaja of Jaipur notified vide gazette notification dated 08.06.1945. Adjudication on this issue required pleadings, oral and documentary evidence as no conclusion could be arrived at one way or the other as to whether Thakur Raghuvir Singh was Thikanedar/ruler or Jagirdar/Biswedar. Further, that enquiry could be made only when patta of 1942 is called in question in appropriately constituted proceedings on the basis that the deed (patta of 1942) was void-ab-initio and incapable of transferring valid title, ownership or interest over the property in dispute for the reason that Thakur Raghuvir Singh had no authority to execute the patta of 1942. If ultimately, it were to be held that patta of 1942 conferred valid title in favour of transferees, i.e. Seth Pali Ram and Brij Lal, all other questions with regard to legal consequences flowing after enactment of the Act of 1945, Khetri Revenue Manual, The Act of 1947, The Jaipur Land Revenue Act of 1947, The Act of 1952, the Act of 1955 and the Act of 1956 would arise. In case, patta of 1942 is held void or inoperative in law, entirely different legal consequences would flow from the operation of various statutes and the provisions contained therein, as referred to hereinabove. In case, patta of 1942 is held void or inoperative in law, entirely different legal consequences would flow from the operation of various statutes and the provisions contained therein, as referred to hereinabove. Only in a case where an appropriate declaration of law in a duly constituted civil suit is given to the effect that Thakur Raghuvir Singh had no title which he could validly pass on in favour of Seth Pali Ram and Brij Lal and that no valid title was transferred in favour of the transferees, the revenue authorities would have the jurisdiction to decide whether in view of the provisions contained in various tenancy laws, including the provisions contained in Section 16(i) of the Act of 1955, khatedari rights would accrue in favour of the transferees and consequently, on successor in interest, i.e. Respondent No. 1-writ petitioner-trust. 44. In view of our detailed consideration hereinabove, we hold that the order passed by the learned Single Judge to the extent it decided legal status of Thakur Raghuvir Singh, legality and validity of patta of 1942 is unsustainable in law and shall not operate for or against any of theik parties. The parties shall be free to work out their remedy as may be available to them under the law. 45. Since we have held that entries made with regard to khatedari rights could not be directed to be cancelled by way of reference proceedings initiated by the Additional Collector vide order dated 17.07.1993 which culminated in order dated 25.04.2003 passed by the Board of Revenue, we also leave the State government to take such remedy as may be available to it under the law if it intends to challenge insofar as legality and validity of order dated 28.06.1980 passed by Assistant Land Settlement Officer-cum-Assistant Land Record Officer, order dated 07.11.1983 passed by the Settlement Commissioner and order dated 26.08.1988 passed by the Board of Revenue is concerned. The findings of the learned Single Judge that proceedings of reference initiated vide order dated 17.07.1993 by the Additional Collector and order dated 25.04.2003 passed by the Board of Revenue suffered from jurisdictional defect, are upheld. 46. In the result, the appeal is partly allowed in the manner and to the extent as indicated above with no order as to costs.